Virginia Code

Va. Code Ann. § 34-29 (2026)

Maximum portion of disposable earnings subject to garnishment

✓ current as of May 2026
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(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (b1), the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek that is subjected to garnishment may not exceed the lesser of the following amounts:

(1) Twenty-five percent of his disposable earnings for that week; or

(2) The amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed 40 times the federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) or the Virginia minimum hourly wage prescribed by § 40.1-28.10, whichever is greater, in effect at the time earnings are payable.

In the case of earnings for any pay period other than a week, the State Commissioner of Labor and Industry shall by regulation prescribe a multiple of the federal or Virginia minimum hourly wage equivalent in effect to that set forth in this section.

(b) The restrictions of subsection (a) do not apply in the case of:

(1) Any order for the support of any person issued by a court of competent jurisdiction or in accordance with an administrative procedure that is established by state law, affords substantial due process, and is subject to judicial review.

(2) Any order of any court of bankruptcy under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act.

(3) Any debt due for any state or federal tax.

(b1) The maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek that is subject to garnishment to enforce any order for the support of any person shall not exceed:

(1) Sixty percent of such individual's disposable earnings for that week; or

(2) If such individual is supporting a spouse or dependent child other than the spouse or child with respect to whose support such order was issued, 50 percent of such individual's disposable earnings for that week.

The 50 percent specified in subdivision (2) shall be 55 percent and the 60 percent specified in subdivision (1) shall be 65 percent if and to the extent that such earnings are subject to garnishment to enforce an order for support for a period that is more than 12 weeks prior to the beginning of such workweek.

(c) No court of the Commonwealth and no state agency or officer may make, execute, or enforce any order or process in violation of this section.

The exemptions allowed herein shall be granted to any person so entitled without any further proceedings.

(d) For the purposes of this section:

(1) The term "earnings" means compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, payments to an independent contractor, or otherwise, whether paid directly to the individual or deposited with another entity or person on behalf of and traceable to the individual, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program,

(2) The term "disposable earnings" means that part of the earnings of any individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts required by law to be withheld, and

(3) The term "garnishment" means any legal or equitable procedure through which the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for payment of any debt.

(e) Every assignment, sale, transfer, pledge, or mortgage of the wages or salary of an individual that is exempted by this section, to the extent of the exemption provided by this section, shall be void and unenforceable by any process of law.

(f) No employer may discharge any employee by reason of the fact that his earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness.

(g) A depository wherein earnings have been deposited on behalf of and traceable to an individual shall not be required to determine the portion of such earnings that are subject to garnishment.

