Wisconsin Statutes
Wis. Stat. § 939.46 (2026)
Coercion
✓ current as of July 2026
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939.46(1)(1) A threat by a person other than the actor’s coconspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to the actor or another and which causes him or her so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act, except that if the prosecution is for first-degree intentional homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd-degree intentional homicide.
939.46(1m)(1m) A victim of a violation of s. 940.302 (2) or 948.051 has an affirmative defense for any offense committed as a direct result of the violation of s. 940.302 (2) or 948.051 without regard to whether anyone was prosecuted or convicted for the violation of s. 940.302 (2) or 948.051.
939.46(2)(2) It is no defense to a prosecution of a married person that the alleged crime was committed by command of the spouse nor is there any presumption of coercion when a crime is committed by a married person in the presence of the spouse.
939.46(3)(3) A petitioner under s. 813.12 or 813.122, or an individual whose parent, stepparent, or legal guardian filed a petition under s. 813.122 on behalf of the individual as a child victim, as defined in s. 813.122 (1) (c), has an affirmative defense for an offense under s. 175.35 (2e) that is punishable under s. 175.35 (3) (b) 2., or for an offense under s. 941.2905, if the person prohibited from possessing a firearm was the respondent in the action under s. 813.12 or 813.122.
939.46 NoteJudicial Council Note, 1988: Sub. (1) is amended by conforming references to the statute titles created by this bill. Since coercion mitigates first-degree intentional homicide to 2nd degree, it is obviously not a defense to prosecution for the latter crime. [Bill 191-S]
939.46 AnnotationThe state must disprove an asserted coercion defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Moes v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 756, 284 N.W.2d 66 (1979).
939.46 AnnotationThe coercion defense is limited to the most severe form of inducement. It requires finding that the actor believed the actor was threatened with immediate death or great bodily harm with no possible escape other than the commission of a criminal act. A defendant seeking a coercion defense instruction must meet the initial burden of producing evidence to support giving an instruction. That the defendant reasonably believed that a companion would attempt to harm him or her if he or she did not comply with the companion’s orders only suggests that the safest course was to comply with companion’s orders, not that it was the only course. State v. Keeran, 2004 WI App 4, 268 Wis. 2d 761, 674 N.W.2d 570, 01-1892.
939.46 AnnotationFor the purposes of sub. (1m), an offense is “committed as a direct result” of a violation of the human-trafficking statutes if there is a logical, causal connection between the offense and the trafficking such that the offense is not the result, in significant part, of other events, circumstances, or considerations apart from the trafficking violation. “Committed as a direct result of the violation” does not require that the trafficker be aware of the offense or that it occur at the trafficker’s behest in furtherance of the trafficking violation. It simply requires that the offense occur as a direct result of the violation of the trafficking statutes. State v. Kizer, 2022 WI 58, 403 Wis. 2d 142, 976 N.W.2d 356, 20-0192.
939.46 AnnotationThe defense under sub. (1m) is a complete defense to first-degree intentional homicide. State v. Kizer, 2022 WI 58, 403 Wis. 2d 142, 976 N.W.2d 356, 20-0192.
939.46 AnnotationThe elements of the coercion defense must continuously be met throughout the duration of an ongoing, otherwise-criminal act. State v. Stetzer, 2025 WI 34, 417 Wis. 2d 373, 22 N.W.3d 893, 23-0874.
939.46 AnnotationA defendant's personal history can be relevant to the reasonableness of the belief that their actions were the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm. State v. Stetzer, 2025 WI 34, 417 Wis. 2d 373, 22 N.W.3d 893, 23-0874.
939.46 AnnotationA Path to Protection: Collateral Crime Vacatur for Wisconsin’s Victims of Sex Trafficking. Mullins. 2019 WLR 1551.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24
cases (8 in the last 5 years), 1979–2025 · leading case: State v. Chrystul D. Kizer, 2022 WI 58 (Wis. 2022).
State v. Chrystul D. Kizer, 2022 WI 58 (Wis. 2022). “See Wis. Stat. § 939.46 (1m) (2019-20).1 Chrystul Kizer wants to rely on this defense when she is tried on charges of first-degree intentional homicide and several other felonies in connection with the death of the man she says trafficked her.”
State v. Chrystul D. Kizer, 2021 WI App 46 (Wis. Ct. App. 2021). “45(1) does not limit itself by reference to a particular subsection of section 939.46. Rather, by referring to the statute generally, it incorporates all of the subdivisions thereof, including subsection (1m).”
State v. DeLao, 2002 WI 49 (Wis. 2002). “The defense of coercion is based upon Wis. Stat. § 939.46 , which provides that: (1) a threat by a person .”
State v. Chrystul D. Kizer, 2022 WI 58 (Wis. 2022). “See Wis. Stat. § 939.46 (1m) (2019-20).1 Chrystul Kizer wants to rely on this defense when she is tried on charges of first-degree intentional homicide and several other felonies in connection with the death of the man she says trafficked her.”
