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Wash. Rev. CodeTitle 64Chapter 64.40

Wash. Rev. Code § 64.40.030 (2025)

Commencement of action—Time limitation

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included cited 1985–2025 31citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 31 opinions since 1985, 3 of them in the last five years.

The 20 cases that cite Wash. Rev. Code § 64.40.030 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENCallfas v. Dep't of Constr. & Land Use, 120 P.3d 110 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 64.40.030 14×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“The City then filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that the Callfases’ original suit was barred by the limitations period in RCW 64.40.030. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action.”
Later courts cite it for
“indeed, a permit applicant like the callfases would have a claim under chapter 64.40 rcw for delay damages, as we noted above, without a writ once the tardy permit was issued.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENCity of Seattle v. Blume, 134 Wash. 2d 243 (1997).
cites § 64.40.030 7×cited by 68 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that both claims were barred by the 30-day statute of limitations period provided in RCW 64.40.030. The Blumes filed a motion for reconsideration arguing their claim for tortious interference with a business…”
3
GREENCity of Seattle v. Blume, 947 P.2d 223 (Wash. 1997).
cites § 64.40.030 7×cited by 64 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that both claims were barred by the 30-day statute of limitations period provided in RCW 64.40.030. The Blumes filed a motion for reconsideration arguing their claim for tortious interference with a business…”
The case’s holding
The independent business judgment rule does not bar the proximate cause element of a legal claim (rejecting the business judgment rule of King).
Later courts cite it for
“cause in fact refers to the 'but for' consequences of an act, that is, the immediate connection between an act and an injury.” · 11 citing courts
4
GREENHayes v. City of Seattle, 131 Wash. 2d 706 (1997).
cites § 64.40.030 4×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“020 was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, RCW 64.40.030? 5 In concluding that Hayes’s claim under RCW 64.”
5
GREENHayes v. City of Seattle, 934 P.2d 1179 (Wash. 1997).
cites § 64.40.030 4×cited by 48 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“020 was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, RCW 64.40.030? [5] In concluding that Hayes's claim under RCW 64.”
The case’s holding
Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if findings are too conclusory to demonstrate consideration of the underlying facts and circumstances (basis).
Later courts cite it for
“final action on applicant's request for a permit did not occur until the city council ultimately approved his application following judicial review of the council's initial determination....” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENSmoke v. City of Seattle, 937 P.2d 186 (Wash. 1997).
cites § 64.40.030 6×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“Plaintiffs received a judgment for the stipulated damages plus attorney fees. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for a 42 U.”
7
REDSmoke v. City of Seattle, 902 P.2d 678 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 64.40.030 10×cited by 8 cases
Reversed by Smoke v. City of Seattle (1997): the Washington Supreme Court's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“RCW 64.40.030. The statute plainly requires actions to be commenced "only .”
Later courts cite it for
“a respondent must cross-appeal when seeking reversal of an adverse ruling on a distinct claim or cause of action.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENSmoke v. City of Seattle, 937 P.2d 186 (Wash. 1997).
cites § 64.40.030 5×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“Although we conclude RCW 64.40.030 requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies, we hold an interpretation does not constitute an adequate administrative remedy for a Type I MUP denial.”
The case’s holding
A municipality waives immunity for damages resulting from land use permitting decisions if a party fails to exhaust administrative remedies (implied waiver of immunity).
Later courts cite it for
“impliedly waiving immunity from the liabilities attendant to such claims.” · 3 citing courts
9
GREENKenneth & Kelly Emerson v. Island Cnty., 371 P.3d 93 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
cites § 64.40.030 3×cited by 8 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“” RCW 64.40.030. ¶25 The county’s motion for summary judgment argued that the Emersons failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.”
10
GREENWestmark Dev. Corp. v. City of Burien, 140 Wash. App. 540 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 64.40.030 3×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“” RCW 64.40.030. *549 ¶13 The plain language of chapter 64.”
The case’s holding
Statutory remedies for permitting delays do not preclude common law claims for tortious interference with business expectancy or negligent misrepresentation.
Later courts cite it for
