Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-521 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Construction and Application of State Workers' Compensation Laws to Claim for Hearing Loss — Resulting from Single Traumatic Accident or Event. 90 A.L.R.6th 425.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Workers' Compensation Laws to Claim for Hearing Loss — Resulting from Long Term Noise Exposure. 99 A.L.R.6th 643 (2014).

Ark. L. Rev.

Workmen's Compensation — Scheduled Benefits as a Minimum Recovery, 21 Ark. L. Rev. 244.

Workmen's Compensation — Schedule Loss of Use, 27 Ark. L. Rev. 132.

Case Notes

In General.

Scheduled injuries differ from unscheduled injuries in that the award for a scheduled injury generally is limited to the benefits provided for that particular scheduled injury. Moser v. Arkansas Lime Co., 40 Ark. App. 113, 846 S.W.2d 188 (1993).

An employee who has suffered a scheduled injury is to receive temporary total or temporary partial disability benefits during his healing period or until he returns to work, regardless of whether he has demonstrated that he is actually incapacitated from earning wages. Wheeler Constr. Co. v. Armstrong, 73 Ark. App. 146, 41 S.W.3d 822 (2001).

Benefits.

An award of a 20 percent wage-loss disability, with the Second Injury Fund to pay half, was proper following a 1995 injury which itself resulted in an impairment rating of only 2 percent. Second Injury Fund v. Stephens, 62 Ark. App. 255, 970 S.W.2d 331 (1998).

Claimant was entitled to temporary disability benefits as claimant showed he sustained a scheduled injury, was in a “healing period” even though his doctor did not use that precise term, and should not be penalized for staying on the job and working through the pain after the employer refused to provide medical treatment for his leg injury sustained on the job, as the claimant did not “return to work” in such a way that benefits should be terminated. Farmers Coop. v. Biles, 77 Ark. App. 1, 69 S.W.3d 899 (2002).

Workers' compensation claimant was not statutorily barred from receiving temporary total or partial disability, under this section, because he undisputedly remained in his healing period and continued to work light duty and because there was no substantial evidence of unjustifiable refusal to work, such that § 11-9-526 would have been triggered. Walker v. Cooper Auto., 289 S.W.3d 184 (2008).

Pursuant to § 11-9-526, an employee with a knee injury who refused light duty work offered to him by his employer following surgery on the knee was not entitled to temporary total disability (TTD) benefits because, under subsection (a) of this section, the failure to return to work must have been causally related to the injury. Gomez v. Crossland Constr. Co., 2011 Ark. App. 787 (2011).

Compensation.

Claimants held entitled to compensation. Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 221 Ark. 469, 254 S.W.2d 322 (1953); Minor v. Poinsett Lumber & Mfg. Co., 235 Ark. 195, 357 S.W.2d 504 (1962).

The term compensation as used in this section refers to money benefits paid to the injured employee for disability. Brooks v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 247 Ark. 61, 444 S.W.2d 246 (1969).

Where the claimant sustained a compensable injury while working at one job, his compensation benefits were properly based on wages from that job rather than on the combined incomes of that job and another job held by claimant. Hart's Exxon Serv. Station v. Prater, 268 Ark. 961, 597 S.W.2d 130 (Ct. App. 1980).

Although a scheduled injury cannot be apportioned to the body as a whole absent total disability, a claimant who has received a scheduled injury can receive additional compensation for an injury which is found to be attributable to the scheduled injury. Milburn v. Concrete Fabricators, Inc., 18 Ark. App. 23, 709 S.W.2d 822 (1986).

For a scheduled injury, absent a finding of permanent total disability, the award is limited to the benefits provided for that scheduled injury. Rash v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 18 Ark. App. 248, 715 S.W.2d 449 (1986).

Compensation for an injury scheduled in this section is payable to the injured worker without regard to subsequent earning capacity; these benefits are awarded more in the nature of an indemnity for physical or functional loss and are payable whether the worker is employed or unemployed and irrespective of what his wages or earning capacity may be. Rash v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 18 Ark. App. 248, 715 S.W.2d 449 (1986).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred in overturning an award of temporary total disability benefits where, due to the fact that employee suffered from a scheduled injury, she was not required to show that she was totally incapacitated from working, only that she had not returned to work because she remained in her healing period. Fendley v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 97 Ark. App. 214, 245 S.W.3d 676 (2006).

