Sec. 305.103. CORRECTION OF VIOLATION. (a) A creditor is not liable to an obligor for a violation of this subtitle if:
(1) not later than the 60th day after the date the creditor actually discovered the violation, the creditor corrects the violation as to that obligor by taking any necessary action and making any necessary adjustment, including the payment of interest on a refund, if any, at the applicable rate provided for in the contract of the parties; and
(2) the creditor gives written notice to the obligor of the violation before the obligor gives written notice of the violation or files an action alleging the violation.
(b) For the purposes of Subsection (a), a violation is actually discovered at the time of the discovery of the violation in fact and not at the time when an ordinarily prudent person, through reasonable diligence, could or should have discovered or known of the violation. Actual discovery of a violation in one transaction may constitute actual discovery of the same violation in other transactions if the violation is of such a nature that it would necessarily be repeated and would be clearly apparent in the other transactions without the necessity of examining all the other transactions.
(c) For purposes of Subsection (a), written notice is given when the notice is delivered to the person or to the person's authorized agent or attorney of record personally, by telecopier, or by United States mail to the address shown on the most recent documents in the transaction. Deposit of the notice as registered or certified mail in a postage paid, properly addressed wrapper in a post office or official depository under the care and custody of the United States Postal Service is prima facie evidence of the delivery of the notice to the person to whom the notice is addressed.
Amended by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 62, Sec. 7.18(a), eff. Sept. 1, 1999.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
18
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 2000–2025 · leading case:
Pagel v. Whatley, 82 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App. 2002).
Pagel v. Whatley, 82 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App. 2002).
· cites it 5× “Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 305.103 (a)(1) (Vernon Supp.”
Sotelo v. Interstate Fin. Corp., 224 S.W.3d 517 (Tex. App. 2007).
· cites it 2× “Tex. Fin.Code Ann. § 305.103. Sotelo argues that IFC had actual knowledge of the usury on March 17, 2004, when she filed her first amended petition, but that it did not give her notice of its intent to correct until December 22, 2004, more than nine months later.”
Threlkeld v. Urech, 329 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. App. 2011).
· cites it 2× “See Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 305.103 (a); see also Bair Chase Prop.”
Monsanto Co. v. Davis, 25 S.W.3d 773 (Tex. App. 2000).
“See Tex. Fin.Code Ann. § 305.103(a) (Vernon Supp.”
Anderson v. Chainani (In Re Kemper), 263 B.R. 773 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001).
· cites it 2× “The response further claimed that any violation of the Texas usury statutes were corrected by the March 2, 1999 demand letters, as allowed under Texas Finance Code § 305.103 and that, therefore, the Defendants were not liable for any damages.”
In Re: Cpdc Inc, 337 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2003).
· cites it 2× “The principal issue on appeal is whether Zer-Ilan and Ideal timely cured alleged usury violations, bringing them within the safe harbor afforded by Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 305.103 . Finding no error in the district court’s conclusion, we affirm.”
Mims v. Fid. Funding, Inc. (In Re Auto Int'l Refrigeration), 275 B.R. 789 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
“On July 9, 1999, Defendants, believing that the Loan Agreement had exceeded the legal interest rate of eighteen percent allowed under Texas law, 3 sent a Cure Letter to AIR’s counsel, pursuant to Texas Finance Code § 305.103(a), 4 stating that *796 AIR’s account had received a…”
Mims v. Fid. Funding, Inc., 307 B.R. 849 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
“On July 9, 1999, Appellees, believing that the Loan Agreement had exceeded the legal interest rate of 18% allowed under Texas law, 2 sent a letter attempting to cure the situation (“Cure Letter”) to AIR’s counsel, pursuant to Texas Finance Code § 305.103(a), 3 stating that AIR’s…”
Zer-Ilan v. Frankford, 337 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2003).
“06(4)(A-B) (Vernon 1993), repealed and codified at Tex. Fin.Code Ann. § 305.103 (Vernon 1998 & Supp.”
— Tex. Fin. Code § 305.103(a) — 6 cases
Pagel v. Whatley, 82 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App. 2002).
“Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 305.103 (a)(1) (Vernon Supp.”
Monsanto Co. v. Davis, 25 S.W.3d 773 (Tex. App. 2000).
“See Tex. Fin.Code Ann. § 305.103(a) (Vernon Supp.”
Mims v. Fid. Funding, Inc. (In Re Auto Int'l Refrigeration), 275 B.R. 789 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
“On July 9, 1999, Defendants, believing that the Loan Agreement had exceeded the legal interest rate of eighteen percent allowed under Texas law, 3 sent a Cure Letter to AIR’s counsel, pursuant to Texas Finance Code § 305.103(a), 4 stating that *796 AIR’s account had received a…”
Mims v. Fid. Funding, Inc., 307 B.R. 849 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
“On July 9, 1999, Appellees, believing that the Loan Agreement had exceeded the legal interest rate of 18% allowed under Texas law, 2 sent a letter attempting to cure the situation (“Cure Letter”) to AIR’s counsel, pursuant to Texas Finance Code § 305.103(a), 3 stating that AIR’s…”
Anderson v. Chainani (In Re Kemper), 263 B.R. 773 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001).
“The response further claimed that any violation of the Texas usury statutes were corrected by the March 2, 1999 demand letters, as allowed under Texas Finance Code § 305.103 and that, therefore, the Defendants were not liable for any damages.”
— Tex. Fin. Code § 305.103(a)(2) — 2 cases
Pagel v. Whatley, 82 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App. 2002).
“Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 305.103 (a)(1) (Vernon Supp.”
— Tex. Fin. Code § 305.103(b) — 1 case
Threlkeld v. Urech, 329 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. App. 2011).
“See Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 305.103 (a); see also Bair Chase Prop.”
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