A. The birth parents, and the parents by previous adoption, if any, other than any such parent who is the husband or wife of one of the petitioners, shall, by final order of adoption, be divested of all legal rights and obligations in respect to the child including the right to petition any court for visitation with the child. Except where a final order of adoption is entered pursuant to § 63.2-1241, any person whose interest in the child derives from or through the birth parent or previous adoptive parent, including but not limited to grandparents, stepparents, former stepparents, blood relatives, and family members, shall, by final order of adoption, be divested of all legal rights and obligations in respect to the child including the right to petition any court for visitation with the child. In all cases the child shall be free from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance in respect to such persons divested of legal rights. Any child adopted under the provisions of this chapter shall, from and after the entry of the interlocutory order or from and after the entry of the final order where no such interlocutory order is entered, be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the person or persons so adopting him and, unless and until such interlocutory order or final order is subsequently revoked, shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges, and subject to all the obligations, of a child of such person or persons born in lawful wedlock. An adopted person is the child of an adopting parent, and as such, the adopting parent shall be entitled to testify in all cases civil and criminal, as if the adopted child was born of the adopting parent in lawful wedlock.
B. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit any child of a deceased person from receiving an award of damages in an action for death by wrongful act in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 (§ 8.01-50 et seq.) of Chapter 3 of Title 8.01 if such child is adopted after the death of the deceased person, provided that the parental rights of such deceased person were not terminated by a court of competent jurisdiction prior to his death. The provisions of this subsection shall apply to any adoption finalized on or after July 1, 2024.
Code 1950, § 63-357; 1968, c. 578, § 63.1-233; 1995, cc. 772, 826; 1997, c. 690; 2000, c. 830, § 63.1-219.22; 2002, c. 747; 2003, c. 229; 2024, cc. 69, 70.
Notes of Decisions
Kummer v. Donak, 715 S.E.2d 7 (Va. 2011).
· cites it 4× “The Kummer children contend that the legislature never intended to divest an adopted child of inheritance rights from her biological family, because Code § 63.2-1215, which delineates the legal effects of adoption, does not specifically address intestate succession.”
McGehee v. Edwards, 597 S.E.2d 99 (Va. 2004).
· cites it 2× “The current version of this provision is found in Code § 63.2-1215.). Neither McGehee, or any party below, objected to the trial court's adjudication concerning the rights of children born to direct lineal descendants through "assisted conception.”
Christopher Pilenza v. Nelson Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. (Va. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 11× “6 The circuit court also held that Cejmer was not a relative within the meaning of Code § 63.2-1215 because when Pilenza was adopted, his relationship as a relative to Cejmer was terminated and his adoptive family became his relatives for purposes of Code § 63.”
Alison Helena Moroney v. Kelly Lynn Majerus (Va. Ct. App. 2024).
· cites it 4× “3 Code § 63.2-1215(A). Thus, “[w]hen a court allows a non-biological mother to adopt a child, the adoption order severs the parent-child relationship between the biological mother and the child, 3 The same is true in Delaware: Upon the issuance of a decree of adoption, the…”
Curtis O'Ferrell Smalls, II v. Curtis O'Ferrell Smalls, Sr. & Sarah Lee Smalls (Va. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 2× “” Code § 63.2-1215. Such an order can only be characterized as a final order, one which “disposes of the whole subject, gives all the relief contemplated, provides with reasonable completeness for giving effect to the sentence, and leaves nothing to be done in the cause save to…”
Curtis O'Ferrell Smalls, II v. Curtis O'Ferrell Smalls, Sr. & Sarah Lee Smalls (Va. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 2× “” Code § 63.2-1215. Such an order can only be characterized as a final order, one which “disposes of the whole subject, gives all the relief contemplated, provides with reasonable completeness for giving effect to the sentence, and leaves nothing to be done in the cause save to…”
Skinner v. United States (E.D. Va. 2020).
· cites it 2× “Code § 63.2-1215.° In 2011, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided Kummer v.”
Angela Segura v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep't of Fam. Servs. (Va. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 3× “2d 531, 542 (2001) (en banc), we granted the natural father the right to challenge a final adoption on the grounds of intrinsic and extrinsic fraud; however, we further held that the natural father, until and unless the final adoption was set aside, had no standing to request…”
— Va. Code Ann. § 63.2-1215(A) — 2 cases
Alison Helena Moroney v. Kelly Lynn Majerus (Va. Ct. App. 2024).
“3 Code § 63.2-1215(A). Thus, “[w]hen a court allows a non-biological mother to adopt a child, the adoption order severs the parent-child relationship between the biological mother and the child, 3 The same is true in Delaware: Upon the issuance of a decree of adoption, the…”
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