Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Liebman, Voluntary Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, 1983 Ark. L. Notes 29.

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Note, Harbison v. State: Just Say No to a Usable Amount, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 425.

Article, Ethical and Effective Representation in Arkansas Capital Trials, 60 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Criminal Law, 5 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 115.

Notes, Criminal Law — Child Abuse Resulting in Death — Arkansas Amends its First Degree Murder Statute, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 785.

Case Notes

Purpose.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's first degree murder conviction because defendant had a key to the victim's apartment, he admitted that he was at the apartment on the evening of the murder, defendant purchased drugs that night and told the seller that he had “busted a some-bitch's head,” and defendant lied to the police during the investigation. Dunn v. State, 371 Ark. 140, 264 S.W.3d 504 (2007).

Defendant's conviction for first-degree terroristic threatening, pursuant to § 5-13-301(a)(1)(A), could not stand because there was no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that it was defendant's conscious object—in keeping with subdivision (1) of this section—that his threatening statements, made to his girlfriend, be communicated to the victim, his former wife. Turner v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 214 (2010).

Sufficient evidence established defendant had the necessary purposeful intent, as defined in subdivision (1) of this section, to commit aggravated assault in violation of § 5-13-204(a) with respect to a vehicular incident on a local road because the victim testified defendant stopped his car, put it in reverse, and rammed into the victim's vehicle enough times and with enough force to cause her vehicle to spin; the victim's testimony constituted substantial evidence that it was defendant's conscious object to engage in conduct that created a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to the victim and her infant son, who was also in the car. Mance v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 472 (2010).

Evidence.

Intent or state of mind is seldom capable of proof by direct evidence and must usually be inferred from the circumstances. Walker v. State, 313 Ark. 478, 855 S.W.2d 932 (1993).

Intent is seldom capable of proof by direct evidence. Akbar v. State, 315 Ark. 627, 869 S.W.2d 706 (1994).

Where there was a plan between defendant and the accomplice to kill a drug dealer during the drug transaction, defendant admitted to driving the truck to a remote location, there was also some evidence that defendant was in a scheme to murder the victim for a fee, defendant lied about the victim's whereabouts, and defendant fled from the scene, there was ample evidence to rationally support the giving of an instruction on the lesser-included offense of first-degree murder. Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003).

In a murder trial, where defendant asserted that the victim was killed as they struggled over a rifle, the jury could have considered the fact that defendant burned not only the victim's body, but all of her personal belongings, in an attempt to cover up his involvement in the crime; such proof was further evidence of a purposeful state of mind. Robinson v. State, 353 Ark. 372, 108 S.W.3d 622 (2003).

Defendant's convictions were supported by substantial evidence where it was shown that (1) shortly after the incident, defendant had a blood-alcohol level of .23 percent, (2) defendant was driving the car that hit two women and narrowly missed a third, (3) just before the impact, defendant was witnessed to speed up and actually swerve the vehicle toward the women's path, and (4) defendant drove away after the impact. Estacuy v. State, 94 Ark. App. 183, 228 S.W.3d 567 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's kidnapping conviction as the 13 year old victim's mother relied upon the representation that defendant was taking the victim to the movies with his daughter when she gave permission for the victim to leave her home with defendant; the victim's mother did not consent to defendant escorting her daughter to a motel room under the guise of meeting someone briefly before meeting her daughter at the movies.Mitchem v. State, 96 Ark. App. 78, 238 S.W.3d 623 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for manslaughter because two people in a motor home were killed when defendant drove a fully loaded commercial vehicle weighing over 82,000 pounds, while under the influence of methamphetamine, into the oncoming-traffic lane, striking the motor home, and ultimately driving through it. Defendant never attempted to brake prior to the accident or to return to the proper lane of traffic. Hoyle v. State, 371 Ark. 495, 268 S.W.3d 313 (2007), rehearing denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ark. LEXIS 12 (Jan. 10, 2008).

Where defendant picked his ex-wife up from work, took her cell phone, started a verbal altercation, drove her to a bridge, stabbed her, threw her to the ground, and pushed her into the water, the evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant possessed the requisite state of mind under subdivision (1) of this section to support his conviction for attempted first-degree murder of his ex-wife. Jones v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 135 (2009).

Sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that a defendant intended to kill a victim: a witness testified that the witness gave defendant a gun, other witnesses testified that defendant shot the victim with that gun, defendant's girlfriend testified that while waiting for defendant in a car, the girlfriend heard two or three shots, and then defendant ran to the car, and inconsistent witness statements regarding whether the shooting occurred inside or outside the victim's apartment were not relevant to the conviction; therefore, defendant's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied. Hawkins v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 675 (2009).

Evidence supporting defendant's convictions for three counts of delivering a controlled substance in violation of § 5-64-401 was substantial because the jury had substantial, if not overwhelming, evidence from which to infer with reasonable certainty from the circumstances that defendant formed the necessary criminal intent to sell a confidential informant crack cocaine; a captain of the police department testified that his office received multiple calls indicating that defendant was engaged in selling controlled substances, and evidence was presented that on three occasions the confidential informant assisted the police in making controlled buys of crack cocaine from defendant and that the substances the confidential informant purchased from defendant tested positive for crack cocaine. Edwards v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 59, 377 S.W.3d 271 (2010).

Trial court did not err by denying defendant's motions for a directed verdict because substantial evidence supported his conviction, as there was evidence that: (1) defendant had prior knowledge of his wife's affair with the victim and investigated the victim's background; (2) defendant waited in his truck after arriving at the store until the victim and his wife were standing by their vehicles; and (3) defendant fired multiple shots, chased the victim, and stood over him to deliver a final shot to the head. James v. State, 2010 Ark. 486, 372 S.W.3d 800 (2010), overruled in part, Kou Her v. State, 2015 Ark. 91, 457 S.W.3d 659 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of promoting prostitution in the first degree, § 5-70-104, where the State presented substantial evidence of circumstances through the testimony of the four witnesses from which the circuit court could infer that defendant knowingly advanced or profited from the prostitution of a person less than 18 years of age. Tatum v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 68 (2014).

