Wisconsin Statutes
Wis. Stat. § 349.03 (2026)
Regulation by local authorities forbidden; exceptions
✓ current as of July 2026
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349.03(1)(1) Chapters 341 to 348 and 350 shall be uniform in operation throughout the state. No local authority may enact or enforce any traffic regulation unless such regulation:
349.03(1)(b)(b) Is expressly authorized by ss. 349.06 to 349.25 or some other provision of the statutes.
349.03(2)(2) No local authority may enact or enforce any traffic regulation providing for suspension or revocation of motor vehicle operator’s licenses or requiring local registration of vehicles, except as authorized by s. 341.35, or in any manner excluding or prohibiting any motor vehicle, mobile home, vehicle transporting a manufactured home or modular home, recreational vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer whose owner has complied with chs. 341 to 348 from the free use of all highways, except as authorized by sub. (3) and ss. 66.0429 (1) and (3), 349.13, 349.17, 349.22 and 349.23.
349.03(2m)(2m) Notwithstanding sub. (2), a municipal court may suspend a license for a violation of a local ordinance in conformity with s. 346.63 (1) or (2m).
349.03(3)(3) In a county having a population of at least 750,000, city councils and village boards may, as to streets within their corporate limits, and the county board may, as to all other highways, establish one-way lanes to be used only by specified public transportation vehicles but only to facilitate mass transit and taxicab movement. The authority granted by this subsection may be exercised extraterritorially by the county board of the populous county on those portions of county trunk and state trunk highways in contiguous counties which are within 2 miles of the populous county if the highways so affected are connected to highways similarly affected in the populous county and if the board of the contiguous county concurs.
349.03(4)(4) If a violation under s. 343.305 or 346.63 or a local ordinance in conformity with s. 346.63 (1), (5) or (7) occurs within a law enforcement officer’s jurisdiction, he or she may enforce the violation anywhere in the state.
349.03(5)(a)(a) Notwithstanding sub. (1), a political subdivision may enter into a written agreement with the owner of a private road or driveway within a manufactured and mobile home community, as defined in s. 66.0435 (1) (cg), that is located within the boundaries of the political subdivision to enforce traffic regulations under ch. 346, or local ordinances in conformity with these regulations, on the private road or driveway.
349.03(5)(b)(b) The agreement under par. (a) may limit the traffic regulations or ordinances to be enforced on the private road or driveway under the agreement.
349.03 HistoryHistory: 1971 c. 234, 277; 1973 c. 86, 87, 336; 1979 c. 59; 1981 c. 20, 165; 1983 a. 535; 1985 a. 194; 1987 a. 3, 27; 1989 a. 105; 1993 a. 113; 1999 a. 150 s. 672; 2007 a. 11; 2009 a. 129; 2017 a. 207 s. 5; 2023 a. 1.
349.03 AnnotationThis section, in prohibitory language, is the same concept of municipal power that is expressed affirmatively in s. 349.06. These sections must be read together and establish one test. Janesville v. Walker, 50 Wis. 2d 35, 183 N.W.2d 158 (1971).
349.03 AnnotationA city ordinance prohibiting loud and unnecessary tire or engine noise was valid under sub. (1) and s. 349.06 (1). City of Janesville v. Garthwaite, 83 Wis. 2d 866, 266 N.W.2d 418 (1978).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13
cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1971–2025 · leading case: Scheunemann v. City of West Bend, 507 N.W.2d 163 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
Scheunemann v. City of West Bend, 507 N.W.2d 163 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). “STATUTORY CHALLENGE The appellants next argue that the cruising ordinance violates sec. 349.03, Stats., of the Motor Vehicle Code.”
In Matter of Suspension of Operating Privilege of Bardwell, 266 N.W.2d 618 (Wis. 1978). “Sec. 349.03, Stats., is entitled “Regulation by local authorities forbidden; exceptions.”
U.S. Oil, Inc. v. City of Fond Du Lac, 544 N.W.2d 589 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996). “Oil responds, however, by pointing to the language differences in the motor vehicle laws and the statutes governing tobacco distribution.”
Town of East Troy v. A-1 Serv. Co., Inc., 537 N.W.2d 126 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). “(1)(a) of § 349.03, Stats., it may adopt administrative rules not expressly authorized by statute so long as the rules are not inconsistent with chs.”
City of Janesville v. Walker, 183 N.W.2d 158 (Wis. 1971). “The state of Wisconsin has preempted the field of traffic regulations by the enactment of chapters 341 to 348 and by sec. 349.03, Stats., 1 which provides that these chapters shall be uniform in operation throughout the state and no local authority may enact any traffic…”
Cnty. of Walworth v. Rohner, 324 N.W.2d 682 (Wis. 1982). “This preemption is expressly found in sec. 349.03, Stats., which provides: “349.”
