Wisconsin Statutes

Wis. Stat. § 346.03 (2026)

Applicability of rules of the road to authorized emergency vehicles

✓ current as of July 2026

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346.03346.03 Applicability of rules of the road to authorized emergency vehicles.

346.03(1)(1) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, when transporting an organ for human transplantation, or when transporting medical personnel for the purpose of performing human organ harvesting or transplantation immediately after the transportation, may exercise the privileges set forth in this section, but subject to the conditions stated in subs. (2) to (5m).

346.03(2)(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may:

346.03(2)(a)(a) Stop, stand or park, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter;

346.03(2)(b)(b) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation;

346.03(2)(c)(c) Exceed the speed limit;

346.03(2)(d)(d) Disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning in specified directions.

346.03(2m)(2m) Notwithstanding s. 346.94 (20), a law enforcement officer, a fire fighter, or emergency medical personnel may open and leave open any door of an authorized emergency vehicle when the vehicle is stopped, standing, or parked and the person is performing official duties.

346.03(3)(3) The exemptions granted by sub. (2) (b), (c) and (d) apply only when the operator of the emergency vehicle is giving a visual signal by means of at least one flashing, oscillating, or rotating red light, except that the visual signal given by a police vehicle may be by means of a blue light and a red light which are flashing, oscillating, or rotating, and also an audible signal by means of a siren or exhaust whistle, except as otherwise provided in sub. (4) or (4m).

346.03(4)(4) Except as provided in sub. (4m), a law enforcement officer operating a police vehicle shall otherwise comply with the requirements of sub. (3) relative to the giving of audible and visual signals but may exceed the speed limit without giving audible and visual signal under the following circumstances:

346.03(4)(a)(a) If the officer is obtaining evidence of a speed violation.

346.03(4)(b)(b) If the officer is responding to a call which the officer reasonably believes involves a felony in progress and the officer reasonably believes any of the following:

346.03(4)(b)1.1. Knowledge of the officer’s presence may endanger the safety of a victim or other person.

346.03(4)(b)2.2. Knowledge of the officer’s presence may cause the suspected violator to evade apprehension.

346.03(4)(b)3.3. Knowledge of the officer’s presence may cause the suspected violator to destroy evidence of a suspected felony or may otherwise result in the loss of evidence of a suspected felony.

346.03(4)(b)4.4. Knowledge of the officer’s presence may cause the suspected violator to cease the commission of a suspected felony before the officer obtains sufficient evidence to establish grounds for arrest.

346.03(4m)(4m) A law enforcement officer operating a police vehicle that is a bicycle is not required to comply with the requirements of sub. (3) relative to the giving of audible and visual signals.

346.03(5)(5) The exemptions granted the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle by this section do not relieve such operator from the duty to drive or ride with due regard under the circumstances for the safety of all persons nor do they protect such operator from the consequences of his or her reckless disregard for the safety of others.

346.03(5m)(5m) The privileges granted under this section apply to the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle under s. 340.01 (3) (dg) or (dh) only if the operator has successfully completed a safety and training course in emergency vehicle operation that is taken at a technical college under ch. 38 or that is approved by the department and only if the vehicle being operated is plainly marked, in a manner prescribed by the department, to identify it as an authorized emergency vehicle under s. 340.01 (3) (dg) or (dh).

346.03(6)(6) Every law enforcement agency that uses authorized emergency vehicles shall provide written guidelines for its officers and employees regarding exceeding speed limits under the circumstances specified in sub. (4) and when otherwise in pursuit of actual or suspected violators. The guidelines shall consider, among other factors, road conditions, density of population, severity of crime and necessity of pursuit by vehicle. The guidelines are not subject to requirements for rules under ch. 227. Each law enforcement agency shall review its written guidelines by June 30 of each even-numbered year and, if considered appropriate by the law enforcement agency, shall revise those guidelines.

346.03 HistoryHistory: 1983 a. 56; 1985 a. 82, 143; 1987 a. 126; 1995 a. 36; 1997 a. 88; 2007 a. 20; 2011 a. 184; 2015 a. 102.

346.03 AnnotationSub. (5) limits the exercise of privileges granted by sub. (2). City of Madison v. Polenska, 143 Wis. 2d 525, 421 N.W.2d 862 (Ct. App. 1988).