Monroe Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Kelli B., 2004 WI 48 (Wis. 2004). “43 , or "coercion," Wis. Stat. § 939.46 , depending on the facts.”
State v. Black, 2001 WI 31 (Wis. 2001). “45 in part are: (1) When the actor's conduct occurs under circumstances of coercion or necessity so as to be privileged under § 939.46 or 939.47; or (2) When the actor's conduct is in defense of persons or property under any of the circumstances described in § 939.”
State v. Horn, 377 N.W.2d 176 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985). “Section 939.46, Stats., specifically requires that the actor hold a reasonable belief that his act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm.”
Moes v. State, 284 N.W.2d 66 (Wis. 1979). “Sec. 939.46(1), Stats. The question presented concerns the burden of proof: Must the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a criminal defendant’s actions were not coerced before he can be convicted of the crime charged when the defendant has raised the statutory defense of…”
Theodore W. Oswald v. Daniel Bertrand, 374 F.3d 475 (7th Cir. 2004). “But there is an exception to the right to plead coercion if the coercion was by the defendant’s coconspirator, id.”
State v. Brown, 318 N.W.2d 370 (Wis. 1982). “" [6] Sec. 939.46, Stats. 1979-80, provides as follows: "939.”
State v. Dundon, 594 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 1999). “" Wis. Stat. § 939.46 (1). Dundon cannot claim the defense of coercion in this case because he did not establish any "threat by a person.”
Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d 783 (Mass. 2012). “§ 2C:2-9 (West 2005); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.46 (West 2005 & Supp.”
— Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1) — 10 cases
State v. Chrystul D. Kizer, 2022 WI 58 (Wis. 2022). “See Wis. Stat. § 939.46 (1m) (2019-20).1 Chrystul Kizer wants to rely on this defense when she is tried on charges of first-degree intentional homicide and several other felonies in connection with the death of the man she says trafficked her.”
State v. Chrystul D. Kizer, 2021 WI App 46 (Wis. Ct. App. 2021). “45(1) does not limit itself by reference to a particular subsection of section 939.46. Rather, by referring to the statute generally, it incorporates all of the subdivisions thereof, including subsection (1m).”
Moes v. State, 284 N.W.2d 66 (Wis. 1979). “Sec. 939.46(1), Stats. The question presented concerns the burden of proof: Must the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a criminal defendant’s actions were not coerced before he can be convicted of the crime charged when the defendant has raised the statutory defense of…”
State v. Horn, 377 N.W.2d 176 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985). “Section 939.46, Stats., specifically requires that the actor hold a reasonable belief that his act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm.”
State v. Chrystul D. Kizer, 2022 WI 58 (Wis. 2022). “See Wis. Stat. § 939.46 (1m) (2019-20).1 Chrystul Kizer wants to rely on this defense when she is tried on charges of first-degree intentional homicide and several other felonies in connection with the death of the man she says trafficked her.”
— Wis. Stat. § 939.46(1m) — 3 cases
State v. Chrystul D. Kizer, 2022 WI 58 (Wis. 2022). “See Wis. Stat. § 939.46 (1m) (2019-20).1 Chrystul Kizer wants to rely on this defense when she is tried on charges of first-degree intentional homicide and several other felonies in connection with the death of the man she says trafficked her.”
State v. Chrystul D. Kizer, 2021 WI App 46 (Wis. Ct. App. 2021). “45(1) does not limit itself by reference to a particular subsection of section 939.46. Rather, by referring to the statute generally, it incorporates all of the subdivisions thereof, including subsection (1m).”
State v. Chrystul D. Kizer, 2022 WI 58 (Wis. 2022). “See Wis. Stat. § 939.46 (1m) (2019-20).1 Chrystul Kizer wants to rely on this defense when she is tried on charges of first-degree intentional homicide and several other felonies in connection with the death of the man she says trafficked her.”
— Wis. Stat. § 939.46(2) — 3 cases
State v. Chrystul D. Kizer, 2021 WI App 46 (Wis. Ct. App. 2021). “45(1) does not limit itself by reference to a particular subsection of section 939.46. Rather, by referring to the statute generally, it incorporates all of the subdivisions thereof, including subsection (1m).”
State v. Chrystul D. Kizer, 2022 WI 58 (Wis. 2022). “See Wis. Stat. § 939.46 (1m) (2019-20).1 Chrystul Kizer wants to rely on this defense when she is tried on charges of first-degree intentional homicide and several other felonies in connection with the death of the man she says trafficked her.”
State v. Chrystul D. Kizer, 2022 WI 58 (Wis. 2022). “See Wis. Stat. § 939.46 (1m) (2019-20).1 Chrystul Kizer wants to rely on this defense when she is tried on charges of first-degree intentional homicide and several other felonies in connection with the death of the man she says trafficked her.”
— Wis. Stat. § 939.46(3) — 1 case
State v. Chrystul D. Kizer, 2021 WI App 46 (Wis. Ct. App. 2021). “45(1) does not limit itself by reference to a particular subsection of section 939.46. Rather, by referring to the statute generally, it incorporates all of the subdivisions thereof, including subsection (1m).”
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