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U.S. CodeTitle 47Chapter 5— Wire or Radio CommunicationSubchapter II— Common CarriersPart I— Common Carrier Regulation

47 U.S.C. § 201 (2026)

Service and charges

Edition and currency
U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTU.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point) cited 1936–2026 519citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 519 opinions since 1936, 32 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (2 cases).

(a) It shall be the duty of every common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio to furnish such communication service upon reasonable request therefor; and, in accordance with the orders of the Commission, in cases where the Commission, after opportunity for hearing, finds such action necessary or desirable in the public interest, to establish physical connections with other carriers, to establish through routes and charges applicable thereto and the divisions of such charges, and to establish and provide facilities and regulations for operating such through routes.(b) All charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with such communication service, shall be just and reasonable, and any such charge, practice, classification, or regulation that is unjust or unreasonable is declared to be unlawful: Provided, That communications by wire or radio subject to this chapter may be classified into day, night, repeated, unrepeated, letter, commercial, press, Government, and such other classes as the Commission may decide to be just and reasonable, and different charges may be made for the different classes of communications: Provided further, That nothing in this chapter or in any other provision of law shall be construed to prevent a common carrier subject to this chapter from entering into or operating under any contract with any common carrier not subject to this chapter, for the exchange of their services, if the Commission is of the opinion that such contract is not contrary to the public interest: Provided further, That nothing in this chapter or in any other provision of law shall prevent a common carrier subject to this chapter from furnishing reports of positions of ships at sea to newspapers of general circulation, either at a nominal charge or without charge, provided the name of such common carrier is displayed along with such ship position reports. The Commission may prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this chapter.(June 19, 1934, ch. 652, title II, § 201, 48 Stat. 1070; May 31, 1938, ch. 296, 52 Stat. 588.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

This chapter, referred to in subsec. (b), was in the original “this Act”, meaning act June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, known as the Communications Act of 1934, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 609 of this title and Tables.

Amendments

1938—Subsec. (b). Act May 31, 1938, inserted proviso relating to reports of positions of ships at sea.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesTelephone Rates for Members of Armed Forces Deployed Abroad

Pub. L. 109–459, § 2, Dec. 22, 2006, 120 Stat. 3399, provided that:“(a)In General.—The Federal Communications Commission shall take such action as may be necessary to reduce the cost of calling home for Armed Forces personnel who are stationed outside the United States under official military orders or deployed outside the United States in support of military operations, training exercises, or other purposes as approved by the Secretary of Defense, including the reduction of such costs through the waiver of government fees, assessments, or other charges for such calls. The Commission may not regulate rates in order to carry out this section.“(b)Factors To Consider.—In taking the action described in subsection (a), the Commission, in coordination with the Department of Defense and the Department of State, shall—“(1) evaluate and analyze the costs to Armed Forces personnel of such telephone calls to and from American military bases abroad;“(2) evaluate methods of reducing the rates imposed on such calls, including deployment of new technology such as voice over Internet protocol or other Internet protocol technology;“(3) encourage telecommunications carriers (as defined in section 3(44) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153(44) [now 153(51)])) to adopt flexible billing procedures and policies for Armed Forces personnel and their dependents for telephone calls to and from such Armed Forces personnel; and“(4) seek agreements with foreign governments to reduce international surcharges on such telephone calls.“(c)Definitions.—In this section:“(1)Armed forces.—The term ‘Armed Forces’ has the meaning given that term by section 2101(2) of title 5, United States Code.“(2)Military base.—The term ‘military base’ includes official duty stations to include vessels, whether such vessels are in port or underway outside of the United States.”

Pub. L. 102–538, title II, § 213, Oct. 27, 1992, 106 Stat. 3545, which required the Federal Communications Commission to make efforts to reduce telephone rates for Armed Forces personnel in certain countries, was repealed by Pub. L. 109–459, § 3, Dec. 22, 2006, 120 Stat. 3400.

