Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Dog as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statutes aggravating offenses such as assault and robbery. 124 A.L.R.5th 657.

Ark. L. Rev.

The Fetal Protection Act: Redefining “Person” for the Purposes of Arkansas' Criminal Homicide Statutes, 54 Ark. L. Rev. 75 (2001).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Davis, Survey of Arkansas Law: Criminal Law, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 193.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Tort Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1085.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Defendant's argument that this section was unconstitutional was not considered by the appellate court where defendant failed to present a record or abstract on appeal that informed the appellate court of the arguments made below; failure to produce a critical document on appeal precluded the appellate court's consideration of any constitutional issues. Bullock v. State, 353 Ark. 577, 111 S.W.3d 380 (2003).

Deadly Weapon.

Jury's finding that an automobile driven by defendant was a deadly weapon was supported by evidence. Harmon v. State, 260 Ark. 665, 543 S.W.2d 43 (1976).

A gun is a deadly weapon, even if it has faulty ammunition that could not inflict serious injury. Mitchell v. State, 290 Ark. 87, 717 S.W.2d 195 (1986).

Five foot length of iron pipe was capable of causing death or serious injury. Jones v. State, 292 Ark. 183, 729 S.W.2d 10 (1987).

Scissors clearly fall within the definition of a deadly weapon. Johnson v. State, 326 Ark. 3, 929 S.W.2d 707 (1996).

Evidence was sufficient to find that the object used in a stabbing was a deadly weapon in the manner of its use, even though it was not identifiable, because it was sharp, pointy, and when stabbed at the victim was capable of penetrating his torso and puncturing his lung. Medlock v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 609 (2013).

Because there was evidence that defendant’s accomplice caused injury to the victim using a deadly weapon, and because the jury was instructed on accomplice liability, there was sufficient evidence presented to support defendant’s second-degree battery conviction as the baseball bat swung by the accomplice, while not specifically designed for the purpose of inflicting death or serious physical injury, could clearly be used in a manner capable of causing death or serious physical injury when it was swung at the victim with the intent to strike her, and did strike her and fracture her hand. Wimbley v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 405, 437 S.W.3d 132 (2014).

State sufficiently showed a beer bottle was a deadly weapon because the bottle, being glass, was capable of greater damage than was inflicted. Wheeler v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 540, 532 S.W.3d 602 (2017).

Element of Offense.

Because defendant presented evidence arguably supporting self defense or a justification defense to a charge of aggravated assault under Arkansas law, the government had to negate that defense by a preponderance of the evidence for an enhancement for using the firearm in connection with another felony offense under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(5) [now (b)(6)] (2005), to apply because whether circumstances negated defendant's excuse or justification was an element of the offense under subdivision (5)(C) of this section, which had to be proved by the state under § 5-1-111(a)(1), and the definition of aggravated assault expressly excluded any person acting in self-defense or the defense of a third party under § 5-13-204(c)(2). United States v. Raglin, 500 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2007).

Substantial evidence existed to support a second-degree murder conviction because defendant's justification defense could have been reasonably rejected; the jury could have credited testimony indicating that defendant walked towards the victim holding a gun after being told that the girls present did not want to fight. Moody v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 538, 444 S.W.3d 389 (2014).

In a trial for manslaughter under § 5-10-104, the circuit court erred when it did not instruct the jury on justification because, under § 5-2-614, if defendant was reckless or negligent in forming the belief that force was necessary, then, and only then, was the defense unavailable; however, if defendant was not reckless or negligent in forming his belief, the defense was available, and that was a decision for the jury. Schnarr v. State, 2018 Ark. 333, 561 S.W.3d 308 (2018).

Firearm.

An M-1 rifle used by the Veterans of Foreign Wars for ceremonial purposes was a “firearm” within the meaning of this section, notwithstanding that it had been modified to shoot only blanks, because it could be easily converted to fire live ammunition with no special tools. Ward v. State, 64 Ark. App. 120, 981 S.W.2d 96 (1998).

Court did not err in declining to direct a verdict on the charges of felon in possession of a firearm and simultaneous possession of drugs and a firearm because the firearm in question met the statutory definition of firearm under this section; hence, defendant's convictions were upheld. Hunt v. State, 354 Ark. 682, 128 S.W.3d 820 (2003).

Jury Instructions.

The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the statutory definition of “sawed-off shotgun” where such definition was not enacted at the time of the offense. Bridges v. State, 327 Ark. 392, 938 S.W.2d 561 (1997).

