Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-919 (2026)
Termination of obligation to register
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Lifetime registration is required for a sex offender who:
- Was found to have committed an aggravated sex offense;
- Was determined by the court to be or assessed as a Level 4 sexually dangerous person;
- Has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to or been found guilty of a second or subsequent sex offense under a separate case number, not multiple counts on the same charge;
- Was convicted of rape by forcible compulsion, § 5-14-103(a)(1), or other substantially similar offense in another jurisdiction; or
- Has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to or been found guilty of failing to comply with registration and reporting requirements under § 12-12-904 three (3) or more times.
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- (a) Any other sex offender required to register under this subchapter may apply for an order terminating the obligation to register to the sentencing court fifteen (15) years after the date the sex offender first registered in Arkansas.
- After fifteen (15) years of having been registered as a sex offender in Arkansas, a sex offender sentenced in another state but permanently residing in Arkansas may apply for an order terminating the obligation to register in the circuit court of the county in which the sex offender resides or has last resided within this state.
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- The court shall hold a hearing on the application at which the applicant and any interested persons may present witnesses and other evidence.
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No less than twenty (20) days before the date of the hearing on the application, a copy of the application for termination of the obligation to register shall be served on:
- The prosecutor of the county in which the adjudication of guilt triggering registration was obtained if the sex offender was convicted in this state; or
- The prosecutor of the county where a sex offender resides if the sex offender was convicted in another state.
- A copy also shall be served to the Arkansas Sex Offender Registry in the Arkansas Crime Information Center and to Community Notification Assessment at least twenty (20) days before the hearing.
- If the sex offender has not been assessed in the five (5) years before making a request to terminate the obligation to register under this section, the prosecuting attorney may request a reassessment and an order terminating the obligation to register shall not be granted without a reassessment.
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The court shall grant an order terminating the obligation to register upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence that:
- The applicant, for a period of fifteen (15) years after the applicant was released from prison or other institution or placed on parole, supervised release, or probation has not been adjudicated guilty of a sex offense; and
- The applicant is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.
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- A sex offender required to register as a result of a conviction for permitting the physical abuse of a minor under § 5-27-221 may apply for termination of the obligation to register at any time after July 22, 2015.
- The court shall grant an order under this subdivision (b)(3) terminating the obligation to register upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the facts underlying the offense for which the sex offender is required to register no longer support a requirement to register.
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- If a court denies a petition to terminate the obligation to register under this section, the sex offender may not file a new petition to terminate the obligation to register under this section before three (3) years from the date the order denying the previous petition was filed.
- The center shall remove a sex offender from the registry upon receipt by the center of adequate proof that the sex offender has died.
(b) If the sex offender was incarcerated in a correctional facility, the date the sex offender first registered in Arkansas is the date the sex offender registered upon his or her release from the correctional facility.
History. Acts 1997, No. 989, § 19; 1999, No. 1353, § 13; 2001, No. 1743, § 14; 2003 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 21, § 10; 2013, No. 172, § 4; 2013, No. 505, § 17; 2013, No. 1248, § 1; 2015, No. 358, § 11; 2015, No. 1285, § 2; 2017, No. 382, § 1; 2017, No. 538, § 1; 2019, No. 800, § 1.
Amendments. The 2013 amendment by No. 172 substituted “apply” for “make application” and “make an application” in (b)(1)(A)(i) and (b)(1)(A)(ii); and rewrote (b)(1)(B)(ii).
The 2013 amendment by No. 505 substituted “dangerous person” for “violent predator” in (a)(2).
The 2013 amendment by No. 1248 inserted “who” at the end of the introductory language of (a); substituted “Was found” for “Found” in (a)(1); in (a)(2), substituted “Was determined” for “Determined” and “to be or assessed as a Level 4 sexually” for “to be a sexually”; and substituted “Has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to or been found guilty of” for “Found to have been adjudicated guilty of” in (a)(3).
The 2015 amendment by No. 358 added (c).
The 2015 amendment by No. 1285 added (b)(3).
The 2017 amendment by No. 382 added (d).
The 2017 amendment by No. 538 added (a)(4).
