Tennessee Code Annotated

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-114 (2026)

Reimbursement of expenses of district attorney general - Duty of attorney general and reporter

✓ current as of May 2026

Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section JustiaTenn. Code CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

(a) The district attorney general or the attorney general and reporter must be reimbursed for any expenses, including travel, incurred in connection with the preparation and trial of any proceeding under this part. This expense must be paid by the state and is not included in the expense allowance now received by the various district attorneys general or the attorney general and reporter.

(b)
- (1) It is the duty and function of the attorney general and reporter, and the attorney general and reporter's staff, to lend whatever assistance may be necessary to the district attorney general in the trial and disposition of the cases.
- (2) In the event an appeal is taken or a delayed appeal in the nature of a writ of error is granted, the attorney general and reporter, and the attorney general and reporter's staff, shall represent the state and prepare and file all necessary briefs in the same manner as now performed in connection with criminal appeals.

(c)
- (1) In cases where a defendant has been sentenced to death and is seeking collateral review of a conviction or sentence, the attorney general and reporter has exclusive control over the state's defense of the request for collateral review and has all of the authority and discretion that the district attorney general would have in non-capital cases as well as any additional authority provided by law. The attorney general and reporter is not bound by any stipulations, concessions, or other agreements made by the district attorney general related to a request for collateral review.
- (2) The trial court lacks jurisdiction to enter a final order granting relief on a request for collateral review outlined in subdivision (c)(1) until the attorney general and reporter files a response to the request.
- (3) It is the duty and function of the district attorney general, and the district attorney general's staff, to lend whatever assistance may be necessary to the attorney general and reporter in the trial and disposition of requests for collateral review outlined in subdivision (c)(1), including, but not limited to, providing the attorney general and reporter with the district attorney general's case file and any other case-related material.
- (4) As used in this subsection (c), "collateral review":
  - (A) Means any proceeding under this chapter, including a petition requesting analysis of evidence, a proceeding under § 39-13-203(g), a proceeding under § 40-26-105, a proceeding involving a challenge to a capital inmate's competency to be executed, and any other judicial reexamination of a judgment or claim in a proceeding outside of the direct review process; and
  - (B) When a defendant has been sentenced to death after March 1, 2023, does not mean the trial of an original petition for post-conviction relief as authorized by § 40-30-104. All other proceedings involving a defendant who has been sentenced to death after March 1, 2023, including reopened post-conviction proceedings granted under § 40-30-117 must be conducted in conformity with subdivision (c)(1).

Amended by 2023 Tenn. Acts, ch. 182, s 2, eff. 4/28/2023.

Amended by 2023 Tenn. Acts, ch. 182, s 1, eff. 4/28/2023.

Acts 1995, ch. 207, § 1; T.C.A. § 40-30-214.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 41 cases (10 in the last 5 years), 1983–2026 · leading case: Allen v. State, 854 S.W.2d 873 (Tenn. 1993).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

Allen v. State, 854 S.W.2d 873 (Tenn. 1993). · cites it 6× “T.C.A. § 40-30-114 imposes upon the district attorney generals, with the assistance of the State Attorney General and his staff where appropriate, the duty to see that “the records or transcripts .”

Delbridge v. State, 742 S.W.2d 266 (Tenn. 1987). · cites it 4× “that are material to the questions raised therein” are timely filed in post-conviction proceedings. That portion of the charge given at the trial of this case dealing with malice should have been filed by the Shelby County District Attorney’s office with its responsive pleading.”

Givens v. State, 702 S.W.2d 578 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985). · cites it 4× “” The state agrees that the district attorney general is required to file a responsive pleading and attach all records or transcripts material to the issues raised in accordance with T.C.A. § 40-30-114, but contends that the omission was harmless since the petitioner’s record is…”

Coker v. State, 911 S.W.2d 357 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). · cites it 2× “” Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-114(a). Moreover, the presumption that the defense applies is rebuttable.”

