Wisconsin Statutes

Wis. Stat. § 174.01 (2026)

Restraining action against dogs

✓ current as of July 2026
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174.01174.01Restraining action against dogs.
174.01(1)(1)Killing a dog.
174.01(1)(a)(a) Except as provided in par. (b), a person may intentionally kill a dog only if a person is threatened with serious bodily harm by the dog and:
174.01(1)(a)1.1. Other restraining actions were tried and failed; or
174.01(1)(a)2.2. Immediate action is necessary.
174.01(1)(b)(b) A person may intentionally kill a dog if a domestic animal that is owned or in the custody of the person is threatened with serious bodily harm by the dog and the dog is on property owned or controlled by the person and:
174.01(1)(b)1.1. Other restraining actions were tried and failed; or
174.01(1)(b)2.2. Immediate action is necessary.
174.01(2)(2)Inapplicable to officers, veterinarians, and persons killing their own dog. This section does not apply to an officer acting in the lawful performance of his or her duties under s. 29.921 (7), 95.21, 173.23 (1m) (c), (3), or (4), or 174.02 (3), or to a veterinarian killing a dog in a proper and humane manner, or to a person killing his or her own dog in a proper and humane manner.
174.01(3)(3)Liability and penalties. A person who violates this section:
174.01(3)(a)(a) Is liable to the owner of the dog for double damages resulting from the killing;
174.01(3)(b)(b) Is subject to the penalties provided under s. 174.15; and
174.01(3)(c)(c) May be subject to prosecution, depending on the circumstances of the case, under s. 951.02.
174.01 AnnotationWithin the meaning of the 4th amendment, domestic animals are effects and the killing of a companion dog constitutes a seizure, which is constitutional only if reasonable. Viilo v. Eyre, 547 F.3d 707 (2008).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1934–2026 · leading case: Rabideau v. City of Racine, 2001 WI 57 (Wis. 2001).
Rabideau v. City of Racine, 2001 WI 57 (Wis. 2001). · cites it 26× “See Wis. Stat. § 174.01 (1997-98). [6] Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's grant of summary judgment on the basis of § 174.”
Brown v. Maxey, 369 N.W.2d 677 (Wis. 1985). · cites it 2× “Even if the treble damages are paid by an insurer, the fact that a dog attacking another person may be killed under sec. 174.01, Stats., may provide both deterrence and punishment.”
Cieslewicz Ex Rel. Finerty v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins., 267 N.W.2d 595 (Wis. 1978). · cites it 2× “Even if the treble damages are paid by an insurer, the fact that a dog attacking another person may be killed under sec. 174.01, Stats., may provide both deterrence and punishment.”
Viilo v. Eyre, 547 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2008). “The defendants make two attempts to resist this conclusion: first, they argue that the killing was justified based on the risk that Bubba might interfere with their investigation; second, they argue that it was not clearly established in 2004 that the seizure of a dog was a…”
Pfeil v. Rogers, 757 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1985). · cites it 2× “that may suddenly assault him while he is peacefully walking or riding and while being out of the inclosure of its owner or keeper____” Wis.Stat. § 174.01 (1974). “Given the size of the dogs, their attacks on Ducommun, and their presence in a public park,” the court ruled that…”
Munyon v. Moe, 176 N.W.2d 324 (Wis. 1970). · cites it 2× “The principal defense asserted by the wardens is that their action was justified under sec. 174.01, Stats., which provides in part: “Dogs may be killed.”
Skog v. King, 254 N.W. 354 (Wis. 1934). “” Sec. 174.01, Stats. The court was of the opinion that a dog is not a domestic animal within the meaning of the language “other domestic animals” found in the statute.”
Bass v. Nofsinger, 269 N.W. 303 (Wis. 1936). “” Defendant-appellant contends that he had a legal right, by virtue of sec. 174.01, Stats. 1933, to kill respondent’s dog.”
Goodlet v. City of Marinette (E.D. Wis. 2021). · cites it 2× ““Both common sense, and indeed Wisconsin law, see Wis. Stat. § 174.01 (1), counsel that the use of deadly force against a household pet is reasonable only if the pet poses an immediate danger and the use of force is unavoidable.”
Jeffrey M. Polfuss v. Wisconsin Mut. Ins. Co. (Wis. Ct. App. 2026). · cites it 2× “” § 174.01(1)(a) and (b). In describing the effect of the dog-bite statute, our supreme court has stated that it “imposes strict liability on a dog owner for injuries caused by the dog” and “obviates the need for a plaintiff to prove specific acts of negligence.”
Kelly v. Berg, 925 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018). “01(1)(b), we noted that the purpose of the double damages provision is to "punish those who harbor or keep a dog with a known propensity for unprovoked assaults and to deter others from doing the same." Id. , ¶11. Based on this purpose, we reasoned that routine property damage…”
Virginia Viilo v. Kevin Eyre (7th Cir. 2008). “Both common sense, and indeed Wisconsin law, see Wis. Stat. § 174.01 (1), counsel that the use of deadly force against a household pet is reasonable only if the pet poses an immediate danger and the use of force is unavoidable.”
— Wis. Stat. § 174.01(1) — 1 case
Rabideau v. City of Racine, 2001 WI 57 (Wis. 2001). “See Wis. Stat. § 174.01 (1997-98). [6] Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's grant of summary judgment on the basis of § 174.”
— Wis. Stat. § 174.01(1)(a) — 1 case
Jeffrey M. Polfuss v. Wisconsin Mut. Ins. Co. (Wis. Ct. App. 2026). “” § 174.01(1)(a) and (b). In describing the effect of the dog-bite statute, our supreme court has stated that it “imposes strict liability on a dog owner for injuries caused by the dog” and “obviates the need for a plaintiff to prove specific acts of negligence.”
— Wis. Stat. § 174.01(1)(b) — 1 case
Kelly v. Berg, 925 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018). “01(1)(b), we noted that the purpose of the double damages provision is to "punish those who harbor or keep a dog with a known propensity for unprovoked assaults and to deter others from doing the same." Id. , ¶11. Based on this purpose, we reasoned that routine property damage…”
— Wis. Stat. § 174.01(3) — 1 case
Rabideau v. City of Racine, 2001 WI 57 (Wis. 2001). “See Wis. Stat. § 174.01 (1997-98). [6] Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's grant of summary judgment on the basis of § 174.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.