Instructions.

In a case in which a jury convicted defendant of capital murder in the shooting death of his ex-wife, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on reckless manslaughter and negligent homicide. Defendant, who fired once into a residence, mortally striking his ex-wife in the back, offered no rational basis to support giving either instruction on the basis that his actions were reckless or negligent. Jones v. State, 2012 Ark. 38, 388 S.W.3d 411 (2012).

Intent.

There was substantial evidence from which the jury could have inferred that it was defendant's conscious object to cause the victim's death, because defendant placed the gun less than one inch away from her head and pulled the trigger, killing her. Williamson v. State, 2013 Ark. 347, 429 S.W.3d 250 (2013).

Knowingly.

Evidence was sufficient to support a verdict that defendant acted “knowingly.” Harris v. State, 262 Ark. 680, 561 S.W.2d 69 (1978); Smith v. State, 30 Ark. App. 111, 783 S.W.2d 72 (1990).

There was ample circumstantial evidence for the jury to find that defendant knowingly caused the death of the infant. Steggall v. State, 340 Ark. 184, 8 S.W.3d 538 (2000).

The court looked at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and determined that the state proved that the defendant had the requisite level of comprehension to knowingly waive his rights. Steggall v. State, 340 Ark. 184, 8 S.W.3d 538 (2000).

Sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find that defendant, the victim's caretaker, knowingly committed second-degree murder when she used enough force inserting a rectal thermometer that she punctured the child's rectum, causing peritonitis, and then failed to immediately seek medical attention. Burley v. State, 348 Ark. 422, 73 S.W.3d 600 (2002).

Defendant's conviction for battery in the second degree was appropriate under §§ 5-13-202(a)(4)(C) and 5-2-202(2) because the evidence was clear that defendant intended to restrain the victim. The victim, defendant's mother-in-law, testified that defendant grabbed her, threw her into a chair, and pushed her down anytime the victim had tried to stand up. LaFort v. State, 98 Ark. App. 202, 254 S.W.3d 27 (2007).

Where defendant took a loaded gun from his vehicle after seeing the victim's group outside a department store and deliberately shot the victim three times at close range, the jury could infer that he knowingly caused the victim's death for purposes of subdivision (2)(A) and (B) of this section; the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting defendant's statement that he shot the victim, because he wanted to give him an early Christmas present. The statement was probative of defendant's state of mind as well as his lack of remorse; because the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for second degree murder in violation of § 5-10-103(a)(1), the trial court did not err by denying his motion for a directed verdict. Vorachith v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 656 (2009).

Appellants' convictions for theft of property were affirmed because substantial evidence supported the convictions where (1) while appellants maintained they were simply running a business and made some poor business decisions, the testimony of the victims established a pattern of taking and exercising unauthorized control over the victims' money with the purpose of depriving the victims of their money; (2) the pattern demonstrated that appellants sold items to the victims, accepted the victims' money, purposefully and knowingly delayed delivery of the merchandise, and offered multiple and most often untrue excuses for why the orders did not arrive; and (3) the evidence showed that appellants would tell customers that an item was in shipping, was shipped in the wrong color, back ordered, or damaged in shipping. Williams v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 848 (2009).

Defendant's conviction for murder in the second degree, with a firearm enhancement, was proper because defendant acted knowingly to cause the victim's death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, as described in subdivision (2) of this section. The issues involved credibility and it was presumed that a person intended the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts; defendant shot her husband in the wrist with a handgun, he bled to death as a result of the wound, and additional evidence indicated that the fatal wound was defensive in nature. Johnson v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 153, 375 S.W.3d 12 (2010).

Appellant's conviction for second-degree murder was affirmed because the pattern of the gunshots, which were aimed at the victim's chest and upper-arm area, as well as the trajectory of the bullets showed that appellant acted deliberately in a manner that would naturally and probably culminate in the victim's death. Phillips v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 575, 386 S.W.3d 99 (2011).

Defendant's conviction for second-degree battery, in violation of § 5-13-202(a)(4)(C), was supported by the evidence because the number of bruises on his girlfriend's 23-month-old son and the unusual force necessary to cause them, as testified to by an emergency room pediatrician, provided proof that he knowingly caused physical injury under subdivision (2)(B) of this section. Hahn v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 297 (2012).

In his directed verdict motion, appellant did not argue that the State did not prove that he knew of the card's existence in the wallet when he stole it, and that he purposely deprived the owner of the card, and thus this argument was barred from appellate review; even if the court reached the argument, it lacked merit, because (1) the statute only required that one knowingly take unauthorized control over property, and it did not require that one know the value or character of the property that was taken, (2) appellant did not dispute that he knowingly took the owner's wallet with the intent of depriving him of it, (3) his knowledge of the contents of the wallet was not necessary for his conviction, and (4) his unauthorized taking of the wallet that had the debit card was one act and he was liable for all property taken, such that the evidence was sufficient to support his theft conviction. Blakely v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 37 (2013).

Defendant's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied because it was apparent that the jury believed that he knowingly, as defined in subdivision (2) of this section, caused his two-month-old daughter's injuries Hoodenpyle v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 375, 428 S.W.3d 547 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for theft by deception because defendant entered into a scheme to defraud by inflating a tax refund amount and then diverting the difference to an account she owned; there was substantial evidence that defendant knowingly obtained the property of another by deception. The taxpayer did not agree to have any of her refund deposited into any other account, and defendant was not forthcoming with information about the separate account, despite the taxpayer's multiple inquiries. McClellan v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 725, 452 S.W.3d 116 (2014).

