Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Insurance agents or brokers as professionals or nonprofessionals for purposes of malpractice statutes of limitations. 121 A.L.R.5th 365.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time of occurrence of negligent act or omission. 11 A.L.R.6th 1.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time of occurrence of sustaining damage or injury and other theories. 12 A.L.R.6th 1.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission-Statement of rule and application of rule to providing client with allegedly negligent advice or failing to advise. 13 A.L.R.6th 1.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission-Application of rule to conduct of litigation and delay or inaction in conducting client's affairs. 14 A.L.R.6th 1.

Timeliness of action under medical malpractice statute of repose, aside from effect of fraudulent concealment of patient's cause of action. 14 A.L.R.6th 301.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission-Application of rule to property, estate, corporate, and document cases. 15 A.L.R.6th 427.

When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission-Application of rule to negligent misrepresentation, failure to supervise junior counsel, conflict of interest, billing disputes, and unspecified acts of negligence. 16 A.L.R.6th 653.

When statute of limitations begins to run in case of dental malpractice. 17 A.L.R.6th 159.

Application of Relation Back Doctrine Permitting Change in Party After Statute of Limitations Has Run in State Court Action — Motor Vehicle Accident or Injury Cases: Individual Drivers, Parents, Owners or Lessors, and Passengers. 97 A.L.R.6th 375 (2014).

Application of Relation-Back Doctrine Permitting Change in Party After Statute of Limitations Has Run in State Court Action — Motor Vehicle Accident or Injury Cases: Corporations, Municipalities, Insurers, and Employers. 98 A.L.R.6th 93 (2014).

Fraud, Misrepresentation, or Deception as Estopping Reliance on Nonmedical Malpractice Statutes of Repose. 98 A.L.R.6th 417 (2014).

Application of Relation-Back Doctrine Permitting Change in Party After Statute of Limitations Has Run in State Court Action — Motor Vehicle Accident or Injury Cases: Estates, and Other or Unspecified Parties. 99 A.L.R.6th 1 (2014).

Application of Relation-Back Doctrine Permitting Change in Party After Statute of Limitations Has Run in State Court Action — Construction Cases. 104 A.L.R.6th 1 (2015).

Application of Doctrine of Adverse Domination. 13 A.L.R.7th Art. 3 (2015).

Accrual of Claims for Continuing Trespass or Continuing Nuisance for Purposes of Statutory Limitations. 14 A.L.R.7th Art. 8 (2015).

Ark. L. Notes.

Looney, When Third Means Fourth, Contract Includes Tort, and a Five-Year Statute of Limitation Actually Leaves Only Three Years or Less to File Suit: The Strange Saga of the Arkansas “Statute of Repose” in Construction Cases, 1993 Ark. L. Notes 87.

Brill, Arkansas Law of Damages, Fifth Edition, Chapter 30: Real Property, 2004 Arkansas L. Notes 9.

Ark. L. Rev.

Sales — Application of Statute of Limitations to Breach of Warranty, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 104.

Limitation of Action — Accrual of Cause of Action, 21 Ark. L. Rev. 264.

Note, The Law of Defamation: An Arkansas Primer, 42 Ark. L. Rev. 915.

Recent Developments, 49 Ark. L. Rev. 419.

Mark James Chaney, Recent Developments: Arkansas Supreme Court Holds Retaliation Claims Under Arkansas Civil Rights Act Subject to Three-Year Statute of Limitations Period in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 193 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Arey, Bank Directors' Duties Under the Common Law of Arkansas, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 629.

Note, Professional Malpractice — Limitation of Actions — Arkansas Extends the Occurrence Rule to Accountants and Recognizes a Tolling Provision in Attorney Malpractice Actions, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 115.

Survey, Contracts, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 329.

Fifteenth Annual Survey of Arkansas Law, 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 427.

Dudley, The Continuous Representation Doctrine: Must You Sue Your Lawyer While She Still Represents You?, 19 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 241.

Case Notes

Construction.

Summary judgment was properly granted in favor of a construction company in a negligent construction case because a lawsuit was not filed until after the three-year period in subsection (3) of this section had run; there was no evidence that the company had performed any repairs or that repairs were done on its behalf, and, even if repair work had been done on the company's behalf, the statute of limitations would have only been tolled during the period of repairs, which was not of sufficient length to render the claim timely. Without proof of the attempted repairs, the statute of repose in § 16-56-112(a) did not come into play, and there was no tolling of the three-year statute of limitations. Marshall v. Turman Constr. Corp., 2012 Ark. App. 686 (2012).

Applicability.

In an action involving fraud and a written instrument, the court looks to the gist of the action as alleged to determine which statute of limitations applies. Ernest F. Loewer, Jr. Farms, Inc. v. National Bank, 316 Ark. 54, 870 S.W.2d 726 (1994).

In a claim where it was unclear whether plaintiffs were complaining of the circumstances surrounding the execution of a 1993 agreement, or seeking to enforce a 1981 contract breached in 1996, summary judgment based on the running of the 3 year statutes of limitations was improper. Ingram v. Chandler, 63 Ark. App. 1, 971 S.W.2d 801 (1998).

Enforcement of environmental regulations intended to improve the environment for the benefit of the public are rights that belong to the public, and the Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) represented the public at large; therefore, the State's exemption from the statute of limitations under subsection (3) of this section did not bar the DEQ's Remedial Action Trust Fund Act, § 8-7-501 et seq., and Arkansas Hazardous Waste Management Act, § 8-7-201 et seq., claims against the customers of the corporation, which was improperly disposing of hazardous wastes. Ark. Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. Brighton Corp., 352 Ark. 396, 102 S.W.3d 458 (2003).

IIn a dispute brought by condominium owners against corporations who were successors-in-interest to the original developers, the corporations attempted to argue that the owners' constructive fraud claim was barred by the statute of limitations, however, the court found that the more specific provisions in § 18-14-403 controlled over the more general statute of limitations in this section. Nat'l Enters. v. Kessler, 363 Ark. 167, 213 S.W.3d 597 (2005).

Specific statute under the Time-Share Act (§ 18-14-403) controlled plaintiff time-share owners' claims against defendant developers, as opposed to the general limitations statute (§ 16-56-105); had the court adopted the developers' argument, it would have terminated the owners' right to seek relief before any injury was known to them, which was contrary to the General Assembly's intention to protect consumers under the Act. Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Pyron, 363 Ark. 521, 215 S.W.3d 637 (2005).

Employee's ERISA claims for benefits under 29 U.S.C.S. § 1132(a), (e)(1), and (f); penalties under § 1132(c)(1); and breach of fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C.S. § 1105(a) and (b), were dismissed because (1) the three-year statute of limitations set forth in subdivision (3) of this section applied to the employee's claim for penalties, the employee requested the plan summary in December 2001 and again in January 2002 but waited until April 2005 to make further inquiries and another year to file a complaint, and the employee did not act with “due diligence,” to enforce her rights so she was not entitled to equitable tolling; (2) with regard to the employee's long-term disability (LTD) claim, the employee knew by December 2001 that her short-term (STD) claim had been denied, such denial served as notification to the employee that no more disability benefits would be approved, the employee should have known that LTD benefits were included and should have taken reasonable steps to enforce her claims, and the employer's failure to send the employee a plan summary did not excuse a four-year delay, so the three-year statute of limitation was not equitably tolled, and the employee's LTD claim was barred; (3) the employee's claim based on the employer's breach of fiduciary duty was also made too late because under the ERISA's statute of limitations, such claims had to be brought within three years under 29 U.S.C.S. § 1113(2); and (4) defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings with regard to the employee's claim for STD benefits was construed as one for summary judgment and was granted because although the five-year limitations period set forth in § 16-56-111 applied to the claim, the statute of limitations was tolled because the amended claim for STD benefits related back to the original complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2), the employer offered an affidavit and documentation of its STD payments to the employee, and the employee did not respond to the employer's offer of proof. Gonser v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 515 F. Supp. 2d 929 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for trade secret misappropriation under § 4-75-601, intentional interference with contractual relationships or business expectancies, fraud, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy was denied because there were fact issues as to whether plaintiffs' claims accrued within the applicable three-year statute of limitations set forth in § 4-75-603 and this section and whether the application of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment was appropriate, and further, plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Roach Mfg. Corp. v. Northstar Indus., 630 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Ark. 2009).

Accountants.

The performance of audits in consecutive fiscal years is not presumptively a course of providing professional services that would call for the application of the continuous treatment doctrine. FDIC v. Deloitte & Touche, 834 F. Supp. 1129 (E.D. Ark. 1992).

The negligence statute of limitations applied to the clients' breach of contract action against their accountants, where the accountants' promise to represent the clients with diligence was not sufficiently specific to create a contract, and any violation of that promise was, by definition, negligence. Tony Smith Trucking v. Woods & Woods, Ltd., 75 Ark. App. 134, 55 S.W.3d 327 (2001).

Accrual.

Chicken growers' claims of fraud, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, and negligence against a chicken processor were properly dismissed as time-barred; the last date the growers' cause of action accrued was the date on which they were informed that they would not be receiving a new contract, rather than the date of expiration of the last contract, and the growers' claims were filed more than three years after accrual. Crutchfield v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2017 Ark. App. 121, 514 S.W.3d 499 (2017).

Actions for Accounting.

An action for an accounting of property held by one of three purchasers as trustee, brought after the death of the trustee which was 15 years after the time of purchase, was not barred. Lasker-Morris Bank & Trust Co. v. Gans, 132 Ark. 402, 200 S.W. 1029 (1918).

The three year statute is applicable to an action for an accounting between partners. Williams v. Walker, 148 Ark. 49, 229 S.W. 28 (1921).

If the three year statute of limitations is applicable to a suit against a county treasurer to require an accounting of fees and emoluments, the statute begins to run not from the date when the treasurer should have filed his annual settlement but from the date he actually filed it. McCoy v. State, 190 Ark. 297, 79 S.W.2d 94 (1935).

Mother's acceptance of care for ten years did not bar her from seeking accounting, and trial court correctly applied five year, rather than three year, statute of limitations to accounting since care-giver's obligation arose from written deeds, not oral or implied promise. Cluck v. Mack, 278 Ark. 506, 647 S.W.2d 442 (1983).

Attorneys.

The statute does not begin to run against an attorney's claim for fees until the relation of attorney and client is terminated. McNeil v. Garland & Nash, 27 Ark. 343 (1871).

The statute begins to run in favor of an attorney failing to pay over money from the time demand might have been reasonably made. Whitehead v. Wells, 29 Ark. 99 (1874); Leigh v. Williams, 64 Ark. 165, 41 S.W. 323 (1897); Crissman v. Carl Lee, 132 Ark. 32, 200 S.W. 133 (1918).

The statute begins to run in favor of an attorney guilty of negligence or misconduct from the date of the offense. White v. Reagan, 32 Ark. 281 (1877)Criticized byWright v. Langdon, 274 Ark. 258, 623 S.W.2d 823 (1981).

An action to recover an attorney's fee is barred after three years. Parker v. Carter, 91 Ark. 162, 120 S.W. 836 (1909); Kinkead v. Estate of Kinkead, 51 Ark. App. 159, 912 S.W.2d 442 (1995).

The statute does not begin to run against an attorney claiming compensation for services in prosecuting a suit until the final determination of the suit. Boynton v. Brown, 103 Ark. 513, 145 S.W. 242 (1912).

Lien of attorney of estate could not be asserted eight years after land was sold, subject to lien of attorney. Tellier v. Darragh, 220 Ark. 363, 247 S.W.2d 960 (1952).

This section setting a three year limitations period governs the period for bringing attorney malpractice claims; and the cause of action arises when the alleged negligent act occurs, not when client discovers it. Cotton v. Mosele, 738 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1984).

The statute of limitations in an action against an attorney for negligence begins to run, in the absence of concealment of the wrong, when the negligence occurs, not when it is discovered by the client. Riggs v. Thomas, 283 Ark. 148, 671 S.W.2d 756 (1984); Goldsby v. Fairley, 309 Ark. 380, 831 S.W.2d 142 (1992).

The misconduct or negligence of an attorney triggers the statute of limitations. Rhoades v. Sims, 286 Ark. 349, 692 S.W.2d 750 (1985).

A legal malpractice claim based on the drafting of a partnership agreement in 1991 was time-barred where the complaint was filed in July, 1996. Dunn v. Westbrook, 334 Ark. 83, 971 S.W.2d 252 (1998).

