49 U.S.C. § 11501

Tax discrimination against rail transportation property

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(a) In this section—(1) the term “assessment” means valuation for a property tax levied by a taxing district;(2) the term “assessment jurisdiction” means a geographical area in a State used in determining the assessed value of property for ad valorem taxation;(3) the term “rail transportation property” means property, as defined by the Board, owned or used by a rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Board under this part; and(4) the term “commercial and industrial property” means property, other than transportation property and land used primarily for agricultural purposes or timber growing, devoted to a commercial or industrial use and subject to a property tax levy.(b) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate against interstate commerce, and a State, subdivision of a State, or authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do any of them:(1) Assess rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation property than the ratio that the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of the other commercial and industrial property.(2) Levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be made under paragraph (1) of this subsection.(3) Levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on rail transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction.(4) Impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Board under this part.(c) Notwithstanding section 1341 of title 28 and without regard to the amount in controversy or citizenship of the parties, a district court of the United States has jurisdiction, concurrent with other jurisdiction of courts of the United States and the States, to prevent a violation of subsection (b) of this section. Relief may be granted under this subsection only if the ratio of assessed value to true market value of rail transportation property exceeds by at least 5 percent the ratio of assessed value to true market value of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction. The burden of proof in determining assessed value and true market value is governed by State law. If the ratio of the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property in the assessment jurisdiction to the true market value of all other commercial and industrial property cannot be determined to the satisfaction of the district court through the random-sampling method known as a sales assessment ratio study (to be carried out under statistical principles applicable to such a study), the court shall find, as a violation of this section—(1) an assessment of the rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation property than the assessed value of all other property subject to a property tax levy in the assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of all other commercial and industrial property; and(2) the collection of an ad valorem property tax on the rail transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax ratio rate applicable to taxable property in the taxing district.(Added Pub. L. 104–88, title I, § 102(a), Dec. 29, 1995, 109 Stat. 843.)Editorial NotesPrior Provisions

Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in section 11503 of this title prior to the general amendment of this subtitle by Pub. L. 104–88, § 102(a).

A prior section 11501, Pub. L. 95–473, Oct. 17, 1978, 92 Stat. 1444; Pub. L. 96–448, title II, § 214(a)–(c)(1), Oct. 14, 1980, 94 Stat. 1913, 1915; Pub. L. 97–261, § 17(a), Sept. 20, 1982, 96 Stat. 1117; Pub. L. 99–521, § 11(a), Oct. 22, 1986, 100 Stat. 2997; Pub. L. 103–272, § 4(j)(34), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1370; Pub. L. 103–305, title VI, § 601(c), Aug. 23, 1994, 108 Stat. 1606; Pub. L. 103–311, title II, § 211(b)(2), Aug. 26, 1994, 108 Stat. 1689, related to Interstate Commerce Commission authority over intrastate transportation, prior to the general amendment of this subtitle by Pub. L. 104–88, § 102(a). See section 14501 of this title.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date

Section effective Jan. 1, 1996, except as otherwise provided in Pub. L. 104–88, see section 2 of Pub. L. 104–88, set out as a note under section 1301 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 154 cases (11 in the last 5 years), 1979–2025 · leading case: Housatonic Railroad v. Commissioner of Revenue Services
Housatonic Railroad v. Commissioner of Revenue Services (2011) conn · cites it 22× “31, which, among other things, prohibits states from taxing rail carriers in a discriminatory manner; see 49 U.S.C. § 11501 (b) (2006); (2) General Statutes § 12-597, which permits "[a]ny taxpayer" aggrieved by an order or decision of the commissioner with respect to the…”
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Revenue (2018) ca11 · cites it 7× “The question before us is whether Alabama's tax scheme, which imposes either a sales or use tax on rail carriers when they buy or consume diesel fuel but exempts competing motor and water carriers from those taxes, violates the Act.”
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Revenue (2012) alnd · cites it 13× “, this court is called upon to answer such a knotty question and must determine whether, under the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (“4-R Act”), 49 U.S.C. § 11501 , the State of Alabama’s “sales and use” tax constitutes “another tax that discriminates against a…”
Alabama Dept. of Revenue v. CSX Transp., Inc. (2015) scotus · cites it 5× “" 49 U.S.C. § 11501 (b)(4). We are asked to decide whether a State violates this prohibition by taxing diesel fuel purchases made by a rail carrier while exempting similar purchases made by its competitors; and if so, whether the violation *1140 is eliminated when other tax…”
State of Texas v. United States of America and Interstate Commerce Commission (1984) ca5 · cites it 9× “” 49 U.S.C. § 11501 (b)(1) (Supp. V 1981). Texas argues that “the provisions of this subtitle” are limited to explicit provisions of the Staggers Act itself and do not include rules and regulations promulgated by the ICC.”
Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Koeller (2011) ca7 · cites it 7× “49 U.S.C. § 11501 . In 2008, the Sny Island Levee Drainage District (“Sny Island” or “District”), a subdivision of Illinois, changed its long-standing method for calculating assessments due from railroads and other properties within its system.”
Bnsf Railway Company v. Oregon Department of Revenue (2020) ca9 · cites it 19× “The panel held that the proper comparison class for BNSF was Oregon’s commercial and industrial taxpayers, and the intangible personal property tax assessment discriminated against BNSF in violation of the 4-R Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11501 (b)(4). Concurring, District Judge Chhabria…”
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Revenue (2017) ca4 · cites it 7× “See 49 U.S.C. § 11501 (b)(4). Because we conclude that the district court’s basis for awarding judgment against CSXT was invalid, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.”
The Railroad Commission of Texas v. United States of America and Interstate Commerce Commission, Association of American (1985) cadc · cites it 8× “See 49 U.S.C. §§ 11501 (b)(1), (2), (3). Within the statutory 120-day application period, forty States filed for certification, each expressing the intent to follow the requisite federal standards and procedures.”
Burlington Northern, Santa Fe Railway Company v. Janette M. Lohman, Director, Department of Revenue of the State of Miss (1999) ca8 · cites it 8× “Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (Burlington Northern) appeals the district court’s holding that the State of Missouri did not violate 49 U.S.C. § 11501 (b)(4) of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (the 4-R Act) by discriminating against the…”
Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Sny Island Levee Drainage District (2016) ca7 · cites it 3× “The Railroads have now sued the District for the second time, alleging, as they did in the earlier case, that the District used an assessment calculation formula that discriminated against them in violation of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (the “4-R…”
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization (2005) gand · cites it 13× “5, 1976), which is now codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11501 (the “4-R Act”). The 4-R Act confers concurrent jurisdiction on federal district courts to enforce its provisions, so long as “the ratio of assessed value to true market value of rail transportation property exceeds by at…”
— 49 U.S.C. § 11501(a) — 1 case
— 49 U.S.C. § 11501(a)(4) — 1 case
— 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b) — 1 case
— 49 U.S.C. § 11501(c) — 1 case
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