In a first-degree murder case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder because the evidence provided a rational basis for an acquittal on the first-degree-murder charge and a conviction on the second-degree-murder charge as defendant did not shoot and kill the victim, but handed his gun to codefendant; defendant could not have known with absolute certainty what codefendant would do; and the jury could have concluded that defendant knowingly caused the death of another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life in that he was practically certain that his conduct would cause the death of the victim. Northern v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 426, 467 S.W.3d 755 (2015).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions of distributing, possessing, or viewing matter depicting sexually explicit conduct involving a child under § 5-27-602; there was substantial evidence that defendant exercised dominion and control over the computers that were seized from his residence, and there was no claim that anyone else lived with defendant or had access to the computer, and there was substantial evidence that defendant knowingly possessed the images and videos of child pornography saved on his computer. Bishop v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 436, 467 S.W.3d 763 (2015).

In a second-degree murder case, defendant's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied as a jury could find that the defense of justification was without merit because defendant's conduct of intentionally firing eight warning shots at the victim established extreme indifference to human life; the simple act of pointing a loaded gun at the victim was enough to satisfy the intent standard of second-degree murder; and defendant was not justified in using deadly force against the victim as he initiated the situation that brought about his use of deadly force, evidence at the crime scene did not support defendant's assertion that he was backing up when firing shots, and an eyewitness testified that the victim never charged at defendant. Sullivan v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 514, 470 S.W.3d 312 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that defendant acted knowingly and with extreme indifference to the value of human life where defendant was alone with the baby for approximately two hours, the baby developed a deformed head by the time the mother arrived home, defendant packed a bag and insisted on driving his own vehicle to the hospital, and defendant initially claimed that nothing had happened and then offered two improbable explanations for how the baby's skull had been fractured. Suchey v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 225, 490 S.W.3d 320 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree under § 5-10-102(a)(3) where the victim was the youngest of defendant's children, a forensic examiner and experts testified that he had died of starvation, evidence showed that defendant had withheld formula from him, and defendant had previously cared for the victim's five other premature siblings, all of whom survived infancy; there was substantial evidence presented to support a conclusion that defendant, who had an IQ of 75, was aware of the risk caused by the infant's obvious malnourishment and that she was aware that it was practically certain her conduct would cause the infant's death. Bowman v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 469, 588 S.W.3d 129 (2019).

Negligently.

In order to be held to have acted negligently under this section, it is not necessary that the actor be fully aware of a perceived risk and recklessly disregard it, rather, it requires only a finding that, under the circumstances, he should have been aware of it and his failure to perceive it was a “gross deviation” from the care a reasonably prudent person would exercise under those circumstances; the section itself declares that the degree of negligence sufficient to establish civil liability will not suffice for the purpose of this section. Phillips v. State, 6 Ark. App. 380, 644 S.W.2d 288 (1982).

There was substantial evidence from which to find that the defendant acted negligently. Phillips v. State, 6 Ark. App. 380, 644 S.W.2d 288 (1982).

Negligent conduct is distinguished from reckless conduct primarily in that it does not involve the conscious disregard of a perceived risk; in order to be held to have acted negligently, it is not necessary that the actor be fully aware of a perceived risk and recklessly disregard it, rather, it requires only a finding that under the circumstances he should have been aware of the risk and his failure to perceive it was a gross deviation from the care a reasonable, prudent person would exercise under those circumstances. Hunter v. State, 341 Ark. 665, 19 S.W.3d 607 (2000).

In defendant's trial for criminally negligent homicide, the trial court erred in failing to grant defendant's motion for directed verdict where the state's evidence that defendant's truck merely crossed the center line of a road was insufficient to support a finding of criminal negligence; this was a different standard from the evidence needed to support a finding of civil negligence. Utley v. State, 93 Ark. App. 381, 219 S.W.3d 709 (2005), rev'd, 366 Ark. 514, 237 S.W.3d 27 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of negligent homicide where the jury could conclude that defendant's failure to perceive the risk under the facts constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in defendant's position. Utley v. State, 366 Ark. 514, 237 S.W.3d 27 (2006).

Appellants' convictions for negligent homicide in the death of their daughter were affirmed; given the record—which included appellants allowing three hours to pass without checking on or knowing the whereabouts of their twenty-two-month-old child—the instant court could not say that the verdicts were not supported by substantial evidence. Marin v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 802 (2009).

Because there was no negligent behavior on the part of defendant pursuant to subsection (4) of this section, his action were purposeful, and a firearm and toolmark examiner for the Arkansas State Crime Lab testified that for the gun to be fired, the trigger had to be pulled, which usually required five to five and a half pounds of pressure, the trial court did not err in refusing to give the jury an instruction on negligent homicide under § 5-10-105(b)(1). Ratterree v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 701 (2012).

Negligent homicide instruction was not warranted because there was no rational basis to conclude that defendant's actions were merely negligent where defendant reached under his car seat, chambered a round, and intentionally fired the weapon directly at the victim's chest. Bennett v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 624, 447 S.W.3d 602 (2014).

Circuit court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss a negligent homicide charge under § 5-10-105(b)(1); although there was no question that defendant's failure to see the decedent's vehicle resulted in the fatal accident, there was no evidence that defendant was speeding, driving erratically, under the influence of alcohol, using a phone, or engaged in some similar conduct, and thus, the evidence fell short of establishing criminal negligence. Gill v. State, 2015 Ark. 421, 474 S.W.3d 77 (2015).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction of misdemeanor negligent homicide; the weather conditions were clear on the night in question, defendant was observed crossing five lanes of traffic at high speed and rolling his vehicle, the vehicle's black box indicated that the brakes were never engaged, plus three cans of air duster had been purchased minutes before the accident and a blood sample had detected the presence of difluoroethane, a gas found in air-duster canisters, in defendant's blood. Sizemore v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 728, 478 S.W.3d 281 (2015).