346.03 AnnotationAn officer who decides to engage in pursuit is immune from liability for the decision under s. 893.80 but may be subject to liability under sub. (5) for negligently operating a motor vehicle during the chase. A city that has adopted a policy that complies with sub. (6) is immune from liability for injuries resulting from high speed chases. A policy that considered the severity of the crime only in terms of when to strike a vehicle or use road blocks did not comply with sub. (6). Estate of Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 202 Wis. 2d 290, 550 N.W.2d 103 (1996), 94-0192.

346.03 AnnotationIn order to comply with this section and lawfully proceed through a red stop signal, an authorized emergency vehicle must slow down as may be necessary for safe operation, have given both a visual and an audible signal, and have proceeded with due regard under the circumstances for the safety of all persons. Brown v. Acuity, 2013 WI 60, 348 Wis. 2d 603, 833 N.W.2d 96, 11-0583.

346.03 AnnotationReading compliance with subs. (2) (b) and (3) as meeting the due regard standard of sub. (5) ignores the language of sub. (5). Sub. (5) explicitly states that the duty of due regard exists notwithstanding the other exemptions or privileges in this section. The duty of “due regard under the circumstances” is a ministerial duty for purposes of determining immunity under s. 893.80. Legue v. City of Racine, 2014 WI 92, 357 Wis. 2d 250, 849 N.W.2d 837, 12-2499.

346.03 AnnotationA private ambulance that is an authorized emergency vehicle usually kept in a given county pursuant to s. 340.01 (3) (i) may not avail itself of the provisions of sub. (2) when proceeding unsolicited to the scene of an accident or medical emergency in an adjacent county. 77 Atty. Gen. 214.

346.03 AnnotationA claim of excessive force in the course of making a seizure of the person is properly analyzed under the 4th amendment’s objective reasonableness standard. A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the 4th amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007).

346.03 AnnotationPolice Civil Liability and the Law of High Speed Pursuit. Zevitz. 70 MLR 237 (1987).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 25 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1964–2025 · leading case: Eileen W. Legue v. City of Racine, 2014 WI 92 (Wis. 2014).

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Eileen W. Legue v. City of Racine, 2014 WI 92 (Wis. 2014). · cites it 290× “80 (2011-12),3 governing the immunity of municipal government and its officers and employees, and Wis. Stat. § 346.03 , governing the rules of the road for emergency vehicles.”

Est. of Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 550 N.W.2d 103 (Wis. 1996). · cites it 174× “80(4), Cavanaugh argues that neither the City nor Andrade are immune from liability arising out of a high-speed pursuit based on Wis. Stat. § 346.03 . Section 346.03 specifically governs the privileges and duties of drivers of emergency vehicles, Wis.”

Marilyn M. Brown v. Acuity, A Mut. Ins. Co., 2013 WI 60 (Wis. 2013). · cites it 38× “It concluded that although Burditt undisputedly "failed to meet" the standard set forth in Wis. Stat. § 346.03 (3) (2009-10) 5 requiring an audible *614 and visual signal when proceeding through a red stop signal, that failure merely "subjected him[] to the penalty for…”

Est. of Cavanaugh Ex Rel. Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 528 N.W.2d 492 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 40× “See § 346.03(5), STATS. Immunity will not protect an officer *259 who fails to exercise due regard in the operation of his motor vehicle.”

Glover-Armont v. Cargile, 426 P.3d 45 (Nev. 2018). · cites it 6× “After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the lower court granted defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict based upon discretionary-act immunity. Id.”

City of Madison v. Polenska, 421 N.W.2d 862 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 14× “1 Section 346.03 2 exempts emergency vehicle operators from several rules of the road, *527 subject to some conditions.”

State v. Brown, 318 N.W.2d 370 (Wis. 1982). · cites it 2× “20, and because the legislature has accorded drivers narrow privileges to violate traffic laws in cases of authorized emergency vehicles, sec. 346.03, Stats. 1979-80, the legislature did not intend to make the defenses of legal justification available to a speeding offender.”

Hoskins v. Dodge Cnty., 2002 WI App 40 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 3× “Thus, Hoskins does not assert the existence of a ministerial duty like the one the supreme court acknowledged in Andrade , where the court determined that the City of Milwaukee "has a ministerial duty to have a written policy for high-speed chases which includes consideration of…”

Merlino v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins., 127 N.W.2d 741 (Wis. 1964). · cites it 2× “The element of emergency call, however, would be material in considering the issue of whether the ambulance driver was guilty of negligence in failing to observe certain rules of the road.”

