§ 717. Evidence of highway completion or discontinuance
(a) The lack of a certificate of completion of a highway shall not alone constitute conclusive
evidence that a highway is not public.
(b) A town or county highway that has not been kept passable for use by the general public
for motorized travel at the expense of the municipality for a period of 30 or more
consecutive years following a final determination to discontinue the highway shall
be presumed to have been effectively discontinued. This presumption of discontinuance
may be rebutted by evidence that manifests a clear intent by the municipality or county
and the public to consider or use the way as a highway. The presumption of discontinuance
shall not be rebutted by evidence that shows isolated acts of maintenance, unless
other evidence exists that shows a clear intent by the municipality or county to consider
or use the highway as if it were a public right-of-way.
(c) A person whose sole means of access to a parcel of land or portion thereof owned by
that person is by way of a town highway or unidentified corridor that is subsequently
discontinued shall retain a private right-of-way over the former town highway or unidentified
corridor for any necessary access to the parcel of land or portion thereof and maintenance
of his or her right-of-way. (Added 1999, No. 156 (Adj. Sess.), § 25, eff. May 29, 2000; amended 2005, No. 178 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.)
Steven Daiello v. Town of Vernon v. Dale A. Merritt & Brenda Merritt, 2022 VT 32 (Vt. 2022). · cites it 7דThey argued that the common-law right recognized in Okemo has been limited in subsequent cases and as codified in 19 V.S.A. § 717(c). ¶ 27. In an order granting neighbors’ motion in part, the court emphasized that it found that landowner had a private right of access over…”
McAdams v. Town of Barnard, 182 Vt. 259 (Vt. 2007). · cites it 3דThat section now provides for a "presumption of discontinuance" when a road has not been maintained by the municipality for thirty years.”
McAdams v. Town of Barnard, 936 A.2d 1310 (Vt. 2007). · cites it 3דThis presumption is rebuttable by evidence of the municipality’s intent to continue the road as a public right-of-way.”
Benson v. Hodgdon, 2010 VT 11 (Vt. 2010). · cites it 2דSee 19 V.S.A. § 717(b) (creating presumption of discontinuance if municipality has not kept highway passable for period of “30 or more consecutive years following a final determination to discontinue the highway” (emphasis added)).”
Town of Granville & Green Crow Corp., Inc. v. Joseph Loprete, 178 A.3d 1013 (Vt. 2017). · cites it 5דThe Town asserted that it did not need to show that a certificate of opening was recorded, citing 19 V.S.A. § 717(a) ("The lack of a certificate of completion of a highway shall not alone constitute conclusive evidence that a highway is not public.”
David Demarest v. Town of Underhill, 2021 VT 14 (Vt. 2021). “Legally, plaintiff relies on the common-law private right of access recognized in Okemo Mountain, and the statutory right of access codified at 19 V.S.A. § 717(c). Critical to these claims is his assertion that topographical features and wetlands on his property prevent…”
Austin v. Town of Middlesex, 2009 VT 102 (Vt. 2009). “§ 25, 19 V.S.A. § 717(a) (“The lack of a certificate of completion of a highway shall not alone constitute conclusive evidence that a highway is not public”).”
Town of Granville v. LoPrete (Vt. Super. Ct. 2016). “19 V.S.A. § 717(a). That statute expressly provides, “The lack of a certificate of completion of a highway shall not alone constitute conclusive evidence that a highway is not public.”
Gerlach v. Town of Chittenden (Vt. Super. Ct. 2025). “Analysis Plaintiffs seeks a judgment declaring that the disputed trail was properly discontinued by court order in 1846 or “pursuant to the presumption of discontinuance contained in 19 V.S.A. § 717.” (Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J.”
— Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 717(a) — 3 cases
Town of Granville & Green Crow Corp., Inc. v. Joseph Loprete, 178 A.3d 1013 (Vt. 2017). “The Town asserted that it did not need to show that a certificate of opening was recorded, citing 19 V.S.A. § 717(a) ("The lack of a certificate of completion of a highway shall not alone constitute conclusive evidence that a highway is not public.”
Austin v. Town of Middlesex, 2009 VT 102 (Vt. 2009). “§ 25, 19 V.S.A. § 717(a) (“The lack of a certificate of completion of a highway shall not alone constitute conclusive evidence that a highway is not public”).”
Town of Granville v. LoPrete (Vt. Super. Ct. 2016). “19 V.S.A. § 717(a). That statute expressly provides, “The lack of a certificate of completion of a highway shall not alone constitute conclusive evidence that a highway is not public.”
— Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 717(b) — 3 cases
Benson v. Hodgdon, 2010 VT 11 (Vt. 2010). “See 19 V.S.A. § 717(b) (creating presumption of discontinuance if municipality has not kept highway passable for period of “30 or more consecutive years following a final determination to discontinue the highway” (emphasis added)).”
McAdams v. Town of Barnard, 182 Vt. 259 (Vt. 2007). “That section now provides for a "presumption of discontinuance" when a road has not been maintained by the municipality for thirty years.”
McAdams v. Town of Barnard, 936 A.2d 1310 (Vt. 2007). “This presumption is rebuttable by evidence of the municipality’s intent to continue the road as a public right-of-way.”
— Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 717(c) — 4 cases
Steven Daiello v. Town of Vernon v. Dale A. Merritt & Brenda Merritt, 2022 VT 32 (Vt. 2022). “They argued that the common-law right recognized in Okemo has been limited in subsequent cases and as codified in 19 V.S.A. § 717(c). ¶ 27. In an order granting neighbors’ motion in part, the court emphasized that it found that landowner had a private right of access over…”
McAdams v. Town of Barnard, 182 Vt. 259 (Vt. 2007). “That section now provides for a "presumption of discontinuance" when a road has not been maintained by the municipality for thirty years.”
McAdams v. Town of Barnard, 936 A.2d 1310 (Vt. 2007). “This presumption is rebuttable by evidence of the municipality’s intent to continue the road as a public right-of-way.”
David Demarest v. Town of Underhill, 2021 VT 14 (Vt. 2021). “Legally, plaintiff relies on the common-law private right of access recognized in Okemo Mountain, and the statutory right of access codified at 19 V.S.A. § 717(c). Critical to these claims is his assertion that topographical features and wetlands on his property prevent…”
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