Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-307 (2026)

Location of debtor

✓ current as of May 2026
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  1. In this section, “place of business” means a place where a debtor conducts its affairs.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following rules determine a debtor's location:
    1. A debtor who is an individual is located at the individual's principal residence.
    2. A debtor that is an organization and has only one (1) place of business is located at its place of business.
    3. A debtor that is an organization and has more than one (1) place of business is located at its chief executive office.
  3. Subsection (b) applies only if a debtor's residence, place of business, or chief executive office, as applicable, is located in a jurisdiction whose law generally requires information concerning the existence of a nonpossessory security interest to be made generally available in a filing, recording, or registration system as a condition or result of the security interest's obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the collateral. If subsection (b) does not apply, the debtor is located in the District of Columbia.
  4. A person that ceases to exist, have a residence, or have a place of business continues to be located in the jurisdiction specified by subsections (b) and (c).
  5. A registered organization that is organized under the law of a state is located in that state.
  6. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (i), a registered organization that is organized under the law of the United States and a branch or agency of a bank that is not organized under the law of the United States or a state are located:
    1. in the state that the law of the United States designates, if the law designates a state of location;
    2. in the state that the registered organization, branch, or agency designates, if the law of the United States authorizes the registered organization, branch, or agency to designate its state of location, including by designating its main office, home office, or other comparable office; or
    3. in the District of Columbia, if neither paragraph (1) nor paragraph (2) applies.
  7. A registered organization continues to be located in the jurisdiction specified by subsection (e) or (f) notwithstanding:
    1. the suspension, revocation, forfeiture, or lapse of the registered organization's status as such in its jurisdiction of organization; or
    2. the dissolution, winding up, or cancellation of the existence of the registered organization.
  8. The United States is located in the District of Columbia.
  9. A branch or agency of a bank that is not organized under the law of the United States or a state is located in the state in which the branch or agency is licensed, if all branches and agencies of the bank are licensed in only one (1) state.
  10. A foreign air carrier under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, is located at the designated office of the agent upon which service of process may be made on behalf of the carrier.
  11. This section applies only for purposes of this part.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1439, § 1; 2013, No. 138, § 6.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment substituted “State” for “state” throughout (f); and inserted “including by designating its main office, home office, or other comparable office” in (f)(2).

U.S. Code. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, referred to in this section, is codified primarily as 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.

Case Notes

Places of Business.

Where a farming partnership had more than one place of business because it grew crops in more than one county, the farm equipment and crops had to be perfected in a county which was considered the partnership's chief executive office; all financing statements regarding the collateral at issue were filed in the proper county and were properly perfected because they were filed in the county where the partnership's executive office was located and where both partners resided. In re Curtis, 363 B.R. 572 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2007).

Creditor had a perfected security interest in a farming partnership's benefits from the United States Department of Agriculture because the creditor filed a financing statement with the office of the Secretary of State. In re Curtis, 363 B.R. 572 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2007).

Subpart 2 Perfection

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 7 cases, 1990–2014 · leading case: Lawhon Farm Supply, Inc. v. Hayes, 870 S.W.2d 729 (Ark. 1994).
Lawhon Farm Supply, Inc. v. Hayes, 870 S.W.2d 729 (Ark. 1994). · cites it 2× “) See also § 4-9-307(1) (Repl.1991) (code does not protect a buyer in the ordinary course of business who buys farm products from a person engaged in farming operations).”
In Re Curtis, 363 B.R. 572 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2007). · cites it 4× “Ark.Code Ann. § 4-9-307(b)(2)(Michie 2003).”
Bank of Yellville v. Scott (In Re Scott), 113 B.R. 516 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990). · cites it 2× “See Ark.Code Ann. § 4-9-307 (Supp.1987). Under these facts, the security interest in favor of the Bank remained, notwithstanding the fact that the property was now owned by a new entity, a corporation.”
Dowden v. First Sec. Bank (In Re Mid-South Auto Brokers, Inc.), 290 B.R. 658 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2003). · cites it 2× “See Ark.Code Ann. § 4-9-307(l)(Michie 1991); Franklin v.”
Wawak v. Affiliated Food Stores, Inc., 812 S.W.2d 679 (Ark. 1991). · cites it 2× “Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-307 (1987). The profits, as well as the losses, were his from and after January 28, when he took possession and began operating the supermarket.”
Duke Wholesale, Inc. v. Pitchford, 56 S.W.3d 399 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 10× “In their motion for summary judgment, appellees argued that Pitchford was a buyer in the ordinary course of business and as such, under Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-307 (a) (Repl. 1991), she took the car free of Duke’s security interest and that Compass Bank received the benefit of…”
Bank of England v. Rice (In re Webb), 520 B.R. 748 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2014). · cites it 2× “” Ark.Code Ann. § 4-9-307(b)(3) (2011). "Chief executive office” is also not defined by the Code, but Official Comment 2 states that this “means the place from which the debtor manages the main part of its business operations or other affairs.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-307(1) — 1 case
Lawhon Farm Supply, Inc. v. Hayes, 870 S.W.2d 729 (Ark. 1994). “) See also § 4-9-307(1) (Repl.1991) (code does not protect a buyer in the ordinary course of business who buys farm products from a person engaged in farming operations).”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-307(b)(2) — 1 case
In Re Curtis, 363 B.R. 572 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2007). “Ark.Code Ann. § 4-9-307(b)(2)(Michie 2003).”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-307(b)(3) — 1 case
Bank of England v. Rice (In re Webb), 520 B.R. 748 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2014). “” Ark.Code Ann. § 4-9-307(b)(3) (2011). "Chief executive office” is also not defined by the Code, but Official Comment 2 states that this “means the place from which the debtor manages the main part of its business operations or other affairs.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-307(l) — 2 cases
Dowden v. First Sec. Bank (In Re Mid-South Auto Brokers, Inc.), 290 B.R. 658 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2003). “See Ark.Code Ann. § 4-9-307(l)(Michie 1991); Franklin v.”
Lawhon Farm Supply, Inc. v. Hayes, 870 S.W.2d 729 (Ark. 1994). “) See also § 4-9-307(1) (Repl.1991) (code does not protect a buyer in the ordinary course of business who buys farm products from a person engaged in farming operations).”
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