Wash. Rev. Code » Title 69 · Chapter 69.50
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.506 (2026)

Burden of proof; liabilities

✓ current as of May 2026
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(a) [(1)] It is not necessary for the state to negate any exemption or exception in this chapter in any complaint, information, indictment, or other pleading or in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding under this chapter. The burden of proof of any exemption or exception is upon the person claiming it.
(b) [(2)] In the absence of proof that a person is the duly authorized holder of an appropriate registration or order form issued under this chapter, he or she is presumed not to be the holder of the registration or form. The burden of proof is upon him or her to rebut the presumption.
(c) [(3)] No liability is imposed by this chapter upon any authorized state, county, or municipal officer, engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties.
[ 2012 c 117 s 370; 1971 ex.s. c 308 s 69.50.506.]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 29 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1971–2025 · leading case: Frost v. City of Walla Walla, 724 P.2d 1017 (Wash. 1986).
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Frost v. City of Walla Walla, 724 P.2d 1017 (Wash. 1986). · cites it 10× “The City of Walla Walla has not cross-appealed, but claims that RCW 69.50.506(c) insulates the City and the officers from liability.”
State v. Knapp, 773 P.2d 134 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 5× “The statutory provision with respect to exceptions in cases of possession of a controlled substance is RCW 69.50.506(a) which provides: It is not necessary for the state to negate any exemption or exception in this chapter in any .”
Roos v. Snohomish Reg'l Drug Task Force, 166 Wash. 2d 834 (Wash. 2009). · cites it 2× “505(5) provides that “[i]n all cases, the burden of proof is upon the law enforcement agency to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture.”
Tellevik v. Real Prop. Known as 31641, 838 P.2d 111 (Wash. 1992). · cites it 2× “RCW 69.50.506(a). Rather, "[t]he burden of proof of any exemption or exception is upon the person claiming it.”
Rozner v. City of Bellevue, 804 P.2d 24 (Wash. 1991). “505(a)(4)(ii) and (e); RCW 69.50.506(a)], unambiguously provides that the claimant has the burden of proving lack of knowledge, the lawful right to possession, or any exemption or exception to the State's prima facie case for forfeiture.”
In Re One 1970 Chevrolet Chevelle, 215 P.3d 166 (Wash. 2009). “505(5) provides that, "[i]n all cases, the burden of proof is upon the law enforcement agency to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture.”
Roy v. City of Everett, 823 P.2d 1084 (Wash. 1992). · cites it 2× “state, county, or municipal officer", RCW 69.50.506(c), also shielded the jurisdiction that employed prosecutors "for acts of [prosecutors] in the performance of [their] duties.”
Brown v. Vail, 169 Wash. 2d 318 (Wash. 2010). “” Further, it is not clear that the Department is in violation of the federal DAPCA, which exempts from civil or criminal liability state officers ‘lawfully engaged in the enforcement of any law or municipal ordinance relating to controlled substances.”
State v. Lawson, 681 P.2d 867 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 2× “50, the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (UCSA) because the gravamen of both offenses is unlawful possession of a specified substance.”
Rozner v. City of Bellevue, 784 P.2d 537 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 2× “505(a)(4)(ii) [12] and RCW 69.50.506(a) [13] in which the Legislature explicitly placed the burden of proving certain exemptions from *532 forfeiture upon the claimant.”
Brown v. Vail, 237 P.3d 263 (Wash. 2010). “" Further, it is not clear that the Department is in violation of the federal DAPCA, which exempts from civil or criminal liability state officers "lawfully engaged in the enforcement of any law or municipal ordinance relating to controlled substances.”
State v. Stearns, 830 P.2d 355 (Wash. 1992). “See RCW 69.50.506(a) ("The burden of proof of any exemption or exception [in RCW 69.”
Show all 29 citing cases →
— Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.506(a) — 18 cases
Roos v. Snohomish Reg'l Drug Task Force, 166 Wash. 2d 834 (Wash. 2009). “505(5) provides that “[i]n all cases, the burden of proof is upon the law enforcement agency to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture.”
Tellevik v. Real Prop. Known as 31641, 838 P.2d 111 (Wash. 1992). “RCW 69.50.506(a). Rather, "[t]he burden of proof of any exemption or exception is upon the person claiming it.”
State v. Knapp, 773 P.2d 134 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). “The statutory provision with respect to exceptions in cases of possession of a controlled substance is RCW 69.50.506(a) which provides: It is not necessary for the state to negate any exemption or exception in this chapter in any .”
Rozner v. City of Bellevue, 804 P.2d 24 (Wash. 1991). “505(a)(4)(ii) and (e); RCW 69.50.506(a)], unambiguously provides that the claimant has the burden of proving lack of knowledge, the lawful right to possession, or any exemption or exception to the State's prima facie case for forfeiture.”
In Re One 1970 Chevrolet Chevelle, 215 P.3d 166 (Wash. 2009). “505(5) provides that, "[i]n all cases, the burden of proof is upon the law enforcement agency to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.506(b) — 1 case
State v. Knapp, 773 P.2d 134 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). “The statutory provision with respect to exceptions in cases of possession of a controlled substance is RCW 69.50.506(a) which provides: It is not necessary for the state to negate any exemption or exception in this chapter in any .”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.506(c) — 7 cases
Frost v. City of Walla Walla, 724 P.2d 1017 (Wash. 1986). “The City of Walla Walla has not cross-appealed, but claims that RCW 69.50.506(c) insulates the City and the officers from liability.”
Roy v. City of Everett, 823 P.2d 1084 (Wash. 1992). “state, county, or municipal officer", RCW 69.50.506(c), also shielded the jurisdiction that employed prosecutors "for acts of [prosecutors] in the performance of [their] duties.”
Brown v. Vail, 169 Wash. 2d 318 (Wash. 2010). “” Further, it is not clear that the Department is in violation of the federal DAPCA, which exempts from civil or criminal liability state officers ‘lawfully engaged in the enforcement of any law or municipal ordinance relating to controlled substances.”
Brown v. Vail, 237 P.3d 263 (Wash. 2010). “" Further, it is not clear that the Department is in violation of the federal DAPCA, which exempts from civil or criminal liability state officers "lawfully engaged in the enforcement of any law or municipal ordinance relating to controlled substances.”
State v. Knapp, 773 P.2d 134 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). “The statutory provision with respect to exceptions in cases of possession of a controlled substance is RCW 69.50.506(a) which provides: It is not necessary for the state to negate any exemption or exception in this chapter in any .”
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