Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503 (2026)
Authority to determine release status of felon - Grounds for denying release status - Hearings - Improvement of skills - Presumptions - Written statement of reason for denial of parole
✓ current as of May 2026
- (a) The board of parole has the authority to parole inmates with felony sentences of more than two (2) years or consecutive felony sentences equaling a term greater than two (2) years.
- (b) Release on parole is a privilege and not a right, and no inmate convicted shall be granted parole if the board finds that:
- (1) There is a substantial risk that the incarcerated individual will not conform to the conditions of the release program;
- (2)
- (A) The release from custody at the time would depreciate the seriousness of the crime of which the incarcerated individual stands convicted or promote disrespect for the law, except that the board's finding shall not be the sole basis for denying parole unless the individual is serving a sentence for any of the following offenses, in which case the board may deny parole for seriousness of the offense:
- (i) First degree murder or an attempt to commit, solicitation of, or facilitation of first degree murder;
- (ii) Second degree murder or an attempt to commit or facilitation of second degree murder;
- (iii) Voluntary manslaughter;
- (iv) Aggravated vehicular homicide;
- (v) Vehicular homicide;
- (vi) Especially aggravated kidnapping or an attempt to commit or facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping;
- (vii) Trafficking for a commercial sex act;
- (viii) A human trafficking offense;
- (ix) Advertising commercial sexual abuse of a minor;
- (x) Especially aggravated robbery or an attempt to commit or facilitation of especially aggravated robbery;
- (xi) Aggravated rape of a child or an attempt to commit or facilitation of aggravated rape of a child;
- (xii) Aggravated rape or an attempt to commit or facilitation of aggravated rape;
- (xiii) Rape of a child or an attempt to commit or facilitation of rape of a child;
- (xiv) Rape;
- (xv) Aggravated sexual battery;
- (xvi) Especially aggravated burglary;
- (xvii) Aggravated child abuse;
- (xviii) Aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor;
- (xix) Especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor;
- (xx) Aggravated vehicular assault;
- (xxi) Aggravated abuse of an elderly or vulnerable adult; or
- (xxii) Vehicular assault;
- (B) If the board denies parole for the seriousness of the offense, then the board shall state in writing how the inmate can improve the inmate's chances of being released on parole at the inmate's next hearing;
- (A) The release from custody at the time would depreciate the seriousness of the crime of which the incarcerated individual stands convicted or promote disrespect for the law, except that the board's finding shall not be the sole basis for denying parole unless the individual is serving a sentence for any of the following offenses, in which case the board may deny parole for seriousness of the offense:
- (3) The release from custody at the time would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline; or
- (4) The incarcerated individual's continued correctional treatment, medical care or vocational or other training in the institution will substantially enhance the incarcerated individual's capacity to lead a law-abiding life when given release status at a later time.
- (c) No person convicted of a sex crime shall be released on parole unless a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist designated as a health service provider has examined and evaluated the inmate and certified that, to a reasonable medical certainty, the inmate does not pose the likelihood of committing sexual assaults upon release from confinement. The examination and evaluation shall be provided by psychiatrists or licensed psychologists designated as health service providers whose services are contracted or funded by the department of correction or the board of parole. The board shall consider any other evaluation by a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist designated as a health service provider that may be provided by the incarcerated individual.
- (d)
- (1) Within one (1) year prior to an incarcerated individual's release eligibility date, an employee of the department of correction shall meet with the incarcerated individual to create a release plan. The board of parole shall conduct a hearing within a reasonable time prior to or upon the individual's release eligibility date to determine the individual's fitness for parole.
- (2) At the hearing, the board shall permit the video testimony of the immediate family members of the victim of a incarcerated individual's criminal offense relative to the fitness of the incarcerated individual for parole, if the family members are unable to attend the hearing. The board may, by rule, establish reasonable guidelines as to what constitutes a family member being unable to attend a hearing.
- (e) The board shall notify the district attorney general and the sentencing court or their successors of the eligibility hearing in the manner provided for in § 40-28-107(c).
- (f) If the board determines that a incarcerated individual should be released on parole, it shall furnish reasons for that decision to the district attorney general who prosecuted the incarcerated individual, the chief law enforcement official of the agency that prosecuted the case and the judge who tried that incarcerated individual or to their successors, upon their request.
- (g)
- (1) In determining whether an inmate should be granted parole, the board shall consider as a factor the extent to which the inmate has attempted to improve the inmate's educational, vocational or employment skills through available department of correction programs while the inmate was incarcerated.
- (2) In cases in which the offender was convicted of a homicide, the board shall also consider as a factor the extent to which the offender obstructed or continues to obstruct the ability of law enforcement to recover the remains of the victim.