A legal malpractice claim based on the revision of a partnership agreement on July 8, 1993 was not time-barred where the complaint was filed on July 5, 1996. Dunn v. Westbrook, 334 Ark. 83, 971 S.W.2d 252 (1998).

A malpractice suit alleging that the defendant attorneys breached their contract by failing to act with diligence as required by the contract is an action for negligence rather than for breach of contract, and the three year statute of limitations should apply. Sturgis v. Skokos, 335 Ark. 41, 977 S.W.2d 217 (1998).

Court properly found that an attorney's action against a client to recover fees was not barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the client admitted that payments were made in 1998 and 2001, and each payment extended the limitations period for three years. Northwest Ark. Recovery, Inc. v. Davis, 89 Ark. App. 62, 200 S.W.3d 481 (2004).

Circuit court did not err by dismissing appellants' legal malpractice claims against their attorney, because they were barred by the three-year statute of limitations under this section; although appellants attempted to categorize the claims differently, the “gist” of their complaint was legal malpractice. The circuit court did not err in failing to apply the discovery rule, because the traditional occurrence rule applied in Arkansas; and appellants did not bring their action within three years of the last alleged negligent act. Richardson v. Madden, 2012 Ark. App. 120 (2012).

Breach of Fiduciary Duty.

In an estate dispute where a sister sued her brother, who had held a power of attorney for the father, the circuit court did not err in finding that the sister's claim for breach of fiduciary duty was barred by the three-year statute of limitations, because, inter alia, a previous appellate decision had rejected the argument that the entire length of the fiduciary relationship should be considered and the sister did not offer any authority to support her suggestion that being a signatory on a bank account gives rise to a fiduciary relationship or that any such fiduciary relationship would have extended to her. Ellis v. Thompson, 2019 Ark. App. 579, 590 S.W.3d 774 (2019).

Burden of Proof.

Where statute is pleaded in action on account, burden is on plaintiff to show it is not barred. Watkins v. Martin, 69 Ark. 311, 65 S.W. 103 (1901).

Defendant invoking this statute has the burden of proof to bring himself within its terms. Smith v. Milam, 195 Ark. 157, 110 S.W.2d 1062 (1937).

Where executor pleaded the statute of limitations as a bar to claim against decedent's estate for amount of loans made to decedent, the burden was on claimant to show that the running of the statute had been tolled or revived by payment or otherwise. Taylor v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 236 Ark. 672, 367 S.W.2d 747 (1963).

Child Support.

This action does not apply to recovery of delinquent child support payments. Brun v. Rembert, 227 Ark. 241, 297 S.W.2d 940 (1957).

The period of time for which the mother may recover for the reasonable and definite amount she has expended for the support of the children is governed by the language of the original divorce decree and where, as in the present case, there was no provision in the original divorce decree for support, the obligation of the father was one express or implied not in writing and would therefore come within the three year statute for such definite amounts as she had expended for the support of the minor children. Wilder v. Garner, 235 Ark. 400, 360 S.W.2d 192 (1962).

Although the three year statute of limitations was applicable to a paternity proceeding which was commenced more than four years after birth of the child, the statute of limitations did not bar the entire cause of action, but only recovery of support for the period more than three years prior to the filing of the complaint. Winston v. Robinson, 270 Ark. 996, 606 S.W.2d 757 (1980).

Where mother brought action for support of illegitimate child against putative father more than five years after the child's birth, it was error to grant the father summary judgment, since the child is the real party in interest and should thus not be barred by the mother's failure to bring the action. Dozier v. Veasley, 272 Ark. 210, 613 S.W.2d 93 (1981).

Cities.

Three-year statute of limitations applied to city's obligation to pay holiday compensation to its employees. City of Pocahontas v. Huddleston, 309 Ark. 353, 831 S.W.2d 138 (1992).

Civil Rights.

In an action for alleged deprivation of civil rights as a result of the arrest of defendant with alleged unnecessary force and violence, either the three year statute of limitations for actions founded on contract or liability, which has been construed to cover liability created by statute, or the five year general statute of limitations was applicable, and since the action was instituted within the statutory period of both statutes, it was timely. Glasscoe v. Howell, 431 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1970)Questioned byKessel v. Schaff, 697 F. Supp. 1102 (D.N.D. 1987).

This section was the governing statute of limitations in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for discriminatory employment practices, since 42 U.S.C. § 1981 creates statutory liabilities. Martin v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 568 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1977).

Where plaintiffs alleged both class-based and incidental individual sex and race discrimination in connection with hiring, wages, promotion and job assignment, and the employment discrimination in issue was only such as would amount to a deprivation of constitutional rights, the district court correctly applied the three year limitations period. Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1979).

Where the plaintiff brought a civil rights complaint involving the termination of the plaintiff's written employment contract, this section was the applicable statute of limitations, not § 16-56-111(a), which governs actions on written contracts. Wagh v. Dennis, 677 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1982).

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, the general rule is to apply the state statute of limitations governing actions most analogous to the civil rights claim being asserted; therefore, in Arkansas, § 1983 claims are subject to the three year limitation found in this section. Weston v. Bachman, 682 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 824, 104 S. Ct. 93 (1983); Whittle v. Wiseman, 683 F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 1982).

Trial court properly applied the three year statute of limitations of this section in dismissing civil rights action against federal employees. Roach v. Owen, 689 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1982).

This section was the applicable statute of limitations for a civil rights action brought pursuant to either 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 544 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D. Ark. 1982), aff'd in part, reversed in part, 722 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. Ark. 1983).

This section is the appropriate statute of limitations for employment discrimination actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. McDowell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd, 753 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. Ark. 1985).

The limitations period in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions; thus, in Arkansas the applicable period is three years. Where a federal cause of action is involved, filing a complaint with the court commences the action pursuant to Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and tolls the statute of limitations; for purposes of the statute of limitations, a complaint is “filed” when it is lodged with the court even though it is technically deficient under local rules. Lyons v. Goodson, 787 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1986).

Former employee's claim of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981 was governed by three-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions, not the one-year statute of limitations contained in the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-107(c)(3), and the employer's motion to dismiss was denied; as racial discrimination was a fundamental injury to the rights of a person, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981 claims were, in essence, personal injury claims. Thompson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 842 (W.D. Ark. 2004).

Claims parents filed under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, that a school district and a vice principal committed sex discrimination and violated their son's rights under the U.S. Constitution when they failed to protect their son from attacks by other students, were not necessarily barred by the three-year statute of limitations contained in this section because some of the incidents they described in their complaint occurred more than three years before they filed their lawsuit. The parents alleged persistent harassment and discrimination which, over the course of time, rose to the level of a constitutional violation. Wolfe v. Fayetteville Ark. Sch. Dist., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (W.D. Ark. 2009).

Inmate was denied in forma pauperis status because his 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 complaint was time-barred under the applicable state law statute of limitations. Hendrix v. Vaughn, No. 09-CV-4062, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1345 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 8, 2010).

Claims Barred.

Inmate's civil claims were properly dismissed because, treating the facts alleged as true, (1) all acts giving rise to the claims of discrimination, civil conspiracy, and outrage arose more than three years before the inmate sued, (2) a three-year statute of limitations applied to all claims, (3) the inmate was aware of those acts when they occurred, and (4) the inmate provided no non-conclusory allegations of fraudulent concealment. Hutcherson v. Rutledge, 2017 Ark. 359, 533 S.W.3d 77 (2017).

Commencement.

This section begins to run when the negligent act occurs. Stroud v. Ryan, 297 Ark. 472, 763 S.W.2d 76 (1989); Courtney v. First Nat'l Bank, 300 Ark. 498, 780 S.W.2d 536 (1989).

The statute of limitations begins to run when there is a complete and present cause of action. Courtney v. First Nat'l Bank, 300 Ark. 498, 780 S.W.2d 536 (1989).

A cause of action accrues the moment the right to commence an action comes into existence, and the statute of limitations commences to run from that time. Courtney v. First Nat'l Bank, 300 Ark. 498, 780 S.W.2d 536 (1989).

The bank's negligence in failing to properly establish a survivorship account occurred when it issued the final certificate and the surviving joint tenant's claim began to accrue at that time. Smackover State Bank v. Oswalt, 307 Ark. 432, 821 S.W.2d 757 (1991).

The limitations period found in subdivision (3) begins to run when there is a complete and present cause of action, and, in the absence of concealment of the wrong, when the injury occurs, not when it is discovered. Chalmers v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 326 Ark. 895, 935 S.W.2d 258 (1996).

The statute of limitations applicable to the clients' malpractice action against their accountants began running, in the absence of concealment of the wrong, when the negligence occurred, not when it was discovered. Tony Smith Trucking v. Woods & Woods, Ltd., 75 Ark. App. 134, 55 S.W.3d 327 (2001).

Court did not err in denying the State's motion for a JNOV where the statute of limitations did not begin to accrue against a gas station until it learned that gasoline contamination was caused, not by it, but by another gas station. State v. Diamond Lakes Oil Co., 347 Ark. 618, 66 S.W.3d 613 (2002).

Dismissal of borrowers' claims for fraud, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and violations of federal law for failure to state a claim was affirmed where it was apparent from the complaint that the applicable statutes of limitations had all run and no basis for tolling was presented. Varner v. Peterson Farms, 371 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2004).

Trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's complaint for interference with a contractual relationship or business expectancy and breach of an implied contract as the statute of limitations was three years under this section; the cause of action arose in January 1999, when defendant left plaintiff's employment, started a directly competing business and induced plaintiff's employees and customers to leave plaintiff's business, but the complaint was not filed until August 2002. Quality Optical of Jonesboro, Inc. v. Trusty Optical, L.L.C., 365 Ark. 106, 225 S.W.3d 369 (2006).

Putative father's action for breach of contract and negligence, brought after a 2003 DNA test indicated that a 1991 test had erroneous shown that he was a child's biological father, was untimely because the occurrence rule, rather than the discovery rule, applied to this section's 3-year statute of limitations. Tate v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 102 Ark. App. 354, 285 S.W.3d 261 (2008).

Contracts Generally.

This section applies to actions on all contracts, expressed or implied, which are not in writing and has regularly been applied to incidental obligations implied from written contracts. Scroggin Farms Corp. v. Howell, 216 Ark. 569, 226 S.W.2d 562 (1950).

Where there was no provision that caused the entire obligation to become automatically accelerated by the first default on a sales contract and subsequent defaults were within the period of this section, the statute of limitations could not be invoked as a bar to rescission. Hogue v. Pellerin Laundry Mach. Sales Co., 353 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1965).

The plaintiff's breach of contract claim based on an oral promise to hire her as a teacher was time barred, since this section provides for a three-year statute of limitation for oral contracts. Crutchfield v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 647 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Ark. 1986).

Where the parties have entered into an agreement which requires a series of mutual acts, some unilateral and some bilateral in character, and have left the time of those acts open-ended, the cause of action does not accrue until one party has by word or conduct indicated to the other a repudiation of the agreement. Chadwell v. Pannell, 27 Ark. App. 59, 766 S.W.2d 38 (1989).

Trial court did not err in finding that written contract had been so altered by oral modification as to constitute a new oral contract subject to the three-year statute of limitations provided in this section, and action was therefore barred. Davis v. Patel, 32 Ark. App. 1, 794 S.W.2d 158 (1990).

A breach of contract action was barred by the statute of limitations where, by the plaintiff's own admission, she was on notice of the alleged breach in January, 1989 and the action was commenced in December, 1993. Elder v. Security Bank, 68 Ark. App. 132, 5 S.W.3d 78 (1999).

Statute of limitations found in this section did not bar an action on an indemnification provision in a contract between a general contractor and a subcontractor because the action accrued on the date that the general contractor wired a settlement to the customer, and the general contractor filed its second amended complaint against the subcontractor within five years of that date. Ray & Sons Masonry Contrs., Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 353 Ark. 201, 114 S.W.3d 189 (2003).

Where the husband of a beneficiary under her parents' first mutual wills brought a tortious interference with contract suit against the beneficiaries under a second will, that right of action accrued in November 1999 when the will-contest was filed seeking probate of decedent's second will, however, the husband did not file his suit until April 2003, and the trial court did not err in dismissing the action because the three year statute of limitations had run. Shelnutt v. Laird, 359 Ark. 516, 199 S.W.3d 65 (2004).

Where the only documents that evidenced a loan between a lender and a borrower were the cashier's check and a transaction record of partial payments that had been made, the breach of contract action by the lender was governed by the three year statute of limitations. Cobb v. Leyendecker, 89 Ark. App. 167, 200 S.W.3d 924 (2005).

