Revised Code of Washington
Wash. Rev. Code § 10.05.020 (2026)
✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the petitioner shall allege under oath in the petition that the wrongful conduct charged is the result of or caused by substance use disorders or mental problems or domestic violence behavior problems for which the person is in need of treatment and unless treated the probability of future recurrence is great, along with a statement that the person agrees to pay the cost of a diagnosis and treatment of the alleged problem or problems if financially able to do so. The petition shall also contain a case history and written assessment prepared by an approved substance use disorder treatment program as designated in chapter 71.24 RCW if the petition alleges a substance use disorder, by an approved mental health center if the petition alleges a mental problem, or by a state-certified domestic violence treatment provider pursuant to RCW 43.20A.735 if the petition alleges a domestic violence behavior problem.
(2) In the case of a petitioner charged with a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor under chapter 9A.42 RCW, the petitioner shall allege under oath in the petition that the petitioner is the natural or adoptive parent of the alleged victim; that the wrongful conduct charged is the result of parenting problems for which the petitioner is in need of services; that the petitioner is in need of child welfare services under chapter 74.13 RCW to improve his or her parenting skills in order to better provide his or her child or children with the basic necessities of life; that the petitioner wants to correct his or her conduct to reduce the likelihood of harm to his or her minor children; that in the absence of child welfare services the petitioner may be unable to reduce the likelihood of harm to his or her minor children; and that the petitioner has cooperated with the department of social and health services to develop a plan to receive appropriate child welfare services; along with a statement that the person agrees to pay the cost of the services if he or she is financially able to do so. The petition shall also contain a case history and a written service plan from the department of social and health services.
(3) Before entry of an order deferring prosecution, a petitioner shall be advised of his or her rights as an accused and execute, as a condition of receiving treatment, a statement that contains: (a) An acknowledgment of his or her rights; (b) an acknowledgment and waiver of the right to testify, the right to a speedy trial, the right to call witnesses to testify, the right to present evidence in his or her defense, and the right to a jury trial; (c) a stipulation to the admissibility and sufficiency of the facts contained in the written police report; and (d) an acknowledgment that the statement will be entered and used to support a finding of guilty if the court finds cause to revoke the order granting deferred prosecution. The petitioner shall also be advised that he or she may, if he or she proceeds to trial and is found guilty, be allowed to seek suspension of some or all of the fines and incarceration that may be ordered upon the condition that he or she seek treatment and, further, that he or she may seek treatment from public and private agencies at any time without regard to whether or not he or she is found guilty of the offense charged. He or she shall also be advised that the court will not accept a petition for deferred prosecution from a person who: (i) Sincerely believes that he or she is innocent of the charges; (ii) sincerely believes that he or she does not, in fact, suffer from alcoholism, drug addiction, mental problems, or domestic violence behavior problems; or (iii) in the case of a petitioner charged under chapter 9A.42 RCW, sincerely believes that he or she does not need child welfare services.
(4) Before entering an order deferring prosecution, the court shall make specific findings that: (a) The petitioner has stipulated to the admissibility and sufficiency of the facts as contained in the written police report; (b) the petitioner has acknowledged the admissibility of the stipulated facts in any criminal hearing on the underlying offense or offenses held subsequent to revocation of the order granting deferred prosecution; (c) the petitioner has acknowledged and waived the right to testify, the right to a speedy trial, the right to call witnesses to testify, the right to present evidence in his or her defense, and the right to a jury trial; and (d) the petitioner's statements were made knowingly and voluntarily. Such findings shall be included in the order granting deferred prosecution.
[ 2021 c 215 s 115; 2019 c 263 s 703; 2016 sp.s. c 29 s 525; 2010 c 269 s 9; 2008 c 282 s 16; 2002 c 219 s 7; 1996 c 24 s 1; 1985 c 352 s 6; 1975 1st ex.s. c 244 s 2.]
Notes:
Effective date—2022 c 268; 2021 c 215: See note following RCW 7.105.900.
Findings—Intent—2019 c 263 ss 202-803: See note following RCW 10.01.240.
Effective date—2019 c 263 ss 501-504, 601, 602, and 701-708: See note following RCW 9.94A.500.
Effective dates—2016 sp.s. c 29: See note following RCW 71.05.760.
