Sec. 51.095. ADMISSIBILITY OF A STATEMENT OF A CHILD. (a) Notwithstanding Section 51.09, the statement of a child is admissible in evidence in any future proceeding concerning the matter about which the statement was given if:
(1) the statement is made in writing under a circumstance described by Subsection (d) and:
(A) the statement shows that the child has at some time before the making of the statement received from a magistrate a warning that:
(i) the child may remain silent and not make any statement at all and that any statement that the child makes may be used in evidence against the child;
(ii) the child has the right to have an attorney present to advise the child either prior to any questioning or during the questioning;
(iii) if the child is unable to employ an attorney, the child has the right to have an attorney appointed to counsel with the child before or during any interviews with peace officers or attorneys representing the state; and
(iv) the child has the right to terminate the interview at any time;
(B) and:
(i) the statement must be signed in the presence of a magistrate by the child with no law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney present, except that a magistrate may require a bailiff or a law enforcement officer if a bailiff is not available to be present if the magistrate determines that the presence of the bailiff or law enforcement officer is necessary for the personal safety of the magistrate or other court personnel, provided that the bailiff or law enforcement officer may not carry a weapon in the presence of the child; and
(ii) the magistrate must be fully convinced that the child understands the nature and contents of the statement and that the child is signing the same voluntarily, and if a statement is taken, the magistrate must sign a written statement verifying the foregoing requisites have been met;
(C) the child knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives these rights before and during the making of the statement and signs the statement in the presence of a magistrate; and
(D) the magistrate certifies that the magistrate has examined the child independent of any law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney, except as required to ensure the personal safety of the magistrate or other court personnel, and has determined that the child understands the nature and contents of the statement and has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived these rights;
(2) the statement is made orally and the child makes a statement of facts or circumstances that are found to be true and tend to establish the child's guilt, such as the finding of secreted or stolen property, or the instrument with which the child states the offense was committed;
(3) the statement was res gestae of the delinquent conduct or the conduct indicating a need for supervision or of the arrest;
(4) the statement is made:
(A) in open court at the child's adjudication hearing;
(B) before a grand jury considering a petition, under Section 53.045, that the child engaged in delinquent conduct; or
(C) at a preliminary hearing concerning the child held in compliance with this code, other than at a detention hearing under Section 54.01; or
(5) subject to Subsection (f), the statement is made orally under a circumstance described by Subsection (d) and the statement is recorded by an electronic recording device, including a device that records images, and:
(A) before making the statement, the child is given the warning described by Subdivision (1)(A) by a magistrate, the warning is a part of the recording, and the child knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives each right stated in the warning;
(B) the recording device is capable of making an accurate recording, the operator of the device is competent to use the device, the recording is accurate, and the recording has not been altered;
(C) each voice on the recording is identified; and
(D) not later than the 20th day before the date of the proceeding, the attorney representing the child is given a complete and accurate copy of each recording of the child made under this subdivision.
(b) This section and Section 51.09 do not preclude the admission of a statement made by the child if:
(1) the statement does not stem from interrogation of the child under a circumstance described by Subsection (d); or
(2) without regard to whether the statement stems from interrogation of the child under a circumstance described by Subsection (d), the statement is:
(A) voluntary and has a bearing on the credibility of the child as a witness; or
(B) recorded by an electronic recording device, including a device that records images, and is obtained:
(i) in another state in compliance with the laws of that state or this state; or
(ii) by a federal law enforcement officer in this state or another state in compliance with the laws of the United States.
(c) An electronic recording of a child's statement made under Subsection (a)(5) or (b)(2)(B) shall be preserved until all juvenile or criminal matters relating to any conduct referred to in the statement are final, including the exhaustion of all appeals, or barred from prosecution.
(d) Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(5) apply to the statement of a child made:
(1) while the child is in a detention facility or other place of confinement;
(2) while the child is in the custody of an officer; or
(3) during or after the interrogation of the child by an officer if the child is in the possession of the Department of Family and Protective Services and is suspected to have engaged in conduct that violates a penal law of this state.
(e) A juvenile law referee or master may perform the duties imposed on a magistrate under this section without the approval of the juvenile court if the juvenile board of the county in which the statement of the child is made has authorized a referee or master to perform the duties of a magistrate under this section.