Prosecutor did not clearly and unequivocally misstate the state's burden of disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt during voir dire and, therefore, the trial court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by failing to instruct the jury not to consider same; the prosecutor relied on the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions — Criminal as the basis for the definition and explanation of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and his statements to the jury about conflicting testimony were not technically incorrect, however, his statements represented a subtle attempt to shift the burden of proof by equating defendant's burden of proof with the state's burden. Anderson v. State, 353 Ark. 384, 108 S.W.3d 592 (2003), cert. denied, Anderson v. Arkansas, 540 U.S. 1050, 124 S. Ct. 832 (2003), appeal dismissed, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Ark. LEXIS 109 (Jan. 12, 2006), dismissed, Anderson v. Norris, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10114 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 8, 2008).

Person.

District court concluded that the Arkansas Supreme Court would extend its decision in Aka, which held that wrongful death suits could be brought on behalf of unborn, viable fetuses, to allow a negligence suit to be filed on a child's behalf, seeking to recover for alleged negligently inflicted injuries that the child sustained in utero. The district court noted that the state supreme court had found persuasive the state legislature's decision to expand the definition of “person” in the homicide and probate laws, subdivision (13)(B)(i)(b) of this section, § 28-1-118(a), to include viable fetuses, thereby giving statutory protection to unborn children, and that it would be absurd to think that less protection would be provided under Arkansas law to children who suffered in utero injury, but nevertheless managed to be born. Crussell v. Electrolux Home Prods., 499 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (W.D Ark. 2007).

Arkansas Criminal Code expressly limits criminalizing conduct with respect to an unborn child to homicide offenses, and even then, does not allow a mother to be charged or convicted of any homicide offense while her child is in utero. Therefore, a conviction under § 5-13-210 for introduction of a controlled substance into the body of another person based on defendant's ingestion of drugs while pregnant could not stand. Arms v. State, 2015 Ark. 364, 471 S.W.3d 637 (2015).

In a death penalty case, defendant's argument that the circuit court erred in permitting the jury to consider the death of the victim's unborn child as an aggravating circumstance under § 5-4-604 was abandoned below and could not be raised on appeal because defendant did not conclusively show prejudice, and he failed to show that the Supreme Court would unquestionably grant him Rule 37 relief on the issue. Smith v. State, 2018 Ark. 277, 555 S.W.3d 881 (2018).

Wicks exception for matters essential to consideration of the death penalty did not apply to the circuit court's failure to bring to the jury's attention that a “person” could not be an unborn child as it applies to the aggravating circumstances listed in § 5-4-604; while the prosecutor chose not to file a separate homicide charge for the death of the victim's unborn child, he could have. Smith v. State, 2018 Ark. 277, 555 S.W.3d 881 (2018).

Physical Injury.

Evidence was insufficient to establish that victim's physical condition was impaired or that victim was inflicted with substantial pain. Kelley v. State, 7 Ark. App. 130, 644 S.W.2d 638 (1983), superseded by statute as stated in, Conner v. State, 75 Ark. App. 418, 58 S.W.3d 865 (2001); Hundley v. State, 22 Ark. App. 239, 738 S.W.2d 107 (1987); Johnson v. State, 28 Ark. App. 256, 773 S.W.2d 450 (1989).

Injuries were sufficient to demonstrate that there was “substantial pain” within the meaning of subdivision (14). Middleton v. State, 14 Ark. App. 92, 685 S.W.2d 182 (1985); Armstrong v. State, 35 Ark. App. 188, 816 S.W.2d 620 (1991).

In determining whether an injury inflicts substantial pain for purposes of subdivision (14), the trier of fact must consider all of the testimony and may consider the severity of the attack and the sensitivity of the area of the body to which the injury is inflicted; the finder of fact is not required to set aside its common knowledge and may consider the evidence in the light of its observations and experiences in the affairs of life. Holmes v. State, 15 Ark. App. 163, 690 S.W.2d 738 (1985); Cole v. State, 33 Ark. App. 98, 802 S.W.2d 472 (1991).

Where the two-year old victim had bite marks on her buttocks and pinch marks and apparent fingerprints on her face, and there was testimony by the babysitter that the child appeared to be terrified of the defendant, the jury could reasonably find that the infliction of the bruises was accompanied by the infliction of substantial pain and the victim suffered “physical injury.” Spencer v. State, 17 Ark. App. 149, 705 S.W.2d 454 (1986).

