Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-312 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Propriety of equalizing income of spouses through alimony awards. 102 A.L.R.5th 395.

Spouse's professional degree or license as marital property for purposes of alimony, support, or property settlement. 3 A.L.R.6th 447.

Ark. L. Notes.

Beard, Transfers of Property between Spouses and Former Spouses — An Overview of Income Tax Issues and a Suggested Analytical Approach to Such Issues, 1990 Ark. L. Notes 1.

Ark. L. Rev.

Bond for Child Support, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 360.

Divorce and Property Awards, 7 Ark. L. Rev. 367.

Notes, Towery v. Towery: Has the “Flexible” Child Support Rule Lost Its Stretch?, 39 Ark. L. Rev. 539.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Note: Duty of Continued Child Support Past the Age of Majority, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 397.

Hawthorne, Note: Family Law — Divorce — Constitutionality of Arkansas Property Settlement and Alimony Statutes, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 123.

Shively, Survey of Family Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 223.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Family Law, 5 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 143.

Legislative Survey — Family Law, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 577.

Survey — Family Law, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 577.

Survey — Family Law, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 215.

Survey — Family Law, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 369.

Survey — Family Law, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 371.

Case Notes

Note. Some of the following cases were decided prior to the 1979 amendment to this section that made the statute gender-neutral.

Constitutionality.

Prior to the 1979 amendment, this section was undisputedly gender-based and therefore unconstitutional as violative of equal protection rights. This section, as amended by Acts 1979, No. 705 is gender-neutral rather than gender-based and therefore is constitutional. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 267 Ark. 595, 593 S.W.2d 21 (1980), overruled in part, Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984).

Unconstitutionality of this section as it existed prior to 1979 amendment did not affect the validity of alimony awarded prior to declaration of unconstitutionality since the wife's rights to alimony were vested by the decree of the court and not by the statute. Boyles v. Boyles, 268 Ark. 120, 594 S.W.2d 17 (1980).

Supreme Court would not consider husband's challenge to constitutionality where the challenge was made two years after the original divorce decree because he waited too long to assert it, even though this section had since been declared unconstitutional because of its gender-based classification. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 268 Ark. 382, 596 S.W.2d 690 (1980).

This section, which permits a court to require child support past majority while the child remains a high school student, is not unconstitutional. McFarland v. McFarland, 318 Ark. 446, 885 S.W.2d 897 (1994).

Former wife failed to show that subdivision (a)(2)(D) of this section relating to alimony and cohabitation violated due process because her argument was based on a misinterpretation of the plain language of the statute; the party attacking a statute bears the burden of making a clear argument demonstrating unconstitutionality. According to the plain language of the statute, the court still has discretion to award alimony even if a party is involved in an intimate cohabitation and the parties are allowed to form an agreement concerning alimony under those circumstances as well. Zimmerman v. Pope, 2015 Ark. App. 499, 471 S.W.3d 646 (2015).

Former wife failed to show that subdivision (a)(2)(D) of this section relating to alimony and cohabitation amounted to an equal protection violation in disproportionately affecting women; the statute passes the rational-basis test, as the reasonable governmental purpose of the statute is to help settle the economic imbalance between the parties by assessing whether the facts of a case show a need for alimony. Zimmerman v. Pope, 2015 Ark. App. 499, 471 S.W.3d 646 (2015).

Former wife failed to show that subdivision (a)(2)(D) of this section relating to alimony and cohabitation violated the fundamental right to privacy under the strict-scrutiny test; there is a compelling state interest in determining the need for alimony, and delving into the private lives of the parties is the least restrictive method, and indeed the only method, the court has to determine the circumstances of the parties and the need for alimony. Zimmerman v. Pope, 2015 Ark. App. 499, 471 S.W.3d 646 (2015).

In General.

This section was not repealed by § 9-12-315. Williams v. Williams, 150 Ark. 319, 234 S.W. 169 (1921).

Although wife did not plead her claim for alimony properly, where it was apparent on the record that throughout the proceeding the parties litigated the case with the full knowledge of wife's desire for alimony, the court erred in granting husband's motion to set aside the award of alimony. McKay v. McKay, 340 Ark. 171, 8 S.W.3d 525 (2000).

Construction.

The General Assembly intended the right of support for the wife, and children, to be construed in the same manner. Brun v. Rembert, 227 Ark. 241, 297 S.W.2d 940 (1957).

Mandatory termination language added to this section by Acts 2013, No. 1487 does not apply retroactively to automatically terminate alimony awards entered before the 2013 amendment (answering certified question from the Court of Appeals). Mason v. Mason, 2017 Ark. 225, 522 S.W.3d 123 (2017).

Amendment to this section by Acts 2013, No. 1487 concerning automatic termination of alimony awards, including the provision that alimony automatically terminates on cohabitation, does not automatically terminate alimony awards entered before August 16, 2013; nothing in the statute or the legislative history indicates that the General Assembly intended for the amendment to apply to previous alimony awards (answering certified question from the Court of Appeals). Mason v. Mason, 2017 Ark. 225, 522 S.W.3d 123 (2017).

Applicability.

Acts 1979, No. 705, which made this section gender-neutral, could not be retroactively applied absent clear legislative intent to that effect, and since there was no indication of such intent, the act was only prospective in its application. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 267 Ark. 595, 593 S.W.2d 21 (1980), overruled in part, Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984).

When support has been previously set in a decree, a change of circumstances must be found before this section is applicable. McKiever v. McKiever, 305 Ark. 321, 808 S.W.2d 328 (1991).

Agreement of Parties.

An agreement by the mother to pay child support to her husband following a divorce was not invalid as being inequitable and contrary to public policy on the grounds that the agreement relieved the father of his obligation to support his children since the obligation belonged to both parents. Barnhard v. Barnhard, 252 Ark. 167, 477 S.W.2d 845 (1972).

Power of a court to modify a decree for the support of minor children cannot be defeated by an agreement between the parties, even if incorporated in the decree. Williams v. Williams, 253 Ark. 842, 489 S.W.2d 774 (1973).

Where the final decree of divorce found that the parties had agreed that one-third of the personal property and crops amounted to a certain sum and an order was entered awarding that amount to the wife, the husband had no grounds to complain that the division of personal property was not exactly one-third. Wilson v. Wilson, 270 Ark. 485, 606 S.W.2d 56 (1980).

The trial court was not bound by the property settlement agreement as to alimony because the court has the authority to make an initial award of alimony when a divorce decree is entered. Womack v. Womack, 16 Ark. App. 108, 697 S.W.2d 930 (1985).

Prior to 1987, agreements between former spouses reducing the amount of child support payments did not bind the court, but the court could recognize such an agreement (1) if the agreement was supported by a valid consideration, or (2) if it were inequitable to do otherwise; thus, where the mother gave up the right to 32% of the father's income as previously ordered but gained an increase in the fixed amount of support from $200 to $250 per month over a period of time there was valid consideration and the chancellor did not err in recognizing the agreement as to the amount of arrearages due before the 1987 amendment to § 9-12-314. Sullivan v. Edens, 304 Ark. 133, 801 S.W.2d 32 (1990), superseded by statute as stated in, Johnson v. Lilly, 308 Ark. 201, 823 S.W.2d 883 (1992), superseded by statute as stated in, Branch v. Carter, 54 Ark. App. 70, 923 S.W.2d 874 (1996).

Alimony.

