Wash. Rev. Code » Title 9 · Chapter 9.95
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.95.125 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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After the on-site parole revocation hearing for a person convicted of a crime committed before July 1, 1984, has been concluded, the members of the board having heard the matter shall enter their decision of record within ten days, and make findings and conclusions upon the allegations of the violations of the conditions of parole. If the member, or members having heard the matter, should conclude that the allegations of violation of the conditions of parole have not been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, or, those which have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence are not sufficient cause for the revocation of parole, then the parolee shall be reinstated on parole on the same or modified conditions of parole. For parole violations not resulting in new convictions, modified conditions of parole may include sanctions according to an administrative sanction grid. If the member or members having heard the matter should conclude that the allegations of violation of the conditions of parole have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence and constitute sufficient cause for the revocation of parole, then such member or members shall enter an order of parole revocation and return the parole violator to state custody. Within thirty days of the return of such parole violator to a state correctional institution the board shall enter an order determining a new minimum term not exceeding the maximum penalty provided by law for the crime for which the parole violator was originally convicted or the maximum fixed by the court.
[ 2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 s 338; 1993 c 140 s 2; 1969 c 98 s 7.]

Notes:

Intent—Severability—Effective dates—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12: See notes following RCW 71.09.250.
Application—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 ss 301-363: See note following RCW 9.94A.030.
Severability—Effective date—1969 c 98: See notes following RCW 9.95.120.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13 cases, 1979–2002 · leading case: Bell v. State, 52 P.3d 503 (Wash. 2002).
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Bell v. State, 52 P.3d 503 (Wash. 2002). · cites it 5× “While this instruction is a correct statement of the standard of proof, [8] the trial court nonetheless properly rejected Bell's proposed instruction 12 because it pertains to irrelevant matters. The preponderance of evidence standard in this instruction does not prove causation…”
Bell v. State, 52 P.3d 503 (Wash. 2002). · cites it 4× “The preponderance of evidence standard in this instruction does not prove causation of damages brought about by a parolee because the ISRB may decline to revoke parole or otherwise restore the parolee’s liberty even if a violation is established.”
State v. Dupard, 609 P.2d 961 (Wash. 1980). “RCW 9.95.125. Despite the similarities between parole revocation hearings and judicial proceedings, the Court of Appeals held: Because the parole board is not a court of law, its decision was not a valid judgment and could not be the basis for applying the doctrine of collateral…”
Pierce v. Dept. of Soc. & Health Servs., 646 P.2d 1382 (Wash. 1982). · cites it 3× “RCW 9.95.125. Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wn.2d 405 , 518 P.”
Matter of Pers. Restraint of Locklear, 823 P.2d 1078 (Wash. 1992). “See RCW 9.95.125. 7 Since Storseth and Rolston , several other decisions of the Court of Appeals have also relied on the conclusion that lack of rehabilitation is an adequate *415 reason to impose an exceptional minimum term.”
Matter of Pers. Restraint of Robles, 817 P.2d 419 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). “The Board sentenced the petitioner pursuant to its authority under RCW 9.95.125 which allows the revocation of parole and imposition of a new minimum sentence.”
Butenhoff v. Oberquell, 603 P.2d 1277 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). · cites it 3× “Under RCW 9.95.125, 1 the parole board member who sits at the revocation hearing has 10 days to enter a decision.”
In Re the Pers. Restraint of Storseth, 751 P.2d 1217 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). “As a consequence of Storseth's petition to this court, the Board reviewed his 15-month sentence on November 2, 1987, to bring it into compliance with its new sentencing rule for parole violators, board rule 2.”
Pierce v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 646 P.2d 1382 (Wash. 1982). · cites it 3× “RCW 9.95.125. Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wn.2d 405 , 518 P.”
In Re the Pers. Restraint of Bonds, 613 P.2d 1196 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). “When Bonds returned to the institution, as required by RCW 9.95.125 the parole board fixed a new minimum sentence of 36 months for him.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Bolduc, 753 P.2d 983 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 3× “In the instant case, once the Board determined that appellant's parole should be revoked, it was required, under RCW 9.95.125, to set "a new minimum sentence, not exceeding the maximum penalty provided by law for the crime for which the parole violator was originally convicted .”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Cashaw, 839 P.2d 332 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). “RCW 9.95.125. RCW 9.95.070 allows inmates whose conduct is good while they are in prison and who perform their work faithfully, industriously and diligently to earn credit reductions from the minimum terms set by the Board.”
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