Tennessee Code Annotated

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (2026)

Order for electronic surveillance - Application - Required findings - Expiration of order - Recordings - Evidence - Motions to suppress

✓ current as of May 2026
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Acts 1994, ch. 964, § 5; 2005, ch. 87, § 1.


Notes of Decisions
Cited in 21 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 2001–2022 · leading case: State v. Moore, 309 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009).
State v. Moore, 309 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009). · cites it 29× “” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (a)(3). In our view, again, the information contained in previous wiretap applications and properly incorporated by reference into the 507-5291 application retains its relevance and applicability due to the Defendant’s suspected membership in…”
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Kristopher King & Kasey Lynn King, 437 S.W.3d 856 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). · cites it 25× “Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (2006) (“the Wiretap Statute”).”
State of Tennessee v. Charlotte Lynn Frazier & Andrea Parks, 558 S.W.3d 145 (Tenn. 2018). · cites it 6× “, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (a) (2018) (addressing warrants authorizing the interception of wire communications and conferring authority to issue such warrants on "a judge of competent jurisdiction .”
State v. Cawood, 134 S.W.3d 159 (Tenn. 2004). · cites it 6× “Additionally, the Court of Criminal Appeals found Cawood’s motion regarding the sealing of the videotape and audiotapes to be without merit because section 40-6-304(f)(1) did not apply. The State applied for permission to appeal to this Court.”
United States v. Kelley, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (E.D. Tenn. 2009). · cites it 17× “His affidavit, which is 26 jJages in length, sought authorization from the state criminal court under Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-6-304 to intercept the communications of Marcus A.”
Frierson v. Goetz, 227 F. Supp. 2d 889 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). · cites it 4× “§ 2518 and Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-6-304. 8 . The Court notes that if the right is determined to be "clearly established” and barring the pleading of extraordinary circumstances, the defense of qualified immunity will usually fail because "a reasonably competent public official…”
Jeffrey King v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017). · cites it 25× “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (c)(2). 6 The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, pro se, in which he alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered.”
Jeffrey King v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017). · cites it 25× “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (c)(2). 6 The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, pro se, in which he alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered.”
Jeffrey King v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017). · cites it 22× “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (c)(4). . . . Therefore, we decline to address any potential contention that there was no “probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning [the] offense will be obtained through the interception.”
Jeffrey King v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017). · cites it 21× “§ 40-6-304 (c)(4). . . . Therefore, we decline to address any potential contention that there was no “probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning [the] offense will be obtained through the interception.”
Jeffrey King v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017). · cites it 21× “§ 40-6-304 (c)(4). . . . Therefore, we decline to address any potential contention that there was no “probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning [the] offense will be obtained through the interception.”
Bruce Elliot v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). · cites it 30× “Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (h)(1), (2). The post-conviction court stated, “Given the breadth of the purpose and potential targets of the wiretap application, the Court finds that the [P]etitioner would qualify as an ‘aggrieved person’ under the statute and has standing to…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304(a) — 1 case
State v. Moore, 309 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009). “” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (a)(3). In our view, again, the information contained in previous wiretap applications and properly incorporated by reference into the 507-5291 application retains its relevance and applicability due to the Defendant’s suspected membership in…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304(a)(1) — 2 cases
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304(a)(3) — 4 cases
State v. Moore, 309 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009). “” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (a)(3). In our view, again, the information contained in previous wiretap applications and properly incorporated by reference into the 507-5291 application retains its relevance and applicability due to the Defendant’s suspected membership in…”
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Kristopher King & Kasey Lynn King, 437 S.W.3d 856 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (2006) (“the Wiretap Statute”).”
Bruce Elliot v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (h)(1), (2). The post-conviction court stated, “Given the breadth of the purpose and potential targets of the wiretap application, the Court finds that the [P]etitioner would qualify as an ‘aggrieved person’ under the statute and has standing to…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304(c) — 8 cases
State of Tennessee v. Charlotte Lynn Frazier & Andrea Parks, 558 S.W.3d 145 (Tenn. 2018). “, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (a) (2018) (addressing warrants authorizing the interception of wire communications and conferring authority to issue such warrants on "a judge of competent jurisdiction .”
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Kristopher King & Kasey Lynn King, 437 S.W.3d 856 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (2006) (“the Wiretap Statute”).”