Fact that victim does not verbalize his pain is not conclusive as to whether substantial pain has been inflicted. Cole v. State, 33 Ark. App. 98, 802 S.W.2d 472 (1991).

Evidence was sufficient to show that the victim sustained a physical injury, even though she was not hospitalized, where she testified that she was stabbed in the shoulder, back, and arm and that the knife penetrated the muscle in her shoulder area, that she felt faint and “felt this warmness run down my body,” that she was scarred as a result of the attack, and that she continued to receive treatment for those scars. Farrelly v. State, 70 Ark. App. 158, 15 S.W.3d 699 (2000).

In determining whether a “physical injury” occurred, the trier of fact may consider the sensitivity of the area of the body to which the injury is inflicted and the severity of the attack; thus, where victim testified that defendant beat him repeatedly with a steel pipe, resulting in his face and nose being “busted up” as well as considerable facial bleeding, the trial court did not err in finding that defendant's purpose was to inflict substantial pain with the pipe. Stultz v. State, 92 Ark. App. 204, 212 S.W.3d 42 (2005).

Defendant's suspended sentence was properly revoked under § 5-4-309(d), where the state proved that defendant committed third-degree domestic battery under § 5-26-305(a), by showing that defendant inflicted physical injury under subdivision (14) of this section by pulling his wife's hair and throwing her against a vehicle. Andrews v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 624 (2009).

During a hearing on the state's petition to revoke a defendant's suspended sentence, defendant admitted that he slapped his pregnant wife and a responding officer testified to a personal observation of the swollen knot on the wife's cheek and knot over the wife's right eye from being hit; this evidence was sufficient to find that defendant inexcusably violated a condition of that suspension and that defendant had committed the offense of domestic battery in the third degree. May v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 703 (2009).

Teacher's testimony alone was sufficient evidence of physical injury to support defendant juvenile's adjudication for second degree in violation of § 5-13-202 for striking the teacher in the arm because the teacher testified that after appellant hit her, the pain she suffered in her arm was of a sufficient nature to cause her to seek medical treatment, and she also testified that her arm was “very sore” for at least a week; while medical treatment is not required in order to establish a physical injury, the fact the pain was of a sufficient nature to cause the victim to seek medical care constitutes evidence that she experienced “substantial pain.” M.T. v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 761, 350 S.W.3d 792 (2009).

Revocation of defendant's suspended imposition of sentence for two felony convictions was appropriate because the circuit court's finding that she committed third-degree domestic battering and thus violated the condition that she break no laws, was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. The testimony was sufficient to prove that, either purposefully or recklessly, she struck her nephew and caused him physical injury in the form of substantial pain under § 5-26-305(a) and subdivision (14) of this section. Westbrook v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 615 (2011).

Suspension of an earlier sentence was properly revoked because defendant committed domestic battery in the third degree where an infant child suffered an arm fracture in defendant's care, and a medical examination revealed healing fractures other places; moreover, there was evidence that other injury incidents had occurred while the child was in defendant's care, and there was testimony that defendant was too rough with the child. The standard for reckless was what a reasonable person in the circumstances would have observed. Singletary v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 699 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to support the revocation of a probationary sentence based on defendant's commission of domestic battering in the third degree. Defendant's boyfriend reported the incident to police, and photographs of his injuries were admitted into evidence without objection; defendant did not contest that her boyfriend was a household member or that his injuries met the statutory definition of “physical injury”, and the boyfriend's testimony was sufficient to show that defendant caused the injuries recklessly or purposefully. Glennon v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 25, 480 S.W.3d 894 (2016).

Evidence supported the second-degree domestic battering conviction under § 5-26-304 where neighbors heard sounds of loud banging and yelling, and defendant beat the child with a leather belt repeatedly for at least five minutes, causing welts and lashings. Jefferson v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 492, 532 S.W.3d 75 (2017).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict on the charge of battery in the second degree because the victim, a jailer, testified he suffered an abrasion on his forehead during the altercation with defendant; scratches and abrasions are sufficient to meet the definition of physical injury, and the jury was entitled to give credit to the victim's testimony. Chambers v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 54 (2020).

Possess.

Possession (possess) as defined in this section concerns the actual dominion, control or management and includes constructive possession with knowledge of presence and control of the substance, rather than literal or physical possession. Glover v. State, 273 Ark. 376, 619 S.W.2d 629 (1981).