The award of alimony in a divorce action is not mandatory, but is a question which addresses itself to the sound discretion of the chancellor, and the chancellor's decision will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Lofton v. Lofton, 23 Ark. App. 203, 745 S.W.2d 635 (1988); Boggs v. Boggs, 26 Ark. App. 188, 761 S.W.2d 956 (1988); Busby v. Busby, 39 Ark. App. 108, 840 S.W.2d 195 (1992).

The chancellor erred when he ordered that alimony would terminate only upon the death of either party and that alimony would not terminate upon the remarriage of the recipient wife where his stated purpose for such award was to substitute alimony for an interest in the husband's unvested military retirement. Holaway v. Holaway, 70 Ark. App. 240, 16 S.W.3d 302 (2000).

When the original divorce decree was entered, the circuit court judge failed to address the issue of alimony; two years later upon the wife's motion for reconsideration, the circuit judge had subject-matter jurisdiction under this section to enter a supplemental divorce decree awarding alimony. Edwards v. Edwards, 2009 Ark. 580, 357 S.W.3d 445 (2009).

Nothing in subdivision (a)(1) of this section or applicable case law requires a spouse to attempt to obtain public housing before a trial court may award alimony. Stuart v. Stuart, 2012 Ark. App. 458, 422 S.W.3d 147 (2012).

In a divorce decree, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $642 per month to the wife in permanent alimony under subdivision (a)(1) of this section. The trial court considered the appropriate factors and observed that while the husband's income was $2,440 per month, the wife's income was $440 per month; the court also noted that the wife did not work outside the home during the nineteen-year marriage. Stuart v. Stuart, 2012 Ark. App. 458, 422 S.W.3d 147 (2012).

Trial court was permitted to modify a divorce decree beyond the expiration of ninety days because Ark. R. Civ. P. 60 was not applicable as the second order merely corrected an oversight in the divorce decree and clarified: (1) the date alimony previously awarded under subdivision (a)(1) of this section would begin; (2) that the Social Security Administration would withhold the payments from the husband's Social Security disability payments; and (3) that alimony payments would continue until remarriage or an appellate ruling. Stuart v. Stuart, 2012 Ark. App. 458, 422 S.W.3d 147 (2012).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion by entering a monthly award of alimony for a period of 30 years in a decree of divorce because the court made findings regarding the amount of alimony and had the authority to set the duration of the award of alimony. Moreover, there was no evidence to support the idea that the alimony award was meant to be punitive, based on the husband's addictions and other detrimental behavior having placed the parties in financial hardship. Trucks v. Trucks, 2015 Ark. App. 189, 4599 S.W.3d 312 (2015).

Denial of a former spouse's petition to eliminate alimony payments was appropriate because the circuit court did not abuse its discretion (1) by considering that the parties had planned that the obligee was to stay at home with the children and (2) in finding that the obligee spouse had a need for alimony until the oldest child graduated from high school, at which time the alimony was to begin to be phased out. Hix v. Hix, 2015 Ark. App. 199, 458 S.W.3d 743 (2015).

Trial court specifically increased monthly alimony over the years commensurate with the amount of decreasing child support, and as such, child support and alimony were inextricably intertwined; because the case was reversed and remanded for recalculation of the father's child-support obligation, the issue of alimony was also remanded. Fox v. Fox, 2015 Ark. App. 367, 465 S.W.3d 18, 465 S.W.3d 18 (2015).

Awarding the husband permanent alimony of $3,787 was an abuse of discretion where the parties had equal earning capacities as lawyers and shared joint custody with equal physical custody, and the law did not require the wife to pay permanent alimony to support the husband's choice to earn less so he had more flexibility. Grimsley v. Drewyor, 2019 Ark. App. 218, 575 S.W.3d 636 (2019).

Rehabilitative alimony award for seven years was affirmed where the court had considered the disparity in the parties' incomes, the fact that the wife had worked in the husband's business the entire length of the marriage, and the parties' health. Perser v. Perser, 2019 Ark. App. 467, 588 S.W.3d 395 (2019).

Permanent alimony award to the wife was affirmed where the circuit court heard evidence of the wife's need, the husband's ability to pay, the spendable incomes of the parties, and the wife's standard of living to which she had become accustomed during the marriage, as well as other evidence. Carr v. Carr, 2019 Ark. App. 513, 588 S.W.3d 821 (2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the ex-wife permanent alimony because the ex-husband's claim that the wife was capable of earning considerably more income than she did at present was not supported by the proof as, after the parents' special-needs child was born, the wife became a stay-at-home mom to care for him; at the time of the parties' divorce, the wife was an hourly employee making $12.75 an hour, while the husband earned a $45,000 salary; and there was evidence that the husband's earning potential was higher than his current salary given that he had worked at a significantly higher salary at previous teaching jobs and had a master's degree that qualified him to be a school principal. Medlen v. Medlen, 2020 Ark. App. 159 (2020).

—In General.

The amount of support must always depend upon the particular facts in each case, such as husband's earnings and ability to pay as well as the needs of the wife. Dean v. Dean, 222 Ark. 219, 258 S.W.2d 54 (1953).

Where property awards were sufficient wife was not entitled to alimony. Brimson v. Brimson, 227 Ark. 1045, 304 S.W.2d 935 (1957).

Fact that wife has more income than husband does not, within itself, preclude her right of recovery, though the fact that a wife has more income than the husband may be taken into consideration in making an award. White v. White, 228 Ark. 732, 310 S.W.2d 216 (1958).

Chancery courts have the power to grant the wife, as a part of her alimony, an interest in her husband's real property where he secures the divorce. Cook v. Cook, 233 Ark. 961, 349 S.W.2d 809 (1961).

When awarding alimony, the chancellor should give proper consideration to (1) the financial condition of the parties such as the husband's ability to pay, the wife's financial needs, and the wife's ability to support herself; (2) the station in life of the parties, that is, the manner and style of living to which the wife has become accustomed; and (3) the character of the parties bearing on the cause of the separation. Sutton v. Sutton, 266 Ark. 451, 587 S.W.2d 67 (1979).

A decree for alimony is binding and conclusive on the parties as to the amount of alimony and as to all conditions or facts existing when it was rendered. Boyles v. Boyles, 268 Ark. 120, 594 S.W.2d 17 (1980).

Section 9-12-301 allows independent proceeding for the division of marital property or alimony when neither the division nor alimony could have been considered in the divorce action. Woods v. Woods, 285 Ark. 175, 686 S.W.2d 387 (1985).

If either spouse is entitled to alimony, the chancellor must comply with this section by making that decision when the decree is entered. If circumstances prevent the spouse who is to pay the alimony from being able to do so, then the court may recite that fact and decline to award a specific amount; thereafter, if circumstances change in a way that will permit the payment of alimony, the party who has been determined to be entitled to it may petition the court. Grady v. Grady, 295 Ark. 94, 747 S.W.2d 77 (1988).

Where chancellor's order said alimony award was not a distribution of marital property or given in lieu of such a distribution, but it then referred to the discrepancy in income which would result from the difference in profit potential between two properties, reversal of the award gave the chancellor appropriate flexibility in reconsidering the distribution of marital property, if he chose to do so, rather than readopt the unequal distribution with an explanation as § 9-12-315 requires. Harvey v. Harvey, 295 Ark. 102, 747 S.W.2d 89 (1988).

The ability of a party to pay and the need of the other party are primary factors to be considered in awarding alimony. Burns v. Burns, 312 Ark. 61, 847 S.W.2d 23 (1993).