Short title—Right of action—2016 sp.s. c 29: See notes following RCW 71.05.010.
Effective date—2010 c 269: See note following RCW 46.20.385.
Intent—Finding—2002 c 219: See note following RCW 9A.42.037.
Legislative finding—Severability—1985 c 352: See notes following RCW 10.05.010.
Criminal history and driving record: RCW 46.61.513.
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the petitioner shall allege under oath in the petition that the wrongful conduct charged is the result of or caused by substance use disorders or mental health disorders or domestic violence behavior problems for which the person is in need of treatment and unless treated the probability of future recurrence is great, along with a statement that the person agrees to pay the cost of a diagnosis and treatment of the alleged problem or problems if financially able to do so. The petition shall also contain a case history and written assessment prepared by an approved behavioral health agency, approved for mental health services or substance use disorder services, as designated in chapter 71.24 RCW or by a state-certified domestic violence treatment provider pursuant to RCW 43.20A.735.
(2) In the case of a petitioner charged with a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor under chapter 9A.42 RCW, the petitioner shall allege under oath in the petition that the petitioner is the natural or adoptive parent of the alleged victim; that the wrongful conduct charged is the result of parenting problems for which the petitioner is in need of services; that the petitioner is in need of child welfare services under chapter 74.13 RCW to improve his or her parenting skills in order to better provide his or her child or children with the basic necessities of life; that the petitioner wants to correct his or her conduct to reduce the likelihood of harm to his or her minor children; that in the absence of child welfare services the petitioner may be unable to reduce the likelihood of harm to his or her minor children; and that the petitioner has cooperated with the department of children, youth, and families to develop a plan to receive appropriate child welfare services; along with a statement that the person agrees to pay the cost of the services if he or she is financially able to do so. The petition shall also contain a case history and a written service plan from the department of children, youth, and families.
(3) Before entry of an order deferring prosecution, a petitioner shall be advised of his or her rights as an accused and execute, as a condition of receiving treatment, a statement that contains: (a) An acknowledgment of his or her rights; (b) an acknowledgment and waiver of the right to testify, the right to a speedy trial, the right to call witnesses to testify, the right to present evidence in his or her defense, and the right to a jury trial; (c) a stipulation to the admissibility and sufficiency of the facts contained in the written police report; and (d) an acknowledgment that the statement will be entered and used to support a finding of guilty if the court finds cause to revoke the order granting deferred prosecution. The petitioner shall also be advised that he or she may, if he or she proceeds to trial and is found guilty, be allowed to seek suspension of some or all of the fines and incarceration that may be ordered upon the condition that he or she seek treatment and, further, that he or she may seek treatment from public and private agencies at any time without regard to whether or not he or she is found guilty of the offense charged. He or she shall also be advised that the court will not accept a petition for deferred prosecution from a person who: (i) Sincerely believes that he or she is innocent of the charges; (ii) sincerely believes that he or she does not, in fact, suffer from a substance use disorder, a mental health disorder, or domestic violence behavior problems; or (iii) in the case of a petitioner charged under chapter 9A.42 RCW, sincerely believes that he or she does not need child welfare services.
(4) Before entering an order deferring prosecution, the court shall make specific findings that: (a) The petitioner has stipulated to the admissibility and sufficiency of the facts as contained in the written police report; (b) the petitioner has acknowledged the admissibility of the stipulated facts in any criminal hearing on the underlying offense or offenses held subsequent to revocation of the order granting deferred prosecution; (c) the petitioner has acknowledged and waived the right to testify, the right to a speedy trial, the right to call witnesses to testify, the right to present evidence in his or her defense, and the right to a jury trial; and (d) the petitioner's statements were made knowingly and voluntarily. Such findings shall be included in the order granting deferred prosecution.
[ 2024 c 306 s 13; 2021 c 215 s 115; 2019 c 263 s 703; 2016 sp.s. c 29 s 525; 2010 c 269 s 9; 2008 c 282 s 16; 2002 c 219 s 7; 1996 c 24 s 1; 1985 c 352 s 6; 1975 1st ex.s. c 244 s 2.]
Notes:
Effective date—2024 c 306: See note following RCW 9.94A.661.
Effective date—2022 c 268; 2021 c 215: See note following RCW 7.105.900.