Written security agreement was a sufficient acknowledgment of a valid existing debt for attorney's fees so as to start the statute of limitations running anew. However, the written acknowledgement did not transform the oral agreement for fees into a written one, and the three-year statute applicable to oral agreements under this section still applied, rather than the five-year statute for written agreements under § 16-56-111, thereby barring an attorney's claim for fees. Still v. Perroni Law Firm, 2011 Ark. 447, 385 S.W.3d 182 (2011).

Trial court properly granted a title company summary judgment on the property owners' claim where the completion and delivery of a title search created an implied or express contract, a three-year limitations period applied to the title search under this section, and the claim had been filed a month after the limitations period had run. Brooks v. Terry Abstract Co., 2014 Ark. App. 212 (2014).

Owners' argument that the limitations period did not arise until they closed on the house was rejected because the claims arose at the time the title company completed the title search and delivered its findings to the owners. Brooks v. Terry Abstract Co., 2014 Ark. App. 212 (2014).

Five-year statute of limitations for contract claims applied to an investor's amended complaint against the investor's investment account manager, rather than the three-year statute of limitations for negligence claims, because the investor pleaded a breach of contract and a specific promise; the investor alleged there was a contract between the investor and the manager, that the manager specifically promised to process an account transaction in a timely manner, that the manager breached this specific promise, and that the investor suffered damages. Farris v. Conger, 2017 Ark. 83, 512 S.W.3d 631 (2017).

—Contractual Interference.

The limitation period for a contractual interference claim is three years. Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1980).

—Oral Contracts.

Where a plain reading of resolution authorizing city manager to award franchise to wrecker service indicated that the city had not contractually bound itself in writing but had only authorized the city manager to award a contract to wrecker service, and where there was no evidence that the city manager signed a written contract with wrecker service, if the parties were contractually bound at all, it was pursuant to an oral contract; thus, plaintiff's attempt to bring an action five years later was barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. Jenkins v. City of Little Rock, 52 Ark. App. 113, 915 S.W.2d 298 (1996).

—Real Property Improvements.

Section 16-56-112(a) clearly establishes a maximum five-year period within which an injured party can bring suit against a person who deficiently constructs or repairs an improvement to real property which commences after the substantial completion of the improvement, but, in bringing such a suit, the injured party must still bring the action within the statute of limitations for that type of cause of action. If the breach or injury occurs immediately after the completion of the improvement, the injured party must still comply with subsection (3) and bring his action within three years from when the breach occurs but not later than the five-year period provided in § 16-56-112(a). East Poinsett County Sch. Dist. No. 14 v. Union Std. Ins. Co., 304 Ark. 32, 800 S.W.2d 415 (1990).

The five-year limitations period contained in § 16-56-112(a) cannot be used to extend the three-year limitations period provided in subsection (3). East Poinsett County Sch. Dist. No. 14 v. Union Std. Ins. Co., 304 Ark. 32, 800 S.W.2d 415 (1990).

General contractor's claims against a masonry subcontractor were time-barred because the contractor filed suit after the three-year period had expired; the failure to use a bonding agent in the mortar in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications constituted a material breach of the contract and started the running of the statute of limitations. C&R Constr. Co. v. Woods Masonry & Repair, LLC, 2020 Ark. App. 105 (2020).

—Third Party Beneficiaries.

Actions by third persons based on written contracts which are made for their benefit are governed by the limitation provided by § 16-56-111(a) rather than by this section. H.B. Deal & Co. v. Bolding, 225 Ark. 579, 283 S.W.2d 855 (1955).

Corporations.

Action under statute making officer of corporation liable for debts of corporation upon failure to file certificate required by statute is for a statutory liability and not a penalty, and this section and not § 16-56-108 governs. Nebraska Nat'l Bank v. Walsh, 68 Ark. 433, 59 S.W. 952 (1900). See also McDonald v. Mueller, 123 Ark. 226, 183 S.W. 751 (1916); Hospelhorn v. Burke, 196 Ark. 1028, 120 S.W.2d 705 (1938).

The statute of limitations runs against the president and secretary of a corporation who have failed to file the annual statement required by law as against the claim of a particular creditor from the time when a complete cause of action exists in favor of that creditor. McDonald v. Mueller, 123 Ark. 226, 183 S.W. 751 (1916).

An action in equity by the stockholders of a corporation, against the directors for misconduct, is based on implied liability; the suit is a derivative one which must be brought within the time in which the corporation itself should have brought the suit; the minority of a stockholder will not suspend the rule. Magale v. Fomby, 132 Ark. 289, 201 S.W. 278 (1918).

An action to enforce collection of a stockholder's statutory liability incurred by reason of an assessment duly made is not a suit to enforce a penalty but is an action founded on a contract not in writing enforcible within three years. Vandover v. Lumber Underwriters, 197 Ark. 718, 126 S.W.2d 105 (1939).

Claims based on alleged statutory liability of corporate directors were barred by this section. Air Leases, Inc. v. Baker, 167 F. Supp. 145 (W.D. Ark. 1958).

Statute of limitations was not tolled as to Resolution Trust Corporation's claims against the officers or directors of a corporation as long as those officers and directors controlled the affairs of a corporation; Arkansas courts do not recognize the doctrine of adverse domination. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Armbruster, 52 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 1995).

Counties.

A claim against a county for fees due an officer is a liability not in writing within the meaning of this section. Baugh v. Prairie County, 66 Ark. 360, 50 S.W. 876 (1899).

The statute of limitations runs in favor of counties against their ordinary indebtedness. Boone County v. Skinner-Kennedy Stationery Co., 191 Ark. 329, 86 S.W.2d 18 (1935).

Action by individual taxpayer to recover amount of county funds allegedly unlawfully withdrawn by county judge was governed by three year limitation period, since action was based on an implied contract. Ward v. Farrell, 221 Ark. 363, 253 S.W.2d 353 (1952).

Debts.

Unwritten contracts, including those for the payment of borrowed money, may have a time for maturity depending on a future event, and this statute runs from the maturity thereof. Smith v. Milam, 195 Ark. 157, 110 S.W.2d 1062 (1937).

Complaint did not show on its face that debt was barred by limitation, and where defendant's evidence showed the debt became due less than three years from filing of suit, debt was not barred since cause of action on a debt does not accrue until after its maturity. Smith v. Milam, 195 Ark. 157, 110 S.W.2d 1062 (1937).

In suit on a note, maker's claim for credit for services in effecting sale of real estate for which payee agreed to credit money on the note was not barred by this statute, because pleaded as a setoff against the note, and, also, it was a closed transaction to which this section does not apply. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hammans, 204 Ark. 298, 161 S.W.2d 950 (1942).

In order to continue or revive a cause of action or remove it from bar of statute of limitation there must be either an express promise of debtor to pay the debt or an acknowledgment of debt from which a promise to pay is implied, or a conditional promise to pay the debt and evidence that the condition has been performed. Blake v. Commercial Factors Corp., 216 Ark. 664, 226 S.W.2d 986 (1950).

In determining whether there has been a sufficient acknowledgment in writing to toll the statute of limitation, the question to be determined is the intention of the debtor. The writing must show that the claim is a subsisting debt and the presumption must be clear and certain. Blake v. Commercial Factors Corp., 216 Ark. 664, 226 S.W.2d 986 (1950).

Where money was loaned on an oral agreement to repay and borrower endorsed and pledged an overdue note for a larger amount as security for the loan, endorsement of the note did not have the effect of reducing the loan to writing and the three year limitation of this section governed rather than the five year limitation of § 16-56-111(a). Shelton v. Harris, 225 Ark. 855, 286 S.W.2d 20 (1956).

Suit based on written support contract is a suit on a written instrument and is governed by the five year statute of limitations, and three year statute of limitations was not applicable. Altman v. Altman, 240 Ark. 370, 399 S.W.2d 501 (1966).

Payments on debt did not revive debts already barred by the three year statute of limitations where debtor was liable on another debt. Camp v. Nokes, 250 Ark. 819, 467 S.W.2d 730 (1971).

Three year statute of limitations on oral promise to pay commenced to run when promise was made, not when creditor paid a bank loan made to get money to loan debtor, although debtor promised to repay any interest creditor had to pay bank. Camp v. Nokes, 250 Ark. 819, 467 S.W.2d 730 (1971).

Oral agreement to assume and pay mortgage indebtedness was subject to three year statute of limitations. Hyde Wholesale Dry Goods Co. v. Edwards, 255 Ark. 211, 500 S.W.2d 85 (1973).

A debt otherwise barred by the statute of limitations can be revived by a letter in which the debtor unequivocally recognizes the indebtedness as a subsisting obligation and makes no statement repelling the presumption that he intends to pay; however, where the debtors' letter did not recognize the indebtedness as a subsisting obligation and fell far short of proving a revival by acknowledgment, collection of the debt was barred by this section. Wright v. Wright, 279 Ark. 35, 648 S.W.2d 473 (1983).

—Accounts.

To constitute a payment on an account so as to bar the running of the statute, the money or other thing must pass from the debtor to the creditor for the purpose of extinguishing the debt and the creditor must receive it for the same purpose. Pettus v. Rawls, 131 Ark. 125, 198 S.W. 874 (1917).

In an action on a written contract witnessed by correspondence, the five year statute of limitations applies though an account is filed specifying the items on which the three year statute would have applied if the action had been brought on the account. Sims v. Miller, 151 Ark. 377, 236 S.W. 828 (1922).

An action on an oral guaranty of an open account is barred after three years from the date the last item was furnished. Goldsmith v. First Nat'l Bank, 169 Ark. 1162, 278 S.W. 22 (1925).

Refusal to instruct that items of debit and credit in an account, incurred more than three years prior to the suit, were barred was error where the accounts were not mutual, open and current. St. Francis Valley Lumber Co. v. Orcutt, 174 Ark. 282, 295 S.W. 713 (1927).

Letter written acknowledging debt on account was, in the absence of a plea of inability to pay or a showing that there was no time within three years from the time the letter was written when the account could have been paid, sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. Arkansas R. Co. v. New York C. R. Co., 195 Ark. 304, 111 S.W.2d 457 (1937).

In an action to recover a balance on an open account, where defendant pleaded this statute, contending that payment upon which plaintiff relied to toll this statute had been made with instructions to apply it to a separate account, while plaintiff contended that it was all a continuing account, instructions properly submitted the issues of fact involved. Thomason v. Wilcox, 201 Ark. 867, 147 S.W.2d 725 (1941).

Letter of buyer regarding buyer's account established a new period from which statute of limitations began to run. Blake v. Commercial Factors Corp., 216 Ark. 664, 226 S.W.2d 986 (1950).

Action on open account was not barred where summons was served less than three years after date of last payment on account. Bridgman v. Drilling, 218 Ark. 772, 238 S.W.2d 645 (1951).

Part payment upon an open account made after the bar of the statute has fallen is presumed to start the statute running anew in absence of circumstances indicating that the debtor did not thereby intend to recognize his obligation. Taylor v. Slayton, 231 Ark. 464, 330 S.W.2d 280 (1959).

Decedents' Estates.

The statute of limitations has no application to claims for expenses of administration where the administration is still pending. Holland v. Doke, 135 Ark. 372, 205 S.W. 648 (1918).

Claimant for services rendered to a decedent was not entitled to recover except for services rendered within three years immediately preceding the death of decedent. Beauchamp v. Jernigan, 189 Ark. 361, 72 S.W.2d 535 (1934); Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Cohn, 194 Ark. 1098, 110 S.W.2d 42 (1937); Harris v. Whitworth, 213 Ark. 480, 211 S.W.2d 101 (1948); Trotter v. Kemp, 232 Ark. 681, 340 S.W.2d 274 (1960).

Claim against a deceased's estate was barred by statute of limitation. Johnson v. Murphy, 204 Ark. 980, 166 S.W.2d 9 (1942)Questioned byStarbird v. Cheatham, 243 Ark. 181, 419 S.W.2d 114 (Ark. 1967).

Where a claim against a deceased's estate is barred by the statute of limitation unless certain payments had been made, the mere fact that the payments were entered on the account and appear as credits, is insufficient to prove that those payments were in fact made. Johnson v. Murphy, 204 Ark. 980, 166 S.W.2d 9 (1942)Questioned byStarbird v. Cheatham, 243 Ark. 181, 419 S.W.2d 114 (Ark. 1967).

Court held that none of the indebtedness of decedent to landlord was barred by the statute of limitations where the limitation had not run before decedent's death. Goins v. Sneed, 229 Ark. 550, 317 S.W.2d 269 (1958).