Where spouse ordered to pay alimony has the ability to generate substantial earnings and a past history of doing so, but, at the time of the divorce, is engaged in lesser employment, the trial court need not award a token amount of alimony in the decree in order to reserve to the other spouse the right to petition for a reasonable amount of alimony when the circumstances permit. Mulling v. Mulling, 323 Ark. 88, 912 S.W.2d 934 (1996).

Chancellor abused his discretion in failing to award husband alimony, where marriage was of long duration, husband was unemployed, without independent financial means, in declining health and ordered to sell farm he had been operating, and wife had a secure job, was beneficiary of a trust fund, retained the main instrumentality enabling her to earn her livelihood and in better health than husband. Mearns v. Mearns, 58 Ark. App. 42, 946 S.W.2d 188 (1997).

The statute is not determinative with regard to the termination of alimony provided for in an incorporated agreement. Rockefeller v. Rockefeller, 335 Ark. 145, 980 S.W.2d 255 (1998).

—Cohabitation.

There was no abuse of discretion in denying alimony as the circuit court would not have awarded alimony to the wife under either the previous or current version of subdivision (a)(2)(D) of this section; moreover, the testimony and exhibits went beyond the issue of cohabitation and concerned income, earning capacity, age, health, and expenses. Zimmerman v. Pope, 2015 Ark. App. 499, 471 S.W.3d 646 (2015).

Trial court erred by terminating the wife's alimony award as subdivision (a)(2)(D) did not automatically terminate alimony awards that were entered before the provision was enacted (applying Mason v. Mason, 2017 Ark. 225, 522 S.W.3d 123). Mason v. Mason, 2017 Ark. App. 683, 536 S.W.3d 657 (2017).

—Discretion of Court.

An award of alimony lies within the discretion of the chancellor and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Burns v. Burns, 312 Ark. 61, 847 S.W.2d 23 (1993).

Where party seeks award of alimony and greater share of marital property, alimony and property settlements are complimentary devices that a chancery court must employ to make the dissolution of a marriage of long standing as equitable as possible. Mearns v. Mearns, 58 Ark. App. 42, 946 S.W.2d 188 (1997).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in its initial alimony award of $3,500 a month for 36 months and thereafter $1,500 a month for 60 months or upon the wife's remarriage because the wife had recently acquired a job making $39,000 a year; the husband had a net monthly income of $15,000 to $16,000 at the time of the final hearing, but he was also making the parties' $5,884 mortgage payment; and the court considered the wife's need for alimony, the husband's ability to pay, the length of the marriage, the incomes and expenses of both parties, the financial circumstances of the parties, the amount and nature of the income, both current and anticipated, of both parties, and the extent and nature of the resources and assets of both parties. Mason v. Mason, 2017 Ark. App. 683, 536 S.W.3d 657 (2017).

—Duration.

The chancery court was not wrong in not extending alimony until 56-year-old wife was eligible for Social Security, rather than just for five years; where the wife had marketable skills, and therefore had the means to support herself, that fact joined with the alimony award and other property given her in the divorce was evidence that the chancery court weighed the relevant circumstances, and acted well within its discretion in awarding alimony “for a specified period of time.” Ducharme v. Ducharme, 316 Ark. 482, 872 S.W.2d 392 (1994).

The chancellor erred when he ordered that alimony would terminate only upon the death of either party and that alimony would not terminate upon the remarriage of the recipient wife where his stated purpose for such award was to substitute alimony for an interest in the husband's unvested military retirement. Holaway v. Holaway, 70 Ark. App. 240, 16 S.W.3d 302 (2000).

—Modification.

When a decree is entered fixing and allowing alimony for the support and maintenance of the wife, that decree limits and defines the extent of the husband's obligation in that respect, but the allowance is always subject to modification by the court to meet the changed situation and conditions of the parties in interest. Pledger v. Pledger, 199 Ark. 604, 135 S.W.2d 851 (1940).

Trial court contemplated the wife inheriting from her mother at the time the original alimony award was given, and thus her ultimately doing so was not a material change in circumstances for alimony modification purposes; the trial court was free not to believe the husband's assertion that the wife's net worth was greater than $1.3 million, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the husband's request to terminate or reduce his alimony obligation. Berry v. Berry, 2017 Ark. App. 145, 515 S.W.3d 164 (2017).

Trial court erred in refusing to modify the wife’s alimony because the evidence showed that the husband's income increased dramatically following the entry of the divorce decree; that his obligations to the wife decreased as his obligation to make the house payment terminated; and that neither party received the anticipated payoff from the sale of the house — a factor the trial court clearly considered important to the initial alimony determination. Mason v. Mason, 2017 Ark. App. 683, 536 S.W.3d 657 (2017).

—Specific Provisions.

Circuit court's finding that the issue of alimony could be revisited in four years did not constitute an escalator clause because the court did not order that alimony would automatically increase when child-support payments ceased. The court explicitly stated that in four years, when child support abated, the wife could petition the court to review the issue of alimony based on the facts at that time. Nauman v. Nauman, 2018 Ark. App. 114, 542 S.W.3d 212 (2018).

Appeal.

Husband in appeal from divorce action has no standing to raise any question about the constitutionality of allowing alimony and attorney's fees where no allowance was made. McNew v. McNew, 262 Ark. 567, 559 S.W.2d 155 (1977).

Appellant had standing to challenge the constitutionality of this section where he was financially obligated to his wife under decree rendered pursuant to this statute. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 267 Ark. 595, 593 S.W.2d 21 (1980), overruled in part, Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984).

Indebtedness which spouse was required to pay as maintenance and support not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Barker v. Barker, 271 Ark. 956, 611 S.W.2d 787 (1981).

Bond.

There is no language in this section which authorizes the seizure of one's property without limitation under the guise of a bond; accordingly, one spouse in a divorce action was not entitled to have all of the other spouse's property impounded as a bond under this section, particularly where the second spouse had never been ordered nor attempted to make a bond. Warren v. Warren, 273 Ark. 528, 623 S.W.2d 813 (1981) (supplemental opinion).

Child Support.

Circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the husband's income for child-support purposes was that reflected on his tax returns; it was clear that the husband's ownership in the limited partnership was a significant portion of his net worth; thus, that ownership interest would be a proper consideration. Brown v. Brown, 373 Ark. 333, 284 S.W.3d 17 (2008), overruled in part, Moore v. Moore, 2016 Ark. 105, 486 S.W.3d 766 (2016).

Court abused its discretion in failing to order parents to pay child support to a grandmother who was awarded custody of their child at the time their divorce was granted, as required by subdivision (a)(1) of this section, where the court had ample evidence of the mother's income and evidence that the father was on active duty in the U.S. Army National Guard. Bass v. Weaver, 101 Ark. App. 367, 278 S.W.3d 127 (2008).

Where the father was awarded child custody and the mother was ordered to pay child support based on the child-support chart rate set forth in Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 10, she was not entitled to a reduction in child support based on allegations that she could not make ends meet while the father was placing some of the child support funds into his savings account. The mother did not show a change of circumstances, nor did she rebut the presumption that the amount of child support awarded under the family-support chart was reasonable in accordance with this section. Hubanks v. Baughman, 2009 Ark. App. 585 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying a mother's motion to increase a father's child-support obligation because all of the children's needs were being met from the father's support payments, with over $3,000 left over each month, and the mother's approximate $46,000 annual income from her part-time jobs did not even factor into the children's expenses; the father was not the only parent required to support the children because in accordance with Administrative Order of the Supreme Court No. 10, the mother's income was also a relevant factor to consider in awarding child support. Kemp v. Kemp, 2011 Ark. App. 354, 384 S.W.3d 56 (2011).

