Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-104 (2026)
Community-based screening process - Prescreening agents
✓ current as of May 2026
- (a) The department shall maintain a community-based screening process designed to provide alternatives to hospitalization, minimize length of confinement, promote speedy return to the community, and maximize each service recipient's ability to remain in a community setting.
- (b) As part of the system the commissioner shall designate individuals to serve as mandatory prescreening agents. The commissioner may base designation on criteria consistent with § 33-6-427 and may set limits on an agent's authority. The commissioner may decline to designate a person who satisfies the requirements of § 33-6-427. The commissioner may remove authority as a mandatory prescreening agent from a person without cause. Designation of a person as a mandatory prescreening agent does not vest any property right, and limitations on authority and removal of designation as a mandatory prescreening agent are not governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, or by title 8, chapter 30.
- (c) An agent has only the authority designated by the commissioner and, if the agent is not a physician, the authority of the agent terminates if the person no longer satisfies § 33-6-427. An agent's authority is valid in connection with hospitalization of a privately funded person at a private hospital or treatment resource only if the private hospital or treatment resource files notice of acceptance of the designated person's authority with the commissioner.
- (d) When performing the duties authorized by this section an individual agent shall be considered to be a state employee pursuant to § 8-42-101(3)(D). When performing the duties authorized by this section an individual agent shall not be considered as an employee of such agent's regular employer, and the agent's regular employer, whether public or private, shall not be held liable in any damages to any person or government entity in a civil action for injury, death or loss to person or property that allegedly results from the actions of the individual agent while acting as a state employee pursuant to this section.
Acts 2000, ch. 947, § 1; 2001, ch. 377, § 3; 2002, ch. 730, § 31; 2010 , ch. 633, § 1.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 14
cases, 1987–2015 · leading case: State v. Groves, 735 S.W.2d 843 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).
State v. Groves, 735 S.W.2d 843 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “Involuntary commitment under T.C.A. § 33-6-104 is civil in nature and thus, our standard of review is de novo upon the record of the trial court with a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.”
State v. Phillips, 968 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). “3 After the diagnosis and evaluation peri *879 od, if certification is made that the acquittee is committable under the civil involuntary care and treatment standards provided in T.C.A § 33-6-104, the district attorney general must file a complaint in criminal court seeking both…”
State v. Blackstock, 19 S.W.3d 200 (Tenn. 2000). “A person may be “judicially committed to involuntary care and treatment,” if the following are found: 1) the person is mentally retarded; 2) the person poses a substantial likelihood of serious harm as defined in § 33-6-104(e) because of the mental retardation; 3) the person…”
Mercer v. HCA Health Servs. of Tennessee, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 500 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). “§ 33-6-104 shall be discharged” if “he no longer meets the standards under which the admission took place, AND the patient’s detention is not otherwise authorized under the admission statute.”
State v. Tripp, 754 S.W.2d 92 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). “This remission was effected by maintaining a schedule of medication in the closely supervised environment of MTMHI and without such supervision the patient would pose a likelihood of serious harm to others as contemplated in T.C.A. § 33-6-104(a). The court expressed the further…”
State v. Overbay, 874 S.W.2d 645 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). “§ 33-7-303 and § 33-6-104, the court will judicially commit this defendant.”
Williams v. Shelby Cnty. Health Care Corp., 803 F. Supp. 1306 (W.D. Tenn. 1992). “the person poses an immediate substantial likelihood of serious harm, as defined in § 33-6-104, because of the mental illness, THEN .”
State of Tennessee v. Janice Floyd (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). “Finally, the letter from Western Mental Health Institute indicated that the defendant did not meet the standards for judicial commitment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section§ 33-6-104 and 7-303. On April 27, 2000, the matter came before the trial court.”
State of Tennessee v. Jackie H. Martin (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). “The appellant continued to meet the commitment standards imposed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-104 (1994 Supp.) and § 33-7-303(c) (1994 Supp.”
State v. Blackstock (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010). “In the petition, the defendant claimed that he needed care, training or treatment and that the failure to provide a secure facility would create a likelihood of causing serious harm, as defined under T.C.A. § 33-6-104, because of his mental retardation.”
Billy Hembree v. State (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). “After this finding, Peavyhouse was subjected to an involuntary commitment proceeding in which MTMHI physicians testified that he was subject to involuntary commitment in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-6-104. Following this hearing, the Circuit Court for…”
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Ryan Mallady (Tenn. Crim. App. 2015). “1987) (applying this standard to involuntary commitment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-6-104). This standard has been interpreted to mean that the appellate court will affirm the trial court’s decision “unless an error of law affecting the result has been…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-104(a) — 4 cases
State v. Groves, 735 S.W.2d 843 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “Involuntary commitment under T.C.A. § 33-6-104 is civil in nature and thus, our standard of review is de novo upon the record of the trial court with a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.”
State v. Tripp, 754 S.W.2d 92 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). “This remission was effected by maintaining a schedule of medication in the closely supervised environment of MTMHI and without such supervision the patient would pose a likelihood of serious harm to others as contemplated in T.C.A. § 33-6-104(a). The court expressed the further…”
State v. Phillips, 968 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). “3 After the diagnosis and evaluation peri *879 od, if certification is made that the acquittee is committable under the civil involuntary care and treatment standards provided in T.C.A § 33-6-104, the district attorney general must file a complaint in criminal court seeking both…”
State v. Blackstock (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010). “In the petition, the defendant claimed that he needed care, training or treatment and that the failure to provide a secure facility would create a likelihood of causing serious harm, as defined under T.C.A. § 33-6-104, because of his mental retardation.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-104(b) — 2 cases
State v. Groves, 735 S.W.2d 843 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “Involuntary commitment under T.C.A. § 33-6-104 is civil in nature and thus, our standard of review is de novo upon the record of the trial court with a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.”
State of Tennessee v. Janice Floyd (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). “Finally, the letter from Western Mental Health Institute indicated that the defendant did not meet the standards for judicial commitment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section§ 33-6-104 and 7-303. On April 27, 2000, the matter came before the trial court.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-104(c) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Janice Floyd (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). “Finally, the letter from Western Mental Health Institute indicated that the defendant did not meet the standards for judicial commitment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section§ 33-6-104 and 7-303. On April 27, 2000, the matter came before the trial court.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-104(e) — 1 case
State v. Blackstock, 19 S.W.3d 200 (Tenn. 2000). “A person may be “judicially committed to involuntary care and treatment,” if the following are found: 1) the person is mentally retarded; 2) the person poses a substantial likelihood of serious harm as defined in § 33-6-104(e) because of the mental retardation; 3) the person…”
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