Code 1919, § 6555; 1928, p. 348; 1938, p. 574; 1948, p. 489; 1952, c. 432; 1954, cc. 143, 379; 1958, cc. 217, 417; 1960, c. 498; 1970, c. 428; 1978, c. 564; 1992, c. 674; 1996, c. 330; 2005, c. 286; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, c. 8.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 33 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1978–2025 · leading case: In re Foster, 556 B.R. 233 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016).
In re Foster, 556 B.R. 233 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016). · cites it 117× “exemption on Va.Code § 34-29. 1 Both the chapter 13 trustee and Margaret S.”
In re Cantu, 553 B.R. 565 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016). · cites it 17× “At the hearing, Debtor’s counsel argued that the Debtor was entitled to exempt the income represented by the savings in not having to pay his retirement fund loan under either Va.Code § 34-29 (which allows an exemption from garnishment of 75% of wages for non-support debts) or…”
In Re Hanes, 162 B.R. 733 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994). · cites it 16× “§ 541 (c)(2) and Va.Code § 34-29 (Mi-chie Supp.1993). 2 The first plan arises from the Debtor’s employment with the firm Wer-theim & Company.”
In Re Sheeran, 369 B.R. 910 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007). · cites it 21× “63 under Va.Code § 34-29 in what she calls accrued wages in violation of express provisions contained in the very code section she cites, (3) her interest in her portion of her ex-husband’s future mil *912 itary retirement pay pursuant to 38 U.”
Frazier v. Commonwealth, 348 S.E.2d 405 (Va. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 12× “Appellant invoked the provisions of Code § 34-29 1 as his defense to the show cause order.”
In re Delima, 561 B.R. 647 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016). · cites it 15× “63 of that amount as exempt under Va. Code Ann. § 34-29 . The trustee objected to the debtors’ claim of exemption.”
In Re Meyer, 211 B.R. 203 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997). · cites it 6× “The continued vitality of that portion of Bemardini holding that an exemption is lost if otherwise-exempt wages are deposited into a non-designated account, even in the absence of commingling, is questionable in light of subsequent amendments to Va.Code Ann. § 34-29, which deals…”
Butler v. Butler, 277 S.E.2d 180 (Va. 1981). · cites it 15× “Butler’s judgment for arrearages. In its supplemental order entered on January 2, 1979, the trial court ruled that the decree awarding Mrs.”
In Re Lamm, 47 B.R. 364 (E.D. Va. 1984). · cites it 6× “21, pursuant to Section 34-29 of the Code of Virginia, consisting of a part of the garnished wages, and the balance under Section 34-4 as a homestead exemption.”
Branch v. Virginia Emp. Comm'n & Virginia Chem. Co., 249 S.E.2d 180 (Va. 1978). · cites it 2× “…any employee by reason of the fact that his earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness.” Code § 34-29(f) (Cum. Supp. 1978).”
Fuller v. Hurley, 559 F. Supp. 313 (W.D. Va. 1983). · cites it 16× “2 of the United States Constitution, and, as a pendent matter, the statute was applied in violation of Va.Code Ann. § 34-29 (Cum.Supp.1979). 3 Jurisdiction is predicated upon 28 U.”
Bernardini v. Cent. Nat'l Bank, 290 S.E.2d 863 (Va. 1982). · cites it 2× “The Bernardinis rely on Code § 34-29 which reads in pertinent part: (a) .”
— Va. Code Ann. § 34-29(a) — 7 cases
In Re Hanes, 162 B.R. 733 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994). “§ 541 (c)(2) and Va.Code § 34-29 (Mi-chie Supp.1993). 2 The first plan arises from the Debtor’s employment with the firm Wer-theim & Company.”
In re Foster, 556 B.R. 233 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016). “exemption on Va.Code § 34-29. 1 Both the chapter 13 trustee and Margaret S.”
In Re Sheeran, 369 B.R. 910 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007). “63 under Va.Code § 34-29 in what she calls accrued wages in violation of express provisions contained in the very code section she cites, (3) her interest in her portion of her ex-husband’s future mil *912 itary retirement pay pursuant to 38 U.”
Butler v. Butler, 277 S.E.2d 180 (Va. 1981). “Butler’s judgment for arrearages. In its supplemental order entered on January 2, 1979, the trial court ruled that the decree awarding Mrs.”
In re Delima, 561 B.R. 647 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016). “63 of that amount as exempt under Va. Code Ann. § 34-29 . The trustee objected to the debtors’ claim of exemption.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 34-29(a)(1) — 3 cases
Emilio Martinez, Jr. (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2025).
Donahue v. Donahue, 28 Va. Cir. 70 (Fairfax Cir. Ct. 1992).
— Va. Code Ann. § 34-29(b)(1) — 2 cases
Butler v. Butler, 277 S.E.2d 180 (Va. 1981). “Butler’s judgment for arrearages. In its supplemental order entered on January 2, 1979, the trial court ruled that the decree awarding Mrs.”
Donahue v. Donahue, 28 Va. Cir. 70 (Fairfax Cir. Ct. 1992).
— Va. Code Ann. § 34-29(b)(2) — 1 case
In re Delima, 561 B.R. 647 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016). “63 of that amount as exempt under Va. Code Ann. § 34-29 . The trustee objected to the debtors’ claim of exemption.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 34-29(b)(l) — 1 case
Butler v. Butler, 277 S.E.2d 180 (Va. 1981). “Butler’s judgment for arrearages. In its supplemental order entered on January 2, 1979, the trial court ruled that the decree awarding Mrs.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 34-29(bl)(2) — 1 case
Butler v. Butler, 277 S.E.2d 180 (Va. 1981). “Butler’s judgment for arrearages. In its supplemental order entered on January 2, 1979, the trial court ruled that the decree awarding Mrs.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 34-29(c) — 1 case
In re Foster, 556 B.R. 233 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016). “exemption on Va.Code § 34-29. 1 Both the chapter 13 trustee and Margaret S.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 34-29(d) — 2 cases
In re Foster, 556 B.R. 233 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016). “exemption on Va.Code § 34-29. 1 Both the chapter 13 trustee and Margaret S.”
Keeton v. Burke, 87 Va. Cir. 54 (Richmond County Cir. Ct. 2013).
— Va. Code Ann. § 34-29(d)(1) — 2 cases
In Re Sheeran, 369 B.R. 910 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007). “63 under Va.Code § 34-29 in what she calls accrued wages in violation of express provisions contained in the very code section she cites, (3) her interest in her portion of her ex-husband’s future mil *912 itary retirement pay pursuant to 38 U.”
Emilio Martinez, Jr. (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2025).
— Va. Code Ann. § 34-29(d)(2) — 1 case
In Re Martin, 189 B.R. 619 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995).
— Va. Code Ann. § 34-29(d)(3) — 3 cases
In re Foster, 556 B.R. 233 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016). “exemption on Va.Code § 34-29. 1 Both the chapter 13 trustee and Margaret S.”
Fuller v. Hurley, 559 F. Supp. 313 (W.D. Va. 1983). “2 of the United States Constitution, and, as a pendent matter, the statute was applied in violation of Va.Code Ann. § 34-29 (Cum.Supp.1979). 3 Jurisdiction is predicated upon 28 U.”
Neblett v. Indus. Alloy Fabricators, Inc., 34 Va. Cir. 192 (Richmond County Cir. Ct. 1994).
— Va. Code Ann. § 34-29(d)(l) — 4 cases
In Re Sheeran, 369 B.R. 910 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007). “63 under Va.Code § 34-29 in what she calls accrued wages in violation of express provisions contained in the very code section she cites, (3) her interest in her portion of her ex-husband’s future mil *912 itary retirement pay pursuant to 38 U.”
In Re Hanes, 162 B.R. 733 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994). “§ 541 (c)(2) and Va.Code § 34-29 (Mi-chie Supp.1993). 2 The first plan arises from the Debtor’s employment with the firm Wer-theim & Company.”
In re Foster, 556 B.R. 233 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016). “exemption on Va.Code § 34-29. 1 Both the chapter 13 trustee and Margaret S.”
In re Delima, 561 B.R. 647 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016). “63 of that amount as exempt under Va. Code Ann. § 34-29 . The trustee objected to the debtors’ claim of exemption.”
— Va. Code Ann. § 34-29(f) — 2 cases
Branch v. Virginia Emp. Comm'n & Virginia Chem. Co., 249 S.E.2d 180 (Va. 1978). “…any employee by reason of the fact that his earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness.” Code § 34-29(f) (Cum. Supp. 1978).”
Neblett v. Indus. Alloy Fabricators, Inc., 34 Va. Cir. 192 (Richmond County Cir. Ct. 1994).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.