“in reviewing the evidence, the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence, draw its own inferences, or substitute its judgment for the jury.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENWestmark Dev. Corp. v. City of Burien, 166 P.3d 813 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 64.40.030 3×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“" RCW 64.40.030. ¶ 13 The plain language of chapter 64.”
12
GREENBirnbaum v. Pierce Cnty., 274 P.3d 1070 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 64.40.030 3×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“” RCW 64.40.030. “Damages” means reasonable expenses and losses, other than speculative losses and profits, incurred between the time a cause of action arises and the time a holder of an interest in real property is granted relief.”
The case’s holding
Statutory damages are recoverable only for losses incurred after a cause of action arises, meaning pre-decision permit delays are not compensable under the final-decision prong.
Later courts cite it for
“a claim for arbitrary delay occurring prior to a final decision ... may be brought once the permit decision is final.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENWestway Constr., Inc. v. Benton Cnty., 151 P.3d 1005 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 64.40.030 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“RCW 64.40.030. ¶14 The first ground for dismissing the claim under RCW 64.”
Later courts cite it for
“a court must dismiss any action commenced in violation of a 10 statutorily mandated claim filing condition precedent.” · 4 citing courts
14
GREENManna Funding, LLC v. Kittitas Cnty., 295 P.3d 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
cites § 64.40.030 1×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“Whether Manna’s suit was barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under RCW 64.40.030 is irrelevant in this situation.”
Later courts cite it for
“is well settled that a landowner has a vested right to develop land under the zoning ordinances in effect at the time the permit application is submitted.” · 1 citing court
15
GREENCox v. City of Lynnwood, 863 P.2d 578 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 64.40.030 1×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“The Coxes filed this action less than 30 days after denial of the BLA satisfying RCW 64.40.030 and well within the 3-year period in which an action under 42 U.”
The case’s holding
Substantive due process is violated when a local jurisdiction makes a land use decision that is irrational, arbitrary, capricious, lacks a legitimate governmental purpose, or involves improper motive.
Later courts cite it for
“substantive due process is denied if a local jurisdiction makes a land use decision irrationally, arbitrarily, and capriciously, its decision utterly fails to serve a legitimate governmental purpose, or was tainted by improper motive.” · 1 citing court
16
GREENIvy Club Investors v. Kennewick, 699 P.2d 782 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
cites § 64.40.030 1×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“Finally, the City contends the trial court erred in awarding the Ivy Club its costs and attorney fees under RCW 64.40.020(2). The Ivy Club's action was filed within 30 days of the City's refusal to refund the fee, which would have been its last administrative remedy.”
The case’s holding
A municipality may impose a revenue-raising park fee only if a statute expressly authorizes it, and the fee-in-lieu authority applies only to subdivision approval.
17
GREENHarrington v. Spokane Cnty., 114 P.3d 1233 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 64.40.030 1×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“This statute creates a claim for losses caused by arbitrary, capricious, and *1241 unlawful government action or inaction in the matter of land use applications.”
18
GREENHarrington v. Spokane Cnty., 128 Wash. App. 202 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 64.40.030 1×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“This statute creates a claim for losses caused by arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful government action or inaction in the matter of land use applications.”
19
GREENHayes v. City of Seattle, 888 P.2d 1227 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 64.40.030 1×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“RCW 64.40.030 provides that any action for damages under RCW 64.”
20
GREENFoster v. King Cnty., 921 P.2d 552 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
cites § 64.40.030 1×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 64.40.030
“020 provides property owners who have applied for a permit with an action for damages to compensate for arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful agency acts.”
Later courts cite it for
“arbitrary and capricious means 'willful and unreasoning action, taken without regard to or consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the action.” · 3 citing courts

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Citing cases by year
198520052025

One bar per year. Tallest: 6 cases in 1997. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Wash. Ct. App.23Wash.6W.D. Wash.2
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session: 2026 session laws are not yet included. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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