State v. Moore, 309 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009). “” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (a)(3). In our view, again, the information contained in previous wiretap applications and properly incorporated by reference into the 507-5291 application retains its relevance and applicability due to the Defendant’s suspected membership in…”
Jeffrey King v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017). “§ 40-6-304 (c)(4). . . . Therefore, we decline to address any potential contention that there was no “probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning [the] offense will be obtained through the interception.”
Jeffrey King v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (c)(2). 6 The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, pro se, in which he alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304(c)(2) — 6 cases
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Kristopher King & Kasey Lynn King, 437 S.W.3d 856 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (2006) (“the Wiretap Statute”).”
Jeffrey King v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (c)(2). 6 The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, pro se, in which he alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered.”
Jeffrey King v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (c)(2). 6 The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, pro se, in which he alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered.”
Jeffrey King v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017). “§ 40-6-304 (c)(4). . . . Therefore, we decline to address any potential contention that there was no “probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning [the] offense will be obtained through the interception.”
Jeffrey King v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017). “§ 40-6-304 (c)(4). . . . Therefore, we decline to address any potential contention that there was no “probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning [the] offense will be obtained through the interception.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304(c)(3) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Kristopher King & Kasey Lynn King, 437 S.W.3d 856 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (2006) (“the Wiretap Statute”).”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304(c)(4) — 6 cases
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Kristopher King & Kasey Lynn King, 437 S.W.3d 856 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (2006) (“the Wiretap Statute”).”
Jeffrey King v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017). “§ 40-6-304 (c)(4). . . . Therefore, we decline to address any potential contention that there was no “probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning [the] offense will be obtained through the interception.”
Jeffrey King v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (c)(2). 6 The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, pro se, in which he alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered.”
Jeffrey King v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017). “§ 40-6-304 (c)(4). . . . Therefore, we decline to address any potential contention that there was no “probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning [the] offense will be obtained through the interception.”
Jeffrey King v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (c)(2). 6 The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, pro se, in which he alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304(c)(l) — 1 case
State v. Moore, 309 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009). “” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (a)(3). In our view, again, the information contained in previous wiretap applications and properly incorporated by reference into the 507-5291 application retains its relevance and applicability due to the Defendant’s suspected membership in…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304(e) — 2 cases
State v. Moore, 309 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009). “” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (a)(3). In our view, again, the information contained in previous wiretap applications and properly incorporated by reference into the 507-5291 application retains its relevance and applicability due to the Defendant’s suspected membership in…”
Bruce Elliot v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (h)(1), (2). The post-conviction court stated, “Given the breadth of the purpose and potential targets of the wiretap application, the Court finds that the [P]etitioner would qualify as an ‘aggrieved person’ under the statute and has standing to…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304(f) — 1 case
State v. Moore, 309 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009). “” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (a)(3). In our view, again, the information contained in previous wiretap applications and properly incorporated by reference into the 507-5291 application retains its relevance and applicability due to the Defendant’s suspected membership in…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304(f)(1) — 2 cases
State v. Cawood, 134 S.W.3d 159 (Tenn. 2004). “Additionally, the Court of Criminal Appeals found Cawood’s motion regarding the sealing of the videotape and audiotapes to be without merit because section 40-6-304(f)(1) did not apply. The State applied for permission to appeal to this Court.”
State of Tennessee v. F. Chris Cawood (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304(f)(4) — 1 case
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304(f)(l) — 1 case
State v. Cawood, 134 S.W.3d 159 (Tenn. 2004). “Additionally, the Court of Criminal Appeals found Cawood’s motion regarding the sealing of the videotape and audiotapes to be without merit because section 40-6-304(f)(1) did not apply. The State applied for permission to appeal to this Court.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304(h)(1) — 2 cases
Bruce Elliot v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (h)(1), (2). The post-conviction court stated, “Given the breadth of the purpose and potential targets of the wiretap application, the Court finds that the [P]etitioner would qualify as an ‘aggrieved person’ under the statute and has standing to…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304(h)(2) — 1 case
Bruce Elliot v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-304 (h)(1), (2). The post-conviction court stated, “Given the breadth of the purpose and potential targets of the wiretap application, the Court finds that the [P]etitioner would qualify as an ‘aggrieved person’ under the statute and has standing to…”
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