It was error for the court to calculate the husband's income based on his tax returns after determining that the tax returns were not credible, because the court found that the husband was earning more than his reported $40,000 salary and questioned him regarding his underemployment. John v. Bolinder, 2013 Ark. App. 224 (2013).

In a child support modification case, a trial court did not err by relying on a father's tax record in determining his monthly income when it determined that there was a material change of circumstances to support the modification under § 9-14-107(a)(1); there was no need to consider the net-worth approach. Cowell v. Long, 2013 Ark. App. 311 (2013).

Because the father was unemployed, there existed a rebuttable presumption that the child support should be based on his zero income as applied to the support chart; the trial court could have rebutted that presumption by making written findings that the application of the support chart would be unjust or inappropriate, but the trial court did not make such findings and consequently erred in its calculation of child support. The trial court has the discretion to impute income, however, and the child support award was reversed and remanded for reassessment. Fox v. Fox, 2015 Ark. App. 367, 465 S.W.3d 18, 465 S.W.3d 18 (2015).

Requiring the wife to make a one-time payment of $1.25 million in child support to the husband per a provision in the divorce decree was error where the assets of the wife's inheritance did not constitute income under Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 10, § II, and there was no evidence of the children's needs. None of the assets that were part of the $5 million inheritance had been liquidated and the parties had joint custody. Grimsley v. Drewyor, 2019 Ark. App. 218, 575 S.W.3d 636 (2019).

Award of child support was affirmed where the court disbelieved the husband as to why he was earning half of what he had earned for the three or more years before he filed for divorce, the husband owned his medical practice and was in sole control of his salary, and the court did not believe that the husband's tax returns showed the correct amount of his earnings. Perser v. Perser, 2019 Ark. App. 467, 588 S.W.3d 395 (2019).

Circuit court erred in allocating the tax exemptions for the parties' children; the circuit court was not bound by the parties' earlier contractual agreement that was made part of the judicial-separation case, and giving tax allocations to a noncustodial parent is considered a deviation from the child-support chart amount, which requires findings, and the necessary findings were lacking. Callan v. Callan, 2020 Ark. App. 205, 599 S.W.3d 145 (2020).

—In General.

Where chancery court did not pass on the question of support of the children, but merely denied the wife alimony, children are not barred from bringing suit against their father, and whether they would recover or not would depend upon all the facts and circumstances. Upchurch v. Upchurch, 196 Ark. 324, 117 S.W.2d 339 (1938).

It is duty of father to support minor child even though custody is awarded to mother, and misconduct of mother cannot be allowed to prejudice the child's right to support. Reiter v. Reiter, 225 Ark. 157, 278 S.W.2d 644 (1955).

Order for the payment of allowances for child support is not a final decree upon which an execution may be issued, or which might become a lien on real estate. Brun v. Rembert, 227 Ark. 241, 297 S.W.2d 940 (1957).

Action to recover delinquent child support payments was not timely where instituted more than five years after the last payment became due. Brun v. Rembert, 227 Ark. 241, 297 S.W.2d 940 (1957).

A mother's obligations to her child for support do not come into existence only when the father is impoverished. Barnhard v. Barnhard, 252 Ark. 167, 477 S.W.2d 845 (1972).

The power of a chancery court to order child support payments under this section does not create in the court an implied authority to impose a lien on the other spouse's property for future child support, and equity courts have no inherent authority to grant one. Warren v. Warren, 273 Ark. 528, 623 S.W.2d 813 (1981) (supplemental opinion).

To declare that Perkins v. Perkins, 15 Ark. App. 82, 690 S.W.2d 356 (1985), or this section effectively eliminates the necessity of the need for equity or a chancellor in child support cases is utterly without foundation. Borden v. Borden, 20 Ark. App. 52, 724 S.W.2d 181 (1987).

While there is no specific provision identifying “earning capacity” as an element to be considered when ordering child support, it is nevertheless recognized as a factor. In determining the amount to be contributed for child support, the chancellor should consider the needs of the children, the resources of each parent, their respective ages, earning capacities, incomes and indebtedness, state of health, future prospects, and any other factors that will aid the court in reaching a just and equitable result. Grady v. Grady, 295 Ark. 94, 747 S.W.2d 77 (1988).

Where custodial parent did not interfere with former spouse's visitation rights, nor defy the divorce decree, but did delay in pursuing her rights to obtain judgment for the accrued child support payments, delay did not defeat right to accrued child support. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 297 Ark. 377, 761 S.W.2d 941 (1988).

The list of factors set out by the Supreme Court for determining whether an amount specified by the chart is unjust or inappropriate, is not exclusive. Stewart v. Winfrey, 308 Ark. 277, 824 S.W.2d 373 (1992).

The language “other income or assets available to support the child from whatever source” is intended to expand, not restrict, the sources of funds to be considered in setting child support. Belue v. Belue, 38 Ark. App. 81, 828 S.W.2d 855 (1992).

The chancellor correctly based the amount of child support ordered on a monthly income which included noncustodial Veterans' Administration disability benefits. Belue v. Belue, 38 Ark. App. 81, 828 S.W.2d 855 (1992).

In a divorce action, a trial court did not err when it relied on a former husband's total net income and averaged the husband's salary to determine income for child support payments, which were presumptively proper under the guidelines and family support chart of this section and Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 10. Taylor v. Taylor, 369 Ark. 31, 250 S.W.3d 232 (2007).

Trial court's order from which the father appealed failed to comply with Administrative Order No. 10 and this section in that it did not contain the court's determination of the father's 2015 income, it did not recite the amount of support required under the guidelines, and it did not recite whether the court deviated from the Family Support Chart and why it deviated. Newton v. Newton, 2018 Ark. App. 525, 565 S.W.3d 493 (2018).

—Beyond Eighteenth Birthday.

Even after a handicapped child reaches age 18, a parent should provide further support for educational purposes to prepare the child to pay his medical bills, and support himself if the financial condition of the parent allows. Elkins v. Elkins, 262 Ark. 63, 553 S.W.2d 34 (1977).

This section gave the chancellor the authority to direct noncustodial parent to continue making payments on the custodial parent's house until the parties' child graduated from high school. Keesee v. Keesee, 48 Ark. App. 113, 891 S.W.2d 70 (1995).

—Chart.

Courts are required to refer to chart but are not bound to set support payments in accordance with exact terms thereof; degree of dependence upon chart is left to sound discretion of the chancellor. Thurston v. Pinkstaff, 292 Ark. 385, 730 S.W.2d 239 (1987).

The Family Support Chart is to be used as a guide and is not intended to be binding. Borden v. Borden, 20 Ark. App. 52, 724 S.W.2d 181 (1987).

Award of support based upon Family Support Chart was not abuse of discretion. Borden v. Borden, 20 Ark. App. 52, 724 S.W.2d 181 (1987); Barnes v. Barnes, 311 Ark. 287, 843 S.W.2d 835 (1992).

Although the chancellor was not required to use the family support chart in setting child support the fact that his order of support was in conformity with the chart indicated that it was not erroneous. Freeman v. Freeman, 29 Ark. App. 137, 778 S.W.2d 222 (1989) (preceding decisions prior to 1989 amendment by No. 948).

