MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

Following pleas of not guilty before the court, Appellant, Torrey Michael Spaulding, was convicted of escape1 in Dallam County trial court cause number 4352 and of burglary of a habitation2 in Hartley County trial court cause number 1159H.3 Officers arrived at the house to assist the detective and were instructed by him to seize the bicycle, which he suspected was stolen. Appellant was taken into custody for criminal trespass and driven to the police station for questioning. Appellant was administered his Miranda rights, and according to Detective Conner, Appellant waived his rights and voluntarily spoke with him. Appellant was interrogated for almost thirty minutes about other felonies including forgery and theft of a vehicle that Detective Conner was investigating. Based on incriminating answers given by Appellant, Detective Conner advised him he was arresting him for the crimes discussed.^[6]

He placed Appellant, whose hands were cuffed behind his back, in the front seat of his vehicle, restrained him with the seat belt, and closed the door.^[7] As the detective proceeded around the vehicle, he heard a noise and saw Appellant running away. His call to stop went unheeded but he eventually caught Appellant and took him to the ground. Another officer assisted and took Appellant back into custody. The assisting officer’s patrol car video recorder captured the escape.

Back at the police station, Detective Conner learned that a bicycle had been reported stolen from a garage attached to a residence. He took the complainant to the evidence room where she identified the red bicycle as the one that had been stolen. ^[8] At trial, she testified the bicycle was stolen from inside her garage and she identified it by the custom seat she had placed on the bicycle and a light she had added to the handle bar. She did not know Appellant and had not given him permission to enter her garage or take her bicycle.

The defense called an inmate for the purpose of having him testify that he had seen Appellant purchase a red bicycle on the day in question. Ultimately, however, the witness testified that Appellant asked him to lie for him.

After reviewing the recordings admitted into evidence, the trial court found Appellant guilty of both offenses and proceeded with punishment. After sustaining defense counsel’s objections that a name and date of birth were insufficient to establish that Appellant was the same person referenced in prior felony judgments, the State put on fingerprint evidence tying Appellant to those judgments. Defense counsel then made hearsay objections to the prior judgments which were from Michigan, and the trial court granted a continuance for the State to prove the prior offenses were committed by Appellant. When the punishment hearing reconvened, the State offered, without objection, a certified letter from the Michigan Department of Corrections establishing Appellant’s prior felony convictions.

During his testimony, Appellant confirmed his extensive criminal history, including a juvenile record, and acknowledged the minimum sentence of twenty-five years. Appellant expressed his opinion that the minimum punishment was too harsh and that it did not fit the crime for which he was convicted. He also testified about having a drug problem and expressed the non-violent nature of his criminal history. The trial court assessed a forty-year sentence in each case.

ANALYSIS

In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel certifies he has conducted a conscientious examination of the record in both cases, and in his opinion, they reflect no potentially plausible basis for reversal of Appellant’s convictions. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Counsel candidly discusses why, under the controlling authorities, the records support that conclusion. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Counsel has demonstrated he has complied with the requirements of Anders and In re Schulman by (1) providing a copy of the brief to Appellant, (2) notifying him of his right to review the records and file a pro se response if he desired to do so,9 and (3) informing him of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408.10 By letter, this court granted Appellant an opportunity to exercise his right to file a response to counsel’s brief. Appellant did not file a response. Neither did the State favor us with a brief.

We note the offense of escape requires a person to escape from custody after having been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of an offense. Medford v. State, 13 S.W.3d 769, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Furthermore, a person commits burglary of a habitation if, without the owner’s consent, the person enters a habitation and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft, or assault. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(3). It is well settled that a defendant’s unexplained possession of property recently stolen in a burglary permits an inference that the defendant is the one who committed the burglary. Poncio v. State, 185 S.W.3d 904, 905 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

With these legal principles in mind, we have independently examined the entire record to determine whether there are any non-frivolous issues which might support these appeals. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S. Ct. 346, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409; Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We have found no such issues. See Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). After reviewing the record and counsel’s brief, we agree with counsel that there is no plausible basis for reversal in either case. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the trial court’s judgments are affirmed and counsel's motion to withdraw is granted.

Patrick A. Pirtle Justice Do not publish.