Every gift, grant, conveyance of lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods, or chattels, or of any rent, common or profit out of the same, by writing or otherwise; and every bond, suit, judgment, or execution, had or made and contrived, of malice, fraud, covin, collusion, or guile, to the intent or purpose to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts, accounts, damages, penalties, forfeitures; or to defraud or to deceive those who shall purchase the same lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any rent, profit, or commodity out of them, shall be deemed and taken, only as against the person, such person's heirs, successors, executors, administrators, and assigns, whose debts, suits, demands, estates, or interest, by such guileful and covinous practices, shall or might be in any wise disturbed, hindered, delayed, or defrauded, to be clearly and utterly void; any pretense, color, feigned consideration, expressing of use, of any other matter or thing, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Code 1858, § 1759 (deriv. Acts 1801, ch. 25, § 2); Shan., § 3143; Code 1932, § 7832; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 64-301.
Notes of Decisions
Paris v. Walker (In re Walker), 566 B.R. 503 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2017).
· cites it 28× “ii Claims brought under Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-3-101 The Trustee’s second state law basis for-avoiding the transfers is under Tenn.”
Collier v. Greenbrier Developers, LLC, 358 S.W.3d 195 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 4× “This case was filed under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, Tenn.Code Ann. § 66-3-101 et seq., seeking to void four quitclaim deeds that were filed in connection with a real estate transaction.”
Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. Nashville Lodging Co., 104 S.W.3d 848 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 4× “A conveyance may be fraudulent for two reasons: one made with actual intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors, Tenn.Code Ann. § 66-3-101, or one made without fair consideration if the grantor is insolvent or the conveyance renders him/her insolvent, TenmCode Ann.”
Weaver v. Nelms, 750 S.W.2d 158 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 4× “After finding that there was an assignment of the note, the trial court then found that “the transfer was fraudulent as to the plaintiffs herein under the provisions of both T.C.A. § 66-3-101 et seq. and T.C. A. § 66-3-301 et seq.”
In Re Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d 317 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 2× “” Tenn.Code Ann. § 66-3-101 (1993). The evidence in this record supports the trial court’s following three conclusions: a deposit of $100,000 in a bank account would disqualify R.”
MacOn Bank & Trust Co. v. Holland, 715 S.W.2d 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).
· cites it 2× “Rather, it is T.C.A. § 66-3-101 that applies. That statute states: Conveyances in fraud of creditors or purchasers void.”
Stevenson v. Hicks (In Re Hicks), 176 B.R. 466 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1995).
· cites it 3× “Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 66-3-101; 66-3-308. Whether or not a particular transfer is declared fraudulent is determined by the facts and circumstances of each case.”
Holcomb Health Care Servs., LLC v. Quart Ltd., LLC (In Re Holcomb Health Care Servs., LLC), 329 B.R. 622 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2004).
· cites it 2× “Similarly, under Tennessee law, a conveyance may be fraudulent for two reasons: one made with actual intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors, T.C.A § 66-3-101, or one made without fair consideration if the grantor is insolvent or the conveyance renders him/her insolvent, T.”
Muroll Gesellschaft M.B.H. v. Tennessee Tape, Inc., 908 S.W.2d 211 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 2× “The payment of $400,000 by Tennessee Tape to Cellux was a fraudulent conveyance, made without consideration and with an intent to defraud the creditors of Tennessee Tape in violation of T.C.A. § 66-3-101. The joint answer of defendants admitted paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, 5, 6, and…”
Hagaman v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. 180 (Tax Ct. 1993).
“Tennessee Law Tenn. Code Ann. section 66-3-101 (1982) provides that any conveyance made with the "intent or purpose to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors" is avoidable.”
Steinberg v. Morton (In Re Buchanan), 25 B.R. 162 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
· cites it 2× “This statute has been recodified as Tenn.Code Ann. § 66-3-101 (1982). 3 .The Order of June 18, 1982, also provided for the modification of the automatic stay to allow the trustee for the Buchanan’s estate to proceed to judgment on a claim of the Buchanans against Morton.”
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