Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-109 (2026)
Prosecution under more than one statute
✓ current as of May 2026
- (a) When the same conduct may be defined under both a specific statute and a general statute, the person may be prosecuted under either statute, unless the specific statute precludes prosecution under the general statute.
- (b) When the same conduct may be defined under two (2) or more specific statutes, the person may be prosecuted under either statute unless one (1) specific statute precludes prosecution under another.
Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13
cases, 1995–2017 · leading case: State v. Gilliam, 901 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
State v. Gilliam, 901 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). “…person may be prosecuted under either, unless the specific statute precludes prosecution under the general statute. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-109 .”
State v. Watkins, 362 S.W.3d 530 (Tenn. 2012). “§ 39-14-149(c) (2010) ("If conduct that violates this section [a]lso constitutes a violation of § 39-14-104 relative to theft of services, that conduct may be prosecuted under either, but not both, statutes as provided in § 39-11-109.”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-204 (e) (2010)…”
State v. Ellis, 953 S.W.2d 216 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-109 , gives the district attorney general discretion to proceed under either a general or specific statute.”
State v. Phillips, 967 S.W.2d 826 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). “” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-109 (1993 Repl.). Conduct defined under two specific statutes may be punishable under either statute provided neither statute precludes prosecution under another statute.”
State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. 1996). “” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-109(b) (1991)(emphasis added).”
State of Tennessee v. Jasper Turner (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-109 (a) (Tenn. 1997).”
Anthony Leon Moore v. Joe Easterling, Warden (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-109 (b) (2010). The petitioner argued that the statute prohibited his dual convictions for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery because “[t]here was one discrete act, one intent, and one victim.”
State v. Beauregard (Tenn. 2000). “§ 39-11-109 (b) (1991), which states: When the same conduct may be defined under two (2) or more specific statutes, the person may be prosecuted under either statute unless one (1) specific statute precludes prosecution under another.”
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Leon Moore (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-109 . The Appellant argued that the statute prohibited his dual convictions for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery because “the specific statute of aggravated robbery and general statute of aggravated burglary” involve the “same conduct relevant…”
State v. James Transou (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-109 (b) (1991). The word "either" rather than "both" suggests a legislative intent of a single prosecution.”
State of Tennessee v. Barry H. Hogg (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). “§ 39-11-109(b)(2). This Court has examined the interpretation of the criminal exposure statute.”
State of Tennessee v. Ronnie Ingram (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012). “§39-11-109(b)(2). In our view, the evidence established that the defendant acted knowingly when he spat in Officer Woolley’s face, exposing Officer Woolley’s eyes, nose, and mouth to his bodily fluid, saliva, with the knowledge that he was infected with HIV.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-109(a) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Jasper Turner (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-109 (a) (Tenn. 1997).”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-109(b) — 2 cases
State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. 1996). “” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-109(b) (1991)(emphasis added).”
State of Tennessee v. Katrina A. Callahan (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-109(b)(2) — 2 cases
State of Tennessee v. Barry H. Hogg (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). “§ 39-11-109(b)(2). This Court has examined the interpretation of the criminal exposure statute.”
State of Tennessee v. Ronnie Ingram (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012). “§39-11-109(b)(2). In our view, the evidence established that the defendant acted knowingly when he spat in Officer Woolley’s face, exposing Officer Woolley’s eyes, nose, and mouth to his bodily fluid, saliva, with the knowledge that he was infected with HIV.”
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