City of Janesville v. Garthwaite, 266 N.W.2d 418 (Wis. 1978). “Because the Janesville ordinance prohibits certain noise made in the operation of a motor vehicle, it is a traffic regulation, and, as such, it must *870 comply with the restrictions on local traffic regulations contained in the motor vehicle code.”
Steel v. Bach, 369 N.W.2d 174 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985). “*255 The next question is whether the common council’s resolutions are valid under the second alternative in sec. 349.03(1), Stats. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the resolutions are valid under sec.”
State v. Richard T. Weske (Wis. Ct. App. 2025). “§ 349.03(4). As to § 175.40(6)(a), the State says that Officer Gurgul met the statutory requirements because he was “on duty and on official business[,]” was “taking an action that he … would be authorized to take under the same circumstances in his … territorial…”
Henkel v. Phillips, 260 N.W.2d 653 (Wis. 1978). “), we could not agree that the Board is promulgating “traffic regulations” as the term is used in sec. 349.03, Stats., contrary to or inconsistent with the specified chapters of the statute.”
Always Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee (Wis. Ct. App. 2023). “Rather, we conclude that the drop fee ordinance falls into a gap in state law where the owner or authorized operator of the vehicle to be 4 Always Towing additionally argued in its opening brief that the City’s authority to pass the drop fee ordinance was expressly withdrawn by…”
Vill. of Chenequa v. Jill Dahlquist (Wis. Ct. App. 2020). “§ 349.03(1), contending that the ordinance is not expressly authorized as required, by “[WIS.”
— Wis. Stat. § 349.03(1) — 4 cases
City of Janesville v. Garthwaite, 266 N.W.2d 418 (Wis. 1978). “Because the Janesville ordinance prohibits certain noise made in the operation of a motor vehicle, it is a traffic regulation, and, as such, it must *870 comply with the restrictions on local traffic regulations contained in the motor vehicle code.”
Steel v. Bach, 369 N.W.2d 174 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985). “*255 The next question is whether the common council’s resolutions are valid under the second alternative in sec. 349.03(1), Stats. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the resolutions are valid under sec.”
Town of East Troy v. A-1 Serv. Co., Inc., 537 N.W.2d 126 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). “(1)(a) of § 349.03, Stats., it may adopt administrative rules not expressly authorized by statute so long as the rules are not inconsistent with chs.”
Vill. of Chenequa v. Jill Dahlquist (Wis. Ct. App. 2020). “§ 349.03(1), contending that the ordinance is not expressly authorized as required, by “[WIS.”
— Wis. Stat. § 349.03(1)(a) — 1 case
Town of East Troy v. A-1 Serv. Co., Inc., 537 N.W.2d 126 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). “(1)(a) of § 349.03, Stats., it may adopt administrative rules not expressly authorized by statute so long as the rules are not inconsistent with chs.”
— Wis. Stat. § 349.03(1)(b) — 1 case
Town of East Troy v. A-1 Serv. Co., Inc., 537 N.W.2d 126 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). “(1)(a) of § 349.03, Stats., it may adopt administrative rules not expressly authorized by statute so long as the rules are not inconsistent with chs.”
— Wis. Stat. § 349.03(2) — 2 cases
In Matter of Suspension of Operating Privilege of Bardwell, 266 N.W.2d 618 (Wis. 1978). “Sec. 349.03, Stats., is entitled “Regulation by local authorities forbidden; exceptions.”
Steel v. Bach, 369 N.W.2d 174 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985). “*255 The next question is whether the common council’s resolutions are valid under the second alternative in sec. 349.03(1), Stats. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the resolutions are valid under sec.”
— Wis. Stat. § 349.03(4) — 1 case
State v. Richard T. Weske (Wis. Ct. App. 2025). “§ 349.03(4). As to § 175.40(6)(a), the State says that Officer Gurgul met the statutory requirements because he was “on duty and on official business[,]” was “taking an action that he … would be authorized to take under the same circumstances in his … territorial…”
— Wis. Stat. § 349.03(5) — 1 case
State v. Varick C. Choice (Wis. Ct. App. 2023).
— Wis. Stat. § 349.03(l)(a) — 1 case
U.S. Oil, Inc. v. City of Fond Du Lac, 544 N.W.2d 589 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996). “Oil responds, however, by pointing to the language differences in the motor vehicle laws and the statutes governing tobacco distribution.”
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