Tennessee Code Annotated

Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-415 (2026)

Obligation of endorser

✓ current as of May 2026

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(a) Subject to subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) and to § 47-3-419(d), if an instrument is dishonored, an endorser is obliged to pay the amount due on the instrument (i) according to the terms of the instrument at the time it was endorsed, or (ii) if the endorser endorsed an incomplete instrument, according to its terms when completed, to the extent stated in §§ 47-3-115 and 47-3-407. The obligation of the endorser is owed to a person entitled to enforce the instrument or to a subsequent endorser who paid the instrument under this section.

(b) If an endorsement states that it is made "without recourse" or otherwise disclaims liability of the endorser, the endorser is not liable under subsection (a) to pay the instrument.

(c) If notice of dishonor of an instrument is required by § 47-3-503 and notice of dishonor complying with that section is not given to an endorser, the liability of the endorser under subsection (a) is discharged.

(d) If a draft is accepted by a bank after an endorsement is made, the liability of the endorser under subsection (a) is discharged.

(e) If an endorser of a check is liable under subsection (a) and the check is not presented for payment, or given to a depositary bank for collection, within thirty (30) days after the day the endorsement was made, the liability of the endorser under subsection (a) is discharged.

Acts 1995, ch. 397, § 2.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 10 cases, 1973–2014 · leading case: Lee v. Hall, 790 S.W.2d 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

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Lee v. Hall, 790 S.W.2d 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 2× “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-3-415(1) (1979). Likewise, Mr.”

Com. Union Bank v. Davis, 581 S.W.2d 142 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978). · cites it 4× “T.C.A. § 47-3-415(1) defines an “accommodation party” as “one who signs [an] instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending his name to another party to it.”

Bank of Ripley v. Sadler, 671 S.W.2d 454 (Tenn. 1984). · cites it 2× “In spite of the fact that the bank undoubtedly made the loan to accommodate Sadler and he received $28,000 of the loan proceeds, under the provisions of T.C.A. § 47-3-415, the instrument reflects that he signed for “the purpose of lending his name to another party to it.”

Williamson Leasing Co. v. Kephart, 627 S.W.2d 683 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). · cites it 2× “T.C.A. § 47-3-415(5). Plaintiffs were sureties or accommodation makers and, as such, if and when one or more of them paid the debt of Capital, he was entitled to be substituted to all of the rights of the Bank, unless he agreed to forego this right.”

SunTrust Bank v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 517 B.R. 95 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2014). “Defendant contends she is the victim of a “Nigerian Scam,” but she is legally liable to plaintiff under the Uniform Commercial code, § 47-3-415, § 416 and § 417, as an endorser, transferor, and presenter.”

Citizens Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Hardaway, 724 S.W.2d 352 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). “Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-3-415(3) states: “As against a holder in due course and without notice of the accommodation oral proof of the accommodation is not admissible to give the accommodation party the benefit of discharges dependent on his character as such.”

Riceville Bank v. Armstrong, 741 S.W.2d 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 2× “Davis, supra, the court, in addressing the issue of an accommodation endorser, said: “T.C.A. § 47-3-415(1) defines an ‘accommodation party’ as ‘one who signs [an] instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending his name to another party to it.”

In Re Carpenter, 363 F. Supp. 218 (W.D. Tenn. 1973). “The Uniform Commercial Code, TCA 47-3-415 provides that: “(1) An accommodation party is one who signs the instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending his name to another party to it.”

Dickenson v. Am. Gen. Fin. (In re Capps), 135 B.R. 821 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992). · cites it 2× “” The court concludes from the proof that Calandruccio was, at best, an accommodation party under Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-3-415 (1979). See Commerce Union Bank v.”

Tom Albert v. Pat Frye (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). “The obligation is owed to a person entitled to enforce the draft or to an endorser who paid the draft under § 47-3-415. Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-414 (b).”

— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-415(1) — 3 cases

Lee v. Hall, 790 S.W.2d 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-3-415(1) (1979). Likewise, Mr.”

Com. Union Bank v. Davis, 581 S.W.2d 142 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978). “T.C.A. § 47-3-415(1) defines an “accommodation party” as “one who signs [an] instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending his name to another party to it.”

Riceville Bank v. Armstrong, 741 S.W.2d 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). “Davis, supra, the court, in addressing the issue of an accommodation endorser, said: “T.C.A. § 47-3-415(1) defines an ‘accommodation party’ as ‘one who signs [an] instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending his name to another party to it.”

— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-415(3) — 1 case

— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-415(5) — 2 cases

Williamson Leasing Co. v. Kephart, 627 S.W.2d 683 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). “T.C.A. § 47-3-415(5). Plaintiffs were sureties or accommodation makers and, as such, if and when one or more of them paid the debt of Capital, he was entitled to be substituted to all of the rights of the Bank, unless he agreed to forego this right.”

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