33 U.S.C. § 905

Exclusiveness of liability

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(a) Employer liability; failure of employer to secure payment of compensation

The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death, except that if an employer fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this chapter, an injured employee, or his legal representative in case death results from the injury, may elect to claim compensation under the chapter, or to maintain an action at law or in admiralty for damages on account of such injury or death. In such action the defendant may not plead as a defense that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, or that the employee assumed the risk of his employment, or that the injury was due to the contributory negligence of the employee. For purposes of this subsection, a contractor shall be deemed the employer of a subcontractor’s employees only if the subcontractor fails to secure the payment of compensation as required by section 904 of this title.

(b) Negligence of vessel

In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void. If such person was employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel. If such person was employed to provide shipbuilding, repairing, or breaking services and such person’s employer was the owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, or charterer of the vessel, no such action shall be permitted, in whole or in part or directly or indirectly, against the injured person’s employer (in any capacity, including as the vessel’s owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, or charterer) or against the employees of the employer. The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred. The remedy provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel except remedies available under this chapter.

(c) Outer Continental Shelf

In the event that the negligence of a vessel causes injury to a person entitled to receive benefits under this Act by virtue of section 1333 of title 43, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b) of this section. Nothing contained in subsection (b) of this section shall preclude the enforcement according to its terms of any reciprocal indemnity provision whereby the employer of a person entitled to receive benefits under this chapter by virtue of section 1333 of title 43 and the vessel agree to defend and indemnify the other for cost of defense and loss or liability for damages arising out of or resulting from death or bodily injury to their employees.

(Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 509, § 5, 44 Stat. 1426; Pub. L. 92–576, § 18(a), Oct. 27, 1972, 86 Stat. 1263; Pub. L. 98–426, §§ 4(b), 5(a)(1), (b), Sept. 28, 1984, 98 Stat. 1641.)Editorial NotesAmendments

1984—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 98–426, § 4(b), inserted at end “For purposes of this subsection, a contractor shall be deemed the employer of a subcontractor’s employees only if the subcontractor fails to secure the payment of compensation as required by section 904 of this title.”

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 98–426, § 5(a)(1), substituted “If such person was employed to provide shipbuilding, repairing, or breaking services and such person’s employer was the owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, or charterer of the vessel, no such action shall be permitted, in whole or in part or directly or indirectly, against the injured person’s employer (in any capacity, including as the vessel’s owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, or charterer) or against the employees of the employer” for “If such person was employed by the vessel to provide ship building or repair services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing ship building or repair services to the vessel”.

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 98–426, § 5(b), added subsec. (c).

1972—Pub. L. 92–576 designated existing provisions as subsec. (a), substituted “the chapter” for “this chapter”, and added subsec. (b).

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 1984 Amendment

Amendment by section 4(b) of Pub. L. 98–426 effective Sept. 28, 1984, and applicable both with respect to claims filed after Sept. 28, 1984, and to claims pending on that date, and amendment by section 5(a)(1), (b) of Pub. L. 98–426 applicable with respect to any injury after Sept. 28, 1984, see section 28(a), (c) of Pub. L. 98–426, set out as a note under section 901 of this title.

Effective Date of 1972 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 92–576 effective 30 days after Oct. 27, 1972, see section 22 of Pub. L. 92–576, set out as a note under section 902 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 1,529 cases (111 in the last 5 years), 1931–2026 · leading case: Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique
Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (1979) scotus · cites it 14× “The longshoreman-victim, however, and his stevedore-employer— also a tortfeasor in this case—are participants in a workers' compensation scheme that affords benefits to the longshoreman regardless of the employer's fault and provides that the stevedore's only liability for the…”
Tilcon New York v. Volk (2017) ca2 · cites it 9× “” 33 U.S.C. § 905 (b). A claimant is not required to elect between statutory compensation from the employer and an action for damages against another, as he “can both accept compensation and file a civil action against a third party tortfeasor.”
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Johnson (1984) scotus · cites it 8× “The question presented by this case is when, if ever, these general contractors are entitled to the immunity from tort liability provided in § 5(a) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 905 (a). I Petitioner Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) is a government agency…”
Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos (1981) scotus · cites it 4× “He later brought an action against Scindia pursuant to § 5 (b) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (Act), as amended in 1972, [1] which, as set forth in 33 U. S. C. § 905 (b), provides in relevant part as follows: "In the event of injury to a person…”
Thomas W. Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corporation and American Commercial Lines, Inc. (1975) ca3 · cites it 11× “1263, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (b), amending § 5 of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, ch.”
Miguel Antonio Aparicio v. Swan Lake, Her Engines, Boilers, Tackle, Etc., Third Party v. Panama Canal Company, Third Par (1981) ca3 · cites it 6× “Because the shipowner’s recovery is based on a contractual right to indemnity, the indemnity is due the vessel despite the limitation in the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 905 , restricting the employer’s liability to compensation payments.”
Sickle v. Torres Advanced Enter. Solutions, LLC (2018) cadc · cites it 3× “" 33 U.S.C. § 905 (a). The statute offers just one exception: "[I]f an employer fails to secure payment of compensation * * *, an injured employee * * * may elect to claim compensation under the chapter, or to maintain an action at law or in admiralty for damages on account of…”
Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co. (2002) ca5 · cites it 14× “This point becomes important in the analysis of 33 U.S.C.A. § 905 (c) below. 41 See 33 U.”
Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co. (2005) scotus · cites it 3× “He also filed an alternative claim under § 5(b) of the LHWCA, 33 U. S. C. § 905 (b), which authorizes covered employees to sue a “vessel” owner as a third party for an injury caused by the owner’s negligence.”
Kevin Scheuring v. Traylor Brothers, Inc. (2007) ca9 · cites it 5× “Moreover, the court determined that the alleged negligence in the positioning of a ramp did not implicate the duty owed by Traylor Brothers as vessel owner, and therefore, Scheming could not sue under 33 U.S.C. § 905 (b). We reverse and remand as to both claims.”
Bollinger Shipyards, Inc. v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs (2010) ca5 · cites it 8× “[19] The plaintiff sued the vessel and its owner under Section 5(b) of the LHWCA [ 33 U.S.C. § 905 (b)], which states that "a person covered under [the LHWCA] .”
Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States (1983) scotus · cites it 4× “[4] See 33 U. S. C. § 905 (a). In Weyerhaeuser S.”
— 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) — 23 cases
Woolston v. Wells (1983) orctapp
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