Possession excludes a passing control, fleeting and shadowy in nature; however, this exclusion does not insulate from prosecution those who seek to dispose of contraband upon discovering that the police are approaching. Turner v. State, 24 Ark. App. 102, 749 S.W.2d 339 (1988).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture because the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant constructively possessed the paraphernalia with intent to manufacture where defendant owned the property jointly with his wife, defendant was the only person in the house when the police arrived, and defendant admitted to the officers that the methamphetamine lab in the home was his. Cantrell v. State, 2009 Ark. 456, 343 S.W.3d 591 (2009).

When a rape victim testified at defendant's probation revocation hearing that he had a gun at the time of the rape, that testimony was sufficient for the court to find that he had possessed a firearm within the meaning of § 5-73-103(a)(1) and subdivision (15) of this section. Craig v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 309 (2010).

Evidence that there was a funnel, plastic tubing, coffee filters, camp fuel, syringes, gloves, a metal spoon, a smoking device, a bag of ammonia nitrate, and a pill crusher in the master bedroom of defendant's home, along with a burn barrel in the back yard, was sufficient to support a conviction for possession of paraphernalia with intent to manufacture. Gowen v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 761, 387 S.W.3d 230 (2011).

Evidence supported the State's assertion that the cocaine was found in a place immediately and exclusively accessible to defendant and was subject to his control, as the container with the cocaine was found clearly visible in the passenger seat of defendant's car, and he was alone. Although defendant claimed he had no knowledge of the container and that another person had been a passenger, the circuit court did not find his testimony to be credible. Clark v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 679, 477 S.W.3d 544 (2015).

State did not have to prove that defendant physically held the contraband because he had constructive possession of the contraband; all of the contraband was immediately accessible to defendant and in his exclusive control as the only occupant of the vehicle. Thus, counsel's no-merit brief was proper and his motion to be relieved was granted because counsel correctly asserted that there could be no meritorious challenge to the trial court's determination that defendant was in possession of the firearm, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia. Gill v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 22, 511 S.W.3d 865 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of three controlled substances because the substances were all found in a boot owned by defendant in the bed of his pickup truck; and there was no evidence that anyone else was in the truck or exercised any form of control over the truck. Vonholt v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 53, 540 S.W.3d 312 (2018).

Purposely.

Evidence presented was substantial enough that the jury did not have to resort to conjecture to convict defendant of first-degree murder, given in part that witnesses testified that defendant and the victim had been fighting, and although defendant claimed self-defense, the victim was shot in the head, which supported the idea that the victim was shot intentionally, not during a struggle for defendant's life. Toombs v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 71, appeal dismissed, 2015 Ark. 471 (2015).

Reasonable Belief.

Because a juvenile's father had not resorted to use of a deadly weapon during an argument, because there had been an interlude of approximately five minutes since their last confrontation, because the father, at the time he was struck, had turned away from the juvenile, and because the juvenile did not testify as to whether the juvenile's beliefs were reasonable, the juvenile lacked justification under subdivision (18) of this section and §§ 5-2-606(a)(1), 5-2-607(a)(1), (2), and was properly adjudicated as a delinquent for second-degree domestic battering. D.W. v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 187 (2011).

Serious Physical Injury.

Issue as to whether the victim's injuries constituted a temporary or protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member or organ was for resolution by the jury. Harmon v. State, 260 Ark. 665, 543 S.W.2d 43 (1976).

Serious physical injury, as defined in this section, meets the constitutional standards for definiteness and is not vague or overbroad since it states the extent of harm that the victim must endure in order for the injury to constitute a “serious physical injury.” Lum v. State, 281 Ark. 495, 665 S.W.2d 265 (1984).

Evidence was sufficient to support a finding of serious physical injury. Lum v. State, 281 Ark. 495, 665 S.W.2d 265 (1984); Tarentino v. State, 302 Ark. 55, 786 S.W.2d 584 (1990); Purifoy v. State, 307 Ark. 482, 822 S.W.2d 374 (1991); Weaver v. State, 324 Ark. 290, 920 S.W.2d 491 (1996).

Where defendant held child-victim's hands under hot water long enough to cause second- and third-degree burns, victim suffered a “serious physical injury” as defined in subdivision (19) of this section, but where defendant lacked the mental state required for first-degree battery, defendant was guilty of second-degree battery. Tigue v. State, 319 Ark. 147, 889 S.W.2d 760 (1994).

