In any Administrative Process Act (§ 2.2-4000 et seq.) action or action at law or suit in equity, the final order, verdict of the jury, or if no jury the judgment or decree of the court, may provide for interest on any principal sum awarded, or any part thereof, and fix the period at which the interest shall commence. The final order, judgment or decree entered shall provide for such interest until such principal sum be paid. If a final order, judgment or decree be rendered which does not provide for interest, the final order, judgment or decree awarded or jury verdict shall bear interest at the judgment rate of interest as provided for in § 6.2-302 from its date of entry or from the date that the jury verdict was rendered. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, any judgment entered for a sum due under a negotiable instrument, as defined by § 8.3A-104, shall provide for interest on the principal sum in accordance with § 8.3A-112 at the rate specified in the instrument. If no such rate is specified, interest on the principal sum shall be at the judgment rate provided in § 6.2-302. Final orders may be recorded, enforced, and satisfied as orders or decrees of a circuit court upon certification of such orders by the agency head or his designee.
Code 1950, § 8-223; 1964, c. 219; 1974, c. 172; 1975, c. 448; 1977, c. 617; 1979, c. 501; 1997, c. 551; 2004, c. 646; 2008, c. 219; 2009, c. 797.
Notes of Decisions
Upper Occoquan Sewage Auth. v. BLAKE CONST., 655 S.E.2d 10 (Va. 2008).
· cites it 70× “The Joint Venture contended that under the terms of Code § 8.01-382 and the Prompt Payment Act, interest on the compensatory damages awarded in the First Trial continued to accrue on any unpaid portion of the judgment at 1% per month, including the period between November 6,…”
Dairyland Ins. v. Douthat, 449 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1994).
· cites it 10× “The insurers contend that the trial court failed to distinguish between the insurers’ duties under their contracts of insurance and the duties that Code § 8.01-382 imposes upon a judgment debtor.”
Shackelford v. Shackelford, 571 S.E.2d 917 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 7× “*212 Based on this evidence, we cannot find the award to wife of forty percent in the business that husband worked to develop for over thirty years, and fifty percent in the business husband started less than ten years ago for someone else to run, was an abuse of discretion.”
Exxonmobil Oil Corp. v. Black Stone Petroleum Inc., 221 F. Supp. 3d 755 (E.D. Va. 2016).
· cites it 8× “Va. Code § 8.01-382 (trial *768 courts “may provide for interest on any principal sum awarded, or any part thereof, and fix the period at which the interest shall commence.”
Tauber v. Commonwealth Ex Rel. Kilgore, 562 S.E.2d 118 (Va. 2002).
· cites it 6× “Prejudgment Interest The defendants argue that the chancellor erred in calculating the award of interest from the date he issued his July 13, 2000 letter opinion rather than from February 21, 2001, the date of his decree awarding the $20 million judgment to the Commonwealth.”
City of Winchester v. Am. Woodmark Corp., 464 S.E.2d 148 (Va. 1995).
· cites it 6× “American Woodmark argues that it is entitled to judgment interest as permitted by Code § 8.01-382. We agree with the City. Code § 58.”
Cnty. of Fairfax v. Century Concrete Servs., Inc., 492 S.E.2d 648 (Va. 1997).
· cites it 9× “2d 598 (1994), says that this Court held that “an award of prejudgment interest against the City of Richmond, although denied, was properly within the discretion of the court under Va. Code § 8.01-382.” Blaylock is not pertinent to our resolution of this appeal.”
J. W. Creech, Inc. v. Norfolk Air Conditioning Corp., 377 S.E.2d 605 (Va. 1989).
· cites it 10× “Creech moved to set the verdict aside on the ground, among others, that 15% exceeded the rate permitted by Code § 8.01-382, which provides, in pertinent part: *325 Except as otherwise provided in § 8.”
Thomas H. Ragsdale v. Diane Harris Ragsdale, 516 S.E.2d 698 (Va. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 6× “Code § 8.01-382 provides in relevant part as follows: In any action at law or suit in equity, the verdict of the jury, or if no jury the judgment or decree of the court, may provide for interest on any principal sum awarded, or any part thereof, and fix the period at which the…”
Pledger v. Pledger, 371 S.E.2d 43 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 14× “It based its decision on Code § 8.01-382. 1 The trial court incorporated the agreement into its decree and further ordered that: The Complainant (wife) is entitled to payments from the retirement benefit of the Defendant (husband) upon his retirement, and such payment shall be…”
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