It was not clear that the administrative law judge (ALJ) incorrectly relied on the criminal-negligence standard; however, the father could not show prejudice because applying the criminal-negligence standard only heightened the standard by which the ALJ could find neglect by inadequate supervision under the Child Maltreatment Act, § 12-18-103. W.N. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 346, 552 S.W.3d 483 (2018).

Purposely.

The kind of evidence and quantum of proof required to show a “conscious object” so as to make an action purposeful under subdivision (1) of this section is the same as that which was formerly required to show “specific intent,” and may be inferred from the facts and circumstances shown in evidence. Chaviers v. State, 267 Ark. 6, 588 S.W.2d 434 (1979).

Where offense requires a purposeful mental state, the defense of voluntary intoxication is available to a defendant charged with such crime. Davis v. State, 12 Ark. App. 79, 670 S.W.2d 472 (1984).

Evidence was sufficient to support a finding that defendant acted purposely. Black v. State, 306 Ark. 394, 814 S.W.2d 905 (1991); Carter v. State, 324 Ark. 249, 921 S.W.2d 583 (1996); Mulkey v. State, 330 Ark. 113, 952 S.W.2d 149 (1997).

The jury could reasonably have inferred that defendant purposely killed his victim, based on the type of weapon used, the manner of its use, and the location of the wounds. Easter v. State, 306 Ark. 615, 816 S.W.2d 602 (1991).

Purposeful intent of the defendant can be inferred from the manner of the victim's death and the location of the victim's wound. Walker v. State, 313 Ark. 478, 855 S.W.2d 932 (1993).

Premeditation, deliberation, and purposeful intent can be formed on the spur of the moment. Missildine v. State, 314 Ark. 500, 863 S.W.2d 813 (1993).

There was substantial evidence that defendant acted with the purpose to cause serious physical injury to the victim under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life where he kicked the victim in the head repeatedly after the victim was down. Harmon v. State, 340 Ark. 18, 8 S.W.3d 472 (2000).

Where the evidence presented showed that defendant had a stormy relationship with the victim, that they argued the night before a fatal shooting, that defendant had pointed a gun at the victim in the past, that defendant had retrieved a gun on the morning of the shooting, and that defendant admitting to shooting the victim, there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for first-degree murder; the evidence was sufficient to show defendant acted purposely, rather than accidentally. Edmond v. State, 351 Ark. 495, 95 S.W.3d 789 (2003).

Based on the testimony of several eyewitnesses that defendant had shot a victim near a vehicle after an argument, there was sufficient evidence presented to infer that defendant acted with a conscious desire to kill the victim. Winbush v. State, 82 Ark. App. 365, 107 S.W.3d 882 (2003).

A person acts purposely with respect to his conduct or a result thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. Robinson v. State, 353 Ark. 372, 108 S.W.3d 622 (2003).

Appellate court found no merit in defendant's argument that he was merely rhetorically questioning a 14-year-old girl about sex, rather than soliciting her, and that he had no intent to make such a statement where there was testimony that he offered to pay money in exchange for sex, that he offered her more money after she refused him, and that he kissed her on the neck after encouraging the young boys in her charge to kiss her. Heape v. State, 87 Ark. App. 370, 192 S.W.3d 281 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient for a conviction of first-degree murder where the victim was last seen in the company of defendant, defendant made statements to his fellow inmates that he killed the victim with his hands in a fight after an argument, defendant told his brother that he would like to kill the victim, the victim's body was placed on wood burning stove, defendant kicked the pipe off of the stove, and the victim's body was found charred. Johnson v. State, 358 Ark. 460, 193 S.W.3d 260 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's forgery and theft convictions where she did not offer a reasonable explanation of how she acquired the forged check; therefore, an inference that she committed the forgery or was an accessory to its commission was warranted and the court did not err in inferring defendant's intent. DeShazer v. State, 94 Ark. App. 363, 230 S.W.3d 285 (2006).

There was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that defendant had the requisite mens rea for first-degree murder at the time he shot and killed his wife as an expert for the state testified that defendant did not have a mental disease or defect at the time of the shooting; the jury was entitled to believe the state's expert over defendant's expert. Davis v. State, 368 Ark. 401, 246 S.W.3d 862 (2007).

Circuit court did not err by admitting into evidence photographs of the murder victim because her wounds were relevant to show defendant's intent to kill her; they also assisted the jury in understanding the crime-scene investigator's description of the scene, and the circuit court performed a proper evaluation of the photographs before allowing them to be presented to the jury. Davis v. State, 368 Ark. 401, 246 S.W.3d 862 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a first degree murder conviction because defendant admitted to hitting, kicking, and stabbing the victim, a knife blade was found at the crime scene, and a matching handle was later found at defendant's house, and defendant's statement to the investigating officer indicated that his conscious object was to cause the death of the victim. Navarro v. State, 371 Ark. 179, 264 S.W.3d 530 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant acted “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” and to sustain his conviction for first degree battery because defendant admittedly placed a child in a tub of water so hot that it severed the skin from his feet, and defendant's own statements, although inconsistent, supported the conclusion that he knew that it was his responsibility to properly supervise the child during a bath and to ensure a safe water temperature and that he consciously disregarded the risks involved. Bell v. State, 99 Ark. App. 300, 259 S.W.3d 472 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for first-degree battery under § 5-13-201(a)(8) where defendant purposely fired three times at an occupied truck on a highway; a passenger was struck and seriously injured. There was a presumption that defendant intended the natural and probable consequences of his actions. Spight v. State, 101 Ark. App. 400, 278 S.W.3d 599 (2008).