- (h) Notwithstanding subsection (b), there is a presumption that an inmate convicted of a Class E or Class D nonviolent felony offense is to be released on parole upon the inmate reaching the inmate's release eligibility date unless good cause is shown as to why the inmate should not be released. As used in this subsection (h), "nonviolent felony offense" means a felony offense that does not involve serious bodily injury, as defined in § 39-11-106, or death to a victim or bystander, does not involve threats reasonably calculated to produce such results, and does not involve sexual contact or sexual penetration as those terms are defined in § 39-13-501.
- (i)
- (1) Notwithstanding subsection (b), there is a presumption that an eligible inmate must be released on parole, except for good cause shown, upon the inmate reaching the inmate's release eligibility date or any subsequent parole hearing.
- (2) For purposes of this subsection (i), "eligible inmate" means an inmate who:
- (A)
- (i) Is currently serving a sentence for a Class E or Class D felony offense; or
- (ii) Is currently serving a sentence for a felony that is not classified as a violent offense under § 40-35-120(b);
- (B) Is determined to be low risk to reoffend or most appropriately supervised in the community under the most recent validated risk and needs assessment performed under § 41-1-126;
- (C) Has successfully completed the programming recommended by the department of correction based on a validated risk and needs assessment performed under § 41-1-126, or can complete any recommended programming while on parole supervision;
- (D) Has not received a Class A or Class B disciplinary offense under department of correction policy within one (1) year of the inmate's parole hearing; and
- (E) Has not been convicted of a violent sexual offense, as defined in § 40-39-202; sexual offense, as defined in § 40-24-108(b) or § 40-39-202; or sex offense, as defined in § 39-13-703.
- (A)
- (3) This subsection (i) does not eliminate or otherwise affect the requirements of subsection (c) or § 40-28-116(a)(2).
- (j) Upon declining to grant parole in any case, the board must state in writing the reason for declining parole and how the inmate can improve the inmate's chance of being released on parole in the future.
Amended by 2022 Tenn. Acts, ch. 944, s 2, eff. 7/1/2022.
Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 410, s 12, eff. 7/1/2021.
Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 410, Secs.s13, s14 eff. 7/1/2021.
Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 409, s 19, eff. 7/1/2021.
Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 381, Secs.s1, s2 eff. 5/11/2021.
Amended by 2019 Tenn. Acts, ch. 488, s 2, eff. 7/1/2019.
Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 6; 1990, ch. 729, § 2; 1990, ch. 980, § 34; 1992, ch. 991, § 18; 1993, ch. 235, § 1; 1994, ch. 730, § 2; 2012 , ch. 727, § 58.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 98
cases (9 in the last 5 years), 1994–2025 · leading case: Jaco v. State, 120 S.W.3d 828 (Tenn. 2003).
Jaco v. State, 120 S.W.3d 828 (Tenn. 2003). “§ 40-35-503(b) (2003). The Criminal Sentencing Reform Act includes the following criteria for denying release to a parole eligible inmate: 1) if there is substantial risk that the defendant will not conform to the conditions of the release programs; 2) if the release at that…”
Joseph Brennan v. Bd. of Parole For The State of Tennessee, 512 S.W.3d 871 (Tenn. 2017). “The hearing officer questioned Mr. Brennan regarding the offenses and the efforts he had made while incarcerated to improve his educational, vocational, and employment skills.”
Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2010). “3d at 830 ; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503 (c) (2003). We recognized in Jaco that “[rjelease on parole is a privilege, not a right,” 120 S.”
Terrance Lavar Davis v. State of Tennessee, 313 S.W.3d 751 (Tenn. 2010). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503 (b); State v.”
William W. York v. Tennessee Bd. Of Parole, 502 S.W.3d 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503 (b) (2014); Stewart v.”
State v. Turner, 297 S.W.3d 155 (Tenn. 2009). “§ 40-35-503(b) (2006); see also id. § 40-28-117(a) (2006).”
McIntyre v. Traughber, 884 S.W.2d 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). “Acts 326, 330] became effective on May 2, 1989, and the requirements contained in the 1989 amendment to Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-503 [Act of May 24, 1989, ch.”
Studdard v. State, 182 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2005). “1 The defendant claims that only after he signed the plea *285 agreement did he learn that pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-503(c) (2003), 2 he would be required to complete a sexual offender treatment program and be psychologically certified before he would be…”
Arnold v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478 (Tenn. 1997). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b) (Supp.1996).”
David Cantrell v. Joe Easterling, Warden, 346 S.W.3d 445 (Tenn. 2011). “§ 40-35-503(b); Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 751 , 756 n.”