Evidence.

Where medical testimony fixed functional loss of use at 10 percent, claimant's testimony could not be used by the commission as basis for increasing the percentage of functional loss from 10 percent to 35 percent. Springdale Farms v. McGarrah, 260 Ark. 483, 541 S.W.2d 928 (1976).

Award held to be supported by substantial evidence. Ellis v. Clayton Shoe Co., 267 Ark. 882, 595 S.W.2d 229 (Ct. App. 1979).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that the employee had not returned to work; the employee repeatedly attempted to work and repeatedly required additional care and treatment and specific medical evidence indicated that her continued treatment for the compensable injury was required past the date of her termination by the employer. Poulan Weed Eater v. Marshall, 79 Ark. App. 129, 84 S.W.3d 878 (2002).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's finding on permanent impairment was supported by substantial evidence as the claimant's treating physician found he had an 88% impairment under the American Medical Association Guides, and the claimant testified that he did have some functional use of his left arm. Main v. McGehee Metals, 2010 Ark. App. 585, 377 S.W.3d 506 (2010).

Eye Injuries.

Partial permanent impairments to the eyes come within the scheduled injury category as set out in subsection (f); claimants are limited to the scheduled benefits, and such benefits cannot be increased by considering wage-loss factors absent a finding of permanent total disability. Federal Compress & Whse. Co. v. Risper, 55 Ark. App. 300, 935 S.W.2d 279 (1996).

Based on an ophthalmologist's testimony, there was substantial evidence to support the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that a claimant was entitled to a 100% loss of vision to the claimant's left eye. However, the Commission erred in converting the claimant's impairment to the body as a whole; because the impairment to the claimant's left eye came within the scheduled-injury category, the claimant was limited to the scheduled benefits. Multi-Craft Contrs., Inc. v. Yousey, 2018 Ark. 107, 542 S.W.3d 155 (2018).

Injuries.

Although the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission is authorized pursuant to subsection (h) of this section to adopt an impairment rating guide to be used in the assessment of anatomical impairment, the Commission has no authority to adopt a guide that changes the definition of compensable injury as established by the legislature and interpreted by the Arkansas judiciary. Singleton v. City of Pine Bluff, 102 Ark. App. 305, 285 S.W.3d 253 (2008).

—In General.

Permanent injuries reduced to a scheduled injury. Anchor Constr. Co. v. Rice, 252 Ark. 460, 479 S.W.2d 573 (1972).

Where worker suffered a compensable injury, he could not recover benefits for permanent disability for this loss since it was not a scheduled injury under this section nor could he recover for the loss through a common law tort action since the injury was compensable under this chapter. Moss v. Southern Excavation, Inc., 271 Ark. 781, 611 S.W.2d 178 (1981).

—Apportionment to Body.

Permanent partial impairment resulting from two successive injuries were scheduled injuries under this section and were not subject to apportionment to the body as a whole under § 11-9-522. Moyers Bros. v. Poe, 249 Ark. 984, 462 S.W.2d 862 (1971).

A scheduled injury could not be apportioned to the body as a whole in determining the extent of permanent partial disability as distinguished from permanent total disability. Anchor Constr. Co. v. Rice, 252 Ark. 460, 479 S.W.2d 573 (1972).

Where effect of foot amputation was continuing aggravation of back condition and five percent permanent partial disability to back, the Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in not apportioning the combined effect of amputation and back injury to the body as a whole. Clark v. Shiloh Tank & Erection Co., 259 Ark. 521, 534 S.W.2d 240 (1976).

The test of whether a claimant's shoulder injury falls within this section is primarily a question of law; claimant's shoulder impairment was clearly an unscheduled injury which should have been apportioned to the body as a whole pursuant to § 11-9-522. Taylor v. Pfeiffer Plumbing & Heating Co., 8 Ark. App. 144, 648 S.W.2d 526 (1983).

