18 U.S.C. § 2520

Recovery of civil damages authorized

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(a)In General.—Except as provided in section 2511(2)(a)(ii), any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person or entity, other than the United States, which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate.(b)Relief.—In an action under this section, appropriate relief includes—(1) such preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be appropriate;(2) damages under subsection (c) and punitive damages in appropriate cases; and(3) a reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.(c)Computation of Damages.—(1) In an action under this section, if the conduct in violation of this chapter is the private viewing of a private satellite video communication that is not scrambled or encrypted or if the communication is a radio communication that is transmitted on frequencies allocated under subpart D of part 74 of the rules of the Federal Communications Commission that is not scrambled or encrypted and the conduct is not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private commercial gain, then the court shall assess damages as follows:(A) If the person who engaged in that conduct has not previously been enjoined under section 2511(5) and has not been found liable in a prior civil action under this section, the court shall assess the greater of the sum of actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, or statutory damages of not less than $50 and not more than $500.(B) If, on one prior occasion, the person who engaged in that conduct has been enjoined under section 2511(5) or has been found liable in a civil action under this section, the court shall assess the greater of the sum of actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, or statutory damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1000.(2) In any other action under this section, the court may assess as damages whichever is the greater of—(A) the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of the violation; or(B) statutory damages of whichever is the greater of $100 a day for each day of violation or $10,000.(d)Defense.—A good faith reliance on—(1) a court warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization;(2) a request of an investigative or law enforcement officer under section 2518(7) of this title; or(3) a good faith determination that section 2511(3), 2511(2)(i), or 2511(2)(j) of this title permitted the conduct complained of;is a complete defense against any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or any other law.(e)Limitation.—A civil action under this section may not be commenced later than two years after the date upon which the claimant first has a reasonable opportunity to discover the violation.(f)Administrative Discipline.—If a court or appropriate department or agency determines that the United States or any of its departments or agencies has violated any provision of this chapter, and the court or appropriate department or agency finds that the circumstances surrounding the violation raise serious questions about whether or not an officer or employee of the United States acted willfully or intentionally with respect to the violation, the department or agency shall, upon receipt of a true and correct copy of the decision and findings of the court or appropriate department or agency promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action against the officer or employee is warranted. If the head of the department or agency involved determines that disciplinary action is not warranted, he or she shall notify the Inspector General with jurisdiction over the department or agency concerned and shall provide the Inspector General with the reasons for such determination.(g)Improper Disclosure Is Violation.—Any willful disclosure or use by an investigative or law enforcement officer or governmental entity of information beyond the extent permitted by section 2517 is a violation of this chapter for purposes of section 2520(a).(Added Pub. L. 90–351, title III, § 802, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 223; amended Pub. L. 91–358, title II, § 211(c), July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 654; Pub. L. 99–508, title I, § 103, Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 1853; Pub. L. 107–56, title II, § 223(a), Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 293; Pub. L. 107–296, title XXII, § 2207(e), formerly title II, § 225(e), Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2157, renumbered § 2207(e), Pub. L. 115–278, § 2(g)(2)(I), Nov. 16, 2018, 132 Stat. 4178; Pub. L. 115–141, div. V, § 104(1)(B), Mar. 23, 2018, 132 Stat. 1216.)Editorial NotesAmendments

2018—Subsec. (d)(3). Pub. L. 115–141 amended par. (3) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (3) read as follows: “a good faith determination that section 2511(3) or 2511(2)(i) of this title permitted the conduct complained of;”.

2002—Subsec. (d)(3). Pub. L. 107–296 inserted “or 2511(2)(i)” after “2511(3)”.

2001—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 107–56, § 223(a)(1), inserted “, other than the United States,” after “person or entity”.

Subsecs. (f), (g). Pub. L. 107–56, § 223(a)(2), (3), added subsecs. (f) and (g).

1986—Pub. L. 99–508 amended section generally. Prior to amendment, section read as follows: “Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of this chapter shall (1) have a civil cause of action against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to intercept, disclose, or use such communications, and (2) be entitled to recover from any such person—

“(a) actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher;

“(b) punitive damages; and

“(c) a reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.

A good faith reliance on a court order or legislative authorization shall constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or under any other law.”

1970—Pub. L. 91–358 substituted provisions that a good faith reliance on a court order or legislative authorization constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or under any other law, for provisions that a good faith reliance on a court order or on the provisions of section 2518(7) of this chapter constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 2002 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 107–296 effective 60 days after Nov. 25, 2002, see section 4 of Pub. L. 107–296, set out as an Effective Date note under section 101 of Title 6, Domestic Security.

Effective Date of 1986 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 99–508 effective 90 days after Oct. 21, 1986, and, in case of conduct pursuant to court order or extension, applicable only with respect to court orders and extensions made after such date, with special rule for State authorizations of interceptions, see section 111 of Pub. L. 99–508, set out as a note under section 2510 of this title.

