Wash. Rev. Code § 51.08.180
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(1) "Worker" means every person in this state who is engaged in the employment of an employer under this title, whether by way of manual labor or otherwise in the course of his or her employment; also every person in this state who is engaged in the employment of or who is working under an independent contract, the essence of which is his or her personal labor for an employer under this title, whether by way of manual labor or otherwise, in the course of his or her employment, or as an exception to the definition of worker, a person is not a worker if he or she meets the tests set forth in RCW 51.08.195 (1) through (6) or the separate tests set forth in RCW 51.08.181 for work performed that requires registration under chapter 18.27 RCW or licensing under chapter 18.106 or 19.28 RCW: PROVIDED, That a person is not a worker for the purpose of this title, with respect to his or her activities attendant to operating a truck which he or she owns, and which is leased to a common or contract carrier.
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, and for purposes of this title only, a driver, as defined in RCW 49.46.300, shall have the same rights and obligations of a "worker" under this title with respect to a transportation network company, as defined in RCW 49.46.300, only while the driver is engaged in passenger platform time and dispatch platform time.
[ 2023 c 88 s 8; 2022 c 281 s 10; 2008 c 102 s 3; 1991 c 246 s 3; 1987 c 175 s 3; 1983 c 97 s 1; 1982 c 80 s 1; 1981 c 128 s 2; 1977 ex.s. c 350 s 15; 1961 c 23 s 51.08.180. Prior: 1957 c 70 s 20; prior: (i) 1939 c 41 s 2, part; 1929 c 132 s 1, part; 1927 c 310 s 2, part; 1921 c 182 s 2, part; 1919 c 131 s 2, part; 1917 c 120 s 1, part; 1911 c 74 s 3, part; RRS s 7675, part. (ii) 1937 c 211 s 2; RRS s 7674-1.]
Notes:
Effective dates—2022 c 281 ss 8-13, 17, and 28: See note following RCW 51.12.020.
Conflict with federal requirements—Severability—2008 c 102: See notes following RCW 51.08.070.
Effective date—Conflict with federal requirements—1991 c 246: See notes following RCW 51.08.195.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 59
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1952–2023 · leading case: B&R Sales, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industries
B&R Sales, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industries (2015)
“The Board’s decision was based on a finding that the contractors were “workers” performing personal labor under RCW 51.08.180. B&R argues that the contractors did not qualify as “workers” because they could not perform the *371 contracted work without the use of expensive…”
Henry Industries, Inc. v. Department Of Labor & Industries (2016)
“’ ” 11 ¶13 Washington courts have expressed differing views on how to review whether an individual is a “worker” under RCW 51.08.180. In deciding the question of the proper standard of review to apply, we are guided by the supreme court’s decision in Tapper v.”
Department of Labor & Industries v. Lyons Enterprises, Inc. (2016)
“¶11 In 2010, L&I completed an audit of Lyons and determined that all of Lyons’ franchisees, except the 18 who employed subordinates, were covered “workers” under RCW 51.08.180. The audit also found that Lyons substantially controlled its franchisees under RCW 51.”
Department of Labor & Industries v. Lyons Enterprises, Inc. (2015)
“5 To answer that question, we rely on two subsections: RCW 51.08.180, which defines the term “worker,” and RCW 51.”
Hanquet v. Department of Labor & Industries (1994)
“Hanquet timely appealed to the Board. An industrial appeals judge (IAJ) held a hearing and defined the sole issue on appeal as whether Hanquet was a "worker" within the meaning of RCW 51.”
Jepson v. Department of Labor & Industries (1977)
“" Also RCW 51.08.180, defining "workman," reads in part: "every person .”
Doty v. Town of South Prairie (2005)
“" RCW 51.08.180. As we have stated, the IIA provides "[i]njured workers [with] a swift, no-fault compensation system" and provides "[ e ] mployers [with] immunity from civil suits by workers.”
Lloyd's of Yakima Floor Center v. Department of Labor & Industries (1983)
“The parties do not now dispute these installers were independent contractors and not employees. The question remains whether the essence of their contracts was their personal labor for Lloyd's.”
Malang v. DEPARTMENT OF L&I (2007)
“" Similarly, RCW 51.08.180(1) defines "worker" as "every person in this state who is engaged in the employment of or who is working under an independent contract, the *456 essence of which is his or her personal labor for an employer.”
Malang v. Department of Labor & Industries (2007)
“” Similarly, RCW 51.08.180(1) defines “worker” as “every person in this state who is engaged in the employment of or who is working under an independent contract, the essence of which is his or her personal labor for an employer.”
Jamison v. Department of Labor & Industries (1992)
“Jamison's argument is twofold: The notices of assessment were invalid because they were not executed by the Director or the Director's designee; and the assessments for unpaid industrial insurance taxes were based on contractual arrangements for the falling and bucking of timber…”
Dana's Housekeeping, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industries (1995)
“180(1) Dana’s first contends the housecleaners are not Dana’s’ "workers” for purposes of RCW 51.08.180(1), despite the Industrial Insurance Act’s sweeping purpose: "There is a hazard in all employment and it is the purpose of this title to embrace all employments which are…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 51.08.180(1) — 12 cases
Malang v. DEPARTMENT OF L&I (2007)
“" Similarly, RCW 51.08.180(1) defines "worker" as "every person in this state who is engaged in the employment of or who is working under an independent contract, the *456 essence of which is his or her personal labor for an employer.”
Malang v. Department of Labor & Industries (2007)
“” Similarly, RCW 51.08.180(1) defines “worker” as “every person in this state who is engaged in the employment of or who is working under an independent contract, the essence of which is his or her personal labor for an employer.”
Dana's Housekeeping, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industries (1995)
“180(1) Dana’s first contends the housecleaners are not Dana’s’ "workers” for purposes of RCW 51.08.180(1), despite the Industrial Insurance Act’s sweeping purpose: "There is a hazard in all employment and it is the purpose of this title to embrace all employments which are…”
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