Courts must adhere to legislative decision to adopt rigid rule that absent a showing of total disability a scheduled injury cannot be apportioned to the body as a whole; accordingly, commission did not err in refusing to reopen record to receive additional evidence concerning degree to which foot injury caused disability to body as a whole. Hill v. White-Rodgers, 10 Ark. App. 402, 665 S.W.2d 292 (1984).

—Hand Injury.

Compensation for permanent partial impairment of hand may be paid regardless of income. Lion Oil Co. v. Reeves, 221 Ark. 5, 254 S.W.2d 450 (1952).

Claimant entitled to payment of amount awarded by board for permanent partial impairment for hand injury even though employer had previously paid him more than the amount. Lion Oil Co. v. Reeves, 221 Ark. 5, 254 S.W.2d 450 (1952).

For 5% permanent partial disability to his right hand, a worker was entitled to the maximum weekly compensation for 5% of the number of weeks allowable for loss of a hand rather than 5% of the maximum weekly compensation for the number of weeks allowable for the loss of a hand. Industrial Coatings of Beaumont v. Heath, 249 Ark. 909, 462 S.W.2d 450 (1971).

Where a Workers' Compensation Commission's rule provides that: the loss by amputation of half or less than half of the terminal phalange of a member shall be one-half of the loss of the phalange, or one-fourth of the digit; that the loss of more than one-half of the terminal phalange of a member shall constitute loss of the phalange, or one-half of the finger; and that ordinarily the base of the nail may be used as a gauge of half the phalange, the rule is not in conflict with subsection (b), but simply amplifies it. Ellis v. Clayton Shoe Co., 267 Ark. 882, 595 S.W.2d 229 (Ct. App. 1979).

—Hearing Loss.

Employee's workers' compensation claim was within the two-year period set forth in § 11-9-702 because the employee's hearing loss stabilized in 2001 when he retired and was no longer exposed to occupational noise and thus, his claim in July 2002 was within the required time-frame. The statute of limitations did not begin to run until a scheduled injury was permanent and a rating could be attributed to the injury. Powers v. City of Fayetteville, 97 Ark. App. 251, 248 S.W.3d 516 (2007).

—Heart Attack.

A heart attack is compensable only if there is a causal connection between the heart attack and one's employment; and when it is established that the employee was putting forth unusual exertion at the time of the heart attack it is ordinarily held that the requirement of causal connection has been met. Beeson v. Landcoast, 43 Ark. App. 132, 862 S.W.2d 846 (1993).

—Leg Injury.

Award of compensation to injured worker was proper. Caddo Quicksilver Corp. v. Barber, 204 Ark. 985, 166 S.W.2d 1 (1942) (decision under prior law).

—Vision Loss.

Trial court properly reversed the commission's award where cumulative vision loss was greater than the amount awarded. Emerson Elec. Co. v. Powers, 268 Ark. 920, 597 S.W.2d 111 (Ct. App. 1980).

The benefits for scheduled injuries are not limited to the schedule if the injury renders the employee permanently and totally disabled, and court did not err in ordering vocational rehabilitation examination for claimant who suffered vision loss. Hampton & Crain v. Black, 34 Ark. App. 77, 806 S.W.2d 21 (1991).

Claimant held not to have sustained any permanent disability to his vision, since under this section the use of corrective lenses may be taken into consideration in evaluating the extent of loss of vision, and an examining physician stated that the claimant's corrected vision was normal. Barnard v. B & M Constr., 52 Ark. App. 61, 915 S.W.2d 296 (1996).

The issue of permanent disability compensation for decreased visual acuity caused by an irregular corneal astigmatism was properly reserved where the employee's physician had not yet determined the degree of correctable impairment. Service Chevrolet v. Atwood, 61 Ark. App. 190, 966 S.W.2d 909 (1998).

Temporary Total Disability.

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission properly denied a workers' compensation claimant temporary total disability benefits after the claimant was terminated for insubordination as under subsection (a) of this section, whether the claimant was within the healing period was irrelevant as the claimant had returned to light-duty work. Robertson v. Pork Group, Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 448, 384 S.W.3d 639 (2011).