Defendant's conviction for theft of property lost, mislaid, or mistakenly delivered was supported by the evidence because defendant failed to take reasonable measures to return a double payment made to defendant's business on behalf of a customer, and acted with purposeful intent under subdivision (1) of this section of depriving the victims. Cora v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 431, 319 S.W.3d 281 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first-degree murder for the killing of a romantic rival and to establish the requisite intent of purposefulness because it showed that defendant, while possessing a knife, drove to the victim's residence, confronted her, and stabbed her with the knife in the ensuing altercation. Mooney v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 622, 331 S.W.3d 588 (2009), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. LEXIS 820 (Dec. 10, 2009).

Trial court did not err in refusing to direct the verdicts where defendant took actions to conceal the harm to the child, and failed to take action to secure appropriate care for the child; the jury could conclude that defendant rubbing a substance known to cause skin irritation on the face of a toddler where Superglue had already adhered would cause, at the very least, the impairment of physical condition or a visible mark associated with the physical trauma. Price v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 664, 344 S.W.3d 678 (2009).

Defendant's conviction for first-degree criminal mischief under § 5-38-203(a)(1) was supported by substantial evidence as: (1) it was fair to presume that defendant purposely for purposes of subdivision (1) of this section broke a former supervisor's car windows when defendant repeatedly swung a long, heavy metal object at them; (2) defendant's statement to the supervisor immediately prior to smashing the supervisor's windows that defendant should “kick (the supervisor's) ass” demonstrated defendant's anger and indicated a desire to express that anger with violence; and (3) defendant failed to support a claim that defendant's actions were justified. Warren v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 102 (2011).

Defendant's conviction for domestic battering under § 5-26-304(a)(2) was supported by sufficient evidence because the state showed that, with the purpose of causing physical injury, defendant caused injury to the victim, his brother, by means of a deadly weapon. While defendant contended that he was acting in self-defense when he struck the victim with a sickle, the testimony of the victim and the victim's brother established that the victim did not have the gun that he had when police arrived until after defendant had battered both the victim and the victim's brother. Brown v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 150, 381 S.W.3d 175 (2011).

State failed to show that a juvenile engaged in disorderly conduct in a reckless or purposeful manner as those terms were defined by this section, as the juvenile's behavior in unexpectedly coming upon a scene in which the juvenile's mother was being arrested was not a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care. M.J. v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 171, 381 S.W.3d 880 (2011), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Ark. App. LEXIS 300 (Apr. 13, 2011).

During a trial for breaking or entering, the jury was not required to believe defendant's claim that defendant did not enter a vehicle with the intent to steal anything under subdivision (1) of this section, but instead to have a place to sleep; defendant's argument overlooked the fact that an officer found a car-stereo faceplate in defendant's pocket. Pruitt v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 754 (2011).

Substantial evidence supported a finding that defendant acted purposely, within the meaning of subdivision (1) of this section, when he discharged a gun in the direction of a step that was three steps down from where the assault victim was standing. Defendant's explanation of the gun accidentally firing did not match the physical evidence of bullet fragments found near a pock mark on the first step to the front porch and both the victim and defendant being wounded. Montalvo v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 119 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first-degree murder under § 5-10-102(a)(2) because the three gunshot wounds to the victim alone, at least two of which were fired 35-40 seconds apart, ran counter to defendant's accidental shooting theory; and the evidence supported an inference of purposeful intent under subdivision (1) of this section. Smith v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 359 (2012), dismissed, Smith v. Kelley, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119827 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 9, 2015).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's attempted first-degree murder conviction because defendant knocked on a door and fired a gun at the victim when he opened the door. The jury could reasonably have inferred that defendant purposely engaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct known to cause death to another person, regardless of that person's identity. Wells v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 596, 424 S.W.3d 378 (2012).

During an inmate's trial for murder in the first degree, in violation of § 5-10-102(a)(2), the court did not err in denying his motion for a directed verdict because there was ample evidence to support the conclusion that he purposely caused the victim's death under subdivision (1) of this section; he admitted to the crime and that it was his intent to kill the victim and that he had to think about how to do it. Kaufman v. State, 2013 Ark. 126 (2013).

Denial of postconviction relief was proper, because the petitioner failed to show the second-degree-murder instruction added an extra element not present in the greater offense of first-degree murder and that counsel should have objected; Second-degree murder was a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder, as it differed from the greater offense only to the extent that it required a lesser kind of culpable mental state. Holloway v. State, 2013 Ark. 140, 426 S.W.3d 462 (2013).

Record contained substantial evidence that defendant had the intent to commit the crime of terroristic threatening, as he made statements that he would destroy anyone who got in his way, and he tried to call his father to talk him out of “it,” and this particular statement was made after defendant loaded or cocked a rifle while pacing; taken in context, the statements were not innocuous, but given the parties' volatile relationship, gave rise to the level sufficient to support a conviction of terroristic threatening. Cauffiel v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 642 (2013).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict on a first-degree murder charge where defendant lied about seeing the victim, had buried her body, and had disposed of a necktie and bag, and thus, the jury could have concluded from the testimony and circumstantial evidence that he had placed a bag over the victim's head with the purpose of causing her death. Williams v. State, 2015 Ark. 316, 468 S.W.3d 776 (2015).