Where chancellor made specific findings on the record spelling out why the support chart was inappropriate, considering all relevant factors, it was sufficient to rebut the presumption that the amount of child support calculated pursuant to the family support chart was correct. Scroggins v. Scroggins, 302 Ark. 362, 790 S.W.2d 157 (1990).

Reference to the Family Support Chart is mandatory, and the chart itself establishes a rebuttable presumption of the appropriate amount which can only be explained away by written findings stating why the chart amount is unjust or inappropriate. Black v. Black, 306 Ark. 209, 812 S.W.2d 480 (1991).

Where the chancellor's order failed to indicate whether he indeed referred to the chart in making his decision, he projected a support chart amount premised on the defendant's monthly income, and he presumed that amount to be correct, the case was remanded for the chart to be considered. Black v. Black, 306 Ark. 209, 812 S.W.2d 480 (1991).

While there is a rebuttable presumption that the amount of support according to the chart is correct, the chancellor in his discretion is not entirely precluded from adjusting the amount as deemed warranted under the facts of a particular case. However, when deviating from the chart, the chancellor must explain his or her reasoning by the entry of a written finding or by making a specific finding on the record. Waldon v. Waldon, 34 Ark. App. 118, 806 S.W.2d 387 (1991).

Where the end result reached by the chancellor represented only a slight deviation from the chart amount, the findings made by the chancellor on the record were sufficient to rebut the presumption that the amount of support according to the chart was correct. Waldon v. Waldon, 34 Ark. App. 118, 806 S.W.2d 387 (1991).

The child support chart and the criteria used for deviating from it are not mandatory, but there is a rebuttable presumption that the amount specified in the chart is the appropriate amount; applying the specific chart amounts is not mandatory if it would be unjust or inequitable, and if written findings are made to that effect. Stewart v. Winfrey, 308 Ark. 277, 824 S.W.2d 373 (1992).

The child support chart specifically takes into account payments made under court order to support other children, and allows these payments to be deducted from weekly take home pay. The chart does not refer to support of children not under court order, but a payor spouse's ability to pay can be considered, and necessarily includes other children the parent is legally obligated to support. Stewart v. Winfrey, 308 Ark. 277, 824 S.W.2d 373 (1992).

Given the presumption that the chart amount is reasonable, it is incumbent on the trial courts to give a fuller explanation of their reasons for rejecting the chart; it was not sufficient to state merely that the amount was “unreasonable.” Cochran v. Cochran, 309 Ark. 604, 832 S.W.2d 252 (1992).

Where there was no evidence regarding defendant's weekly take home pay during the relevant time period, the support was set at the minimum level required of an unemployed person. Barnes v. Barnes, 311 Ark. 287, 843 S.W.2d 835 (1992).

Where the chancellor found that the chart called for $51.00 per week child support, which would quadruple the noncustodial parent's payments, and considering his expenses, would be devastating to increase by four times the amount of his support payments, an increase of the weekly payment to $30.00 instead of $51.00 followed the requirements, and applied the rules set out in the Supreme Court's per curiams by avoiding a modification that would work undue hardship on that party. Howard v. Wisemon, 38 Ark. App. 27, 826 S.W.2d 314 (1992).

Reference to the child support chart is mandatory. Jones v. Jones, 43 Ark. App. 7, 858 S.W.2d 130 (1993).

The child support chart itself establishes a rebuttable presumption of the appropriate amount which can only be explained away by written findings stating why the chart amount is unjust or inappropriate. Jones v. Jones, 43 Ark. App. 7, 858 S.W.2d 130 (1993).

The presumption that the child support chart correctly estimates support may be overcome if the chancellor determines, upon consideration of all the relevant factors, that the chart amount is unjust or inappropriate; the relevant factors include food, shelter, utilities, clothing, medical and education expenses, accustomed standard of living, insurance, and transportation expenses. Jones v. Jones, 43 Ark. App. 7, 858 S.W.2d 130 (1993).

The family support chart is structured so that the amount of support per child decreases in proportion to the number of added dependents. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. Child Support Enforcement Unit v. Forte, 46 Ark. App. 115, 877 S.W.2d 949 (1994).

Chancellor erroneously applied father's income figure of $270.00 to the chart under the column for three dependents, which showed support of $101.00, and then divided that figure by three, to arrive at support of $35.00 for the one child before the court; the chart should be applied to the child that is before the court, and it was improper for the chancellor to have applied the chart based on three dependents and then divide that amount by three. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. Child Support Enforcement Unit v. Forte, 46 Ark. App. 115, 877 S.W.2d 949 (1994).

Reference to the family support chart is mandatory, and the chart itself establishes a rebuttable presumption of the appropriate amount which can only be explained away by express findings stating why the chart amount is unjust or inappropriate. McJunkins v. Lemons, 52 Ark. App. 1, 913 S.W.2d 306 (1996).

Where the chancellor failed to make any reference to the family chart in his comments or the order, the chancellor failed to comply with this section and the award was improper. McJunkins v. Lemons, 52 Ark. App. 1, 913 S.W.2d 306 (1996).

Reference to the family support chart is mandatory; although a trial court's order did not specifically reference the family support chart, the appellate court held that the trial judge in his bench ruling referenced the chart by ordering the incarcerated father to pay the minimum amount. Allen v. Allen, 82 Ark. App. 42, 110 S.W.3d 772 (2003).

Given the evidence of the father's affluence, exceptional generosity to his girlfriend and sisters, and extravagant lifestyle, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in setting child support in the divorce proceeding in accordance with the presumptive amount derived from the family support chart. Williams v. Williams, 82 Ark. App. 294, 108 S.W.3d 629 (2003).

Father was properly ordered to pay a percentage of his salary as child support, pursuant to the child support guidelines, where his income exceeded the amount of income shown on the family support chart as the child was entitled to a lifestyle similar to that of his father's and said monies were going toward the child's college education; thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not deviating from the family-support guidelines and in not ordering father to pay less than 15 percent of his monthly income in child support. Ceola v. Burnham, 84 Ark. App. 269, 139 S.W.3d 150 (2003).

—Custody.

If the divorce decree grants the custody of a minor child to the mother but makes no provision for the child's support and the mother thereafter supports the child and supplies the child with necessaries, the father, if financially able, should repay the mother for the reasonable value of the support or necessaries thus furnished. Wilder v. Garner, 235 Ark. 400, 360 S.W.2d 192 (1962).

Where parents have physical custody of one child each, the court should determine whether each parent should pay child support for the other child and, if not, should make specific findings as provided by this section. Lonigro v. Lonigro, 55 Ark. App. 253, 935 S.W.2d 284 (1996).

—Deviation from Chart.

Given the presumption in this section that the chart amount is reasonable, it is incumbent on the chancellor to give a full explanation of his reasons for rejecting the chart. Roland v. Roland, 43 Ark. App. 60, 859 S.W.2d 654 (1993).

The chancellor did not abuse his discretion in considering father's other two illegitimate children as justification for deviating from the child support chart, even though father was not under a court order to support those children. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. Child Support Enforcement Unit v. Forte, 46 Ark. App. 115, 877 S.W.2d 949 (1994).

Where chancellor awarded the noncustodial parent the right to claim the children as dependents for income tax purposes, the chancellor essentially deviated from the child support chart without providing the required written findings. Fontenot v. Fontenot, 49 Ark. App. 106, 898 S.W.2d 55 (1995).