Danny A. Stewart v. Derrick D. Schofield, Comm'r, Tennessee Dep't of Corr., 368 S.W.3d 457 (Tenn. 2012). “§ 40-35-503(d)(1). The authority to grant or deny parole resides with the Board — not TDOC.”
Wade v. State, 914 S.W.2d 97 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). “Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-35-503(c) (1994) provides that no person convicted of a sex crime may be released on parole unless a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist has examined the inmate and certified that he or she is not likely to commit further sexual assaults.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(1)(1) — 1 case
Hughes v. Duncan (M.D. Tenn. 2022).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(B) — 1 case
Billy R. Sadler v. Tennessee Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b) — 24 cases
Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2010). “3d at 830 ; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503 (c) (2003). We recognized in Jaco that “[rjelease on parole is a privilege, not a right,” 120 S.”
Terrance Lavar Davis v. State of Tennessee, 313 S.W.3d 751 (Tenn. 2010). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503 (b); State v.”
State v. Turner, 297 S.W.3d 155 (Tenn. 2009). “§ 40-35-503(b) (2006); see also id. § 40-28-117(a) (2006).”
Jaco v. State, 120 S.W.3d 828 (Tenn. 2003). “§ 40-35-503(b) (2003). The Criminal Sentencing Reform Act includes the following criteria for denying release to a parole eligible inmate: 1) if there is substantial risk that the defendant will not conform to the conditions of the release programs; 2) if the release at that…”
Arnold v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478 (Tenn. 1997). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b) (Supp.1996).”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b)(1) — 3 cases
Johnny McClain, Jr. v. Tennessee Bd. of Parole (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018).
Fred Auston Wortman, III v. State of Tennessee, Tennessee Bd. of Parole (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021).
Wortman III v. State of Tennessee Bd. of Parole (M.D. Tenn. 2020).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b)(2) — 13 cases
William W. York v. Tennessee Bd. Of Parole, 502 S.W.3d 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503 (b) (2014); Stewart v.”
Joseph Brennan v. Bd. of Parole For The State of Tennessee, 512 S.W.3d 871 (Tenn. 2017). “The hearing officer questioned Mr. Brennan regarding the offenses and the efforts he had made while incarcerated to improve his educational, vocational, and employment skills.”
South v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, 946 S.W.2d 310 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
William Cooper v. Bd. of Parole (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019).
William W. York v. Tennessee Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b)(2)(1997) — 1 case
Mohamed Ali v. Bd. of Paroles (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b)(2)(A)(i) — 1 case
Swatzell v. Tennessee Bd. of Parole (M.D. Tenn. 2022).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b)(2)(B) — 1 case
Swatzell v. Tennessee Bd. of Parole (M.D. Tenn. 2022).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b)(3) — 1 case
Johnny McClain, Jr. v. Tennessee Bd. of Parole (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(c) — 15 cases
Jaco v. State, 120 S.W.3d 828 (Tenn. 2003). “§ 40-35-503(b) (2003). The Criminal Sentencing Reform Act includes the following criteria for denying release to a parole eligible inmate: 1) if there is substantial risk that the defendant will not conform to the conditions of the release programs; 2) if the release at that…”
Studdard v. State, 182 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2005). “1 The defendant claims that only after he signed the plea *285 agreement did he learn that pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-503(c) (2003), 2 he would be required to complete a sexual offender treatment program and be psychologically certified before he would be…”
Wade v. State, 914 S.W.2d 97 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). “Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-35-503(c) (1994) provides that no person convicted of a sex crime may be released on parole unless a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist has examined the inmate and certified that he or she is not likely to commit further sexual assaults.”
Alan Dale Bailey v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).
Thomas Poston Studdard v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(c)(2) — 1 case
Houser v. Traughber (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(d)(1) — 1 case
Danny A. Stewart v. Derrick D. Schofield, Comm'r, Tennessee Dep't of Corr., 368 S.W.3d 457 (Tenn. 2012). “§ 40-35-503(d)(1). The authority to grant or deny parole resides with the Board — not TDOC.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(d)(2) — 1 case
James M. Morris v. Tennessee Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(d)(l) — 1 case
Joseph Brennan v. Bd. of Parole For The State of Tennessee, 512 S.W.3d 871 (Tenn. 2017). “The hearing officer questioned Mr. Brennan regarding the offenses and the efforts he had made while incarcerated to improve his educational, vocational, and employment skills.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(e) — 1 case
Jaco v. State, 120 S.W.3d 828 (Tenn. 2003). “§ 40-35-503(b) (2003). The Criminal Sentencing Reform Act includes the following criteria for denying release to a parole eligible inmate: 1) if there is substantial risk that the defendant will not conform to the conditions of the release programs; 2) if the release at that…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(g) — 1 case
Swatzell v. Tennessee Bd. of Parole (M.D. Tenn. 2022).
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