42 U.S.C. § 13704
Transferred
[transferred]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1998–2025 · leading case: Commonwealth v. Boyer
Commonwealth v. Boyer (2004)
“42 U.S.C. § 13704 (a)(3)(A). In Pennsylvania, our sentencing and release guidelines provide that, at the discretion of the Parole Board, parole may be granted after the expiration of the minimum term.”
Nathaniel Porter, Jr. v. Walter S. Ray, Jr. (2006)
“The appellants assert that the Board enacted and applied the 90% policy and continued to apply a de facto 90% policy even after abandoning the official 90% policy in order to obtain federal grants under the Violent Offenders Incarceration— Truth in Sentencing Act (“VOI/TIS”), 42…”
State v. Morales (2001)
“42 U.S.C. § 13704 (a) (2001) provides that states are eligible for "[t]ruth-in-sentencing incentive grants" if they require persons convicted of "part 1 violent crime[s]" to serve 85% of the sentences imposed.”
Commonwealth v. Baldwin (2000)
“Pursuant to the TIS, a state is eligible for the grant when a person convicted of certain specified violent crimes, serves on average, not less than 85 percent of the prison term established under that State’s sentencing and release guidelines, (emphasis added) 42 U.S.C. § 13704…”
Stewart v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole (1998)
“42 U.S.C. § 13704 (a). With this background to the Federal Act in mind, we shall now consider Petitioner’s arguments.”
Carter v. Muller (1999)
“” 42 U.S.C. § 13704 (a)(3)(A). It is true that the alternative way for a state with an indeterminate sentencing regime to qualify is by showing that such prisoners “on average serve not less than 85 percent of the maximum prison term,” 42 U.”
Kim v. State of Kansas (2006)
“He relied on 42 U.S.C. § 13704 , which conditions a state’s receipt of truth-in-sentencing grants on the state’s implementation of laws requiring that part-1 violent criminals serve no less than 85% of their sentences.”
Bottom v. Pataki (2015)
“to violent felons, and therefore had failed to consider the statutory factors enumerated in New York’s parole statute, Executive Law § 259 — i; and (2) the Board’s decision to deny Bottom parole was motivated by factors outside of those enumerated in § 259 — i, in particular by…”
Farmer v. McVey (2009)
“Farmer has not alleged the source of these federal requirements, but he appears to be referring to the Violent Offenders Incarceration — Truth in Sentencing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13704 , et seq., which imposes requirements that states must meet in order to receive federal grants for…”
Gannett Satellite Information Network, LLC v. U.S. Department of Justice (2025)
“13, 2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13704 (2000) (current version at 34 U.”
Joseph Farmer v. Catherine C. McVey (2011)
“In his amended complaint, Farmer occasionally refers to 42 U.S.C. § 13704 , which provides for federal grants to states that comply with various prerequisites, including requiring that certain violent offenders serve a substantial percentage of their judicially imposed sentences.”
United States v. Klear (2014)
“” While the phrase has been used in the context of other sentencing goals, such as definite sentencing, see 42 U.S.C. § 13704 , the court now uses it to represent the idea that, while courts cannot get away from subjectivity in sentencing, they should as much as possible use…”
— 42 U.S.C. § 13704(a)(l)(C)(i) — 1 case
Nathaniel Porter, Jr. v. Walter S. Ray, Jr. (2006)
“The appellants assert that the Board enacted and applied the 90% policy and continued to apply a de facto 90% policy even after abandoning the official 90% policy in order to obtain federal grants under the Violent Offenders Incarceration— Truth in Sentencing Act (“VOI/TIS”), 42…”
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