Ark. Code Ann. » Title 4 Chapter 59
Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 4-59-207 (2026)

Remedies of creditor

✓ current as of May 2026
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  1. In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this subchapter, a creditor, subject to the limitations in § 4-59-208, may obtain:
    1. avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim;
    2. an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee if available under applicable law;
    3. subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with applicable rules of civil procedure:
      1. an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property;
      2. appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of the transferee; or
      3. any other relief the circumstances may require; and
    4. a settlement agreement with the transferee or a child support creditor or the Office of Child Support Enforcement in Title IV-D cases.
  2. If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the creditor, if the court so orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its proceeds.

History. Acts 1987, No. 967, § 7; 1997, No. 1296, § 2; 2017, No. 1086, § 1.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment substituted “creditor” for “creditors” in the section heading; substituted “if available under applicable law” for “in accordance with the procedure prescribed by §§ 16-110-201 — 16-110-211” in (a)(2); and made stylistic changes.

U.S. Code. Title IV-D, referred to in this section, is a reference to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Corporations — Internal Dissension as a Ground for Equity's Appointing a Receiver for a Solvent Corporation, 4 Ark. L. Rev. 228.

Case Notes

In General.

Setting aside fraudulent conveyances — Proof of insolvency. Rudy v. Austin, 56 Ark. 73, 19 S.W. 111 (1892); Davis v. Beauchamp, 99 Ark. 404, 138 S.W. 636 (1911) (preceding decisions under prior law).

The statute did not apply so as to allow a judgment creditor to recover either from a family farming corporation in which the judgment debtor owned stock or from the majority shareholder in that corporation after the judgment debtor transferred that stock to a family-owned limited partnership. Thomsen Family Trust v. Peterson Family Enters., Inc., 66 Ark. App. 294, 989 S.W.2d 934 (1999).

Avoidance of the Transfer.

Transfer of real estate from the debtor to her parents set aside. Schieffler v. Beshears, 182 B.R. 235 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1995).

In a case under this subchapter, there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether a debtor received a reasonably equivalent value as a result of a transfer to her attorney; at the time of the transfer, the debtor believed or reasonably should have believed that she was incurring debts beyond her ability to pay as they became due. Druyvestein v. Gean, 2014 Ark. App. 559, 445 S.W.3d 529 (2014).

Equitable Garnishments.

A suit in equity to subject the debt of a third person to the extinguishment of plaintiff's demand against his debtor was an equitable garnishment within the meaning of former statute. Riggin v. Hilliard, 56 Ark. 476, 20 S.W. 402 (1892) (decision under prior law).

Garnishment was available against the payments due on a contract which was fraudulently assigned to defraud creditors where the action was in equity and all interested parties were before the court. Southern Lumber Co. v. Riley, 224 Ark. 298, 273 S.W.2d 848 (1954) (decision under prior law).

Jurisdiction.

Where there was personal service of the defendant's person, sequestration of his property was unnecessary to give the court jurisdiction to cancel a conveyance as fraudulent. Smith v. Arkadelphia Milling Co., 143 Ark. 214, 220 S.W. 49 (1920) (decision under prior law).

In order that relief be granted under former statute, it was necessary that the chancery court have jurisdiction of the subject matter. Horstmann v. La Fargue, 140 Ark. 558, 215 S.W. 729 (1919), overruled, Spitzer v. Barnhill, 237 Ark. 525, 374 S.W.2d 811 (1964) (decision under prior law).

Former statute was concerned only with the avoidance of fraudulent conveyances; and consequently, where a tort claimant sought a restraining order in chancery court to enjoin the alleged tort feasor from denuding himself of his assets and amended her complaint to assert also her cause of action in tort, the tort action should have been transferred to a court of law. Spitzer v. Barnhill, 237 Ark. 525, 374 S.W.2d 811 (1964) (decision under prior law).

Persons Protected.

The benefits of former statute were conferred upon anyone who, before the statute, would have had the right after his cause of action had been reduced to judgment, to sue to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. Horstmann v. La Fargue, 140 Ark. 558, 215 S.W. 729 (1919), overruled, Spitzer v. Barnhill, 237 Ark. 525, 374 S.W.2d 811 (1964) (decision under prior law).

Proof of Insolvency.

Former statute did not dispense with the necessity of proving the debtor's insolvency under the rule that equity would not lend its aid when the remedy at law was full and adequate. Davis v. Arkansas Fire Ins. Co., 63 Ark. 412, 39 S.W. 258 (1897); Euclid Ave. Nat'l Bank v. Judkins, 66 Ark. 486, 51 S.W. 632 (1899) (preceding decisions under prior law).

A bill in equity to set aside a conveyance by a joint debtor, alleged to be insolvent, was insufficient if it failed to allege that other debtors, jointly bound with him, were likewise insolvent. Euclid Ave. Nat'l Bank v. Judkins, 66 Ark. 486, 51 S.W. 632 (1899) (decision under prior law).

Where defendant is admittedly insolvent, it is not necessary to show an execution issued on the judgment with a nulla bona return. Fluke v. Sharum, 118 Ark. 229, 176 S.W. 684 (1915) (decision under prior law).