This section does not apply to actions against a decedent's estate, but those actions must be brought within the time limit for filing claims against the estate even though the plaintiff is looking not to the assets of the estate but to the decedent's liability insurer for payment of his judgment. Swan v. Estate of Monette ex rel. Monette, 265 F. Supp. 362 (W.D. Ark. 1967), aff'd, 400 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. Ark. 1968).

Action for breach of fiduciary duty was timely where it was instituted within three years of the first action adverse to the estate. Jamison v. Estate of Goodlett, 56 Ark. App. 71, 938 S.W.2d 865 (1997).

In a will contest, the trial court erred in imposing the constructive trust because the three-year statute of limitations for breach of a fiduciary duty expired before appellee filed his petition for a constructive trust; the limitations clock started running when the alleged undue influence occurred and not at the repudiation or disavowal of any false promise or trust (however, the setting aside of the will was affirmed). Smith v. Smith (In re Estate of Smith), 2020 Ark. App. 113 (2020).

Employment.

—Retaliation.

Employment retaliation claim under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-108, was subject to the three-year limitation period applicable when a statutory claim had no limitation period under this section, rather than the one-year limitation provided in another part of the Act, § 16-123-107(c). Smith v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 2013 Ark. 502, 431 S.W.3d 200 (2013).

Employment Contracts.

Suit by employee for wrongful discharge based on violation of written collective bargaining contract was barred by three year limitation period for suits on oral contract where contract of employment with railroad was oral. Roberts v. Thompson, 107 F. Supp. 775 (E.D. Ark. 1952)Questioned bySandobal v. Armour & Co., 429 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1970)Questioned by429 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1970).

Suit for wrongful discharge based on violation of written collective bargaining contract and written job application where contract of employment was oral would be barred by three year limitation period for oral contracts in this section, but filing of suit within three years after discharge with employee taking a nonsuit after the three years and bringing another action under § 16-56-126 was not barred. Smithey v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 127 F. Supp. 210 (E.D. Ark. 1955), aff'd, 237 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. Ark. 1956).

Complaint against employed defendant which was filed more three years after termination of the defendant's employment was not timely filed. Tasby v. Peek, 396 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Ark. 1975).

Claim that publication of false and defamatory statements by defendants was a wrongful interference with plaintiff's employment contract and future economic and business expectancies sounds in tort and thus must be brought within three years or it is barred. Bankston v. Davis, 262 Ark. 635, 559 S.W.2d 714 (1978).

Three-year statue of limitations set forth in this section applies to private causes of action brought pursuant to the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act, § 11-4-218(e), because § 11-4-218(e) constitutes a liability created expressly by statute, and it does not include a specific limitations provision; where a cause of action is brought pursuant to a statute that does not expressly provide a limitations period, this section is the appropriate limitations provision. Douglas v. First Student, Inc., 2011 Ark. 463, 385 S.W.3d 225 (2011).

Federal Preemption.

When a nonsuit is taken in a federal court and a new suit is begun in a state court within a year as provided in § 16-56-126, the new action is maintainable although begun more than three years after the cause accrued, as the pendency of the suit in the federal court for the same cause of action had the effect to toll the general statute. Kansas City S. Ry. v. Akin, 138 Ark. 10, 210 S.W. 350 (1919).

Where federal statute suspended the running of any existing statute of limitations applicable to violations of antitrust laws of the United States or subject to civil proceedings under any existing statute, act of suspension applied equally to private and government actions; Arkansas three year statute of limitations did not bar suit for treble damages brought by company under provisions of Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act. Russellville Canning Co. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. Ark. 1949), rev'd, 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. Ark. 1951).

Federal statute of limitations rather than this section applies to an action by a trustee in bankruptcy to set aside preferential payment by the bankrupt. Nicklaus v. McClure, 244 Ark. 23, 423 S.W.2d 562 (1968).

The limitation period for actions brought under the provisions of the Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or the Securities Act of 1933 is that prescribed in § 23-42-106(f) and not that prescribed by this section. Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. Ark. 1970).

The three year limitation of this section was applicable to an action for common law fraud but not to an action for violation of § 10 of the Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. Ark. 1970).

Fraud and Deceit.

Where a suit is barred unless brought within three years after the cause of action accrues, yet there has been a fraudulent concealment of the cause of action, the statute is suspended until discovery of the fraud. Free v. Jordan, 178 Ark. 168, 10 S.W.2d 19 (1928).

An action for fraud and deceit is a tort and barred by the three year limitation. Air Leases, Inc. v. Baker, 167 F. Supp. 145 (W.D. Ark. 1958).

Plaintiff could not be heard to claim fraud or concealment as a bar to the statute based on an allegation in the complaint when the defendant had offered substantive proof that there was no fraud or concealment. Mining Corp. of Arkansas v. International Paper Co., 324 F. Supp. 705 (W.D. Ark. 1971).

Where the gravamen of plaintiff's complaint for damages was that the defendant fraudulently concealed the illegal nature of a loan transaction so that plaintiff would be convicted of making illegal loans, the action was subject to the three year statute of limitations for actions founded on any contract or liability, express or implied. Lane v. Graves, 525 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1975).

Although similar to an action for defamation, an action for deceit is distinct and is covered by a different, three year statute of limitations. Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1980).

In fraud actions, for purposes of determining when the statute of limitations begins to run, parties alleging fraud are charged with knowledge of any pertinent real estate conveyances from the time the conveyances are placed in public records, since filing for public record and concealment are mutually exclusive. Hughes v. McCann, 13 Ark. App. 28, 678 S.W.2d 784 (1984).

Affirmative action on the part of the person charged with fraud to conceal a plaintiff's cause of action will toll the running of the statute of limitations. Hughes v. McCann, 13 Ark. App. 28, 678 S.W.2d 784 (1984); Williams v. Hartje, 827 F.2d 1203 (8th Cir. 1987).

Fraud suspends the running of the statute of limitations, and the suspension remains in effect until the party having the cause of action discovers the fraud or should have discovered it by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Hughes v. McCann, 13 Ark. App. 28, 678 S.W.2d 784 (1984); Talbot v. Jansen, 294 Ark. 537, 744 S.W.2d 723 (1988); Hickson v. Saig, 309 Ark. 231, 828 S.W.2d 840 (1992); First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Stoltz, 311 Ark. 313, 843 S.W.2d 842 (1992), rehearing denied, First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Stoltz, 312 Ark. 95, 843 S.W.2d 842 (1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 908, 114 S. Ct. 290 (1993).

The plaintiff's claim for misrepresenting arising from the alleged promise to give her a teacher's contract was time barred, where the latest possible date of any such promise would have been more than three years before the filing of the complaint. Crutchfield v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 647 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Ark. 1986).

Where existence of cause of action has been fraudulently concealed, the statute of limitations begins to run no later than the day that the concealed matter was discovered; but concealment of facts, no matter how fraudulent or otherwise wrongful, has no effect on the running of a statute of limitations if the plaintiffs could have discovered the fraud or sufficient other facts on which to bring their lawsuit, through a reasonable effort on their part. Williams v. Hartje, 827 F.2d 1203 (8th Cir. 1987).

Fraud claim held barred. Moore v. Moore, 21 Ark. App. 165, 731 S.W.2d 215 (1987).

A cause of action for fraud is governed by this section. Ripplemeyer v. National Grape Coop. Ass'n, 807 F. Supp. 1439 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

The burden is on the plaintiff to exercise due diligence to discover the fraud if apprised of facts which should place the plaintiff on notice. Ripplemeyer v. National Grape Coop. Ass'n, 807 F. Supp. 1439 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

The statute of limitations on fraud is three years. Wages v. Robson, 148 B.R. 567 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992).

There was no evidence of record that insurance company attempted to fraudulently conceal, cover-up, or misrepresent to an estate the problem of determining the proper beneficiary of an insurance policy. First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Stoltz, 311 Ark. 313, 843 S.W.2d 842 (1992), rehearing denied, First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Stoltz, 312 Ark. 95, 843 S.W.2d 842 (1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 908, 114 S. Ct. 290 (1993).

Under Arkansas law, a cause of action for fraud is governed by a three-year statute of limitations. Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993).

While an action for fraud must be brought within three years from the date the cause of action accrues, the fraud does suspend the running of the statute of limitations and the suspension remains in effect until the party having the cause of action discovered the fraud or should have discovered it by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993).

The plaintiff's misrepresentation and/or constructive fraud claims were time barred where, by their own admission, plaintiffs knew the contract terms were being changed by defendant to their detriment more than three years prior to the filing of the suit. Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993).

In an action for fraud or misrepresentation the statutory limitation period begins to run when the wrong occurs, not when it is discovered; in the absence of purposeful concealment of the wrong, the statute of limitations is not tolled. Hampton v. Taylor, 318 Ark. 771, 887 S.W.2d 535 (1994).

Where the dates on which defendant's alleged misrepresentations were made were one month apart, the latter date was controlling for purposes of the running of the statute of limitations. Hampton v. Taylor, 318 Ark. 771, 887 S.W.2d 535 (1994).

Where defendant did nothing to prevent plaintiff from discovering the falsity of his reputed representation that touching her breasts was necessary to a lymph node examination, plaintiff failed to show an affirmative act of concealment, and her cause of action advanced under either a medical injury or invasion of privacy theory accrued on her last treatment date. Norris v. Bakker, 320 Ark. 629, 899 S.W.2d 70 (1995).

Farmer's action for fraud against a corporation was not barred by the statute of limitations because it was filed within three years of the last time the corporation made a fraudulent misrepresentation to the farmer. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Davis, 347 Ark. 566, 66 S.W.3d 568 (2002).

Summary judgment was properly awarded to bank in customer's action for conversion, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, constructive fraud, and fraudulent concealment where the action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations; the bank did not commit any act of fraud that would toll the running of the statute of limitations. Technology Partners, Inc. v. Regions Bank, 97 Ark. App. 229, 245 S.W.3d 687 (2006).

An unattested notation on the margin of a document was insufficient to extend the maturity date of the bonds at issue, and the bonds matured at the latest in 1954 and were purchased by the holder in 1974, 20 years after their maturity date, so any remaining claims would have to have been brought before the bonds became unenforceable. The holder did not contact the bank until 1984, 30 years after the maturity date and well after any applicable statute of limitations periods; therefore, the holder was barred by the three year statute of limitations under this section from bringing any of his breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, conversion, or negligence claims. Wilkins v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 514 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (W.D. Ark. 2007).

In a case arising out of a real property transaction, a fraud action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the cause of action arose when a deed was executed in 1996, and there was no evidence of fraudulent concealment to toll the limitations period. Riddle v. Udouj, 99 Ark. App. 10, 256 S.W.3d 556 (2007), aff'd, 371 Ark. 452, 267 S.W.3d 586 (2007).

Dismissal of appellant's tort action was appropriate because the action was barred by the statute of limitations. Appellant had plenty of time and the opportunity after she should have, by reasonable diligence, discovered the asserted fraud to bring suit and to counter the defense of release with the present allegation that it had been fraudulently obtained. Pambianchi v. Howell, 100 Ark. App. 154, 265 S.W.3d 788 (2007).

Agent's claim against an insurance company for making false representations was barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the limitations period began to run when the agent received a letter from the company notifying the agent that it wished to terminate the agent's contract. Gunn v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2010 Ark. 434, 372 S.W.3d 346 (2010).

In an action by a solicitor against a contractor and others, the trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss the solicitor's fraud claim as time-barred because the relevant dates of the alleged fraud, fraudulent concealment, or the solicitor's discovery of the fraud, from which the trial court could rule on the statute-of-limitations defense as a matter of law, were not discernible from the complaint. Nobles v. Tumey, 2010 Ark. App. 731, 379 S.W.3d 639 (2010).

Trial court did not err in granting a law firm's partial motion for summary judgment based on the three-year statute of limitations under subdivision (1) of this section, and dismissing an attorney's counterclaim for constructive fraud because the firm presented evidence that it was unaware of an erroneous fee percentage until after the litigation began, and the attorney failed to meet proof with proof. Grayson & Grayson, P.A. v. Couch, 2012 Ark. App. 20, 388 S.W.3d 96 (2012).

Goods and Chattel.

The statute of limitations does not run against the plaintiff in a replevin suit if he was a minor at the time of the commencement of the suit. Phipps v. Martin, 33 Ark. 207 (1878).

The statute does not begin to run against an action for the recovery of property fraudulently concealed until the fraud is discovered. Conditt v. Holden, 92 Ark. 618, 123 S.W. 765 (1909).