Findings—Intent—2019 c 263 ss 202-803: See note following RCW 10.01.240.
Effective date—2019 c 263 ss 501-504, 601, 602, and 701-708: See note following RCW 9.94A.500.
Effective dates—2016 sp.s. c 29: See note following RCW 71.05.760.
Short title—Right of action—2016 sp.s. c 29: See notes following RCW 71.05.010.
Effective date—2010 c 269: See note following RCW 46.20.385.
Intent—Finding—2002 c 219: See note following RCW 9A.42.037.
Legislative finding—Severability—1985 c 352: See notes following RCW 10.05.010.
Criminal history and driving record: RCW 46.61.513.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 32
cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1979–2025 · leading case: Abad v. Cozza, 128 Wash. 2d 575 (Wash. 1996).
Abad v. Cozza, 128 Wash. 2d 575 (Wash. 1996). “The Court of Appeals held that the local rule and form were beyond the authority of the district court under the pertinent portion of the deferred prosecution statute, RCW 10.05.020. We hold that the local rule and form were consistent with the statutory requirements of RCW 10.”
Abad v. Cozza, 911 P.2d 376 (Wash. 1996). “The court of appeals held that the local rule and form were beyond the authority of the district court under the pertinent portion of the deferred prosecution statute, RCW 10.05.020. We hold that the local rule and form were consistent with the statutory requirements of RCW 10.”
State v. Colquitt, 137 P.3d 892 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). “RCW 10.05.020. Before RCW 10.05.020 required a stipulation to the sufficiency of the facts, the court was not foreclosed from examining the sufficiency of the evidence.”
State v. Colquitt, 133 Wash. App. 789 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). “RCW 10.05.020. Before RCW 10.05.020 required a stipulation to the sufficiency of the facts, the court was not foreclosed from examining the sufficiency of the evidence.”
State v. Shattuck, 776 P.2d 1001 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). “The incentive that encourages successful completion of treatment is the possibility that failure will mean the deferred prosecution order will be revoked and the person will be convicted.”
State v. Hahn, 924 P.2d 392 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996). “A person charged with a traffic infraction, misdemeanor, or gross misdemeanor under Title 46 RCW shall not be eligible for a deferred prosecution program unless the court makes specific findings pursuant to RCW 10.”
Michel v. City of Richland, 950 P.2d 10 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). “2d 405 (1996) (all direct consequences of the guilty plea must be communicated to the defendant before the plea is entered) with RCW 10.05.020 (defendant must be advised of his or her rights as an accused and must acknowledge the admissibility of the stipulated facts in any…”
State v. Vinge, 795 P.2d 1199 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). “RCW 10.05.020 also specifies the advisement of rights necessary prior to entry of a deferred prosecution order.”
State v. Higley, 902 P.2d 659 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). “Higley apparently submitted a statement pursuant to RCW 10.05.020(2), but not so the court could use it at that time; rather, he submitted the statement for the prosecutor to use, if necessary, if and when a trial ever became necessary.”
State v. Cascade Dist. Court, 621 P.2d 115 (Wash. 1980). “] RCW 10.05.020. An accused who wishes to petition for deferred prosecution must do so at the time of arraignment.”
City of Bremerton v. Tucker, 103 P.3d 1285 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). “2d 1007 (2000) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also, RCW 10.05.020. Conversely, if the accused refuses to admit guilt or professes innocence, “the court will not accept a petition for deferred prosecution.”
State v. Bays, 954 P.2d 301 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). “A person charged with a traffic infraction, misdemeanor, or gross misdemeanor under Title 46 RCW shall not be eligible for a deferred prosecution program unless the court makes specific findings pursuant to RCW 10.05.020. Such person shall not be eligible for a deferred…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.05.020(1) — 8 cases
Abad v. Cozza, 128 Wash. 2d 575 (Wash. 1996). “The Court of Appeals held that the local rule and form were beyond the authority of the district court under the pertinent portion of the deferred prosecution statute, RCW 10.05.020. We hold that the local rule and form were consistent with the statutory requirements of RCW 10.”
Abad v. Cozza, 911 P.2d 376 (Wash. 1996). “The court of appeals held that the local rule and form were beyond the authority of the district court under the pertinent portion of the deferred prosecution statute, RCW 10.05.020. We hold that the local rule and form were consistent with the statutory requirements of RCW 10.”