Brown v. Acuity, 2012 WI App 66 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 16× “Brown alleges that Burditt had a ministerial duty not to run the red light because of Wis. Stat. § 346.03 (3), which states that the operator of an emergency vehicle is not exempt from the Wis.”

Daley v. Kashmanian, 344 Conn. 464 (Conn. 2022). “Wis. Stat. Ann. § 346.03 (4) (a) and (b) (West 2019) (The Wisconsin emergency vehicle statute authorizes law enforcement officers to exceed the speed limit without ‘‘giving audible and visual signal’’ if ‘‘the officer is obtaining evidence of a speed violation’’ or ‘‘is…”

Smith v. Cnty. of Milwaukee, 470 N.W.2d 274 (Wis. 1991). · cites it 9× “I would reverse because I conclude that sec. 346.03, Stats., which delineates the responsibility of the driver of an emergency vehicle when in pursuit of a suspected law violator, places upon the driver the duty of ordinary care under the circumstances for the safety of all…”

Show all 25 citing cases →

— Wis. Stat. § 346.03(1) — 5 cases

City of Madison v. Polenska, 421 N.W.2d 862 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988). “1 Section 346.03 2 exempts emergency vehicle operators from several rules of the road, *527 subject to some conditions.”

Glover-armont Vs. Cargile, 2018 NV 49 (Nev. 2018).

Glover-amont v. Cargile, 2018 NV 49 (Nev. 2018).

Glover-armont Vs. Cargile, 2018 NV 49 (Nev. 2018).

Glover-Armont v. Cargile (Nev. 2018).

— Wis. Stat. § 346.03(2) — 1 case

Eileen W. Legue v. City of Racine, 2014 WI 92 (Wis. 2014). “80 (2011-12),3 governing the immunity of municipal government and its officers and employees, and Wis. Stat. § 346.03 , governing the rules of the road for emergency vehicles.”

— Wis. Stat. § 346.03(2)(b) — 4 cases

City of Madison v. Polenska, 421 N.W.2d 862 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988). “1 Section 346.03 2 exempts emergency vehicle operators from several rules of the road, *527 subject to some conditions.”

Brown v. Acuity, 2012 WI App 66 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012). “Brown alleges that Burditt had a ministerial duty not to run the red light because of Wis. Stat. § 346.03 (3), which states that the operator of an emergency vehicle is not exempt from the Wis.”

Place v. City of Milwaukee, 688 N.W.2d 783 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004).

— Wis. Stat. § 346.03(3) — 3 cases

Marilyn M. Brown v. Acuity, A Mut. Ins. Co., 2013 WI 60 (Wis. 2013). “It concluded that although Burditt undisputedly "failed to meet" the standard set forth in Wis. Stat. § 346.03 (3) (2009-10) 5 requiring an audible *614 and visual signal when proceeding through a red stop signal, that failure merely "subjected him[] to the penalty for…”

— Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) — 12 cases

Est. of Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 550 N.W.2d 103 (Wis. 1996). “80(4), Cavanaugh argues that neither the City nor Andrade are immune from liability arising out of a high-speed pursuit based on Wis. Stat. § 346.03 . Section 346.03 specifically governs the privileges and duties of drivers of emergency vehicles, Wis.”

Est. of Cavanaugh Ex Rel. Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 528 N.W.2d 492 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). “See § 346.03(5), STATS. Immunity will not protect an officer *259 who fails to exercise due regard in the operation of his motor vehicle.”

City of Madison v. Polenska, 421 N.W.2d 862 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988). “1 Section 346.03 2 exempts emergency vehicle operators from several rules of the road, *527 subject to some conditions.”

Smith v. Cnty. of Milwaukee, 470 N.W.2d 274 (Wis. 1991). “I would reverse because I conclude that sec. 346.03, Stats., which delineates the responsibility of the driver of an emergency vehicle when in pursuit of a suspected law violator, places upon the driver the duty of ordinary care under the circumstances for the safety of all…”

— Wis. Stat. § 346.03(6) — 7 cases

Hoskins v. Dodge Cnty., 2002 WI App 40 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). “Thus, Hoskins does not assert the existence of a ministerial duty like the one the supreme court acknowledged in Andrade , where the court determined that the City of Milwaukee "has a ministerial duty to have a written policy for high-speed chases which includes consideration of…”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.