(f) A magistrate who provides the warnings required by Subsection (a)(5) for a recorded statement may at the time the warnings are provided request by speaking on the recording that the officer return the child and the recording to the magistrate at the conclusion of the process of questioning. The magistrate may then view the recording with the child or have the child view the recording to enable the magistrate to determine whether the child's statements were given voluntarily. The magistrate's determination of voluntariness shall be reduced to writing and signed and dated by the magistrate. If a magistrate uses the procedure described by this subsection, a child's statement is not admissible unless the magistrate determines that the statement was given voluntarily.
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1086, Sec. 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1997. Amended by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 982, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1999; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1477, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1999; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1297, Sec. 7, eff. Sept. 1, 2001; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1420, Sec. 21.001(29), eff. Sept. 1, 2001.
Amended by:
Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 949 (H.B. 1575), Sec. 5, eff. September 1, 2005.
Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 908 (H.B. 2884), Sec. 8, eff. September 1, 2007.
Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 110 (H.B. 841), Sec. 3, eff. May 21, 2011.
Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1158 (H.B. 2337), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2011.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
120
cases (
14 in the last 5 years), 1998–2025 · leading case:
Roquemore v. State, 60 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
Roquemore v. State, 60 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
· cites it 10× “Tex. Fam.Code § 51.095. [7] At the time of Comer's offense, section 51.”
Gonzales v. State, 67 S.W.3d 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
· cites it 4× “[3] Upon arrival, the officers took appellant's written statement, in compliance with Texas Family Code § 51.095(a). [4] The entire process, from the moment of appellant's arrest until his later release to the juvenile detention facility, lasted about five hours.”
Adams v. State, 180 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. App. 2005).
· cites it 5× “Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095 (Vernon 2002).”
Vega v. State, 84 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
· cites it 7× “09 which are now found in Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095 (2002) appear to address the issue raised.”
Marsh v. State, 140 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. App. 2004).
· cites it 5× “Regarding his first statement, appellant argues that Beall and Ortiz violated sections 52.025 and 51.095 of the Family Code by subjecting appellant to “over three hours of continuous custodial interrogation” prior to taking him before the magistrate.”
In re D.A.R., 73 S.W.3d 505 (Tex. App. 2002).
· cites it 10× “He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements because they were inadmissible as a result of noncompliance with Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095 and that he therefore was denied his due process rights.”
Michael Herring v. State, 359 S.W.3d 275 (Tex. App. 2012).
· cites it 8× “See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095. In the applicable statute, it is important to distinguish between administration of the warnings enumerated in Section 51.”
Vega v. State, 255 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App. 2008).
· cites it 6× “1, 1973 (current version at Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.01 (Vernon 2002)).”
Pham v. State, 175 S.W.3d 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
· cites it 2× “, where he was given the warnings required by Texas Family Code section 51.095. It was in the judge's chambers with the police officers that Appellant Gonzales then gave his written statement.”
Matthews v. State, 513 S.W.3d 45 (Tex. App. 2016).
· cites it 2× “It is undisputed that appellant was not provided with statutory warnings under either the Juvenile Justice Code or the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure before talking with police officers during these interviews.”
Rogelio Delacerda v. State, 425 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. App. 2011).
· cites it 2× “Laws 2129 , 2129-30 (amended 1997) (current version at Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095(a) (Vernon 2008)); see also Tex.”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(B)(i) — 1 case
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(a) — 5 cases
Gonzales v. State, 67 S.W.3d 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
“[3] Upon arrival, the officers took appellant's written statement, in compliance with Texas Family Code § 51.095(a). [4] The entire process, from the moment of appellant's arrest until his later release to the juvenile detention facility, lasted about five hours.”
Adams v. State, 180 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. App. 2005).
“Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095 (Vernon 2002).”
Rogelio Delacerda v. State, 425 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. App. 2011).
“Laws 2129 , 2129-30 (amended 1997) (current version at Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095(a) (Vernon 2008)); see also Tex.”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(a)(1) — 8 cases
Roquemore v. State, 60 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
“Tex. Fam.Code § 51.095. [7] At the time of Comer's offense, section 51.”
Michael Herring v. State, 359 S.W.3d 275 (Tex. App. 2012).
“See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095. In the applicable statute, it is important to distinguish between administration of the warnings enumerated in Section 51.”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(a)(1)(A) — 15 cases
Marsh v. State, 140 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. App. 2004).
“Regarding his first statement, appellant argues that Beall and Ortiz violated sections 52.025 and 51.095 of the Family Code by subjecting appellant to “over three hours of continuous custodial interrogation” prior to taking him before the magistrate.”