While there was evidence of the defendant's history of mental difficulties, there was sufficient evidence that she was not acting with such difficulties at the time of the murder; in addition to defendant's deliberate acts after the murder to conceal evidence, law enforcement officers testified that they had clear conversations with the 17-year-old defendant the day of the murder and her mother testified that she was calm immediately before the murder. While the State did not offer a motive for the murder, the jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that defendant purposely killed the victim. Fink v. State, 2015 Ark. 331, 469 S.W.3d 785 (2015).

Defendant was properly found guilty of first-degree murder because she purposely caused the 80-year-old victim's death by stabbing him approximately 36 times, deliberately sought to conceal evidence, and the jury was entitled to believe the testimony of one expert over the other and to find that defendant had not proved the defense of mental disease or defect by a preponderance of the evidence. Fink v. State, 2015 Ark. 331, 469 S.W.3d 785 (2015).

Evidence presented was substantial enough that the jury did not have to resort to conjecture to convict defendant of first-degree murder, given in part that witnesses testified that defendant and the victim had been fighting, and although defendant claimed self-defense, the victim was shot in the head, which supported the idea that the victim was shot intentionally, not during a struggle for defendant's life. Toombs v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 71, appeal dismissed, 2015 Ark. 471 (2015).

Defendant acted with the purpose to cause the victim's death in that defendant, instead of leaving when defendant's paramour became angry and intoxicated, retrieved a handgun, hid it under a sofa cushion beside defendant, and shot defendant's paramour, after the paramour threw a cup of wine at defendant, when the paramour was in a vulnerable position reclined in the paramour's chair. Scott-Paxson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 149, 457 S.W.3d 311 (2015).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction for residential burglary because the circumstances were plainly sufficient to allow the trial court to reasonably infer, without resort to speculation or conjecture, that he entered the victim's home with the purpose of assaulting her; defendant violently broke into the victim's home, chased her, tried to prevent her from being able to call for help, verbally threatened her safety, and immediately thereafter physically beat her. Davis v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 234, 459 S.W.3d 821 (2015).

It was defendant's brother who fired the shot that killed the victim, and although defendant claimed the State failed to prove it was his conscious object to assist his brother, the law in Arkansas made no distinction between the criminal liability of a principal and an accomplice; defendant drove around with the stated purpose to assist in hunting down and killing the victim, and thus the evidence supported his convictions of first-degree murder and committing a terroristic act, and the circuit court properly denied his motions for directed verdict. Starling v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 429, 468 S.W.3d 294 (2015).

State produced sufficient evidence that defendant purposely killed the victim; it was defendant's conscious object to end the victim's life, given that even after defendant had beaten the victim with a bat for several minutes, and the victim begged her to stop, she did not stop, she made efforts to conceal the crime, including burying the victim's body, and she fled when investigators found the body. Rollf v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 520, 472 S.W.3d 490 (2015).

Trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict on an aggravated assault charge where, after realizing that he would be unable to escape from two police officers pursuing him, he turned towards one officer and held a knife in a threatening manner, the officer was able to strike appellant with his baton and take away the knife, and thus, appellant was close enough to the officer to cause serious physical injury. Freeman v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 36, 480 S.W.3d 886 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first-degree murder because, after stabbing the victim, defendant immediately started trying to cover up evidence when she hid the knife and returned asking another individual what happened; defendant lied to the police during her first interview about her involvement; lying about a crime could indicate a consciousness of guilt, and a jury could properly consider an attempt to cover up one's connection to a crime as proof of a purposeful mental state; and, contrary to defendant's statement to police that she barely swung the knife, the medical examiner testified that the blade had gone halfway through the victim's body. Stearns v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 472, 529 S.W.3d 654 (2017).

In defendant’s trial for first-degree terroristic threatening arising from a workplace incident, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant threatened the victim in order to terrorize him, in violation of § 5-13-301(a)(1)(A), where multiple witnesses testified that defendant had pointed a pistol at the victim, the victim testified that as defendant aimed, he told him that he was “fixing to shoot”, and the jurors were entitled to rely on their common knowledge and life experiences to infer that, given the circumstances, defendant acted with the conscious objective to cause the victim terror. Hughes v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 114 (2020).

Recklessly.

The definition of “recklessly” is of such common understanding and practice that its meaning in certain statutes as an element of an offense is not unconstitutionally vague. Harmon v. State, 260 Ark. 665, 543 S.W.2d 43 (1976).

The word recklessly is not an obscure, vague or technical word outside the scope of the common understanding of the ordinary individual or juror; therefore, even though there is a statutory definition, such definition is not essential for the jury's understanding of a charge involving reckless conduct. Viar v. State, 269 Ark. 772, 601 S.W.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1980).

Failure to instruct on the meaning of the word “recklessly” was held proper. Viar v. State, 269 Ark. 772, 601 S.W.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1980).

It was error for the trial court to refuse defendant's requested instruction on offense involving negligence since the jury would have determined under this section whether the defendant should have been aware of the risk involved in her actions. Worring v. State, 2 Ark. App. 27, 616 S.W.2d 23 (1981).

There was substantial evidence to support conclusion that defendant acted recklessly. Slavens v. State, 1 Ark. App. 245, 614 S.W.2d 529 (1981); Smith v. State, 3 Ark. App. 224, 623 S.W.2d 862 (1981).

Defendant recklessly caused the death of her baby by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death might occur if she did not feed the baby more often. Miles v. State, 59 Ark. App. 97, 954 S.W.2d 286 (1997).

There was sufficient evidence of reckless conduct to support the conviction for second-degree assault where defendant pushed victim from behind as she went through a door; defendant's actions created a substantial risk that the victim would be physically injured by falling on a concrete sidewalk, and it was of no consequence that victim was able to regain her balance before falling. Walker v. State, 330 Ark. 652, 955 S.W.2d 905 (1997).