Where victim was hit repeatedly in the head and face with defendant's fist, was kicked repeatedly, has a permanent scar on her forehead, remained in the emergency room for three and one half hours, and subsequently remained in the hospital for thirty-six to forty-eight hours, there was substantial evidence to support defendant's conviction for second degree battery. Black v. State, 50 Ark. App. 42, 901 S.W.2d 849 (1995).

There was substantial evidence that defendant acted with the purpose to cause serious physical injury to the victim under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life where he kicked the victim in the head repeatedly after the victim was down. Harmon v. State, 340 Ark. 18, 8 S.W.3d 472 (2000).

Defendant caused “serious physical injury” to his wife, as defined in subdivision (19), where he shot her in the buttocks and the bullets pierced her small intestine, causing her to spend nine days in the hospital. Brown v. State, 347 Ark. 308, 65 S.W.3d 394 (2001).

No serious injury under § 5-13-102(19) or 5-13-201(a)(1), or injury by means of a firearm under § 5-13-201(a)(7), was shown where defendant hit the victim with the butt of a pistol because the injury did not require stitches and because striking a person in such a manner did not constitute injury to another person by means of a firearm under § 5-13-201(a)(7); rather, the injury was covered by § 5-13-202(a)(1). Smith v. State, 352 Ark. 92, 98 S.W.3d 433 (2003).

Officer's testimony that when he opened the side door and looked in the driver's seat he observed a .22 Derringer pistol in plain view, which was loaded with two rounds, constituted substantial evidence that the .22 pistol was a firearm within the meaning of subdivision (6) of this section. Saulsberry v. State, 81 Ark. App. 419, 102 S.W.3d 907 (2003).

Where the victim, a child, was bathed by defendant and received second-degree burns, the physicians at the hospital determined that the child had sustained an intentionally-inflicted immersion injury in which she was forcibly held in position while immersed in scalding water, and the child still bore scars from the incident two years later, there was substantial evidence to show that the victim sustained a serious physical injury as required by subdivision (19), and defendant's conviction for first degree battery under § 5-13-201(a)(6) was proper. Britt v. State, 83 Ark. App. 117, 118 S.W.3d 140 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant acted “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” and to sustain his conviction for first degree battery because defendant admittedly placed a child in a tub of water so hot that it severed the skin from his feet, and defendant's own statements, although inconsistent, supported the conclusion that he knew that it was his responsibility to properly supervise the child during a bath and to ensure a safe water temperature and that he consciously disregarded the risks involved. Bell v. State, 99 Ark. App. 300, 259 S.W.3d 472 (2007).

Where defendant stepped out of his motel room and fired a .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol through the windshield of a nearby car, striking all three occupants and killing two of them, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of committing a terroristic act under § 5-13-310(a)(1)(A) and (B) as to the third victim because the evidence established that the third victim was shot in the foot, and the court rejected defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient for failing to establish that the victim suffered a “serious physical injury” as that term is defined in subdivision (21) of this section. The evidence was sufficient to establish that the victim suffered a serious physical injury because the victim suffered a gunshot wound from a .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol that was serious enough to warrant emergency medical care, the victim continued to experience pain and tenderness while walking and was often unable to wear shoes due to the lasting effects of the wound, and the victim was unable to participate in activities that he enjoyed before sustaining the injury, such as playing basketball, and had visible scarring from the entry and exit of the bullet; this evidence was sufficient to support the jury's factual finding that the victim suffered a serious physical injury as a result of defendant's actions. Butler v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 695, 371 S.W.3d 699 (2009).

Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault was proper because there was evidence that defendant's conduct created a substantial risk of serious physical injury, as defined in subdivision (21) of this section; defendant hit the victim with the butt of a pistol with sufficient force to knock the victim down, breaking facial bones and causing the victim's eye to swell shut. Pitts v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 228 (2012).

During parents' trial for first-degree battery against their infant, the court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of third-degree battery because the physical injury the infant sustained could only be described as serious under subdivision (21) of this section; the infant was severely malnourished to the point of starvation and death would have occurred within days without medical attention. Bruner v. State, 2013 Ark. 68, 426 S.W.3d 386 (2013).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the aggravated-robbery offense as the State presented evidence that the victim suffered serious physical injury; as a result of the attack, the victim had little control over his right side, suffered partial memory loss, was confined to a wheelchair, and would require constant care for the rest of his life. Britt v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 456, 468 S.W.3d 285 (2015).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated assault conviction, given that defendant had beaten the victim repeatedly while she was bound in such a position that she had to hold her head up in order not to choke, photographs depicted serious injuries to her face, head, and neck, and defendant threatened to kill her and talked about disposing of her body. Reynolds v. State, 2016 Ark. 214, 492 S.W.3d 491 (2016).

