Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-403 (2026)
Establishing embryo parentage - Relinquishment of rights and responsibilities
✓ current as of May 2026
- (a)
- (1) A legal embryo custodian may relinquish all rights and responsibilities for an embryo prior to embryo transfer. A written contract shall be entered into as appropriate when establishing embryo parentage prior to embryo transfer for the legal transfer of rights to an embryo and to any child that may result from the embryo transfer:
- (A) Between legal embryo custodians and the embryo transfer clinic; or
- (B) Between a legal embryo custodian and each recipient intended parent.
- (2) The contract shall be signed, as appropriate, by each legal embryo custodian for such embryo, by the embryo transfer clinic or by each recipient intended parent in the presence of a notary public. Initials or other designations may be used if the individuals desire anonymity.
- (1) A legal embryo custodian may relinquish all rights and responsibilities for an embryo prior to embryo transfer. A written contract shall be entered into as appropriate when establishing embryo parentage prior to embryo transfer for the legal transfer of rights to an embryo and to any child that may result from the embryo transfer:
- (b) If the embryo was created using donor gametes, the sperm or oocyte donors who irrevocably relinquished their rights in connection with in vitro fertilization shall not be entitled to any notice of the embryo relinquishment, nor shall their consent to the embryo relinquishment be required.
- (c) Upon embryo relinquishment by each legal embryo custodian pursuant to subsection (a), the legal transfer of rights to an embryo shall be considered complete at the time of thawing or to such other time as the parties may agree, and the embryo transfer shall be authorized.
- (d) A child born to a recipient intended parent as the result of embryo relinquishment pursuant to subsection (a) shall be presumed to be the legal child of the recipient intended parent; provided, that each legal embryo custodian and each recipient intended parent has entered into a written contract pursuant to this part.
- (e) Any and all prior legal embryo custodians whose donation of an embryo has resulted in the birth of a child to a recipient intended parent pursuant to subsection (a) shall have no rights or responsibilities with such child and of the child to them.
Added by 2013 Tenn. Acts, ch. 309,s 1, eff. 7/1/2013.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10
cases (3 in the last 5 years), 2003–2022 · leading case: In Re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807 (Tenn. 2014).
In Re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807 (Tenn. 2014). “§ 36-2-403(d). Because traditional surrogacies do not involve donated embryo transfers, this procedure is not directly applicable to the facts before us; however, these provisions are indicative of a policy geared toward the accommodation of assisted reproductive technology,…”
In re S.Y., 121 S.W.3d 358 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). “§ 36-1-113(g)(2) and § 36-2-403. That this Court finds clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of parental rights in that pursuant to T.”
Cedra Deanntre Potts (Taylor) v. Starr Anastasia Potts (2021). “Following briefing and a hearing, the trial court determined that the defendant was able to establish parentage under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-403 because she met the requirements of the statute, in that she was a party to the written contract consenting to the in vitro…”
Christina Jane Compher v. Dana Janelle Whitefield (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022). “We explained that, under section 36-2-403, the status as the biological parent does not place an individual in a superior position to that of the defendant who lacked a biological connection to the children.”
Pamela Estelle Harrison v. Shannon Nicole Harrison (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021). “, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-403 (a) (requiring a “written contract” when establishing embryo parentage prior to embryo transfer).”
In Re Sy, 121 S.W.3d 358 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). “§ 36-1-113(g)(2) and § 36-2-403. That this Court finds clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of parental rights in that pursuant to T.”
In Re: Alicia K.A. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013). “Compliance with T.C.A. 36-2-403(a)(2)(B) was established (a) by the order entered as the result of the permanency hearing on July 27, 2011, which found that [Mother], who was present at the hearing, was informed that failure to support the child could result in the termination…”
State of Tennessee v. Phyllis McCrary (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). “Madison argues that the Juvenile Court erred when it neglected to find that the requirements of the permanency plan were “reasonable and related to remedying the conditions -12- which necessitate foster care placement” as dictated by T.C.A. § 36-2-403(a)(2)(C). However, Mr.…”
In matter of: S.Y., J.Y., & D.Y. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). “§ 36-1-113(g)(2) and § 36-2-403. That this Court finds clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of parental rights in that pursuant to T.”
In Re Baby (Tenn. 2014). “§ 36-2-403(d). Because traditional surrogacies do not involve donated embryo transfers, this procedure is not directly applicable to the facts before us; however, these provisions are indicative of a policy geared toward the accommodation of assisted reproductive technology,…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-403(a)(2)(B) — 1 case
In Re: Alicia K.A. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013). “Compliance with T.C.A. 36-2-403(a)(2)(B) was established (a) by the order entered as the result of the permanency hearing on July 27, 2011, which found that [Mother], who was present at the hearing, was informed that failure to support the child could result in the termination…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-403(a)(2)(C) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Phyllis McCrary (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). “Madison argues that the Juvenile Court erred when it neglected to find that the requirements of the permanency plan were “reasonable and related to remedying the conditions -12- which necessitate foster care placement” as dictated by T.C.A. § 36-2-403(a)(2)(C). However, Mr.…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-403(d) — 3 cases
In Re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807 (Tenn. 2014). “§ 36-2-403(d). Because traditional surrogacies do not involve donated embryo transfers, this procedure is not directly applicable to the facts before us; however, these provisions are indicative of a policy geared toward the accommodation of assisted reproductive technology,…”
Cedra Deanntre Potts (Taylor) v. Starr Anastasia Potts (2021). “Following briefing and a hearing, the trial court determined that the defendant was able to establish parentage under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-403 because she met the requirements of the statute, in that she was a party to the written contract consenting to the in vitro…”
In Re Baby (Tenn. 2014). “§ 36-2-403(d). Because traditional surrogacies do not involve donated embryo transfers, this procedure is not directly applicable to the facts before us; however, these provisions are indicative of a policy geared toward the accommodation of assisted reproductive technology,…”
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