Evidence that defendant had been stared at by the victim did not provide a rational basis for giving a reckless manslaughter jury instruction. Ellis v. State, 345 Ark. 415, 47 S.W.3d 259 (2001).

Second-degree murder conviction was affirmed because defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter under § 5-10-104(a)(3); defendant's act of shooting into an ex-spouse's occupied vehicle did not constitute recklessness. Bankston v. State, 361 Ark. 123, 205 S.W.3d 138 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant acted recklessly as to her son's abuse where she was confronted by her sister-in-law regarding concerns that defendant's son was being abused and defendant did nothing to prevent future abuse. Graham v. State, 365 Ark. 274, 229 S.W.3d 30 (2006).

Defendant's convictions for manslaughter, in violation of § 5-10-104(a)(3), were modified to the lesser-included offense of negligent homicide under § 5-10-105(b)(1) because defendant's acts of crossing the center line, tailgating, and averting defendant's eyes from the road constituted negligence, not recklessness under subdivision (3) of this section. Rollins v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 110, 302 S.W.3d 617 (2009), rev'd, 2009 Ark. 484, 347 S.W.3d 20 (2009).

State produced evidence in the form of a witness that defendant pushed the victim from a moving vehicle and that he struck her afterwards as she lay on the ground; by pushing the victim from a moving vehicle and then kicking her, defendant consciously disregarded the risk that his actions would cause injury to the victim, and there was substantial evidence to support a finding that defendant recklessly caused physical injury to the victim. Lasker v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 591 (2009).

Evidence supported the inference that defendant juvenile intended to engage in the conduct of hitting a nurse and threatening her and a doctor's lives to create public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm in violation of § 5-71-207 because the nurse testified that defendant attacked her on several different occasions, and defendant did not argue that he was in any way incapable of controlling his actions at the time he threatened to kill either the nurse or the doctor and struck the nurse; at the very least, defendant consciously disregarded the effects of his actions. M.T. v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 761, 350 S.W.3d 792 (2009).

State failed to show that a juvenile engaged in disorderly conduct in a reckless or purposeful manner as those terms were defined by this section, as the juvenile's behavior in unexpectedly coming upon a scene in which the juvenile's mother was being arrested was not a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care. M.J. v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 171, 381 S.W.3d 880 (2011), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Ark. App. LEXIS 300 (Apr. 13, 2011).

During defendant's trial for permitting the abuse of her minor child, the court did not err in allowing defendant's mother to testify regarding her reaction to the child's injuries; the testimony was relevant as to whether defendant recklessly failed to take action to prevent the abuse under subdivision (3) of this section. Sullivan v. State, 2012 Ark. 74, 386 S.W.3d 507 (2012).

During parents' trial for first-degree battery against their infant, the court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of third-degree battery because regardless of whether there was some reckless conduct under subdivision (3) of this section, the physical injury the infant sustained could only be described as serious; the infant was severely malnourished to the point of starvation and death would have occurred within days without medical attention. Bruner v. State, 2013 Ark. 68, 426 S.W.3d 386 (2013).

Because the attorney committed the drug and drug paraphernalia possession crimes with only a reckless mental state under subdivision (3) of this section and § 5-2-203(b), had been rehabilitated, had successfully completed his suspended sentence, and had successfully established his present mental and emotional stability and good moral character, the attorney was not prevented from being readmitted to the Arkanses Bar under Ark. Sup. Ct. P. Reg. Prof'l Conduct § 24(B)(2), and his request for readmission to the Arkansas Bar pursuant to Ark. R. Admis. Bar XIII(G) was granted. In re Haynes, 2013 Ark. 102, 426 S.W.3d 411 (2013).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's manslaughter convictions under § 5-10-104(a)(3) and subdivision (3) of this section given defendant's ingestion of 11 controlled substances prior to driving her SUV across the center line, running two vehicles off the road before striking the victims' car, which had pulled onto the shoulder. Dail v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 184 (2013).

Suspension of an earlier sentence was properly revoked because defendant committed domestic battery in the third degree where an infant child suffered an arm fracture in defendant's care, and a medical examination revealed healing fractures other places; moreover, there was evidence that other injury incidents had occurred while the child was in defendant's care, and there was testimony that defendant was too rough with the child. The standard for reckless was what a reasonable person in the circumstances would have observed. Singletary v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 699 (2013).

Trial court did not err by failing to instruct on attempted reckless manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of attempted second-degree murder because the crime of attempted reckless manslaughter is inherently contradictory. The attempted offense involved an intentional act, and it would have been illogical to ask the jury to find that defendant intended to act recklessly or that he purposely engaged in conduct that was a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in acting recklessly. Even if the instruction was based on sound law, there was no rational basis for giving it in this case where defendant's actions in running over people were intentional, regardless of whether he intended to bring about the particular result of death. Allen v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 360, 465 S.W.3d 9 (2015).

Circuit court, which instructed the jury on first-degree murder and the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on reckless manslaughter because the jury was presented with evidence that defendant chased the victim, blocked the victim's vehicle with defendant's vehicle, and ran up to the victim's car, shooting once into the hood of the car and a second time through the windshield of the car, killing the victim. Starling v. State, 2016 Ark. 20, 480 S.W.3d 158 (2016).

Trial court did not err in instructing the jury because, even assuming endangering the welfare of a minor in the third degree was a lesser-included offense of endangering the welfare of a minor in the first degree, there was not a rational basis for giving the instruction. By defendant's own testimony, defendant's actions were not reckless; they were actions that defendant purposely undertook after defendant became upset and frustrated when an infant child would not stop crying, which resulted in serious injury to the child. Myers v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 501, 505 S.W.3d 694 (2016).