A bill of lading for shipping is a contract in writing, and where a carrier sues the shipper for a balance due under it, the five year statute of limitations applies. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Pfeiffer Stone Co., 166 Ark. 226, 266 S.W. 82 (1924).

Where goods were taken upon arrival by company other than consignee and warehouse receipts were delivered to unauthorized person, there was a conversion, and action by shipper after more than three years from the taking of the goods and the delivery of the warehouse receipts was barred by this statute. Meacham v. Mid-South Cotton Growers Ass'n, 196 Ark. 78, 115 S.W.2d 1078 (1938).

Statute of limitations begins to run in favor of person charged with converting chattels at the time when the conversion takes place. Thomas v. Westbrook, 206 Ark. 841, 177 S.W.2d 931 (1944).

Action by assignee of note secured by chattel mortgage against maker of the note and third party who had converted the chattels was not a suit on a note nor a suit to foreclose a mortgage, but a suit for conversion subject to the limitation provided by this statute rather than the five year statute of limitations. Thomas v. Westbrook, 206 Ark. 841, 177 S.W.2d 931 (1944).

Where a producer wrongfully sold equities of redemption in warehouse receipts to two purchasers, and the second purchaser buys in good faith without notice of prior sale and redeems the receipt before the first purchaser demands the receipts, an action brought four years after notice of purchaser's redemption was barred by the statute of limitations. Scroggin Farms Corp. v. McFadden, 165 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1948).

Suit by assignee of stored goods to recover for cotton taken by subsequent assignee of original assignor was a suit for conversion and not for violation of contract, and therefore this section and not § 16-56-111(a) applies. Scroggin Farms Corp. v. Howell, 216 Ark. 569, 226 S.W.2d 562 (1950).

—Bailments.

Statute does not run against a bailee until he does some act inconsistent with the relation. Chapman v. Hudson, 46 Ark. 489 (1885).

In bailments, an action for the property does not accrue nor the statute of limitations begin to run until demand is made therefor and delivery is refused. Lee County Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 165 Ark. 493, 265 S.W. 50 (1924).

Where relationship of bailor and bailee existed between shipper and warehouse company, delivery of warehouse receipts to unauthorized person would be a severance of that relationship, and statute of limitations against shipper's cause of action would begin to run as of the date the receipts were delivered. Meacham v. Mid-South Cotton Growers Ass'n, 196 Ark. 78, 115 S.W.2d 1078 (1938).

Where there has been a loan of a chattel for an indefinite period, the statute of limitations does not run against the bailor until a repudiation of his title is brought home to him. Shewmake v. Shifflett, 205 Ark. 875, 171 S.W.2d 309 (1943).

—Conversion.

The statute of limitations for conversion of personal property and the running of time for adverse possession are the same. Johnson v. Gilliland, 320 Ark. 1, 896 S.W.2d 856 (1995).

Implied Liability.

Implied obligations arising from mere acceptance of a deed are controlled by this section. Dismukes v. Halpern, 47 Ark. 317, 1 S.W. 554 (1886); Matthews v. Simmons, 49 Ark. 468, 5 S.W. 797 (1887). See also Percy v. Cockrill, 53 F. 872 (8th Cir. 1893).

A right of action by a joint maker of a note who paid it for contribution is based on an implied obligation and is barred in three years from the time payment was made. Hazel v. Sharum, 182 Ark. 557, 32 S.W.2d 315 (1930).

In action for breach of implied warranty in sale of goods, statute of limitation begin to run from the date of sale and delivery of goods. Peterson v. Brown, 216 Ark. 709, 227 S.W.2d 142 (1950).

Where owner of cafe shot and injured customer, cause of action of customer was governed by three year limitation of this section as founded on an implied liability growing out of the proprietor-invitee relationship rather than the one year limitation of § 16-56-104 governing assault and battery. Jefferson v. Nero, 225 Ark. 302, 280 S.W.2d 884 (1956).

Action fell within the implied obligation or liability provisions of this section. Carroll County v. Eureka Springs School Dist. # 21, 292 Ark. 151, 729 S.W.2d 1 (1987).

Insurance.

Where no time limit for making proof of disability is contained in insurance policy, proof of disability may be made at any time within this statute. National Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Cook, 194 Ark. 433, 108 S.W.2d 471 (1937).

As to all invalid warrants shown by any settlement to have been paid more than three years prior to the date suit was filed to recover the same, the cause of action was barred. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. State ex rel. Columbia County, 197 Ark. 1027, 126 S.W.2d 293 (1939).

Limitations against action by excess liability insurance carrier against primary insurer did not begin to run until settlement payment was made. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 246 Ark. 1021, 441 S.W.2d 95 (1969).

Where the insurance carrier paid the insured for losses, in a damage suit filed by the insured the insurance carrier could not be substituted as plaintiff more than three years after the insurance claim was paid and after the three year statute of limitations had run. Ark-Homa Foods, Inc. v. Ward, 251 Ark. 662, 473 S.W.2d 910 (1971).

The theory of subrogation being that the subrogee steps into the shoes of subrogor, he takes subject to all defenses which the third party could have asserted against the subrogor, including the statute of limitations. Williams v. Globe Indem. Co., 507 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948, 95 S. Ct. 1679 (1975).

The equitable duty to reimburse, when an insured settles with a tortfeasor and thereby destroys the insurer's subrogation interest, is a liability implied by law with a three year limitations period. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Williams, 858 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Ark. 1994).

Insured's bad faith and negligence claims against insurer accrued when judgment was entered against her in the underlying state court action. Carpenter v. Automobile Club Interinsurance Exch., 58 F.3d 1296 (8th Cir. 1995).

The statute of limitations for an insurance agent's negligence commences at the time the negligent act occurs. Calcagno v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 55 Ark. App. 321, 934 S.W.2d 548 (1996), aff'd, 330 Ark. 802, 957 S.W.2d 700 (1997).

In actions based on negligence, a subrogee insurance company is subject to the same three-year statute of limitations period as its insured. Shelter Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 57 Ark. App. 8, 940 S.W.2d 505 (1997).

Insurance underwriter's negligence claim against its agent, arising from the agent's issuance of a general liability policy to an Alabama motel in violation of the parties' binding authority agreement, was time-barred under this section because the underwriter filed its suit more than three years after the date the agent acted negligently by issuing the policy. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds v. Regions Ins., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (E.D. Ark. 2009).

Insurance underwriter's equitable indemnification claim against its agent was not time-barred under this section: (1) the equitable indemnification claim arose from the fact that the underwriter paid settlements in two lawsuit filed against an insured motel after the agent, which had issued a general liability policy to the motel in violation of the parties' binding authority agreement, refused to provide defense and indemnification in the suits; (2) the underwriter's claim did not accrue until it actually paid to settle the suits; and (3) the equitable indemnification claim was timely asserted because the underwriter filed its suit less than three years after it tendered the settlement payments. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds v. Regions Ins., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (E.D. Ark. 2009).

Insured's unjust enrichment and civil conspiracy claims, which alleged a conspiracy to sell insurance policies of little or no value through a non-qualifying group, were untimely; the insured filed suit in October 6, 2014, he alleged the marketing, underwriting, and purchase of his policy occurred in 2001, and no tolling could have been found after 2006 because obtaining the policy for review or simply contacting the state's director of insurance any time after the 2006 coverage denials would have revealed the infirmities the insured alleged as the basis for his claims. Graham v. Catamaran Health Sols. LLC, No. 16-1161, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16133 (8th Cir. Aug. 23, 2017).

Knowledge.

Ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not suspend the running of the statute of limitations in absence of fraudulent concealment by the defendant. Morrilton Homes, Inc. v. Sewer Improv. Dist., 226 Ark. 22, 287 S.W.2d 581 (1956); Cherepski v. Walker, 323 Ark. 43, 913 S.W.2d 761 (1996).

Where the appellees admitted they attempted to complete the novation of contracts as secretly as possible, the statute did not begin to run until the appellants had or, by the exercise of due diligence, should have known, the facts that gave rise to their cause of action. Klein v. Jones, 980 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1992).

Libel.

Under this section an action alleging libel under Arkansas law must be brought within three years after the cause of action accrued. Gilpin v. Tack, 256 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Ark. 1966).

Malpractice.

In accountant malpractice cases, the statute of limitations begins to run, in the absence of concealment of the wrong, when the negligence occurs, not when it is discovered. Ford's Inc. v. Russell Brown & Co., 299 Ark. 426, 773 S.W.2d 90 (1989).

The limitations period for professional negligence is three years, and it begins to run at the time the tortious conduct is committed. FDIC v. Deloitte & Touche, 834 F. Supp. 1129 (E.D. Ark. 1992).

Three years is the applicable statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty and malpractice actions. Smith v. Elder, 312 Ark. 384, 849 S.W.2d 513 (1993).

Although the trial court determined that the five year statute of limitations applicable to written contracts applied, where the trial court based its finding of liability against the defendant completely upon the finding that defendant breached his fiduciary duty to plaintiffs as their attorney and thereby committed malpractice, the applicable statute of limitations as to defendant was three years. Smith v. Elder, 312 Ark. 384, 849 S.W.2d 513 (1993).

The statute of limitations in legal malpractice cases begins to run, in the absence of concealment of the wrong, when the act of negligence occurs, not when it is discovered. Morris v. McLemore, 313 Ark. 53, 852 S.W.2d 135 (1993).

The three-year limitation period was tolled during the time the trial court's ruling was in effect until the court of appeals' decision reversing the trial court's ruling was delivered. Pope County v. Friday, Eldredge & Clark, 313 Ark. 83, 852 S.W.2d 114 (1993).

The limitation period begins to run in malpractice cases upon the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action. Wright v. Compton, Prewett, Thomas & Hickey, 315 Ark. 213, 866 S.W.2d 387 (1993).

The statute of limitations for an insurance agent commences at the time the negligent act occurs, in keeping with the traditional rule in professional malpractice cases. Flemens v. Harris, 323 Ark. 421, 915 S.W.2d 685 (1996).

Statute of limitations applied to an action against a law firm handling the probate of an estate despite the fact that the firm signed a tolling agreement. Stoltz v. Friday, 325 Ark. 399, 926 S.W.2d 438 (1996).

This section applies to actions against an attorney for negligence; the period begins to run, in the absence of concealment of the wrong, when the negligence occurs, not when the negligence is discovered. Smothers v. Clouette, 326 Ark. 1017, 934 S.W.2d 923 (1996).

Arkansas has long adhered to the traditional occurrence rule in legal malpractice; thus, where plaintiff did not allege that her attorneys concealed their alleged wrongdoing, and she was not prevented from bringing suit, the trial court's finding that her case was barred by the three-year statute of limitations and the grant of summary judgment was correct. Ragar v. Brown, 332 Ark. 214, 964 S.W.2d 372 (1998).

Directing of a verdict in favor of employee on the employers' issue of accounting malpractice was inappropriate as Arkansas adhered to the “occurrence rule” and there was evidence that the employers did not accept the employee's tax advice until March 2000; if that was the case, then the action would not have been barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Morrow Cash Heating Air, Inc. v. Jackson, 96 Ark. App. 105, 239 S.W.3d 8 (2006).

Trial court properly dismissed a client's complaint against an attorney for breach of contract, deception, slander, and defamation of character because the three-year statute of limitations barred the complaint. The “gist” of the client's complaint was that the attorney failed to act diligently and timely file a proper appeal on the client's behalf; such inaction was clearly negligent. Kassees v. Guy Randolph Satterfield & Satterfield Law Firm, PLC, 2009 Ark. 91, 303 S.W.3d 42 (2009).

When the client sued the attorney in connection with the execution of a prenuptial agreement, her complaint was barred by the three-year statute of limitations for legal-malpractice claims under this section. There was no written contract to bring the action under the five-year statute of limitations set forth in § 16-56-111. Pounders v. Reif, 2009 Ark. 581 (2009).

Clients' legal malpractice suit under § 16-22-306 for failure of a law firm to properly file a medical malpractice suit was barred by the three-year statute of limitations under subdivision (3) of this section because, under the occurrence rule, the clients' legal malpractice action ran no later than three years after the last day that their medical malpractice action could have been properly instituted. Rice v. Ragsdale, 104 Ark. App. 364, 292 S.W.3d 856 (2009).

After the Arkansas Supreme Court held in 2015 in Earls that the summons used in debt collection cases by a law firm was defective, and then plaintiff filed suit in 2015 against the law firm arising out of its previous debt collection service agreement with the law firm, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. In legal malpractice cases, Arkansas follows the occurrence rule that claims accrue when the negligence occurs and not when it is discovered. The malpractice claim arose from the use of the defective summons, last used in 2011, and not from the Earls case, and at no point was plaintiff prevented from filing suit. Manuel Bail Bond Co. v. Hosto & Buchan, PLLC, 2018 Ark. App. 631, 567 S.W.3d 542 (2018).

