Revised Code of Washington
Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.560 (2026)
Stopping, standing, or parking outside business or residence districts
✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) Outside of incorporated cities and towns no person may stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the roadway.
(2) Subsection (1) of this section and RCW 46.61.570 and 46.61.575 do not apply to the driver of any vehicle that is disabled in such manner and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily leaving the vehicle in such position. The driver shall nonetheless arrange for the prompt removal of the vehicle as required by RCW 46.61.590.
(3) Subsection (1) of this section does not apply to the driver of a public transit vehicle who temporarily stops the vehicle upon the roadway for the purpose of and while actually engaged in receiving or discharging passengers at a marked transit vehicle stop zone approved by the state department of transportation or a county upon highways under their respective jurisdictions. However, public transportation service providers, including private, nonprofit transportation providers regulated under chapter 81.66 RCW, may allow the driver of a transit vehicle to stop upon the roadway momentarily to receive or discharge passengers at an unmarked stop zone only under the following circumstances: (a) The driver stops the vehicle in a safe and practicable position; (b) the driver activates four-way flashing lights; and (c) the driver stops at a portion of the highway with an unobstructed view, for an adequate distance so as to not create a hazard, for other drivers.
(4) Subsection (1) of this section and RCW 46.61.570 and 46.61.575 do not apply to the driver of a solid waste collection company or recycling company vehicle who temporarily stops the vehicle as close as practical to the right edge of the right-hand shoulder of the roadway or right edge of the roadway if no shoulder exists for the purpose of and while actually engaged in the collection of solid waste or recyclables, or both, under chapters 81.77, 35.21, and 35A.21 RCW or by contract under RCW 36.58.040.
[ 2009 c 274 s 1; 1991 c 319 s 408; 1984 c 7 s 72; 1979 ex.s. c 178 s 20; 1977 c 24 s 2; 1965 ex.s. c 155 s 64.]
Notes:
Rules of court: Monetary penalty schedule—IRLJ 6.2.
Severability—1979 ex.s. c 178: See note following RCW 46.61.590.
Limited access highways: RCW 47.52.120.
Unattended motor vehicles: RCW 46.61.600.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8
cases, 1970–1996 · leading case: Mina v. Boise Cascade Corp., 710 P.2d 184 (Wash. 1985).
Mina v. Boise Cascade Corp., 710 P.2d 184 (Wash. 1985). “Thus, argues Hofstrand, because RCW 46.61.560 prohibits stopping on the roadway, [1] Mr.”
Palmer v. Jensen, 913 P.2d 413 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996). “[RCW 46.61.560] However, this statute does not prohibit involuntary stops by a motorist, required by the exigencies of traffic on a highway.”
Mina v. Boise Cascade Corp., 681 P.2d 880 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). “This finding of comparative negligence was based on the jury's determination that the Minas either had been traveling at an unreasonably slow speed or had illegally parked or stopped their vehicle on the roadway. First, the Minas contend the trial court erred in instructing the…”
Leach v. Weiss, 467 P.2d 894 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970). “This created a question of fact which must be submitted to the jury for determination. It was therefore error to refuse Statlers’ requested instructions 18 and 27.”
Bradley v. Maurer, 560 P.2d 719 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977). “First, this instruction was inappropriate in that RCW 46.61.560(2) expressly excludes "disabled" vehicles from its operation.”
Naranen v. Harders, 466 P.2d 521 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970). “It is contended that RCW 46.61.560 was violated by the defendants and that such violation constituted negligence per se.”
Larson v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 502 P.2d 1258 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972). “In this regard, the trial court instructed the jury that the county employees were negligent as a matter of law for parking on the driving portion of 55th Avenue in violation of RCW 46.61.560. However, issues of proximate causation and the negligence of the school district were…”
Svehaug v. Donoghue, 490 P.2d 1345 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). “In this position, the truck substantially blocked Svehaug’s lane of travel, in violation of RCW 46.61.560. *819 Svehaug’s first opportunity to observe the truck occurred when she reached the crest of the grade, approximately 385 feet from the truck.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.560(2) — 3 cases
Mina v. Boise Cascade Corp., 710 P.2d 184 (Wash. 1985). “Thus, argues Hofstrand, because RCW 46.61.560 prohibits stopping on the roadway, [1] Mr.”
Bradley v. Maurer, 560 P.2d 719 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977). “First, this instruction was inappropriate in that RCW 46.61.560(2) expressly excludes "disabled" vehicles from its operation.”
Mina v. Boise Cascade Corp., 681 P.2d 880 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). “This finding of comparative negligence was based on the jury's determination that the Minas either had been traveling at an unreasonably slow speed or had illegally parked or stopped their vehicle on the roadway. First, the Minas contend the trial court erred in instructing the…”
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