The 2019 amendment added (a)(5); rewrote (b)(1)(A); added (b)(1)(C); and substituted “three (3) years” for “one (1) year” in (c).
Case Notes
Constitutionality.
Subdivision (a)(3) of this section, requiring lifetime registration as applied to petitioner, did not violate his equal protection rights as there was a rational basis for treating sex offenders convicted under more than one case number differently than those convicted under a single case number. Individuals convicted of a subsequent sex offense under a second case number have committed more than one sex crime, and the General Assembly could have concluded that those individuals are more likely to reoffend; and the underinclusiveness of a particular provision does not make the provision unconstitutional. Ray v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 574, 533 S.W.3d 587 (2017).
There was no merit to petitioner's ex post facto claims where he offered no explanation as to how the 2001 amendment to this section, which added the lifetime registration provisions, rendered the registration requirement punitive in nature. Ray v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 574, 533 S.W.3d 587 (2017).
That the prosecutor or court may chose to combine multiple charges under one case number for some sex offenders and not others does not render subdivision (a)(3) of this section unconstitutional. Wyly v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 505, 559 S.W.3d 326 (2018).
Subdivision (a)(3) of this section, as applied to appellant, did not violate due process. While appellant contended that application of the 2001 statutory provision requiring lifetime registration to the guilty pleas he made on the same day in 2000 to two offenses with different case numbers removed his right to petition the court to end his registration requirement, the 2001 provision did not impose a new legal consequence that violated due process. The registration requirement was in effect when appellant was convicted, and removal of the requirement was never guaranteed. Wyly v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 505, 559 S.W.3d 326 (2018).
Construction.
There is no requirement in this section that an applicant admit guilt. State v. Khabeer, 2014 Ark. 107 (2014).
Evidence.
Circuit court did not clearly err under subdivision (b)(2)(B) of this section in terminating appellee's obligation to register as a sex offender on the ground that he was not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others because he had been released from prison for over 15 years and he had not committed a sexual offense in the past 15 years. State v. Miller, 2013 Ark. 329 (2013).
Circuit court, which granted appellee's motion under this section to terminate his obligation to register as a sex offender, did not clearly err in concluding that appellee had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that appellee was not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others. State v. Khabeer, 2014 Ark. 107 (2014).
Petition to terminate defendant's obligation to report as a sex offender in Arkansas was denied because he failed to prove that he was no longer a safety threat; an offender profile report showed that defendant had engaged in sexual conduct with his daughter for many years and was good at hiding things. Moreover, he had a lengthy history of inappropriate sexual behaviors with a strong addictive element, he went back to engaging in certain behaviors after his release from prison, and he had a “true” finding regarding allegations of molesting his granddaughter in 2008. Stow v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 84, 482 S.W.3d 752 (2016).
Lifetime Registration.
Subdivision (a)(3) of this section, enacted in 2001, required lifetime sex offender registration for appellant, who had pled guilty on the same day in 2000 to a second sex offense involving a second victim under a separate case number. The Court of Appeals was not convinced that the statutory provision was meant to apply only to an offender who committed a second offense after having been convicted of a first offense; instead, the application of the provision to appellant fulfilled the legislative intent to protect the public from sex offenders who have been deemed more likely to reoffend because they have committed more than one offense and were prosecuted under different case numbers. Wyly v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 505, 559 S.W.3d 326 (2018).
Registration Requirements.
As the Arkansas Code Revision Commission substantively altered Acts 2003 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 21 in its codification of subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section, in a manner that changed its meaning, a probationer may apply to terminate his or her obligation to register as a sex offender 15 years after being placed on probation. Further, the probationer is entitled to relief upon a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has not been adjudicated of a sex offense during that 15-year period and he or she is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others. Harrell v. State, 2012 Ark. 421 (2012).
Defendant's second-degree sexual abuse conviction under former § 5-14-109 did not require defendant's lifetime sex offender registration; the crime was not substantially equivalent to aggravated sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 2241, since second-degree sexual abuse did not require the use of force and required only sexual contact, while aggravated sexual abuse under the federal statute required a sexual act, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(D). Myers v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 617, 535 S.W.3d 301 (2017).