“Gist” of plaintiff's claim was legal malpractice rather than contract, and thus, the three-year statute of limitations that applied to legal-malpractice actions controlled; the debt-collection agreement was an ancillary contract for representation, and plaintiff failed to plead a viable cause of action regarding a breach of a separate and distinct written contract. Manuel Bail Bond Co. v. Hosto & Buchan, PLLC, 2018 Ark. App. 631, 567 S.W.3d 542 (2018).

Miscellaneous.

When the right to a public office is contested, the right to receive the emoluments of the office depends upon an adjudication of the title which is made in the contest suit and until the title to the office is adjudicated, the right of action to recover emoluments is not mature, and a suit to collect the emoluments is not barred by limitations when brought within three years of the final adjudication of the title to the office. Bowen v. Lovewell, 119 Ark. 64, 177 S.W. 929 (1915).

The three year statute of limitations controls in an action by a surety to compel contribution by a cosurety. Cooper v. Rush, 138 Ark. 602, 212 S.W. 94 (1919); Pennington v. Karcher, 171 Ark. 828, 286 S.W. 969 (1926).

A suit on a highway contractor's bond to pay subcontractor may be maintained at any time within three years after the completion of the work where the sub-contract was not in writing. Tolbert Bros. & Co. v. Molinder, 178 Ark. 888, 12 S.W.2d 780 (1929).

Person holding and having physical possession of bank stock endorsed in blank by the person to whom issued acquired title by adverse possession three years after the person had notice of the adverse claim to title and title in the adverse possession 18 years later related back to the beginning of the three-year period, and dividends all belonged to the adverse possessor. Henderson v. First Nat'l Bank, 254 Ark. 427, 494 S.W.2d 452 (1973).

Plaintiff's claims were time-barred because his complaint was filed on the first day of the fourth year after the alleged wrongful release of plaintiff's records. Morton v. City of Little Rock, 934 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1991).

Occurrence Rule.

Where two cities solicited bids for the construction of the wastewater facility, engineers prepared a soil report on September 30, 2001; a contractor was the successful bidder for the construction project and contracted with the cities on June 7, 2002. When the contractor filed suit against the engineers on May 24, 2005 for professional negligence in the preparation of the soil report, the circuit court correctly applied the occurrence rule to determine that the professional negligence claim against the engineers was barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in this section. Bryan v. City of Cotter, 2009 Ark. 457, 344 S.W.3d 654 (2009).

Pleadings.

It was held that, three years having elapsed between the time the plaintiff's cause of action accrued and the time the complaint was amended to make the defendant a party, the action against him was barred. Tedford Auto Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 116 Ark. 198, 172 S.W. 1006 (1915).

In an action by a company, a counterclaim was not barred because the cause of action thereon arose over three years before the complaint was filed if it was not barred when the plaintiff's cause of action accrued. Missouri & N.A. Ry. v. Bridwell, 178 Ark. 37, 9 S.W.2d 781 (1928)Questioned byLittle Rock Crate & Basket Co. v. Young, 284 Ark. 295, 681 S.W.2d 388 (1984).

In an action for assault, a cause of action for slander which was barred by statute before the assault could not be interposed as a counterclaim. Collier v. Thompson, 180 Ark. 695, 22 S.W.2d 562 (1929).

An amendment to a complaint filed after the statute had run was allowed where the effect of the amendment was only to correct the name of the party originally sued. Evans v. List, 193 Ark. 13, 97 S.W.2d 73 (1936).

Where original complaint on open account was not barred, neither was the complaint's amendment filed more than three years after date of last payment on account, where amendment merely amplified and expanded single cause of action stated in original complaint. Bridgman v. Drilling, 218 Ark. 772, 238 S.W.2d 645 (1951).

The defense of limitations may be raised by motion to dismiss. Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Ark. 1953).

Where statute of limitations was not pleaded it could not be relied upon even though the face of the record indicated it might have been a good defense if pleaded. Ashley v. Eisele, 247 Ark. 281, 445 S.W.2d 76 (1969).

Where statute of limitations was pleaded and relied on by plaintiff, defendant had the right to plead and rely on any facts and circumstances which may have tolled the statute. Ashley v. Eisele, 247 Ark. 281, 445 S.W.2d 76 (1969).

Where the first counterclaim amended did not allege the cause of action for fraud and deceit but the later amendment at the end of the three year period stated that cause of action, the relief sought for the action was barred. Beam v. Monsanto Co., 259 Ark. 253, 532 S.W.2d 175 (1976).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed a personal representative's wrongful death complaint as being untimely filed because the original pro se complaint filed by plaintiff, a nonlawyer, as the personal representative of the estate constituted the unauthorized practice of law and was a nullity and could not be amended; by the time an attorney filed a complaint, more than three years had passed since the decedent's death, and the personal representative's claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Henson v. Cradduck, 2020 Ark. 24 (2020).

Where homeowners mistakenly brought suit as individuals rather than in the name of the corporation that owned the real property, the circuit court did not err in denying their motion to substitute the corporation as the real party in interest because if the circuit court had granted the motion for substitution, it would have constituted a new complaint and would have been after the statute of limitations had run; relation back did not apply. C&R Constr. Co. v. Woods Masonry & Repair, LLC, 2020 Ark. App. 105 (2020).

Property Damage.

Damages arising under a contract to permit the defendant to use the plaintiff's wall in the construction of a building are original and begin to run when the building is negligently constructed and attached to the wall, and an action for damages for the negligent construction is barred after three years. Evans v. Pettus, 112 Ark. 572, 166 S.W. 955 (1914).

The fact that the sewers are of permanent construction does not render the nuisance permanent; when a sewer system was constructed and maintained so as to constitute a nuisance, the nuisance is of a continuing or recurring nature, and an action by plaintiffs on account of the nuisance is not barred by the three year statute. Jones v. Sewer Improv. Dist. No. 3, 119 Ark. 166, 177 S.W. 888 (1915).

In an action against a railroad for damages to a dwelling from maintenance of a coal chute, the limitation began to run upon the completion of the chute. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Davis, 186 Ark. 401, 53 S.W.2d 851 (1932); Baldwin v. Simpson, 191 Ark. 448, 86 S.W.2d 420 (1935).

Where a structure alleged to have caused diversion of water was erected more than three years before the suit was filed, the permanency of the structure is not wholly controlling. If it is of such a character that damage must necessarily result but the nature and extent of the damage may not be reasonably ascertained at the time of construction, then the damage is not original and the statute of limitations is not set in motion until the injury occurs. St. Louis S. F. R. Co. v. Spradley, 199 Ark. 174, 133 S.W.2d 5 (1939).

Suit for injury to property brought within three years after plaintiff reached age of majority was not barred under this statute where plaintiff had a homestead interest in addition to a fee estate in the property. Andrews v. Johnson, 202 Ark. 1115, 155 S.W.2d 681 (1941).

Statute of limitations from damage caused by dam or floodgate runs from when damage actually occurs. Greasy Slough Outing Club, Inc. v. Amick, 224 Ark. 330, 274 S.W.2d 63 (1954); Naylor v. Eagle, 227 Ark. 1012, 303 S.W.2d 239 (1957).

In action for damages for maintenance of a nuisance, the statute of limitations begins to run from the happening of the injury complained of. Consolidated Chem. Indus., Inc. v. White, 227 Ark. 177, 297 S.W.2d 101 (1957).

The statute of limitations began to run against an action when the damage to the land became permanent, and it was a question of fact for the jury when the damage became permanent. Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Thurman, 238 Ark. 789, 384 S.W.2d 482 (1964); Springdale v. Weathers, 241 Ark. 772, 410 S.W.2d 754 (1967).

Where gasoline retailer, having been sued for contamination of neighboring property, discovered the source of the contamination was from another gasoline retailer, the discovery rule was appropriately applied to the limitations statute, subdivision (4), applicable to the first retailer's claim against the second retailer. State v. Diamond Lakes Oil Co., 347 Ark. 618, 66 S.W.3d 613 (2002).

—Ditches, Embankments, Etc.

This section applies to suits against railroads for building levees causing an overflow of the plaintiff's land. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Morris, 35 Ark. 622 (1880); Fordyce v. Stone, 50 Ark. 250, 7 S.W. 129 (1887); Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Biggs, 52 Ark. 240, 12 S.W. 331 (1889); Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Yarborough, 56 Ark. 612, 20 S.W. 515 (1892).

A suit for damages for obstructing ditches is barred after three years. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Anderson, 62 Ark. 360, 35 S.W. 791 (1896).

Where the obstruction of a stream by reason of the construction of an embankment and ditch was of a permanent nature and necessarily injurious to the land of the adjacent proprietors, the damages thereby caused can be recovered only by suit brought within three years from the time the embankment and ditch were completed. Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Magness, 93 Ark. 46, 123 S.W. 786 (1909).

Where a company constructs a culvert so that damage to adjoining property by overflow must necessarily result and the certainty, nature, and extent of the damage may be reasonably ascertained and estimated at the time of the construction of the culvert, then the damage is original and there can be but a single recovery, and the statute of limitations against the cause of action is set in motion on the completion of the obstructing culvert. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Humphreys, 107 Ark. 330, 155 S.W. 127 (1913).

Where a levee permanently obstructed the drainage of land and caused the same to overflow, and the owner of the land had knowledge of the condition, the damage was original and the cause of action therefor arose immediately upon the completion of the levee. Russell v. Board of Dirs. of Red River Levee Dist. No. 1, 110 Ark. 20, 160 S.W. 865 (1913).

Suit to enjoin obstruction and diversion of the natural flow of a creek by filling in a trestle spanning it and digging a ditch too small to accommodate the flow during heavy rains, thus causing the water to back up over the plaintiff's lands, is barred after three years from the completion of the embankment, the nuisance as well as the injuries being original and permanent. Boas v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 157 Ark. 446, 248 S.W. 283 (1923).

In a cause of action for overflow of subjacent land, where water broke through defendant's embankment and flooded the plaintiff's land, the statute began to run from the time the injury occurred. Baldwin v. Neal, 190 Ark. 673, 80 S.W.2d 648 (1935).

Where the defendant, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, dug ditches across plaintiff's land through which polluted water flowed, it was a taking of land to the extent of a dimunition thereof on value for which plaintiff was entitled to compensation; but an action to recover damages therefor must be brought within three years of the date of the exercise of the right of eminent domain. Sewer Improv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jones, 199 Ark. 534, 134 S.W.2d 551 (1939).

Action instituted for damage allegedly caused by water overflowing plaintiff's land by reason of failure to keep ditches, culverts and drain pipes under roadbed open in two prior years was not barred by this statute, though ditches were constructed more than three years before, since damages were of a recurring nature. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Holman, 204 Ark. 11, 160 S.W.2d 499 (1942).

Where ditch which encroached on plaintiff's land was dug five years before the suit was instituted and it was apparent at the time it was dug that the water flowing through it would widen it by erosion, the injury to the plaintiff's land was certain and permanent and the action was barred by the statute of limitations. Cox v. Berry, 233 Ark. 910, 349 S.W.2d 661 (1961).

—Dumps.

Action for damages resulting from maintenance of dump was held barred by the three year statute. Davis v. Dunn, 157 Ark. 125, 247 S.W. 793 (1923).

Evidence sufficient to find that damages to plaintiff's land from dump occurred within three years before the filing of the complaint. Consolidated Chem. Indus., Inc. v. White, 227 Ark. 177, 297 S.W.2d 101 (1957).

Limitation of claims for damages resulting from dump to the three years prior to the suit was proper. Moore v. City of Blytheville, 1 Ark. App. 35, 612 S.W.2d 327 (1981).

—Power Plants.

Where the defendant's power plant threw soot, cinders, and ashes on the plaintiff's property inflicting damages which could have been estimated and compensated at the time the injury first occurred, there was an original and permanent injury so that the statute of limitations began to run at once. Brown v. Arkansas Cent. Power Co., 174 Ark. 177, 294 S.W. 709 (1927).

Where a power plant in its operation is such that damages must necessarily result and the certainty, nature, and extent of the damage can then be reasonably ascertained and estimated, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the construction. Brown v. Arkansas Cent. Power Co., 174 Ark. 177, 294 S.W. 709 (1927).

—Removals from Land.

An action for taking gravel from land is barred after three years. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Decker, 181 Ark. 1079, 28 S.W.2d 701 (1930).