State v. Velasquez, 292 P.3d 92 (Wash. 2013).
State v. Vinge, 795 P.2d 1199 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). “RCW 10.05.020 also specifies the advisement of rights necessary prior to entry of a deferred prosecution order.”
Michel v. City of Richland, 950 P.2d 10 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). “2d 405 (1996) (all direct consequences of the guilty plea must be communicated to the defendant before the plea is entered) with RCW 10.05.020 (defendant must be advised of his or her rights as an accused and must acknowledge the admissibility of the stipulated facts in any…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.05.020(2) — 9 cases
Abad v. Cozza, 128 Wash. 2d 575 (Wash. 1996). “The Court of Appeals held that the local rule and form were beyond the authority of the district court under the pertinent portion of the deferred prosecution statute, RCW 10.05.020. We hold that the local rule and form were consistent with the statutory requirements of RCW 10.”
Abad v. Cozza, 911 P.2d 376 (Wash. 1996). “The court of appeals held that the local rule and form were beyond the authority of the district court under the pertinent portion of the deferred prosecution statute, RCW 10.05.020. We hold that the local rule and form were consistent with the statutory requirements of RCW 10.”
State v. Higley, 902 P.2d 659 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). “Higley apparently submitted a statement pursuant to RCW 10.05.020(2), but not so the court could use it at that time; rather, he submitted the statement for the prosecutor to use, if necessary, if and when a trial ever became necessary.”
State v. Shattuck, 776 P.2d 1001 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). “The incentive that encourages successful completion of treatment is the possibility that failure will mean the deferred prosecution order will be revoked and the person will be convicted.”
Michel v. City of Richland, 950 P.2d 10 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). “2d 405 (1996) (all direct consequences of the guilty plea must be communicated to the defendant before the plea is entered) with RCW 10.05.020 (defendant must be advised of his or her rights as an accused and must acknowledge the admissibility of the stipulated facts in any…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.05.020(2)(b) — 2 cases
State v. Shattuck, 776 P.2d 1001 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). “The incentive that encourages successful completion of treatment is the possibility that failure will mean the deferred prosecution order will be revoked and the person will be convicted.”
Abad v. Cozza, 893 P.2d 695 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.05.020(2)(c) — 3 cases
Abad v. Cozza, 128 Wash. 2d 575 (Wash. 1996). “The Court of Appeals held that the local rule and form were beyond the authority of the district court under the pertinent portion of the deferred prosecution statute, RCW 10.05.020. We hold that the local rule and form were consistent with the statutory requirements of RCW 10.”
Abad v. Cozza, 911 P.2d 376 (Wash. 1996). “The court of appeals held that the local rule and form were beyond the authority of the district court under the pertinent portion of the deferred prosecution statute, RCW 10.05.020. We hold that the local rule and form were consistent with the statutory requirements of RCW 10.”
State v. Shattuck, 776 P.2d 1001 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). “The incentive that encourages successful completion of treatment is the possibility that failure will mean the deferred prosecution order will be revoked and the person will be convicted.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.05.020(3) — 9 cases
Abad v. Cozza, 128 Wash. 2d 575 (Wash. 1996). “The Court of Appeals held that the local rule and form were beyond the authority of the district court under the pertinent portion of the deferred prosecution statute, RCW 10.05.020. We hold that the local rule and form were consistent with the statutory requirements of RCW 10.”
Abad v. Cozza, 911 P.2d 376 (Wash. 1996). “The court of appeals held that the local rule and form were beyond the authority of the district court under the pertinent portion of the deferred prosecution statute, RCW 10.05.020. We hold that the local rule and form were consistent with the statutory requirements of RCW 10.”
City of Bremerton v. Tucker, 103 P.3d 1285 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). “2d 1007 (2000) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also, RCW 10.05.020. Conversely, if the accused refuses to admit guilt or professes innocence, “the court will not accept a petition for deferred prosecution.”
City of Bremerton v. Tucker, 103 P.3d 1285 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
Merseal v. State Dept. of Licensing, 994 P.2d 262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.05.020(3)(b) — 1 case
State of Washington v. Humberto Estrada (Wash. Ct. App. 2023).
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