Chancellor's deviation from family child support chart without making appropriate findings of fact did not relieve parent of his support obligation, but child-support issue would be remanded to chancery court to reconsider support obligation consistent with this section. Mearns v. Mearns, 58 Ark. App. 42, 946 S.W.2d 188 (1997).

By omitting that portion of a depreciation deduction which represented spendable income to noncustodial parent without entering a specific finding on the record that it would be unjust or inappropriate to calculate the support based on its inclusion, the chancellor in effect deviated from the child-support chart without making the requisite written findings. Stepp v. Gray, 58 Ark. App. 229, 947 S.W.2d 798 (1997).

The chancellor did not commit error in declining to deviate from the presumptively correct support amount where the father asserted that the amount required by the statute exceeded what was a reasonable requirement for child support for a very young child and sought to prove his contention through cross-examination of the wife as to her utility bills, cost of food, and the costs associated with living in her trailer home, as well as those expenses on her affidavit of financial means, which had been prepared before the child was born. Smith v. Smith, 341 Ark. 590, 19 S.W.3d 590 (2000).

Trial court properly dismissed client's malpractice action even though the attorney committed malpractice by failing to perfect client's appeal of the trial court's child-support award as the client would not have prevailed on appeal because the trial court properly adhered to guidelines of Arkansas Family Support Chart when it deviated from presumptive amount; although the trial court was required to consider the guidelines, the court did not have to use the chart amount where the circumstances of the parties indicated another amount would be more appropriate. Davis v. Bland, 367 Ark. 210, 238 S.W.3d 924 (2006).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in deviating from the child support chart provided by Administrative Order of the Supreme Court No. 10 and by disallowing a mother's request for a $3,000 allowance per month so that she could work part-time or not at all because considering the child support chart, evidence, testimony, and exhibits, the trial court determined that the increase to $10,317 per month was reasonable and allowed both homes to provide for the children in like manner; the trial court found that the presumptive amount of monthly support provided by the family support chart was rebutted based on credible evidence, the testimony, the exhibits, and the needs of the children. Gilbow v. Travis, 2010 Ark. 9, 372 S.W.3d 319 (2010).

There was no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's decision to deviate upward from the family support chart; although the father testified that he lived on a sailboat, he acknowledged that he also had another, land-based home, and the court was permitted to consider the father's investment assets themselves in deviating from the support chart. Guthrie v. Guthrie, 2015 Ark. App. 108, 455 S.W.3d 839 (2015).

—Modification.

Any increase in the allowance for the support of children must be based upon a showing that conditions have changed since the entry of the decree of divorce. Haney v. Haney, 235 Ark. 60, 357 S.W.2d 19 (1962).

Where child support payments pursuant to written order were at variance with those previously announced orally by the chancellor, the chancellor was at liberty to reconsider his first conclusion. Schaefer v. Schaefer, 235 Ark. 870, 362 S.W.2d 444 (1962).

Remarriage of the husband was not in itself sufficient change in circumstances to justify a reduction of child support payments. Pults v. Pults, 236 Ark. 434, 367 S.W.2d 120 (1963).

Change in custody constitutes a change in circumstances under which a court has the right to review and modify awards for support of children, increasing or reducing the awards as warranted. Williams v. Williams, 253 Ark. 842, 489 S.W.2d 774 (1973).

Trial court always has right to review and modify child support payments in accordance with changing circumstances and may increase or reduce the payments as warranted in each case, but it is error to change amount of support where there is no evidence submitted to show a change in circumstances. Matters which should be considered in determining whether there has been a change in circumstances warranting adjustment in child support include remarriage of the parties, a minor reaching majority, change in the income and financial conditions of the parties, relocation, change of custody, debts of the parties, financial conditions of the parties and families, ability to meet current and future obligations, and child support chart. Thurston v. Pinkstaff, 292 Ark. 385, 730 S.W.2d 239 (1987).

It is error to change the amount of child support where there is no evidence submitted to show a change in circumstances. Ross v. Ross, 29 Ark. App. 64, 776 S.W.2d 834 (1989).

Chancellor's determination as to whether there are sufficient changed circumstances to warrant an increase in child support is a finding of fact; this finding will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous. Hunt v. Hunt, 40 Ark. App. 166, 842 S.W.2d 470 (1992).

Because this section and § 9-14-234 specifically provide that any decree which contains a provision for the payment of child support shall be a final judgment until either party moves to modify the order, where father did not file his petition to reduce support until over a year after the decree was entered, the unpaid support accrued as originally ordered, until the motion to modify the judgment was filed. Burnett v. Burnett, 313 Ark. 599, 855 S.W.2d 952 (1993).

Whether provisions regarding child support are in a divorce decree or property settlement contract, the court always retains authority and jurisdiction to modify child support obligations. Warren v. Kordsmeier, 56 Ark. App. 52, 938 S.W.2d 237 (1997).

A child-support obligation cannot be modified based solely on the current chart amount without there also being proof of a change in circumstances, and where the appellant failed to introduce evidence of appellee's income when the order was entered, a change in circumstances could not be shown. Ritchey v. Frazier, 57 Ark. App. 92, 940 S.W.2d 892 (1997).

Material change of circumstances occurred when the child's custody changed from the mother to the father and the child began attending a military academy; thus, the trial court was not bound by the one-half division of education expenses it directed in its first order, which contemplated the child attending a different school. Hyden v. Hyden, 85 Ark. App. 132, 148 S.W.3d 748 (2004).

Two large judgments received by father constituted “income” under Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 10 and, thus, the trial court did not err by ordering the father to pay a percentage of the judgments as a one-time child support obligation; it was irrelevant to the modification proceeding that the father had agreed to repay discharged bankruptcy debts, and the father's monthly obligation was not increased due to the judgments. Evans v. Tillery, 361 Ark. 63, 204 S.W.3d 547 (2005).

Father was allowed to claim the youngest child as a dependent and receive a tax exemption where the circuit court determined that the mother had not been employed since the birth of the last child and that the support of $4,653.00 per month for the child in the mother's custody was more than 50% of the support required to maintain the child in her lifestyle. Hill v. Kelly, 368 Ark. 200, 243 S.W.3d 886 (2006).

In reducing father's child support obligation from $1000 to $525 per month, the trial judge specifically noted that the child's accustomed life style was being accommodated and that the father was in fact earning no income whatsoever; the chart amount was not deemed to be unjust or inappropriate based upon the criteria applied to the facts, and the trial court did not err in setting an equitable amount of child support. McKinney v. McKinney, 94 Ark. App. 100, 226 S.W.3d 37 (2006).

Trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify payments for parochial school education because the parties' agreement on that subject was an independent contract separate from child support; tuition payments in this case did not support or care for the children where they were in addition to a support payment, and there was no deviation based on the tuition. An independent property-settlement agreement, if approved by a court and incorporated into a divorce decree, cannot be subsequently modified by the court. Fischer v. Fischer, 2015 Ark. App. 116, 456 S.W.3d 779 (2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in reducing a father's child support obligation; there was an undisputed reduction in the father's income, and the 50-50 custody arrangement and expenses the father paid for the children justified a substantial deviation from the chart amount. Guin v. McWhorter, 2017 Ark. App. 463, 528 S.W.3d 326 (2017).