A cause of action for removal of support to the surface arose when the subsidence occurred and the plaintiffs could bring their action for injuries within the statutory period after injuries to the surface occurred, irrespective of the date of the removal of support. Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Randolph, 191 Ark. 1115, 89 S.W.2d 741 (1936).

Real Estate Interests.

The right to enforce the collection of the amount bid at a sale of real estate sold in the pursuance of a decree of foreclosure, where the sale to the bidder is not confirmed by the court, is barred by the the three year statute of limitations. Cotham v. Lucy, 115 Ark. 84, 171 S.W. 113 (1914).

Statute does not apply where plaintiff claims title to the land. Sutton v. Lee, 181 Ark. 914, 28 S.W.2d 697 (1930).

Statute limiting time for bringing an action against purchaser of land sold on judicial sale does not apply against a person in possession of property in dispute. Forbus v. Gibbs, 216 Ark. 138, 224 S.W.2d 790 (1949).

Where plaintiff, formerly under guardianship, brought an action to reform tax deeds issued to wife during guardianship and alleged that wife and stepdaughter used funds of the guardianship to purchase deeds, plaintiff was estopped to assert three year statute of limitation barring right of stepdaughter to refund, where evidence showed that action for refund had been delayed due to promise of plaintiff to will her the property. Forbus v. Gibbs, 216 Ark. 138, 224 S.W.2d 790 (1949).

When action to divest person of any title and claim to land in question was brought within three years after that person asserted claim of title, the action was within the statute of limitation on actions in contract not reduced to writing. Fuller v. Fuller, 240 Ark. 475, 400 S.W.2d 283 (1966).

Where there is no written contract for the sale of land, a cause of action for breach of the contract, if oral, was barred after three years. Booth v. Mason, 241 Ark. 144, 406 S.W.2d 715 (1966).

An action brought to enforce a trust alleged to have been created sixteen years earlier by a father's conveyance of real estate to one of his sons which was repudiated by the widow of the grantee six years prior to the bringing of the action was barred by this section. White v. McBride, 245 Ark. 594, 434 S.W.2d 79 (1968).

—Abstractors.

The right of action against an abstractor for damages resulting from errors, defects, or omissions in an abstract of title prepared by him is not and cannot be based on the written certificate attached to the abstract because the written certificate is only evidence of the provisions of the preexisting oral or implied contract of employment. Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Ark. 1953).

The right of action against an abstractor for damages resulting from errors, defects, or omissions in an abstract of title prepared by him accrues at the time of the delivery of the abstract. Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Ark. 1953).

The statute of limitations in an action brought against an abstractor for damages resulting from an omission in the abstract of title, in the absence of concealment of the wrong, begins to run when the negligence occurs, not when it is discovered. Riggs v. Thomas, 283 Ark. 148, 671 S.W.2d 756 (1984).

Recovery of Money.

An action to recover money paid by mistake is barred in three years. Richardson v. Bales, 66 Ark. 452, 51 S.W. 321 (1899).

An action to recover a bank deposit is barred after three years. England v. Hughes, 141 Ark. 235, 217 S.W. 13 (1919).

An action to recover money, paid out under a void contract, which had been wrongfully converted sounded purely in tort and was not within this section but was governed by § 16-56-115. Core v. McWilliams Co., 175 Ark. 112, 298 S.W. 879 (1927).

This section is applicable to a claim of a county board of education for excess commissions and interest belonging to the common school fund and improperly credited to the county general fund. County Bd. of Educ. v. Morgan, 182 Ark. 1110, 34 S.W.2d 1063 (1931), overruled, Hartwick v. Thorne, 300 Ark. 502, 780 S.W.2d 531 (1989).

The three year and not five year statute of limitations was applicable to suit to recover from circuit clerk excess fees and commissions above the lawful salary allowed where there was no intentional fraud, corruption, or willful diversion on the part of the clerk. State ex rel. Garland County v. Jones, 198 Ark. 756, 131 S.W.2d 612 (1939).

Action to recover from fees alleged to have been wrongfully received by sheriff of the county was, since the fees were collected more than three years before the action was instituted, barred by the three year statute. Baker v. Allen, 204 Ark. 818, 164 S.W.2d 1004 (1942).

Where a sheriff uses his office to wrongfully obtain money from person and where suit is brought to recover the money, it is an action to recover money wrongfully obtained, and after three years the statute of limitations would bar a recovery. Wrinkles v. Brown, 217 Ark. 393, 230 S.W.2d 39 (1950).

Where commissioners of sewer improvement district did not learn of sewer connections until three years after they were made, suit filed more than three years after the connection was made to recover connection charges was barred by the limitation of this section. Morrilton Homes, Inc. v. Sewer Improv. Dist., 226 Ark. 22, 287 S.W.2d 581 (1956).

An action by taxpayers to compel a county judge to reimburse the county for use of county labor and equipment on private property for private benefit was governed by this section. McGhee v. Glenn, 244 Ark. 1000, 428 S.W.2d 258 (1968).

An action by county taxpayers to recover expense money paid or obtained through mistake by a prosecuting attorney, in the absence of fraud or corruption, is an action founded upon an implied contract, not in writing, and must be commenced within three years under this section. Munson v. Abbott, 269 Ark. 441, 602 S.W.2d 649 (1980).

Evidence sufficient to support conclusion that depositor had knowledge of unauthorized withdrawals and yet failed to act within the time allowed under the statute of limitations. Cooley v. First Nat'l Bank, 276 Ark. 387, 635 S.W.2d 250 (1982).

Service of Process.

Tort claim was time-barred, even though complaint was filed in a timely manner, where plaintiff did not obtain service on defendant within 120 days pursuant to ARCP 4(i). Sublett v. Hipps, 330 Ark. 58, 952 S.W.2d 140 (1997).

Negligence action for a slip and fall was improperly dismissed as being barred by the three-year limitations period because, under Ark. R. Civ. P. 15(c), an amendment correcting the name of a wrong owner as defendant related back to the original complaint in that the same allegations were made and the new owner was served within 120 days, as set forth in Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(i). Bell v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 96 Ark. App. 283, 241 S.W.3d 276 (2006).

Taxes.

Paying taxes on the lands of another under an express promise to repay entitles one to lien, but recovery is limited to three years where statute of limitations is pleaded. Person v. Cogbill, 180 Ark. 664, 22 S.W.2d 161 (1929).

A suit brought by commissioners of a road improvement district to collect taxes three years after they became delinquent was barred by limitation. Tallman v. Board of Comm'rs, 185 Ark. 851, 49 S.W.2d 1039 (1932).

Where one has mistakenly paid taxes on the property of another, the statute of limitations runs from the time of the payment. Brookfield v. Rock Island Imp. Co., 205 Ark. 573, 169 S.W.2d 662, 147 A.L.R. 451 (1943).

Tolling.

Former bank executive's annuity claims against the bank, which were barred by the three-year statute of limitations, were not saved by the doctrine of equitable tolling; while it may not have been beneficial for plaintiff as an executive officer to have filed a complaint to enforce the annuity agreement, there was no allegation that he was prevented from doing so and no allegation of fraudulent concealment. Loftin v. First State Bank, 2020 Ark. App. 66 (2020).

Tolling of Statute.

The running of the statute of limitations was tolled while default judgment was set aside; during that time, although the alleged negligent act had occurred, plaintiff had no claim against defendant, as he could have shown no injury. Stroud v. Ryan, 297 Ark. 472, 763 S.W.2d 76 (1989).

Lack of knowledge of a cause of action does not stop the statute of limitations from running unless there has been fraud or concealment by the person invoking the defense of limitations or if the statute is otherwise tolled. Courtney v. First Nat'l Bank, 300 Ark. 498, 780 S.W.2d 536 (1989).

Employer's offer of employment did not induce employees to forego filing their personal injury claims, and did not bar employer's motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. Burdine v. Dow Chem. Co., 923 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1991).

Surviving joint tenant's claim against funds in account commenced running upon the issuance of the certificate, but ceased to exist once he was paid the amount of the deposit, six months later, and the running of the statute was tolled until the probate court issued its order disallowing the accounting, therefore, the complaint, filed only two weeks after that date, was timely. Smackover State Bank v. Oswalt, 307 Ark. 432, 821 S.W.2d 757 (1991).

Where plaintiff's alleging fraud in a contract action did not fulfill their duty to exercise reasonable diligence in examining the contract they executed to uncover what they alleged was a fraudulent misrepresentation by the defendant, they could not complain on appeal that the statute of limitations should have tolled. Wilson v. GE Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 311 Ark. 84, 841 S.W.2d 619 (1992).

Where affirmative acts of concealment by the person charged with fraud prevent the discovery of that person's misrepresentations, the statute of limitations will be tolled until the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Wilson v. GE Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 311 Ark. 84, 841 S.W.2d 619 (1992).

Statute of limitations was not tolled, and the statute ran before suit was filed. Scollard v. Scollard, 329 Ark. 83, 947 S.W.2d 345 (1997).

The defendant jeweler was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations in an action in which the plaintiff alleged that he had switched a diamond for a cubic zirconium since such a switch, if proven, would constitute fraudulent concealment and would toll the statute. Gibson v. Herring, 63 Ark. App. 155, 975 S.W.2d 860 (1998).

Any concealment or misrepresentation did not sufficiently toll the limitations period in an action for an alleged breach of contract in connection with a mortgage payment disability insurance policy where the action was not commenced until more than three years after the plaintiff received a copy of the policy. Elder v. Security Bank, 68 Ark. App. 132, 5 S.W.3d 78 (1999).

Client's claims of legal malpractice and breach of contract against her former attorney where properly dismissed as time-barred where the client did not file suit until more than three years after all of the allegations of negligence had occurred; the client's argument that the statute was tolled until she obtained her file was refuted by the client's earlier letter to the attorney asserting negligence. Parkerson v. Lincoln, 347 Ark. 29, 61 S.W.3d 146 (2001).

Three-year statute of limitations for a legal malpractice action was not tolled by fraudulent concealment due to an incorrect statement made by attorneys regarding a tax liability letter; there was no furtively planned or secretly executed acts, nor was there an affirmative act of concealment; rather, the client failed to act with reasonable diligence when he was informed of the tax liability by the State on two different times. Delanno, Inc. v. Peace, 366 Ark. 542, 237 S.W.3d 81 (2006).

Circuit court improperly granted two attorneys summary judgment on a shareholder's legal malpractice action based on subdivision (3) of this section (Repl. 2006) where the shareholder had produced evidence that the attorneys had set up and concealed shell corporations; it was unlikely that he could have discovered the concealment of the attorneys' wrongful acts, and as a result, there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the attorneys committed acts of fraudulent concealment that tolled the statute of limitations. Bomar v. Moser, 369 Ark. 123, 251 S.W.3d 234 (2007).

More than three years had elapsed since the commission of the alleged fraud, and thus the buyers had the burden to show that the statute of limitations in this section was tolled; however, the buyers failed to produce any evidence that the seller engaged in any act designed to conceal her alleged misrepresentation, and instead the buyers were aware of all the material facts surrounding the alleged fraud before taking possession of the land, and thus the trial court did not err in finding that the buyers' constructive fraud claim had expired. Riddle v. Udouj, 371 Ark. 452, 267 S.W.3d 586 (2007).

In a personal injury suit, when a pedestrian and his wife failed to properly serve a summons and complaint on a driver, and service was not completed within 120 days of the filing of the complaint, the complaint had to be dismissed without prejudice, but when service was not completed within the three-year statute of limitations period, the dismissal had to be with prejudice because the pedestrian and his wife failed to show fraud on the part of the driver, so the statute of limitations was not tolled. Brennan v. Wadlow, 372 Ark. 50, 270 S.W.3d 831 (2008).

Business owners' claims against auditors for fraud, constructive fraud, and professional negligence regarding a 1995 audit were time-barred by this section despite a tolling agreement signed by the auditors because the tolling agreement's purpose was to waive the statute of limitations as to claims arising out a 1994 audit and the claims with respect to the 1995 audit were not related to nor did they arise from the 1994 audit. Ernst & Young LLP v. Reid, 2010 Ark. 255 (2010).

Plaintiff's action was properly dismissed because his claims were clearly time-barred under this section and §§ 16-56-111, 4-88-115, and by failing to allege when and how he discovered defendant's alleged fraud, plaintiff failed to meet his burden under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), (f) of sufficiently pleading that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment saved his otherwise time-barred claims. Summerhill v. Terminix, Inc., 637 F.3d 877 (8th Cir. 2011).