Johnson v. State, 834 S.W.2d 922 (Tenn. 1992). · cites it 2× “Obviously, the petitioner actually may have been aware of his constitutional rights even though the trial court failed to advise him of them and failed to determine at the plea hearing that petitioner was aware of his rights. If the record of the hearing at which the plea was…”

Powers v. State, 942 S.W.2d 551 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). “§ 40-30-114(b) (1990) (if the record of the guilty plea hearing is not made a part of the petition for post-conviction relief, the transcript must be filed by the District Attorney General).”

State v. Higgins, 729 S.W.2d 288 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). · cites it 2× “T.C.A. § 40-30-114(a) provides that the State shall file its answer “within thirty (30) days after receiving notice of the docketing (of the petition) or within such time as the court orders.”

Davis v. State, 673 S.W.2d 171 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). · cites it 2× “In this case the district *173 attorney general failed to comply with T.C.A. 40-30-114. In Parton v. State, 483 S.”

State v. Mullins, 767 S.W.2d 668 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). · cites it 2× “T.C.A. § 40-30-114(b) commands that if the petition does not include the records or transcripts that are material to the questions raised therein, the District Attorney General is empowered to obtain them at the expense of the State and shall file them with the responsive…”

Sneed v. State, 942 S.W.2d 567 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). · cites it 2× “T.C.A § 40-30-114(b) (1990 Repl.) (repealed 1995).”

State v. Butler, 670 S.W.2d 241 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). · cites it 2× “The District Attorney General will comply in accordance with T.C.A. § 40-30-114. The trial court will proceed in accordance with T.”

Mayes v. State, 671 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). “Also, we call the district attorney general’s attention to T.C.A. 40-30-114 which requires a response on his part to the petitions, and we point out that under that section if the petitions do not include the records or transcripts that are material to the questions raised, then…”

Show all 41 citing cases →

— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-114(4) — 1 case

State of Tennessee v. James R. Baysinger (Tenn. Crim. App. 2019).

— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-114(a) — 6 cases

Coker v. State, 911 S.W.2d 357 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). “” Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-114(a). Moreover, the presumption that the defense applies is rebuttable.”

Allen v. State, 854 S.W.2d 873 (Tenn. 1993). “T.C.A. § 40-30-114 imposes upon the district attorney generals, with the assistance of the State Attorney General and his staff where appropriate, the duty to see that “the records or transcripts .”

State v. Higgins, 729 S.W.2d 288 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “T.C.A. § 40-30-114(a) provides that the State shall file its answer “within thirty (30) days after receiving notice of the docketing (of the petition) or within such time as the court orders.”

Dulsworth v. State, 881 S.W.2d 275 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Otha Bomar v. State (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-114(b) — 9 cases

Delbridge v. State, 742 S.W.2d 266 (Tenn. 1987). “that are material to the questions raised therein” are timely filed in post-conviction proceedings. That portion of the charge given at the trial of this case dealing with malice should have been filed by the Shelby County District Attorney’s office with its responsive pleading.”

State v. Mullins, 767 S.W.2d 668 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). “T.C.A. § 40-30-114(b) commands that if the petition does not include the records or transcripts that are material to the questions raised therein, the District Attorney General is empowered to obtain them at the expense of the State and shall file them with the responsive…”

Sneed v. State, 942 S.W.2d 567 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). “T.C.A § 40-30-114(b) (1990 Repl.) (repealed 1995).”

— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-114(c)(1) — 6 cases

Henry Lee Jones v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2026).

Michael Dale Rimmer v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2026).

Charles Rice v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2026).

Urshawn Miller v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2026).

Sedrick Clayton v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2026).

— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-114(c)(4)(A) — 1 case

Charles Rice v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2026).

— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-114(c)(4)(B) — 5 cases

Henry Lee Jones v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2026).

Michael Dale Rimmer v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2026).

Urshawn Miller v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2026).

Sedrick Clayton v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2026).

James Hawkins v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2026).

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.