Wash. Rev. Code » Title 26 · Chapter 26.09
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.300 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) Whenever a restraining order is issued under this chapter, and the person to be restrained knows of the order, a violation of the provisions restricting the person from acts or threats of violence or of a provision restraining the person from going onto the grounds of or entering the residence, workplace, school, or day care of another, or prohibiting the person from knowingly coming within, or knowingly remaining within, a specified distance of a location, a protected party's person, or a protected party's vehicle, is punishable under RCW 7.105.450.
(2) A person is deemed to have notice of a restraining order if:
(a) The person to be restrained or the person's attorney signed the order;
(b) The order recites that the person to be restrained or the person's attorney appeared in person before the court;
(c) The order was served upon the person to be restrained; or
(d) The peace officer gives the person oral or written evidence of the order by reading from it or handing to the person a certified copy of the original order, certified to be an accurate copy of the original by a notary public or by the clerk of the court.
(3) A peace officer shall verify the existence of a restraining order by:
(a) Obtaining information confirming the existence and terms of the order from a law enforcement agency; or
(b) Obtaining a certified copy of the order, certified to be an accurate copy of the original by a notary public or by the clerk of the court.
(4) A peace officer shall arrest and take into custody, pending release on bail, personal recognizance, or court order, a person without a warrant when the officer has probable cause to believe that:
(a) A restraining order has been issued under this chapter;
(b) The respondent or person to be restrained knows of the order; and
(c) The person to be arrested has violated the terms of the order restraining the person from acts or threats of violence or restraining the person from going onto the grounds of or entering the residence, workplace, school, or day care of another, or prohibiting the person from knowingly coming within, or knowingly remaining within, a specified distance of a location.
(5) It is a defense to prosecution under subsection (1) of this section that the court order was issued contrary to law or court rule.
(6) No peace officer may be held criminally or civilly liable for making an arrest under subsection (4) of this section if the officer acts in good faith and without malice.
[ 2021 c 215 s 135; 2000 c 119 s 21; 1996 c 248 s 9; 1995 c 246 s 27; 1984 c 263 s 28; 1974 ex.s. c 99 s 1.]

Notes:

Effective date—2022 c 268; 2021 c 215: See note following RCW 7.105.900.
Application—2000 c 119: See note following RCW 10.31.100.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1983–2025 · leading case: State v. Van Tuyl, 133 P.3d 955 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
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State v. Van Tuyl, 133 P.3d 955 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 8× “We hold RCW 26.09.300(1) sets the knowledge requirement consistent with RCW 26-.”
State v. Turner, 118 Wash. App. 135 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 6× “The pertinent statutes are RCW 26.09.300(1) and RCW 26.50.110. RCW 26.”
State v. Turner, 74 P.3d 1215 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 6× “The pertinent statutes are RCW 26.09.300(1) and RCW 26.50.110. RCW 26.”
State v. Van Tuyl, 133 P.3d 955 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 8× “We hold RCW 26.09.300(1) sets the knowledge requirement consistent with RCW 26.”
State v. Ohrt, 862 P.2d 140 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 4× “1 RCW 26.09.300(1), part of the marriage dissolution act, makes it a misdemeanor to violate a restraining order "issued under this chapter".”
State v. Groom, 133 Wash. 2d 679 (Wash. 1997). “210; RCW 26.09.300(6); RCW 26.10.220; RCW 26.26.”
State v. Groom, 947 P.2d 240 (Wash. 1997). “[3] If the Legislature had intended to include a good or bad faith component in RCW 10.79.045, it would have done so, as it has done in numerous other statutes.”
State v. Thomas, 668 P.2d 1294 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 9× “Before trial, Thomas moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds that RCW 26.09.300, regarding violation of temporary restraining orders, more specifically applied to his conduct.”
State Of Washington, V. Dayjuan Anthony Jenkins (Wash. Ct. App. 2024). “To that end, a person has knowledge of the order if 2 Jenkins cites to RCW 26.09.300(2) as providing the requirements for notice here, but that statute involves restraining orders in dissolution cases.”
John Loop, V. Lisa Loop (Wash. Ct. App. 2025). “9 In an e-mail to the parties dated September 25, 2023, the arbitrator reiterated that she authorized the restraining order pursuant to RCW 26.09.300. -7- No. 86382-7-I/8 Jack further asserts that the arbitrator did not have the authority to impose a restraining order because…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.300(1) — 6 cases
State v. Van Tuyl, 133 P.3d 955 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). “We hold RCW 26.09.300(1) sets the knowledge requirement consistent with RCW 26-.”
State v. Turner, 118 Wash. App. 135 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “The pertinent statutes are RCW 26.09.300(1) and RCW 26.50.110. RCW 26.”
State v. Turner, 74 P.3d 1215 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). “The pertinent statutes are RCW 26.09.300(1) and RCW 26.50.110. RCW 26.”
State v. Van Tuyl, 133 P.3d 955 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). “We hold RCW 26.09.300(1) sets the knowledge requirement consistent with RCW 26.”
State v. Ohrt, 862 P.2d 140 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). “1 RCW 26.09.300(1), part of the marriage dissolution act, makes it a misdemeanor to violate a restraining order "issued under this chapter".”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.300(2) — 4 cases
State v. Ohrt, 862 P.2d 140 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). “1 RCW 26.09.300(1), part of the marriage dissolution act, makes it a misdemeanor to violate a restraining order "issued under this chapter".”
State v. Van Tuyl, 133 P.3d 955 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). “We hold RCW 26.09.300(1) sets the knowledge requirement consistent with RCW 26-.”
State v. Van Tuyl, 133 P.3d 955 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). “We hold RCW 26.09.300(1) sets the knowledge requirement consistent with RCW 26.”
State Of Washington, V. Dayjuan Anthony Jenkins (Wash. Ct. App. 2024). “To that end, a person has knowledge of the order if 2 Jenkins cites to RCW 26.09.300(2) as providing the requirements for notice here, but that statute involves restraining orders in dissolution cases.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.300(2)(c) — 2 cases
State v. Van Tuyl, 133 P.3d 955 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). “We hold RCW 26.09.300(1) sets the knowledge requirement consistent with RCW 26-.”
State v. Van Tuyl, 133 P.3d 955 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). “We hold RCW 26.09.300(1) sets the knowledge requirement consistent with RCW 26.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.300(6) — 2 cases
State v. Groom, 133 Wash. 2d 679 (Wash. 1997). “210; RCW 26.09.300(6); RCW 26.10.220; RCW 26.26.”
State v. Groom, 947 P.2d 240 (Wash. 1997). “[3] If the Legislature had intended to include a good or bad faith component in RCW 10.79.045, it would have done so, as it has done in numerous other statutes.”
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