Vega v. State, 255 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App. 2008).
“1, 1973 (current version at Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.01 (Vernon 2002)).”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(a)(1)(A)(iii) — 2 cases
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(a)(1)(B) — 3 cases
Michael Herring v. State, 359 S.W.3d 275 (Tex. App. 2012).
“See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095. In the applicable statute, it is important to distinguish between administration of the warnings enumerated in Section 51.”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(a)(1)(B)(i) — 1 case
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(a)(1)(B)(ii) — 1 case
Vega v. State, 84 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
“09 which are now found in Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095 (2002) appear to address the issue raised.”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(a)(1)(C) — 4 cases
Michael Herring v. State, 359 S.W.3d 275 (Tex. App. 2012).
“See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095. In the applicable statute, it is important to distinguish between administration of the warnings enumerated in Section 51.”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(a)(1)(D) — 2 cases
Vega v. State, 255 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App. 2008).
“1, 1973 (current version at Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.01 (Vernon 2002)).”
Michael Herring v. State, 359 S.W.3d 275 (Tex. App. 2012).
“See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095. In the applicable statute, it is important to distinguish between administration of the warnings enumerated in Section 51.”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(a)(2) — 4 cases
Marsh v. State, 140 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. App. 2004).
“Regarding his first statement, appellant argues that Beall and Ortiz violated sections 52.025 and 51.095 of the Family Code by subjecting appellant to “over three hours of continuous custodial interrogation” prior to taking him before the magistrate.”
In re D.A.R., 73 S.W.3d 505 (Tex. App. 2002).
“He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements because they were inadmissible as a result of noncompliance with Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095 and that he therefore was denied his due process rights.”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(a)(5) — 8 cases
In re D.A.R., 73 S.W.3d 505 (Tex. App. 2002).
“He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements because they were inadmissible as a result of noncompliance with Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095 and that he therefore was denied his due process rights.”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(a)(5)(A) — 6 cases
Marsh v. State, 140 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. App. 2004).
“Regarding his first statement, appellant argues that Beall and Ortiz violated sections 52.025 and 51.095 of the Family Code by subjecting appellant to “over three hours of continuous custodial interrogation” prior to taking him before the magistrate.”
In re D.A.R., 73 S.W.3d 505 (Tex. App. 2002).
“He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements because they were inadmissible as a result of noncompliance with Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095 and that he therefore was denied his due process rights.”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(a)(l)(A) — 1 case
Vega v. State, 255 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App. 2008).
“1, 1973 (current version at Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.01 (Vernon 2002)).”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(a)(l)(B)(i) — 2 cases
Vega v. State, 255 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App. 2008).
“1, 1973 (current version at Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.01 (Vernon 2002)).”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(a)(l)(B)(ii) — 1 case
Vega v. State, 84 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
“09 which are now found in Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095 (2002) appear to address the issue raised.”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(b) — 5 cases
Adams v. State, 180 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. App. 2005).
“Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095 (Vernon 2002).”
Marsh v. State, 140 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. App. 2004).
“Regarding his first statement, appellant argues that Beall and Ortiz violated sections 52.025 and 51.095 of the Family Code by subjecting appellant to “over three hours of continuous custodial interrogation” prior to taking him before the magistrate.”
In re D.A.R., 73 S.W.3d 505 (Tex. App. 2002).
“He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements because they were inadmissible as a result of noncompliance with Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095 and that he therefore was denied his due process rights.”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(b)(1) — 11 cases
Roquemore v. State, 60 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
“Tex. Fam.Code § 51.095. [7] At the time of Comer's offense, section 51.”
Adams v. State, 180 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. App. 2005).
“Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095 (Vernon 2002).”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(b)(2) — 1 case
Rogelio Delacerda v. State, 425 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. App. 2011).
“Laws 2129 , 2129-30 (amended 1997) (current version at Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095(a) (Vernon 2008)); see also Tex.”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(c) — 2 cases
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(d) — 2 cases
Michael Herring v. State, 359 S.W.3d 275 (Tex. App. 2012).
“See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095. In the applicable statute, it is important to distinguish between administration of the warnings enumerated in Section 51.”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(d)(2) — 6 cases
In re D.A.R., 73 S.W.3d 505 (Tex. App. 2002).
“He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements because they were inadmissible as a result of noncompliance with Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095 and that he therefore was denied his due process rights.”
— Tex. Fam. Code § 51.095(f) — 2 cases
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