The 20 cases that cite 47 U.S.C. § 201 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENUnited States Telecom Ass'n v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
cites § 201 12×cited by 79 cases
Where it cites § 201
“§ 202(a), and charge “just and reasonable” rates, id. § 201(b). The Computer II rules also recognized a third category of services, “adjunct-to-basic” services: enhanced services, such as “speed dialing, call forwarding, [and] computer-provided directory assistance,” that…”
The case’s holding
Broadband providers do not receive First Amendment protection against net neutrality rules because they are not engaged in the indiscriminate, neutral transmission of speech.
Later courts cite it for
“entities that serve as conduits for speech produced by others receive first amendment protection . . . when the entities are not engaged in indiscriminate, neutral transmission of any and all users' speech.” · 4 citing courts
cites § 201 16×cited by 106 cases
Where it cites § 201
“1070 , 47 U.S.C. § 201 (b). Communications Act language links § 201(b) to § 207, which authorizes any person "damaged" by a violation of § 201(b) to bring a lawsuit to recover damages in federal court.”
Holding on this section
The Commission possesses broad authority to define unreasonable practices under section 201(b) of the Communications Act.
Later courts cite it for
“to violate a regulation that lawfully implements 201(b)'s requirements is to violate the statute.” · 6 citing courts
3
GREENVerizon v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
cites § 201 10×cited by 56 cases
Where it cites § 201
“The Computer II rules drew a line between “basic” services, which were subject to regulation under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 as common carrier services, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and “enhanced” services, which were not.”
The case’s holding
An agency cannot impose regulations that constitute per se common carrier obligations if it has classified the regulated entities as exempt from common carrier treatment.
Later courts cite it for
“determine whether the commission's actions were 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENAt&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
cites § 201 6×cited by 543 cases
Where it cites § 201
“588 , 47 U. S. C. § 201 (b). Since Congress expressly directed that the 1996 Act, along with its local-competition provisions, be inserted into the Communications Act of 1934, 1996 Act, § 1(b), 110 Stat.”
The case’s holding
The Federal Communications Commission possesses rulemaking authority to implement the provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, including matters affecting intrastate telecommunications services.
Later courts cite it for
“there is no doubt . . . that if the federal courts believe a state commission is not regulating in accordance with federal policy they may bring it to heel.” · 18 citing courts
5
GREENBeattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2007).
cites § 201 5×cited by 204 cases
Where it cites § 201
“Plaintiffs-Appellees moved the district court for class certification and for judgment on the pleadings on Count I of the Complaint, which alleged that Centu-ryTel engaged in unjust and unreasonable billing practices in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 201 (b) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.2401 .”
The case’s holding
A claim is typical if it arises from the same event, practice, or course of conduct as the claims of other class members and is based on the same legal theory.
Later courts cite it for
“on the other hand, . . . the typicality requirement is not satisfied when a plaintiff can prove his own claim but not 'necessarily have proved anybody's else's claim.” · 7 citing courts
6
GREENBeattie v. Centurytel, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 160 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
cites § 201 11×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 201
“The plaintiffs’ suit alleges that the defendant intentionally mislabeled the wire service program and by keeping the charge relatively small reaped substantial rewards for what amounts to a deceptive billing practice under the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 201 (b), and…”
Holding on this section
A telecommunications billing description that labels a charge only by what it is not, such as Non-Regulated Services, does not satisfy truth-in-billing requirements and violates section 201(b) as an unreasonable practice.
Later courts cite it for
“a motion to strike should only be granted if there is a clear showing that the challenged defense has no bearing on the subject matter and that permitting the defense to stand would prejudice the plaintiff.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENDirect Commc'ns Cedar Valley, LLC v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 753 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 2014).
cites § 201 6×cited by 57 cases
Where it cites § 201
“And for interstate traffic, the FCC relies on 47 U.S.C. § 201 . Id. at 646-47 ¶ 771, 675-76 ¶¶ 834-36.”
The case’s holding
An argument not raised in a reply brief cannot be used to rebut an opposing party's argument (7 of 14).
Later courts cite it for
“the arbitrary-and-capricious standard requires an agency to provide an adequate explanation to justify treating similarly situated parties differently.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENCenturyTel of Chatham, LLC v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., 861 F.3d 566 (5th Cir. 2017).
cites § 201 6×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 201
“Under 47 U.S.C. § 201 (b), a private right of action exists for damages for “any ‘practice’ in connection with providing communications services ‘that is unjust or unreasonable’”.”
9
cites § 201 2×cited by 667 cases
Where it cites § 201
“588 , codified at 47 U.S.C. § 201 (b). Of course, that rulemaking authority extends to the subsequently added portions of the Act.”
The case’s holding
Courts must accord deference to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statutory ambiguity, even when that ambiguity concerns the scope of the agency's own jurisdiction.
Later courts cite it for
“no matter how it is framed, the question a court faces when confronted with an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers is always, simply, whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority.” · 34 citing courts
10
GREENGonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
cites § 201 2×cited by 620 cases
Where it cites § 201
“`prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions' of the Act" (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 201 (b))); Household Credit Services, Inc.”
The case’s holding
The Controlled Substances Act does not authorize the Attorney General to define medical standards of care or prohibit physician-assisted suicide through interpretive rules.
Later courts cite it for
“deference in accordance with chevron ... is warranted only 'when it appears that congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” · 36 citing courts
11
GREENRobert Johnson v. Am. Towers, LLC, 781 F.3d 693 (4th Cir. 2015).
cites § 201 3×cited by 144 cases
Where it cites § 201
“In doing so, the district court relied on three provisions of the Act: (1) Section 332, the Act’s preemption provision; and (2) Sections 201 and 207, which when read in conjunction allow private parties to recover damages resulting from a common carrier’s breach of its…”