Conviction for aggravated residential burglary was reversed because there was insufficient evidence that defendant attempted to inflict a serious physical injury under § 5-39-204(a)(2). Serious physical injury could be inflicted during a sexual assault, but under current Arkansas law, a sexual assault does not necessarily constitute a serious physical injury; even assuming that defendant did intend to sexually assault the victim, defendant's intention, combined with his grabbing her shoulder and causing a minor scratch to her baby's face, did not constitute a substantial step under § 5-3-201 toward inflicting a serious physical injury, as defined by this section. Inskeep v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 135, 484 S.W.3d 709 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to show that a baby sustained a serious physical injury for purposes of § 5-13-201(a)(9) where the medical testimony described the skull fracture, the pain potentially caused by the subdural bleeding, and the greater risk of developing further complications. Suchey v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 225, 490 S.W.3d 320 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of unlawful discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle and battery as the victim suffered a serious physical injury. The victim testified that he received three gunshot wounds, was hospitalized, lost a kidney, and suffered further infections as a result of the wound; and the victim's injury caused protracted impairment of his health as the victim testified about the complications that resulted in infection and required him to return to the hospital, receive antibiotics, and have drainage tubes placed in his body. Johnson v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 71, 510 S.W.3d 298 (2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that defendant, charged with first-degree battery, was not entitled to a second-degree battery instruction under § 5-13-202(a)(1) because defendant provided no rational basis for a second-degree battery instruction, as (1) the victim's bullet wounds creating a substantial risk of death were a serious injury, (2) defendant's claim that the victim's injury was not serious was no basis for the instruction, as first- and second-degree battery both required a serious physical injury, and (3) evidence that defendant shot the victim in the neck and in the back as the victim fled showed intent to inflict serious physical injury. Dixon v. State, 2019 Ark. 245, 581 S.W.3d 505 (2019).

Cited: Martin v. State, 261 Ark. 80, 547 S.W.2d 81 (1977); France v. State, 262 Ark. 193, 555 S.W.2d 225 (1977); Rust v. State, 263 Ark. 350, 565 S.W.2d 19 (1978); Sbabo v. State, 264 Ark. 497, 572 S.W.2d 585 (1978); Fink v. State, 265 Ark. 865, 582 S.W.2d 3 (1979); Killman v. State, 274 Ark. 422, 625 S.W.2d 489 (1981); Kendrick v. State, 6 Ark. App. 427, 644 S.W.2d 297 (1982); Hall v. State, 11 Ark. App. 53, 666 S.W.2d 408 (1984); Harper v. State, 17 Ark. App. 237, 707 S.W.2d 332 (1986); Lair v. State, 19 Ark. App. 172, 718 S.W.2d 467 (1986); Henderson v. State, 291 Ark. 138, 722 S.W.2d 842 (1987); Shells v. State, 22 Ark. App. 62, 733 S.W.2d 743 (1987); Johnson v. State, 26 Ark. App. 286, 764 S.W.2d 621 (1989); Campbell v. State, 300 Ark. 606, 780 S.W.2d 567 (1989); Strawhacker v. State, 304 Ark. 726, 804 S.W.2d 720 (1991); Enoch v. State, 37 Ark. App. 103, 826 S.W.2d 291 (1992); Anderson v. State, 312 Ark. 606, 852 S.W.2d 309 (1993); Gibson v. State, 316 Ark. 705, 875 S.W.2d 58 (1994); Hagen v. State, 47 Ark. App. 137, 886 S.W.2d 889 (1994); Forrest v. Ford, 324 Ark. 27, 918 S.W.2d 162 (1996); Sykes v. State, 57 Ark. App. 5, 940 S.W.2d 888 (1997); Beulah v. State, 352 Ark. 472, 101 S.W.3d 802 (2003); McCoy v. Crumby, 353 Ark. 251, 106 S.W.3d 462 (2003); Wells v. State, 93 Ark. App. 106, 217 S.W.3d 1455 (2005); Kale v. Ark. State Med. Bd., 367 Ark. 151, 238 S.W.3d 89 (2006); Autrand v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 245 (2010); Stalnaker v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 412, 437 S.W.3d 700 (2014); Coger v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 466, 529 S.W.3d 640 (2017); Wade v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 157, 516 S.W.3d 772 (2017); Caldwell v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 588, 565 S.W.3d 539 (2018).