Benefits claimant was not entitled to additional temporary total disability benefits under subsection (a) of this section because the evidence did not support an argument that the claimant was still in a healing period two years after her original compensable injuries or that she had reentered a healing period; the claimant reached maximum medical improvement by August 6, 2010, and her continued complaints were too diffuse and unsupported by corroborating clinical findings to suggest otherwise. By the time the claimant sought unauthorized treatment, her residual symptoms were attributed to de Quervain's Tenosynovitis, which could not have been pinpointed to a particular cause, the claimant's own testimony supporting the finding that she had reached the end of her healing period for her left upper extremity, and the claimant abandoned her light-duty employment for reasons unrelated to her compensable hand injuries. Foster v. Tyson Poultry, Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 172, 426 S.W.3d 563 (2013).

Appellate review was not possible because it was unclear whether the Workers' Compensation Commission determined that a benefits claimant remained in his healing period or started a new healing period, whether he suffered a total incapacity to earn a meaningful wage, whether he returned to work within the meaning of this section, whether his absenteeism was related to a compensable knee injury, and whether violations of the attendance policy did or did not affect temporary total disability eligibility under § 11-9-526. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Turcios, 2015 Ark. App. 647, 476 S.W.3d 177 (2015).

Decision awarding a claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits was reversed and remanded where the administrative law judge (ALJ) clearly analyzed the claimant's entitlement to TTD benefits under § 11-9-526, it was undisputed that the claimant's injury was a scheduled injury, and neither the Workers’ Compensation Commission nor the ALJ made any findings with regard to the requirements set forth in subsection (a) of this section. City of Fort Smith v. Kaylor, 2019 Ark. App. 517, 588 S.W.3d 803 (2019).

Total Permanent Disability.

Total permanent disability may be paid notwithstanding compensation was received for specific loss under this section. McNeely v. Clem Mill & Gin Co., 241 Ark. 498, 409 S.W.2d 502 (1966); Cooper Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Worth, 256 Ark. 394, 508 S.W.2d 59 (1974); Johnson Constr. Co. v. Noble, 257 Ark. 957, 521 S.W.2d 63 (1975); Bemberg Iron Work v. Martin, 12 Ark. App. 128, 671 S.W.2d 768 (1984); Electro-Air v. Villines, 16 Ark. App. 102, 697 S.W.2d 932 (1985).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred in interpreting §§ 11-9-521(g) and -519(b) as barring an employee, who suffered a fifty-percent impairment to his left lower extremity, from recovering permanent total disability benefits because he had suffered a scheduled compensable injury to his right leg. In finding that a scheduled-injury claimant was prohibited from entitlement to permanent total disability benefits in excess of the percentage of his physical impairment and that such a claim had to meet the multiple-loss requirements, the Commission impermissibly expanded the statutory prohibition of a claim for permanent partial disability benefits except in a case of multiple losses. McDonald v. Batesville Poultry Equip., 90 Ark. App. 435, 206 S.W.3d 908 (2005).

Denial of a claimant's claim for permanent-total-disability benefits was appropriate because substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that the claimant's right hand was functional and that the claimant could participate in gainful employment. The Commission found that the claimant's unreliable effort and magnified symptoms during testing were entitled to significant weight. Walker v. Fresenius Med. Care Holding, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 322, 436 S.W.3d 164 (2014).

Wage Earning Loss.

The commission cannot consider a wage earning loss in addition to the functional loss in fixing partial loss or partial loss of use of a limb under this section. Anchor Constr. Co. v. Rice, 252 Ark. 460, 479 S.W.2d 573 (1972).

Where an injury scheduled under this section is involved, it is immaterial that the claimant has suffered no loss of earnings. International Paper Co. v. Remley, 256 Ark. 7, 505 S.W.2d 219 (1974).

The wage-loss factor rather than the functional or anatomical loss is controlling in disability determinations which are to be made by the commission on the basis of medical evidence, age, education, experience and other matters reasonably expected to affect the claimant's earning power. Rooney v. Charles, 262 Ark. 695, 560 S.W.2d 797 (1978); City of Fayetteville v. Guess, 10 Ark. App. 313, 663 S.W.2d 946 (1984); Perry v. Mar-Bax Shirt Co., 16 Ark. App. 133, 698 S.W.2d 302 (1985).