Where a complaint alleged that the defendant was insolvent and the answer did not deny the allegation, it was unnecessary to prove it. Horstmann v. La Fargue, 140 Ark. 558, 215 S.W. 729 (1919), overruled, Spitzer v. Barnhill, 237 Ark. 525, 374 S.W.2d 811 (1964) (decision under prior law).

Transfer on Death.

In creditor's action to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance arising from a transfer-on-death (TOD) beneficiary designation, the circuit court erroneously ruled that the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction and that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction; under Ark. Const. Amend. 80, § 6, and the fact that, under the Uniform Transfer on Death Security Registration Act, § 28-14-101 et seq., the money transferred from the TOD account did not become part of the estate, the circuit court clearly had jurisdiction. Heritage Props. Ltd. P'ship v. Walt & Lee Keenihan Found., Inc., 2019 Ark. 371, 584 S.W.3d 685 (2019).

In creditor's action to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance arising from a transfer-on-death (TOD) beneficiary designation, the transferee's argument failed that the personal representative of the estate and not the creditor had standing for such an action; while there are procedures within the probate code that would allow for the challenge of an alleged fraudulent conveyance, § 28-14-109 concerning TODs plainly allows creditors to pursue their claims against transferees under other Arkansas laws, and thus a creditor also may pursue its claim under the Fraudulent Transfers Act, § 4-59-201 et seq.Heritage Props. Ltd. P'ship v. Walt & Lee Keenihan Found., Inc., 2019 Ark. 371, 584 S.W.3d 685 (2019) (decided under pre-2017 version of § 4-59-201 et seq.).

In creditor's action to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance arising from a transfer-on-death (TOD) beneficiary designation, the creditor of the deceased had standing to pursue its claim under the Fraudulent Transfers Act, § 4-59-201 et seq., against the transferee beneficiary. Heritage Props. Ltd. P'ship v. Walt & Lee Keenihan Found., Inc., 2019 Ark. 371, 584 S.W.3d 685 (2019) (decided under pre-2017 version of § 4-59-201 et seq.).

Cited: Helm v. Mid-America Indus., Inc., 305 Ark. 12, 804 S.W.2d 727 (1991); FDIC v. Bell, 106 F.3d 258 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Hogan, 214 B.R. 1022 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1997); In re Armstrong, 217 B.R. 569 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1998); Williams v. Marlar, 246 B.R. 606 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2000).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases, 1991–2019 · leading case: Druyvestein v. Gean, 2014 Ark. App. 559 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Druyvestein v. Gean, 2014 Ark. App. 559 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 4× “He alleged that, pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 4-59-207, the transfers to Ms.”
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Melvyn Bell, Darlene Bell, Bell Holdings, Inc., Bell Equities, Inc., 106 F.3d 258 (8th Cir. 1997). “See Ark.Code Ann. § 4-59-207(a)(3)(i) (provision of Arkansas Fraudulent Transfer Act authorizing “injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property”).”
Thomsen Fam. Trust, 1990 v. Peterson Fam. Enter., Inc., 989 S.W.2d 934 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 2× “Arkansas Code Annotated section 4-59-207 (Supp. 1997) and section 4-59-208 (Repl.”
Schieffler v. Beshears (In Re Beshears), 182 B.R. 235 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1995). · cites it 2× “§ 4-59-207. The Transfer from the Parents to King Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for recovery of property which has been transferred.”
Meeks v. Greenville Casino Partners, L.P. (In Re Armstrong), 217 B.R. 569 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1998). · cites it 2× “§ 548 (a)(2), as well as under Arkansas law, Ark.Code Ann. § 4-59-207, the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debt- or in property if the debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value for the transfer and the debtor was insolvent at the time of the…”
Dowen v. Hogan (In Re Hogan), 214 B.R. 1022 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1997). “§ 4-59-207. The trustee moves for summary judgment on the basis that the Court has already determined that the transfers were made with the requisite fraudulent intent.”
Southmark Corp. v. Cagan, 999 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1993). “Ark.Code Ann. §§ 4-59-207, 208. Even if Diamondhead was sold without “reasonably equivalent value” under Section 4-59-204, Arkansas appears to require Ca-gan to prove that Southmark acted in bad faith before he can prevent Southmark from foreclosing on Diamondhead.”
Heritage Props., Ltd. P'ship v. Walt & Lee Keenihan Found., Inc., 2019 Ark. 371 (Ark. 2019). · cites it 5× “Ark. Code Ann. § 4-59-207 . The preceding provisions clearly allow for a creditor to seek avoidance of a fraudulent transfer against the transferee to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim.”
Helm v. Mid-Am. Indus., Inc., 804 S.W.2d 727 (Ark. 1991). · cites it 2× “Mid-America’s complaint sought in count two to have the conveyances set aside pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 4-59-207 (a)(1) (1987). In count three, the complaint sought judgment, as permitted by Ark.”
FDIC v. Darlene Bell (8th Cir. 1997). “See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-59-207 (a)(3)(i) (provision of Arkansas Fraudulent Transfer Act authorizing "injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property").”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 4-59-207(a)(3)(i) — 1 case
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Melvyn Bell, Darlene Bell, Bell Holdings, Inc., Bell Equities, Inc., 106 F.3d 258 (8th Cir. 1997). “See Ark.Code Ann. § 4-59-207(a)(3)(i) (provision of Arkansas Fraudulent Transfer Act authorizing “injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property”).”
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