Circuit court clearly erred in finding that a father's increased expenses due to his agreement to have primary custody of a child was a material change of circumstances warranting modification of child support; not only was the circumstance that the father would have more time with, and therefore more expenses for, the child known at the time of the entry of the agreed order, it was a circumstance that the father created by agreeing to it. Higdon v. Roberts, 2020 Ark. App. 59, 595 S.W.3d 19 (2020).

Circuit court did not err in modifying a father's child support because the inconsistency between the chart amount of the mother's child support and the agreed order without supporting reasons constituted a material change in circumstances sufficient to petition for modification of child support under § 9-14-107. Higdon v. Roberts, 2020 Ark. App. 59, 595 S.W.3d 19 (2020).

Disability.

Although the Guidelines for Child Support Enforcement do not specifically address the situation where a parent with a disability is required to provide support for an adult handicapped child who also receives disability income in his or her own right, the guidelines do provide that for Social Security Disability recipients, the court should consider the amount of any separate awards made to the disability recipient's spouse and/or children. Kimbrell v. Kimbrell, 47 Ark. App. 56, 884 S.W.2d 268 (1994).

A custodial parent, who is himself disabled, is still obligated by this section to support a disabled child. Kimbrell v. Kimbrell, 47 Ark. App. 56, 884 S.W.2d 268 (1994).

Circuit court did not err by finding that a father's child support obligation did not automatically terminate at the age of majority due to the fact that the child at issue was disabled. There was no error in addressing the issue at the time modification was sought because the child at issue was disabled at the time he reached the age of majority and still resided with his mother at the time of the modification attempt. Miller v. Ark. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 2015 Ark. App. 188, 458 S.W.3d 733 (2015).

Earning Capacity.

The court may consider the fact that a supporting spouse voluntarily changes employment so as to lessen earning capacity and, in turn, the ability to pay alimony and child support. The court may, in proper circumstances, impute an income to a spouse according to what could be earned by the use of his or her best efforts to gain employment suitable to his or her capabilities. Grady v. Grady, 295 Ark. 94, 747 S.W.2d 77 (1988).

As there could be found no Arkansas case holding that prior tax refunds paid months before a divorce hearing must be included in income, there was no error in the chancellor's refusal to include receipt of one-half of an income tax refund in calculating income. Jones v. Jones, 43 Ark. App. 7, 858 S.W.2d 130 (1993).

Award of alimony to the wife was properly denied where the husband was 64 years old and in relatively poor health, unable to do much farm work other than bookkeeping; the wife was 58 years old, in good health, and was currently employed managing an RV park. Powell v. Powell, 82 Ark. App. 17, 110 S.W.3d 290 (2003).

In an action to increase husband's child support obligation, the trial court did not err in allowing the husband to claim the tax deduction for the parties' daughter because the trial court performed the required weighing and made the required findings when it stated that the benefit to the husband substantially outweighed the benefit to the wife. White v. White, 95 Ark. App. 274, 236 S.W.3d 540 (2006).

Trial court erred in determining a husband's income for child support and alimony purposes under subdivision (a)(2) of this section and Administrative Order No. 10 by failing to account for depreciation in the husband's business and using only one year of tax returns. Wright v. Wright, 2010 Ark. App. 250, 377 S.W.3d 369 (2010).

Fault.

Fault is not a factor in deciding whether to award alimony unless it relates to need or the ability to pay. Burns v. Burns, 312 Ark. 61, 847 S.W.2d 23 (1993).

Eighty-five-year-old former husband was ordered to pay alimony to his former wife based on evidence that showed he used the wife's salary to fund his extramarital relationships with several women since the diversion of funds related to the wife's need, and the amount awarded was within his ability to pay since he was still employed. Dykman v. Dykman, 98 Ark. App. 145, 253 S.W.3d 23 (2007).

Life Insurance.

Trial court had the authority to require the husband to maintain life insurance for the benefit of the wife and children. Rudder v. Hurst, 2009 Ark. App. 577, 337 S.W.3d 565 (2009).

Medical Expenses.

The term “support and maintenance” includes necessary medical attention. Pledger v. Pledger, 199 Ark. 604, 135 S.W.2d 851 (1940).

Evidence sufficient to show that court should have modified decree so as to require husband to pay his wife's doctor, hospital, nursing, and medical bills. Pledger v. Pledger, 199 Ark. 604, 135 S.W.2d 851 (1940).

Rehabilitative Alimony.

After granting a husband a divorce on the ground of general indignities, a trial court did not err in its award of rehabilitative alimony to the wife; the trial court looked at the husband's four-year income picture and considered the wife's alleged physical limitations due to a prior car accident, but noted that she had worked as a substitute teacher long after the accident and that she made approximately $50 per day doing so. Hickman v. Hickman, 2010 Ark. App. 704 (2010).

Language in the amended version of subsection (b) of this section does not indicate that the Legislature intended different factors to apply to rehabilitative alimony. Foster v. Foster, 2016 Ark. 456, 506 S.W.3d 808 (2016).

Circuit court did not err in interpreting this section or in finding that a wife was entitled to rehabilitative alimony because it specifically found after analyzing all of the appropriate factors, including the financial circumstances of both parties, that the wife's proposed plan was reasonable; the circuit court was correct in considering the wife's history as a homemaker in deciding whether she was entitled to rehabilitative alimony. Foster v. Foster, 2016 Ark. 456, 506 S.W.3d 808 (2016).

Legislature expressly chose not to make a rehabilitative plan a mandatory prerequisite to an award of rehabilitative alimony, nor did the Legislature choose to impose specific requirements on the recipient of rehabilitative alimony, such as education or training. Foster v. Foster, 2016 Ark. 456, 506 S.W.3d 808 (2016).

There is no requirement in this section that a rehabilitation plan contain specific goals or requirements regarding education or training on the part of the payee; subdivision (b)(3) merely allows the payor to petition the court for a review if the requirements of a rehabilitative plan are not being met, and this section does not mandate that a plan be submitted, nor does it require that any plan that is submitted contain specific, measurable requirements. Foster v. Foster, 2016 Ark. 456, 506 S.W.3d 808 (2016).

There was no abuse of discretion by the circuit court with regard to the amount or the duration of the rehabilitative alimony awarded to the wife because it was not unreasonable to allow the wife 10 years in which to become completely self-supporting given that she had contributed to the development of the husband's career during their 12-year marriage by being the primary caregiver to their three children. Foster v. Foster, 2016 Ark. 456, 506 S.W.3d 808 (2016).

Calculation of the three-year rehabilitative alimony award to the wife was affirmed where, inter alia, the wife waiving a right to an interest in a marital asset in the property settlement agreement did not impact consideration of her earning ability and the husband's bonuses in calculating alimony; and this section does not mandate that a rehabilitative plan be submitted and the husband did not request one. Carr v. Carr, 2019 Ark. App. 513, 588 S.W.3d 821 (2019).

Remarriage.

Remarriage of the divorced wife is sufficient grounds to entitle the husband to a termination of alimony payments upon proper application to the court granting the original decree but the remarriage does not of itself terminate the obligation. Wear v. Boydstone, 230 Ark. 580, 324 S.W.2d 337 (1959).

Subsequent judgments on original decree were not void because of remarriage of wife but husband was entitled to proceed for modification of judgments where it did not appear that chancellor was aware of wife's remarriage at the time he allowed the judgments. Wear v. Boydstone, 230 Ark. 580, 324 S.W.2d 337 (1959) (preceding decisions prior to 1989 amendment by No. 100).