The rule in this state is that a claimant sustaining a scheduled injury is limited to the applicable allowances set forth in this section and the benefits cannot be increased by considering wage loss factors absent a finding of permanent total disability. Taylor v. Pfeiffer Plumbing & Heating Co., 8 Ark. App. 144, 648 S.W.2d 526 (1983).

Given that, in scheduled injury cases, the nature of the injury is fixed, the finding of permanent and total disability under such circumstances necessarily hinges on factors which bear on the claimant's age, education, experience, and other matters affecting wage loss. Moser v. Arkansas Lime Co., 40 Ark. App. 113, 846 S.W.2d 188 (1993).

Arkansas Court of Appeals, Division Four, holds that a claimant with a scheduled injury is not entitled to permanent partial disability benefits, and this applies whether the claimant is seeking benefits from an employer, an insurer, or the Arkansas Second Injury Fund. Therefore, a claimant, who lost four fingers in an accident, was unable to obtain wage-loss disability over and above the impairment rating to her hand based on a previous diagnosis of foot ulcers, even if the Fund was liable. Crelia v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 99 Ark. App. 73, 257 S.W.3d 115 (2007).

Substantial evidence did not support an award of only 20-percent wage-loss disability, because at the time of the work-related injury the employee was making $67,721.07, and the evidence clearly showed that the most the employee would be able to make as a social worker or in one of the sedentary jobs found by the disability insurer was $35,000 per year, an amount significantly less than the employee's pre-injury earnings. Taggart v. Mid Am. Packaging, 2009 Ark. App. 335, 308 S.W.3d 643 (2009).

Cited: Lion Oil Co. v. Reeves, 221 Ark. 5, 254 S.W.2d 450 (1952); McGehee Hatchery Co. v. Gunter, 234 Ark. 113, 350 S.W.2d 608 (1961); Abbott v. C. H. Leavell & Co., 244 Ark. 544, 426 S.W.2d 166 (1968); Bibler Bros. Lumber Co. v. Allen, 251 Ark. 593, 474 S.W.2d 116 (1971); Oak Lawn Farms v. Payne, 251 Ark. 674, 474 S.W.2d 408 (1971); Coleman's Bar-B-Que v. Fuller, 262 Ark. 645, 559 S.W.2d 714 (1978); Randall, Burkart/Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Daniels, 266 Ark. 1060, 599 S.W.2d 392 (1979); Model Laundry & Dry Cleaning v. Simmons, 268 Ark. 770, 596 S.W.2d 337 (Ct. App. 1980); Hammer v. Intermed N.W., 270 Ark. 262, 603 S.W.2d 913 (1980); Weeks v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 270 Ark. 151, 604 S.W.2d 566 (1980); Midwest Steel Co. v. Mulanax, 270 Ark. 914, 606 S.W.2d 606 (1980); Mountain Valley Superette, Inc. v. Bottorff, 4 Ark. App. 251, 629 S.W.2d 320 (1982); Vann v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Ark. 1983); Crain Burton Ford Co. v. Rogers, 12 Ark. App. 246, 674 S.W.2d 944 (1984); C.J. Horner Co. v. Stringfellow, 14 Ark. App. 138, 685 S.W.2d 533 (1985); Gerber Prods. v. McDonald, 15 Ark. App. 226, 691 S.W.2d 879 (1985); Franklin Collier Farms v. Chapple, 18 Ark. App. 200, 712 S.W.2d 334 (1986); General Indus. v. Gibson, 22 Ark. App. 217, 738 S.W.2d 104 (1987); Noggle v. Arkansas Valley Elec. Coop., 31 Ark. App. 104, 788 S.W.2d 497 (1990); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Baker, 63 Ark. App. 160, 975 S.W.2d 863 (1998); Kirkendolph v. DF&A Revenue Servs. Div., 2009 Ark. App. 629 (2009).