39 U.S.C. § 3201

Definitions

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As used in this chapter—(1) “penalty mail” means official mail, other than franked mail, which is authorized by law to be transmitted in the mail without prepayment of postage;(2) “penalty cover” means envelopes, wrappers, labels, or cards used to transmit penalty mail;(3) “frank” means the autographic or facsimile signature of persons authorized by sections 3210–3216 and 3218 of this title to transmit matter through the mail without prepayment of postage or other indicia contemplated by sections 733 and 907 of title 44;(4) “franked mail” means mail which is transmitted in the mail under a frank;(5) “Members of Congress” includes Senators, Representatives, Delegates, and Resident Commissioners; and(6) “missing child” has the meaning provided by section 403(1) of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974.(Pub. L. 91–375, Aug. 12, 1970, 84 Stat. 751; Pub. L. 99–87, § 1(b), Aug. 9, 1985, 99 Stat. 291.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

Section 403 of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, referred to in par. (6), is section 403 of Pub. L. 93–415, which is classified to section 11292 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.

Amendments

1985—Par. (6). Pub. L. 99–87 added par. (6).

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date

Section effective July 1, 1971, pursuant to Resolution No. 71–9 of the Board of Governors. See section 15(a) of Pub. L. 91–375, set out as a note preceding section 101 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 6 cases, 1972–1992 · leading case: Coalition to End the Permanent Cong. v. Marvin T. Runyon, Donald K. Anderson, 979 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Coalition to End the Permanent Cong. v. Marvin T. Runyon, Donald K. Anderson, 979 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1992). · cites it 2× “The franking privilege allows congressmen to send mail, without prepaid postage, at taxpayer expense.”
Alfred D. Schiaffo, in No. 72-2168 v. Henry Helstoski, in No. 72-2167, 492 F.2d 413 (3rd Cir. 1974). “39 U.S.C. § 3201 reads as follows : “(3) ‘frank’ means the autographic or facsimile signature of persons authorized by sections 3210-3216 and 3218 of this title to transmit matter through the mail without prepayment of postage or other indicia contemplated by sections 733 and…”
Common Cause v. Bolger, 574 F. Supp. 672 (D.D.C. 1982). “The 197S Statute The statute is set forth primarily in 39 U.S.C. §§ 3201 , 3210-19. In this litigation, our attention is focused on section 3210.”
John J. Hoellen v. Frank Annunzio, 468 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1972). “39 U.S.C. § 3201 provides, in part: “As used in this chapter — • * * * “ (3) ‘frank’ means the autographic or facsimile signature of persons authorized by sections 3210-3216 and 3218 of this title to transmit matter through the mail without prepayment of postage or other indicia…”
Bowie v. Williams, 351 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Pa. 1972). “” 39 U.S.C. § 3201 (3). 2 . A Congressman may send under liis frank : 1.”
Cervase v. Rangel, 464 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). “§ 3210 (a)(4) provides as follows: (4) It is the intent of the Congress that the franking privilege under this section shall not permit, and may not be used for, the transmission through the mails as franked mail, of matter which in its nature is purely personal to the sender or…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.