Claims by mineral lessors, including under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, § 4-88-101 et seq., were properly dismissed as time-barred under this section and § 4-88-115 where they were brought more than five years after the leases were executed; fraud was not sufficiently shown for purposes of tolling. Hipp v. Vernon L. Smith & Assocs., 2011 Ark. App. 611, 386 S.W.3d 526 (2011).

Action alleging conspiracy to conceal evidence and malicious prosecution was time-barred, as the suit was brought more than three years after the former suspect's acquittal of a murder charge; the alleged concealment of an investigating officer's notes did not warrant equitable tolling, as the notes could not reasonably have been read to contradict a report that the officer provided to the state prosecutor. Jones v. Frost, 770 F.3d 1183 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 2315, 191 L. Ed. 2d 979 (2015).

Torts.

Lex fori governs as to limitation of action for common law tort. Moores v. Winter, 67 Ark. 189, 53 S.W. 1057 (1899).

An action for damages for wrongful ejection from a train is within the three year limitation of this section. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Mynott, 83 Ark. 6, 102 S.W. 380 (1907).

The limitation fixed by this section governs the right of action for pain and suffering before death in a suit brought by the administrator for the benefit of the estate. Smith v. Missouri P. R. Co., 175 Ark. 626, 1 S.W.2d 48 (1927).

The three-year statute of limitations applies to all tort actions not otherwise limited by law, where the means of information as to the cause of the injury is equally accessible to both parties and the cause or extent of the injury was not fraudulently concealed. Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934)Questioned byNorris v. Bakker, 320 Ark. 629, 899 S.W.2d 70 (1995)Questioned bySchenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. Ark. 1970).

Tort action barred by statute of limitations. Brown v. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co., 189 Ark. 885, 75 S.W.2d 804 (1934); Faulkner v. Huie, 205 Ark. 332, 168 S.W.2d 839 (1943)Questioned byMulligan v. Lederle Laboratories, Div. of American Cyanamid Co., 786 F.2d 859 (8th Cir. 1986); Orlando v. Alamo, 646 F.2d 1288 (8th Cir. 1981)Criticized byPoindexter v. Armstrong, 934 F. Supp. 1052 (W.D. Ark. 1994); Turner v. Baptist Medical Center, 275 Ark. 424, 631 S.W.2d 275 (1982); Simpson v. Bailey, 279 Ark. 27, 648 S.W.2d 464 (1983); Cherepski v. Walker, 323 Ark. 43, 913 S.W.2d 761 (1996).

Tort action not barred by statute of limitations. Schott v. Colonial Baking Co., 111 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Larson Machine, Inc. v. Wallace, 268 Ark. 192, 600 S.W.2d 1 (1980).

This section governs actions brought under § 16-62-101(a) as well as personal injury suits brought by an injured party during his lifetime. Hicks v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 181 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Ark. 1960), appeal dismissed, 285 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. Ark. 1960).

Where deceased was injured as a result of negligence, his cause of action for injuries accrued on the date of injury; where deceased's action was barred by period of limitations, similar action by administratrix was also barred, as she occupied the same position as deceased in regard to the action. Hicks v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 181 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Ark. 1960), appeal dismissed, 285 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. Ark. 1960).

The three year limitation on an action for injury resulting from taking a drug manufactured by the defendant began to run when it became apparent that the injury was permanent. Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. Ark. 1970).

A right of action for injury resulting from taking drug accrued when the patient knew or, in the exercise of ordinary care for her health and safety, could have known that she was injured. Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Ark. 1968), aff'd, 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. Ark. 1970).

The statute of limitations on a personal injury action did not run against an incompetent even though a guardian of his estate had been appointed prior to accrual of the cause of action. Mason v. Sorrell, 260 Ark. 27, 551 S.W.2d 184 (1976).

The three-year statute applies to all tort actions, including allegations of negligence with respect to sale of securities transaction. F & M Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners Ltd. Partnership, 702 F. Supp. 1417 (W.D. Ark. 1988).

Where the gist of the complaint clearly sounds in tort, and the court is unable to construe it to include another type action so as to permit the application of a longer statute of limitations, the cause of action will be barred by the three year statute of limitations for torts. O'Bryant v. Horn, 297 Ark. 617, 764 S.W.2d 445 (1989).

A cause of action for contribution accrues when one joint tortfeasor pays more than his or her pro rata share of common liability; therefore, the three-year statute of limitations under this section had not yet expired due to the fact that a settlement had just been entered where an executor and his wife agreed to pay more of their fair share in a trust dispute. Heinemann v. Hallum, 365 Ark. 600, 232 S.W.3d 420 (2006).

In a foreclosure case involving a construction loan, summary judgment was properly granted on the borrower's nonsuited counterclaims for negligence and interference with business expectancies, which were untimely under this section because they were filed more than three years after the lender refused further funding of the loan and were not saved by § 16-56-126 because they were filed more than two years after the voluntary nonsuit. Grand Valley Ridge, LLC v. Metro. Nat'l Bank, 2012 Ark. 121, 388 S.W.3d 24 (2012).

In a creditor's breach of contract suit arising from cross-defaulted loan agreements, counterclaims asserting causes of action for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, breach of contract, and deceptive trade practices were time-barred. Bank of Am., N.A. v. JB Hanna, LLC, 766 F.3d 841 (8th Cir. 2014).

In a dispute over family burial plots, appellants' cause of action accrued in 2006 at the time the headstone was placed by appellee, signifying appellee's and her husband's intention to claim the property for their burial plot, because, at that moment, the injury to appellants' claim to the property had occurred and the three-year statute of limitations in subdivision (4) of this section began to run; however, because the cause of action was not filed within three years of that date and Arkansas did not recognize the tort theory of continuing trespass for limitations purposes, the trial court did not err in holding that the statute of limitations barred appellants' claim and in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee. Cason v. Lambert, 2015 Ark. App. 213, 462 S.W.3d 681 (2015).

—Outrage.

Allegations that a doctor had improperly touched, examined, and otherwise fondled plaintiffs' breasts during a physical examination did not allege a complaint of battery, governed by the one-year statute of limitations in § 16-56-104, but stated a cause of action for the tort of outrage, which is governed by the three-year statute of limitations in this section. McQuay v. Guntharp, 331 Ark. 466, 963 S.W.2d 583 (1998).

Trespass.

An action for damages for trespass on real property instituted after more than three years since the cause of action arose, but within one year after final judgment was rendered on demurrer in a previous action on the same cause, was barred by limitations, since former judgment was not a nonsuit. Thompson v. Pulaski-Lonoke Drainage Dist., 192 Ark. 1178, 90 S.W.2d 237 (1936).

Evidence in trespass suit sufficient to bar cause of action by statute of limitation. Jones v. Brooks, 233 Ark. 148, 343 S.W.2d 99 (1961).

Court properly denied summary judgment to the oil company, which was one of the defendants in an action by the landowners for damages from defendants' dumping, where the court could not say that a reasonable jury would not find that the three year limitations period under subdivision (4) of this section was tolled under the continuing violation theory. Sewell v. Phillips Petro. Co., 197 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (W.D. Ark. 2002).

District court's verdict was reversed on appeal where the applicable statute of limitations began to run at the latest date the plaintiff lessor learned its land had suffered a remediable injury, though it did not yet know the extent of the injury. Highland Indus. Park, Inc. v. BEI Def. Sys. Co., 357 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 2004).

Estate administrator's amended complaint for the wrongful conversion of timber, brought on behalf of the estate, was time-barred under subdivisions (4) and (6) of this section, the three-year statute of limitations for trespass and conversion, and § 16-56-108, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to penal statutes where the penalty goes to the person suing, which included claims brought pursuant to § 18-60-102. It was also barred because the administrator failed to meet the bond requirement of § 28-42-103. Travis Lumber Co. v. Deichman, 2009 Ark. 299, 319 S.W.3d 239 (2009).

Trusts.

Although the beneficiary's claims nominally sounded in tort, they were predominantly assertions of a breach of trust; therefore, the statute of limitations in the Arkansas Trust Code in § 28-73-1005 controlled, rather than the more general three-year tort limitations period in this section. The beneficiary's allegations clearly involved claims that the trustee breached her duties as trustee in her administration of the trusts. Peck v. Peck, 2019 Ark. App. 190, 575 S.W.3d 137 (2019).

Cited: Meyer v. Cunningham, 196 Ark. 1097, 121 S.W.2d 90 (1938); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Neal, 212 Ark. 866, 208 S.W.2d 176 (1948); Collie v. Coleman, 223 Ark. 206, 265 S.W.2d 515 (1954); Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Neely, 225 Ark. 230, 282 S.W.2d 150 (1955); Booth v. Hayde, 228 Ark. 244, 307 S.W.2d 227 (1957); Baxter v. Young, 229 Ark. 1035, 320 S.W.2d 640 (1959); Nelson v. Eckert, 231 Ark. 348, 329 S.W.2d 426 (1959); Wilson v. Wilson, 231 Ark. 416, 329 S.W.2d 557 (1959); Tollett v. Mashburn, 183 F. Supp. 120 (W.D. Ark. 1960); Carter v. Zachary, 243 Ark. 104, 418 S.W.2d 787 (1967); Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970); Brown v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Ark. 1972); Hogue v. Jennings, 252 Ark. 1009, 481 S.W.2d 752 (1972); Coleman v. Young, 256 Ark. 759, 510 S.W.2d 877 (1974); Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arkansas Nat'l Co., 260 Ark. 352, 538 S.W.2d 574 (1976); Pruitt v. Pruitt, 271 Ark. 404, 609 S.W.2d 84 (1980); Wright v. Langdon, 274 Ark. 258, 623 S.W.2d 823 (1981); Federal Land Bank v. Wilson, 533 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 550 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Okla Homer Smith Furn. Mfg. Co. v. Larson & Wear, Inc., 278 Ark. 467, 646 S.W.2d 696 (1983); Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984); Freeman v. King, 10 Ark. App. 220, 662 S.W.2d 479 (1984); Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 Ark. 5, 678 S.W.2d 361 (1984); Lacey v. Bekaert Steel Wire Corp., 619 F. Supp. 1234 (W.D. Ark. 1985); Mulligan v. Lederle Laboratories, Div. of American Cyanamid Co., 786 F.2d 859 (8th Cir. 1986); Jackson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 803 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1986); Broadhead v. McEntire, 19 Ark. App. 259, 720 S.W.2d 313 (1986); Ballheimer v. Service Fin. Corp., 292 Ark. 92, 728 S.W.2d 178 (1987); Rogers Iron & Metal Corp. v. K & M, Inc., 22 Ark. App. 228, 738 S.W.2d 110 (1987); Carton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 295 Ark. 126, 747 S.W.2d 93 (1988); Fayetteville v. Bibb, 30 Ark. App. 31, 781 S.W.2d 493 (1989); Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Atlanta Exploration, Inc. v. Ethyl Corp., 301 Ark. 331, 784 S.W.2d 150 (1990); Phillips v. Sugrue, 800 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Ark. 1992); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Kerr, 804 F. Supp. 1091 (W.D. Ark. 1992); Green v. Bell, 308 Ark. 473, 826 S.W.2d 226 (1992); Orsini v. Larry Moyer Trucking, Inc., 310 Ark. 179, 833 S.W.2d 366 (1992); Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993); Hicks v. Clark, 316 Ark. 148, 870 S.W.2d 750 (1994); Alexander v. Twin City Bank, 322 Ark. 478, 910 S.W.2d 196 (1995); Howard v. Northwest Ark. Surgical Clinic, 324 Ark. 375, 921 S.W.2d 596 (1996); Kingsbury v. Robertson, 325 Ark. 12, 923 S.W.2d 273 (1996); Grace v. Grace, 326 Ark. 312, 930 S.W.2d 362 (1996); Calcagno v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 330 Ark. 802, 957 S.W.2d 700 (1997); Colonia Ins. Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 13 F. Supp. 2d 891 (W.D. Ark. 1998); Helms v. University of Missouri-Kansas City, 65 Ark. App. 155, 986 S.W.2d 419 (1999); Kohl v. American Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885 (W.D. Ark. 1999); Martin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 344 Ark. 177, 40 S.W.3d 733 (2001); Adams v. Wolf, 73 Ark. App. 347, 43 S.W.3d 757 (2001); Vanderpool v. Pace, 351 Ark. 630, 97 S.W.3d 404 (2003); Shelnutt v. Laird, 359 Ark. 516, 199 S.W.3d 65 (2004); Moody v. Tarvin, 2016 Ark. App. 169, 486 S.W.3d 242 (2016).