This section clearly requires that remarriage of the person who is awarded alimony must be specifically mentioned in the divorce decree or alimony agreement if the automatic cessation of liability for alimony is not to occur upon such event. Smith v. Smith, 41 Ark. App. 29, 848 S.W.2d 428 (1993).

Former wife's cohabitation with another man could not be viewed as the equivalent to marriage for purposes of determining whether she was entitled to continue receiving alimony payments from the former husband where there was no evidence that the former wife had assumed the man's name, that she held herself out publicly as his wife, or that he had assumed responsibility for her care and maintenance. Herman v. Herman, 335 Ark. 36, 977 S.W.2d 209 (1998).

By using the words “unless otherwise … agreed by the parties,” the General Assembly clearly indicated that it is permissible for a divorcing couple to contractually agree to continue alimony even after one of the parties has children with another person and is obligated to pay child support. Rockefeller v. Rockefeller, 335 Ark. 145, 980 S.W.2d 255 (1998).

Husband's argument that the wife was not entitled to alimony payments under subsection (a) of this section because she had remarried was rejected where the payments at issue were properly characterized as periodic distributions of marital property and not alimony. Surratt v. Surratt, 85 Ark. App. 267, 148 S.W.3d 761 (2004).

In a domestic relations case, the trial court did not err in refusing to terminate an ex-husband's alimony obligation upon his ex-wife's remarriage pursuant to this section because the parties had contracted for the ex-husband's alimony obligation to continue beyond the ex-wife's remarriage, so the statute's automatic termination provision regarding remarriage was not applicable. Artman v. Hoy, 370 Ark. 131, 257 S.W.3d 864 (2007).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the wife still had a need for alimony despite remarrying; although the wife's expenses had been reduced as a result of the marriage, she was still falling short every month, and the husband had the ability to pay the reduced amount. Dace v. Doss, 2017 Ark. App. 531, 530 S.W.3d 893 (2017).

Modification of subsection (b) of this section by Acts 2013, No. 1487, concerning rehabilitative alimony, did not call into question the validity of permanent alimony awards; and, in any event, in this case, the parties were divorced before August 16, 2013. Dace v. Doss, 2017 Ark. App. 531, 530 S.W.3d 893 (2017).

Circuit court properly denied an ex-husband's request for automatic termination of alimony payments upon the remarriage of his ex-wife; while the trial court erred in finding that the “alimony” payments in the decree were provisions of a property-settlement agreement and not, in actuality, alimony payments, both parties admitted to an agreement regarding the payment of alimony to cover the remaining balance of an automobile loan and agreed to alimony payments of a designated sum for a designated period of time. Martens v. Blasingame, 2018 Ark. App. 96, 541 S.W.3d 492 (2018).

Provisions of this section providing for the automatic termination of alimony when the receiving spouse remarries or cohabitates do not apply to an agreement for the payment of alimony over a term of years, even when the decree does not specifically address the effect of remarriage or cohabitation on the alimony obligation. Martens v. Blasingame, 2018 Ark. App. 96, 541 S.W.3d 492 (2018).

Res Judicata.

Where a judgment is based upon rights conferred by a statute later declared unconstitutional, the doctrine of res judicata bars the relitigation of the case in which it was rendered, or the reopening of the judgment after it has become final. Boyles v. Boyles, 268 Ark. 120, 594 S.W.2d 17 (1980).

Where husband waited four years after the divorce decree to argue that this section was violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the husband plainly did not raise nor pursue the constitutional issue with diligence and the matter was res judicata. Mensch v. Mensch, 268 Ark. 1022, 597 S.W.2d 859 (Ct. App. 1980) (decision prior to 1979 amendment).

Temporary Rehabilitative Alimony.

An award of temporary rehabilitative alimony, which required the husband to pay for tuition, books, and fees for the wife to attend college for up to five years, was not an abuse of discretion, notwithstanding the wife's assertion that she was the mother of four children, had a full time job, and did not have time to go to school, where the wife was a school teacher and earned only slightly less than the husband, and the husband paid more child support than the support chart indicated, even though he had custody of one of the children. Myrick v. Myrick, 339 Ark. 1, 2 S.W.3d 60 (1999).

Trial court's ruling that estate was liable for husband's temporary alimony payments was reversed as, under this section, the husband's obligation for the payment of temporary alimony terminated upon his death; however, the estate was liable for the amount the husband was in arrears up to the point of his death. Estate of Carpenter v. Carpenter, 93 Ark. App. 441, 220 S.W.3d 263 (2005).

Torts.

A spouse involved in a divorce, having a cause of action in tort against his or her spouse, is not required to bring that action in the divorce case and can pursue the claim in circuit court. Cater v. Cater, 311 Ark. 627, 846 S.W.2d 173 (1993).

Trusts.

The statute does not give a chancellor the authority to establish a trust for a child with the support funds paid out of the amount established for child support. Smith v. Smith, 341 Ark. 590, 19 S.W.3d 590 (2000).

Written Findings.

Where noncustodial parent's income exceeds the amount for which there is a specific entry on the child-support chart, necessitating a separate calculation made in accordance with the child-support guidelines, the same imperative applies regarding written findings for deviation from the level of support indicated by the guidelines. Stepp v. Gray, 58 Ark. App. 229, 947 S.W.2d 798 (1997).

Trial court erred in awarding to the mother, the noncustodial parent, the right to claim a child for tax exemption purposes without providing the requisite written or specific findings to support the decision; an award of a tax exemption to a noncustodial parent resulted in a deviation from the child support chart. Dumas v. Tucker, 82 Ark. App. 173, 119 S.W.3d 516 (2003).

Where the husband's income of $540,217.00 was reduced to an annual salary of $476,171.00 and the trial court deviated downward from the family support chart in reducing his child support to $7607.75 a month, the award was reversed because the trial court failed to make specific findings supporting a deviation. Morehouse v. Lawson, 94 Ark. App. 374, 231 S.W.3d 86 (2006).

Circuit court erred in ordering a father to pay child support and child support arrearage because the circuit court's order did not contain a determination of the father's income, did not refer to the guidelines pursuant to this section or the support amount required thereunder, and did not recite whether it deviated from the family-support chart as required under Administrative Order of the Supreme Court No. 10, § I; under § I, the circuit court's order shall (1) contain the circuit court's determination of the payor's income, (2) recite the amount of support required under the guidelines, and (3) recite whether the circuit court deviated from the family support chart. Bradford v. Johnson, 2010 Ark. App. 492 (2010).

Cited: Law v. Law, 248 Ark. 894, 455 S.W.2d 854 (1970); Russell v. Russell, 275 Ark. 193, 628 S.W.2d 315 (1982); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 299 Ark. 200, 771 S.W.2d 764 (1989); Roe v. State, 304 Ark. 673, 804 S.W.2d 708 (1991); Green v. Bell, 308 Ark. 473, 826 S.W.2d 226 (1992); Heflin v. Bell, 52 Ark. App. 201, 916 S.W.2d 769 (1996); Sanderson v. Harris, 330 Ark. 741, 957 S.W.2d 685 (1997); Guest v. San Pedro, 70 Ark. App. 389, 19 S.W.3d 62 (2000); Weir v. Phillips, 75 Ark. App. 208, 55 S.W.3d 804 (2001); In re Admin. Order No. 10: Ark. Child Support Guidelines, 347 Ark. 1064 (2002); Johnson v. Cotton-Johnson, 88 Ark. App. 67, 194 S.W.3d 806 (2004).