Although the circuit court in a bench trial incorrectly held that the applicable culpable mental state was strict liability in a DWI case under § 5-65-103 that did not involve alcohol, defendant's conviction was affirmed where the circuit court made an alternative finding under the correct standard that the State had submitted proof sufficient to satisfy reckless conduct under § 5-2-203 and this section; the testimony of the officer, the pharmacist expert, and the defendant provided sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant acted recklessly in taking prescribed barbiturates (for her migraine) and then operating a motor vehicle. Cordero v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 484, 588 S.W.3d 369 (2019).

Recklessly and Negligently Distinguished.

Reckless and negligent conduct, as defined in this section, are distinguished in that reckless conduct involves a conscious disregard of a perceived risk; a person charged with negligent homicide is assumed to have been unaware of the existence of the risk. Smith v. State, 3 Ark. App. 224, 623 S.W.2d 862 (1981).

Cited: Martin v. State, 261 Ark. 80, 547 S.W.2d 81 (1977); Hamilton v. State, 262 Ark. 366, 556 S.W.2d 884 (1977); Rust v. State, 263 Ark. 350, 565 S.W.2d 19 (1978); Lowe v. State, 264 Ark. 205, 570 S.W.2d 253 (1978); Sbabo v. State, 264 Ark. 497, 572 S.W.2d 585 (1978); State v. Brown, 265 Ark. 41, 577 S.W.2d 581 (1979); Kirkendall v. State, 265 Ark. 853, 581 S.W.2d 341 (1979); Cates v. State, 267 Ark. 726, 589 S.W.2d 598 (Ct. App. 1979); Dixon v. State, 268 Ark. 471, 597 S.W.2d 77 (1980); Darville v. State, 271 Ark. 580, 609 S.W.2d 50 (1980); Avery v. State, 271 Ark. 584, 609 S.W.2d 52 (1980); Nolen v. State, 278 Ark. 17, 643 S.W.2d 257 (1982); Ethridge v. State, 9 Ark. App. 111, 654 S.W.2d 595 (1983); Blaney v. State, 280 Ark. 253, 657 S.W.2d 531 (1983); Garner v. White, 726 F.2d 1274 (8th Cir. 1984); Coleman v. State, 12 Ark. App. 214, 671 S.W.2d 221 (1984); Heard v. State, 284 Ark. 457, 683 S.W.2d 232 (1985); Neely v. State, 18 Ark. App. 122, 711 S.W.2d 482 (1986); Jackson v. State, 290 Ark. 160, 717 S.W.2d 801 (1986); Fladung v. State, 292 Ark. 510, 730 S.W.2d 901 (1987); Booth v. State, 26 Ark. App. 115, 761 S.W.2d 607 (1988); Johnson v. State, 28 Ark. App. 256, 773 S.W.2d 450 (1989); Dunlap v. State, 303 Ark. 222, 795 S.W.2d 920 (1990); Norton v. State, 307 Ark. 336, 820 S.W.2d 272 (1991); Cole v. State, 33 Ark. App. 98, 802 S.W.2d 472 (1991); Cotnam v. State, 36 Ark. App. 109, 819 S.W.2d 291 (1991); Enoch v. State, 37 Ark. App. 103, 826 S.W.2d 291 (1992); Edwards v. State, 40 Ark. App. 114, 842 S.W.2d 459 (1992); Anderson v. State, 312 Ark. 606, 852 S.W.2d 309 (1993); Paige v. State, 45 Ark. App. 13, 870 S.W.2d 771 (1994); Williams v. State, 321 Ark. 635, 906 S.W.2d 677 (1995); Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702; Walker v. State, 324 Ark. 106, 918 S.W.2d 172 (1996); Davis v. State, 325 Ark. 96, 925 S.W.2d 768 (1996); Williams v. State, 325 Ark. 432, 930 S.W.2d 297 (1996); Webb v. State, 328 Ark. 12, 941 S.W.2d 417 (1997); Ladwig v. State, 328 Ark. 241, 943 S.W.2d 571 (1997); Cox-Hilstrom v. State, 58 Ark. App. 109, 948 S.W.2d 409 (1997); McGill v. State, 60 Ark. App. 246, 962 S.W.2d 382 (1998); Anderson v. State, 62 Ark. App. 1, 967 S.W.2d 569 (1998); Byrd v. State, 337 Ark. 413, 992 S.W.2d 759 (1999); Terrell v. State, 342 Ark. 208, 27 S.W.3d 423 (2000); Kelley v. State, 75 Ark. App. 144, 55 S.W.3d 309 (2001); McEntire v. State, 363 Ark. 473, 215 S.W.3d 658 (2005); Henson v. State, 94 Ark. App. 163, 227 S.W.3d 450 (2006); MacKool v. State, 365 Ark. 416, 231 S.W.3d 676 (2006); Bell v. State, 371 Ark. 375, 266 S.W.3d 696 (2007); Law v. State, 375 Ark. 505, 292 S.W.3d 277 (2009); Jackson v. State, 2009 Ark. 336, 321 S.W.3d 260 (2009); Moseby v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 5 (2010); Lee v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 15 (2010); Freeman v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 90 (2010); Banks v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 249 (2011); Stevenson v. State, 2013 Ark. 100, 426 S.W.3d 416 (2013); Adams v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 308, 435 S.W.3d 520 (2014); Edwards v. State, 2015 Ark. 377, 472 S.W.3d 479 (2015); Fowler v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 579, 474 S.W.3d 120 (2015); Ta v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 220, 459 S.W.3d 325 (2015); Edwards v. State, 2017 Ark. 207 (2017); Campbell v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 340, 525 S.W.3d 465 (2017); Turner v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 5, 538 S.W.3d 227 (2018).