Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.070 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) The protection accorded to financial institutions and other third parties under RCW 11.11.040 has no bearing on the actual rights of ownership to nonprobate assets as between beneficiaries and testamentary beneficiaries, and their heirs, successors, personal representatives, and assigns.
(2) A testamentary beneficiary entitled to a nonprobate asset otherwise transferred to a beneficiary not so entitled, and a personal representative of the owner's estate on behalf of the testamentary beneficiary, may petition the superior court having jurisdiction over the owner's estate for an order declaring that the testamentary beneficiary is so entitled, the hearing of the petition to be held in accordance with *chapter 11.96 RCW.
(3) A testamentary beneficiary claiming a nonprobate asset who has not filed such a petition within the earlier of: (a) Six months from the date of admission of the will to probate; and (b) one year from the date of the owner's death, shall be forever barred from making such a claim or commencing such an action.
[ 1998 c 292 s 111.]

Notes:

*Reviser's note: Chapter 11.96 RCW was repealed by 1999 c 42 s 637, effective January 1, 2000.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9 cases, 2008–2015 · leading case: In Re Est. of Palmer, 187 P.3d 758 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
In Re Est. of Palmer, 187 P.3d 758 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 9× “She argues that the trial court erred by (1) failing to dismiss the petition under the time bar in RCW 11.11.070, (2) declining to admit certain evidence, (3) applying the wrong burden of proof, and (4) entering various findings of fact.”
Palmer v. Golden, 187 P.3d 758 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 8× “She argues that the trial court erred by (1) failing to dismiss the petition under the time bar in RCW 11.11.070, (2) declining *254 to admit certain evidence, (3) applying the wrong burden of proof, and (4) entering various findings of fact.”
Kitsap Bank v. Denley, 312 P.3d 711 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 8× “¶9 Lanterno filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging she was entitled to have the permanent restraining order dismissed and an order declaring that she was the legal owner of the funds because the Estate’s claim to the funds was time barred by the statute of limitations in…”
Manary v. Anderson, 292 P.3d 96 (Wash. 2013). · cites it 5× “RCW 11.11.070. 12 RCW 11.11.070(2) permits a testamentary beneficiary to petition the court for relief when a nonprobate asset has been transferred to an unentitled beneficiary.”
Est. of Jepsen v. Miles, 358 P.3d 403 (Wash. 2015). “” RCW 11.11.070(3) (emphasis added). However, the Court of Ap *389 peals has properly held that a defendant waives the time bar as a defense if the defendant does not raise the defense in the answer.”
Manary v. Anderson, 164 Wash. App. 569 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 3× “¶36 RCW 11.11.070 is titled “Ownership rights as between individuals preserved—Testamentary beneficiary may recover nonprobate asset from beneficiary—Limitation on action to recover” and states: (1) The protection accorded to financial institutions and other third parties under…”
MANARY v. Anderson, 265 P.3d 163 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 3× “¶ 35 Manary also argues that Anderson failed to timely petition the court for relief within the statutory time limits, as required by RCW 11.11.070(3). We conclude that this statute is also inapplicable.”
Est. Of Virginia Jepsen: Julie Miles v. Est. Of Mack Jepsen (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). “3d 758 (2008) (holding that one-year period under RCW 11.11.070(3), in which a testamentary beneficiary may claim a nonprobate asset after the owner's death, does not affect the court's jurisdiction but attaches only to the claim itself and may be waived if a party fails to…”
In re Est. of Jepsen (Wash. 2015). “" RCW 11.11.070(3) (emphasis added). However, the Court of Appeals has properly held that a defendant waives the time bar as a defense ifthe defendant does not raise the defense in the answer.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.070(2) — 1 case
Manary v. Anderson, 292 P.3d 96 (Wash. 2013). “RCW 11.11.070. 12 RCW 11.11.070(2) permits a testamentary beneficiary to petition the court for relief when a nonprobate asset has been transferred to an unentitled beneficiary.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.070(3) — 8 cases
In Re Est. of Palmer, 187 P.3d 758 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “She argues that the trial court erred by (1) failing to dismiss the petition under the time bar in RCW 11.11.070, (2) declining to admit certain evidence, (3) applying the wrong burden of proof, and (4) entering various findings of fact.”
Palmer v. Golden, 187 P.3d 758 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “She argues that the trial court erred by (1) failing to dismiss the petition under the time bar in RCW 11.11.070, (2) declining *254 to admit certain evidence, (3) applying the wrong burden of proof, and (4) entering various findings of fact.”
Manary v. Anderson, 292 P.3d 96 (Wash. 2013). “RCW 11.11.070. 12 RCW 11.11.070(2) permits a testamentary beneficiary to petition the court for relief when a nonprobate asset has been transferred to an unentitled beneficiary.”
Est. of Jepsen v. Miles, 358 P.3d 403 (Wash. 2015). “” RCW 11.11.070(3) (emphasis added). However, the Court of Ap *389 peals has properly held that a defendant waives the time bar as a defense if the defendant does not raise the defense in the answer.”
Manary v. Anderson, 164 Wash. App. 569 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). “¶36 RCW 11.11.070 is titled “Ownership rights as between individuals preserved—Testamentary beneficiary may recover nonprobate asset from beneficiary—Limitation on action to recover” and states: (1) The protection accorded to financial institutions and other third parties under…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.070(3)(b) — 2 cases
Palmer v. Golden, 187 P.3d 758 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “She argues that the trial court erred by (1) failing to dismiss the petition under the time bar in RCW 11.11.070, (2) declining *254 to admit certain evidence, (3) applying the wrong burden of proof, and (4) entering various findings of fact.”
In Re Est. of Palmer, 187 P.3d 758 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). “She argues that the trial court erred by (1) failing to dismiss the petition under the time bar in RCW 11.11.070, (2) declining to admit certain evidence, (3) applying the wrong burden of proof, and (4) entering various findings of fact.”
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