Effective Date of 1970 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 91–358 effective on first day of seventh calendar month which begins after July 29, 1970, see section 901(a) of Pub. L. 91–358.

Rule of Construction

Pub. L. 115–141, div. V, § 106, Mar. 23, 2018, 132 Stat. 1224, provided that: “Nothing in this division [see section 101 of Pub. L. 115–141, set out as a Short Title of 2018 Amendment note under section 1 of this title], or the amendments made by this division, shall be construed to preclude any foreign authority from obtaining assistance in a criminal investigation or prosecution pursuant to section 3512 of title 18, United States Code, section 1782 of title 28, United States Code, or as otherwise provided by law.”

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 774 cases (115 in the last 5 years), 1969–2026 · leading case: Javier Luis v. Joseph Zang, 833 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2016).

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Javier Luis v. Joseph Zang, 833 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2016). · cites it 14× “18 U.S.C. § 2520 (a). Luis’s first claim thus divides into two parts: one is the allegation that Awareness violated § 2511 by “intercepting” his communications, and the other is the allegation that, because Luis’s communications were so intercepted, he has the right under § 2520…”

DirecTV, Inc. v. Griffin, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (M.D. Fla. 2003). · cites it 19× “See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (a). In that connection, a court may award the following relief: *1346 (1) such premilinary and other eqruitable or declaratory relief as may be appropriate; (2) damages under subsection (c) and punitive damages in appropriate cases; and (3) a reasonable…”

DirecTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2007). · cites it 8× “§ 605 (e)(4), or alternatively, for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (a), or alternatively, for violations of 47 U.”

DirecTV, Inc. v. Rawlins, 523 F.3d 318 (4th Cir. 2008). · cites it 14× “On appeal, DIRECTV seeks review only of the district court's refusal to award statutory damages under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (c)(2). Significantly, DIRECTV did not appeal the denial of damages *323 under the Cable Act, 47 U.”

Sharyl Attkisson v. Eric Holder, Jr., 925 F.3d 606 (4th Cir. 2019). · cites it 3× “See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 . Comparing § 2511 and § 2520, the district court determined that the cause of action authorized by § 2520 does not extend to persons who procured another to intercept, disclose, or intentionally use a covered communication.”

Pamela A. Dorris v. Charles Absher & Della Absher, 179 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 1999). · cites it 11× “The Abshers contend that the district court abused its discretion by awarding statutory damages in the amount of $10,-000 for each violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2520 . That section provides in pertinent part as follows: (a) In general.”

Kenneth R. Smoot v. United Transp. Union Csx Transp., Inc., 246 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2001). · cites it 8× “The district court also found that Plaintiffs violations were willful, wanton and reckless, and thereby awarded UTU and CSX $50,000 each in punitive damages pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (b), as well as finding UTU and CSX entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under §…”

Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271 (1st Cir. 1993). · cites it 8× “” 4 See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 . 5 Each of the three sides to this controversy has appealed from various rulings made by the district court.”

David W. Lanier v. Ed Bryant, 332 F.3d 999 (6th Cir. 2003). · cites it 4× “See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 . Lanier timely filed a notice of appeal, arguing that the district court erred by: (1) granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants; (2) denying Lanier’s request to file a second amended complaint; (3) denying Lanier’s motion for the appointment of…”

DirecTV, Inc. v. Cardona, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (M.D. Fla. 2003). · cites it 11× “§ 2512 (l)(b) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (a). In relevant part, 18 U.”

Darrell Rodgers & Peter Simet v. James C. Wood, 910 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1990). · cites it 13× “Appellees Rodgers and Simet brought this action under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2520 , contending that appellant Wood’s disclosure of an unauthorized tape of their telephone conversation with a television news reporter violated the Act.”

DirecTV, Inc. v. Drury, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (M.D. Fla. 2003). · cites it 20× “The answer evidently lies in 18 U.S.C. § 2520 . Section 2520 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: § 2520.”

Show all 774 citing cases →

— 18 U.S.C. § 2520(C)(2) — 1 case

Meche v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 692 So. 2d 544 (La. Ct. App. 1997).

— 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) — 1 case

Perfit v. Perfit, 693 F. Supp. 851 (C.D. Cal. 1988).

— 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(1) — 3 cases

Joffe v. Google, Inc., 746 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2013).

Benjamin Joffe v. Google Inc. (9th Cir. 2013).

— 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2) — 1 case

Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).

— 18 U.S.C. § 2520(d) — 1 case

Vickey Horton Tapley v. Darrell Collins, 211 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2000).

— 18 U.S.C. § 2520(d)(2) — 1 case

Banks v. Opat (D. Kan. 2021).

— 18 U.S.C. § 2520(e) — 1 case

Hall v. The City Of Houston (S.D. Tex. 2021).

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