49 U.S.C. § 3

SECURITY INCIDENT RESPONSE AT AIRPORTS.

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“(a)In General.—The Assistant Secretary shall, in consultation with other Federal agencies as appropriate, conduct outreach to all airports in the United States at which the Administration performs, or oversees the implementation and performance of, security measures, and provide technical assistance as necessary, to verify such airports have in place individualized working plans for responding to security incidents inside the perimeter of the airport, including active shooters, acts of terrorism, and incidents that target passenger-screening checkpoints.“(b)Types of Plans.—Such plans may include, but may not be limited to, the following:“(1) A strategy for evacuating and providing care to persons inside the perimeter of the airport, with consideration given to the needs of persons with disabilities.“(2) A plan for establishing a unified command, including identification of staging areas for non-airport-specific law enforcement and fire response.“(3) A schedule for regular testing of communications equipment used to receive emergency calls.“(4) An evaluation of how emergency calls placed by persons inside the perimeter of the airport will reach airport police in an expeditious manner.“(5) A practiced method and plan to communicate with travelers and all other persons inside the perimeter of the airport.“(6) To the extent practicable, a projected maximum timeframe for law enforcement response to active shooters, acts of terrorism, and incidents that target passenger security-screening checkpoints.“(7) A schedule of joint exercises and training to be conducted by the airport, the Administration, other stakeholders such as airport and airline tenants, and any relevant law enforcement, airport police, fire, and medical personnel.“(8) A schedule for producing after-action joint exercise reports to identify and determine how to improve security incident response capabilities.“(9) A strategy, where feasible, for providing airport law enforcement with access to airport security video surveillance systems at category X airports where those systems were purchased and installed using Administration funds.“(c)Report to Congress.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Sept. 24, 2015], the Assistant Secretary shall report to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate on the findings from its outreach to airports under subsection (a), including an analysis of the level of preparedness such airports have to respond to security incidents, including active shooters, acts of terrorism, and incidents that target passenger-screening checkpoints.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 243 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1927–2023 · leading case: Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261 (1968).

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Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261 (1968). · cites it 4× “902 , 49 U. S. C. § 3 (1), Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Chicago, R.”

S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Com. Metals Co., 456 U.S. 336 (1982). · cites it 2× “The District Court, however, went on to hold that Metals had established a valid equitable defense to SP’s collection of the charges by showing that SP had failed to comply with the ICC’s credit regulations promulgated pursuant to § 3(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S.…”

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). · cites it 2× “20; 49 U.S.C. §§ 3 , 4, 5. Cf. Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U.”

Am. Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 387 U.S. 397 (1967). · cites it 3× “Section 3 (1), 49 U. S. C. § 3 (1), forbids undue *407 preferences or advantages, and undue or unreasonable prejudices or disadvantages to any person, area or particular description of traffic.”

Interstate Com. Comm'n v. Inland Waterways Corp., 319 U.S. 671 (1943). · cites it 5× “" The decision of the Commission also violates § 3 (4) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 3 (4), which under the 1940 amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act is applicable to the appellees, and which forbids carriers to "discriminate in their rates, fares, and charges…”

United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). · cites it 2× “To decline to find a constitutional right of the nature asserted here does not render the Federal Government *773 helpless.”

Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945). · cites it 2× “The witness relied on § 3 (1) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 3 (1), making it unlawful for any rail carrier to make or give undue or unreasonable preferences or advantage to any particular person, locality or particular description of traffic; on § 1 (4) (5) (6), 49 U.”

Nw. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Burchwell Co., Inc., 349 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1965). · cites it 7× “We hold that the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 3 (2) and 3(3), imposes liability for the freight charges on the original consignee unless he notify the carrier that he is not the owner of the goods.”

New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284 (1947). · cites it 2× “902 , 49 U.S.C. § 3 (1). But the Act already prohibited undue prejudice or preference to any "locality" and it is conceded that *361 the 1940 Act made no change in the substantive law of discrimination.”

Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960). · cites it 2× “" So far as relevant to our problem, the provisions of § 216 (d) quoted are the same as those in § 3 (1) of the Act, 49 U. S. C. § 3 (1), except that the latter refers to railroads as defined in Part I of the Act instead of motor carriers as defined in Part II.”

Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1941). · cites it 2× “380 , 49 U.S.C.A. § 3 (1887) of the Interstate Commerce Act makes it unlawful for a carrier to subject any person or traffic to unreasonable disadvantage, and while Section 8, 24 Stat.”

Interstate Com. Comm'n v. Mechling, 330 U.S. 567 (1947). · cites it 2× “898 , 903-904, 49 U.S.C. § 3 (4). Finally § 2 of the pre-existing Act has long forbidden the Commission to authorize railroads to charge one person more than another for "a like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under substantially *577…”

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— 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) — 6 cases

Samuel Bailey v. Joe T. Patterson, Attorney Gen. of the State of Mississippi, 323 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1963).

State of New York v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 856 (N.D.N.Y. 1946).

Terminal Warehouse Co. of Baltimore City v. United States, 31 F.2d 951 (D. Maryland 1929).

Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. United States, 401 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Int'l Milling Co., 33 F.2d 636 (D. Minnesota 1929).

— 49 U.S.C. § 3(2) — 4 cases

Consol. Freightways Corp. of Delaware v. Admiral Corp., 442 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1971).

Roll Form Prods., Inc. v. All State Trucking Co. (In Re Roll Form Prods., Inc.), 8 B.R. 479 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).

Lyon Van Lines, Inc. v. Ogden, 503 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App. 1973).

Cont'l Shippers' Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 328 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1964).

— 49 U.S.C. § 3(3) — 2 cases

Illinois Cent. R. v. W. Smelting & Refining Co., 123 F. Supp. 3 (D. Neb. 1954).

New York Cent. R. v. Long Island R., 57 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1932).

— 49 U.S.C. § 3(4) — 6 cases

Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 346 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1965).

Pittsburgh & W. v. Ry. Co. v. United States, 41 F.2d 806 (N.D. Ohio 1929).

New York Cent. R. v. Long Island R., 57 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1932).

Des Moines Terminal Co. v. Des Moines Union Ry. Co., 52 F.2d 605 (S.D. Iowa 1929).

United States ex rel. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Com. Comm'n, 18 F. Supp. 94 (D.D.C. 1937).

— 49 U.S.C. § 3(5) — 1 case

Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Ohio 1965).

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