The case’s holding
The Communications Act does not completely preempt state-law claims but expressly preempts state-law tort duties that obstruct a provider's ability to provide wireless service coverage.
Later courts cite it for
“a complaint must include 'more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” · 6 citing courts
12
GREENGlobal TelLink v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 866 F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
cites § 201 3×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 201
“EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: The Communications Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) authorized the Federal Communications Commission (“Commission” or “FCC”) to ensure that interstate telephone rates are “just and reasonable,” 47 U.S.C. § 201 (b), but left regulation of intrastate rates…”
The case’s holding
The FCC lacks statutory authority to cap intrastate inmate calling rates because such regulatory power remains reserved to the states under the Communications Act.
Later courts cite it for
“if agreeing to pay site commissions is a condition precedent to ics providers offering their services, those commissions are related to the provision of ics.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENMCI Commc'ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
cites § 201 3×cited by 489 cases
Where it cites § 201
“See 47 U.S.C. § 201 (a) (1976). With respect to tariffs, the 1934 Act continued the prior practice that tariffs be generated, at least in the first instance, by the carriers themselves.”
The case’s holding
A pervasive regulatory scheme does not grant implied antitrust immunity unless the regulatory provisions are plainly repugnant to the Sherman Act.
Later courts cite it for
“extend monopoly power from one stage of production to another, and from one market into another.” · 17 citing courts
cites § 201 2×cited by 330 cases
Where it cites § 201
“" 47 U.S.C. §§ 201 (b), 202(a) (2000 ed.). And, in my view, a purchaser from a regulated firm (which, if a natural monopolist, is lawfully such) cannot win an antitrust case simply by showing that it is "squeezed" between the regulated firm's wholesale price (to the plaintiff)…”
The case’s holding
An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and the failure to include claims in an amended complaint constitutes an abandonment of those claims.
Later courts cite it for
“normally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint” · 126 citing courts
15
GREENIn re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing, 619 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2010).
cites § 201 6×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 201
“On March 10, 2003, plaintiffs filed a second consolidated and amended class action complaint alleging, among other things, violations of federal antitrust laws, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201 (b) and 202, the New York and Kansas statutory consumer protection acts, and breach of contract.”
16
GREENIn re Core Commc'ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
cites § 201 2×cited by 280 cases
Where it cites § 201
“47 U.S.C. § 201 . [2] Section 251(g) provides, in relevant part: On and after [the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996], each local exchange carrier .”
The case’s holding
The central question in evaluating a claim of unreasonable delay is whether the agency's delay is so egregious as to warrant a writ of mandamus.
Later courts cite it for
“are not 'ironclad,' but rather are intended to provide 'useful guidance in assessing claims of agency delay.” · 56 citing courts
17
YELLOWSikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2002).
cites § 201 3×cited by 83 cases
Abrogated by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. on other grounds: 3 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 201
“§§ 1961 to 1968 (1994), the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 229 (1994), and the federal common law of communications law.”
The case’s holding
A district court errs in certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(3) for RICO claims by applying a presumption of reliance, injury, and damages.
Later courts cite it for
“to allow recovery by persons who have not been injured or to allow recovery for an injury greater than that caused by the offending conduct would run counter to the plain language of 18 u.s.c. 1964 (c).” · 3 citing courts
18
GREENUnited States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
cites § 201 2×cited by 868 cases
The case’s holding
A federal court may use the All Writs Act to issue commands to nonparties necessary to effectuate court orders or prevent the frustration of the administration of justice.
Later courts cite it for
“the power conferred by the act extends, under appropriate circumstances, to persons who, though not parties to the original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the proper administration of justice.” · 110 citing courts
cites § 201 4×cited by 102 cases
Where it cites § 201
“, and that this federal statute provided the exclusive remedy for the defendants’ allegedly unlawful actions.”
The case’s holding
The Federal Communications Commission has primary jurisdiction to determine whether a term or condition of a long-distance service contract constitutes an unreasonable practice under the Communications Act.
Later courts cite it for
“section 201(b) speaks in terms of reasonableness, and the very charge of count i is that the defendants engaged in unreasonable practices;this is a determination that congress has placed squarely in the hands of the fcc.” · 4 citing courts
20
GREENGlobal TelLink v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 859 F.3d 39 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
cites § 201 6×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 201
“EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: The Communications Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) authorized the Federal Communications Commission (“Commission” or “FCC”) to ensure that interstate telephone rates are “just and reasonable,” 47 U.S.C. § 201 (b), but left regulation of intrastate rates…”
Later courts cite it for
“clients with an interest in the provision of inmate calling services.” · 2 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
193619812026

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 43 cases in 2002–2003. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
D.C. Cir.989th Cir.31S.D.N.Y.262d Cir.22D.S.D.14N.D. Ill.1311th Cir.128th Cir.12

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 98 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)2 cases
Bell Atl. Tel. Companies v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
People's Tel. Coop. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 399 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Tex. 1975).
(b)2 cases
McLeodusa Telecomm. Servs., Inc. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (S.D. Iowa 2008).
Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. FCC, No. 24-3206 (6th Cir. Aug. 13, 2025).

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Enactment and amendments
(June 19, 1934, ch. 652, title II, § 201, 48 Stat. 1070; May 31, 1938, ch. 296, 52 Stat. 588.)
Amendment years (notes): 1938
Versions

Edition shown: U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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