Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-233 (2026)

Arrearages — Interest and attorney's fees — Work activities and incarceration

✓ current as of May 2026
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  1. All child support that becomes due and remains unpaid shall accrue interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum unless the owner of the judgment or the owner's counsel of record requests prior to the accrual of the interest that the judgment shall not accrue interest.
  2. The circuit court shall award a minimum of ten percent (10%) of the support amount due or any reasonable fee, including a contingency fee approved by the circuit court, as attorney's fees in actions for the enforcement of payment of support provided for in the order.
  3. Collection of interest and attorney's fees may be by executions, proceedings of contempt, or other remedies as may be available to collect the original support award.
    1. In all cases brought pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act wherein the custodial parent or children receive temporary assistance for needy families or benefits under the food stamp program, the Supplemental Security Income program, Medicaid, and the Children's Health Insurance Program and the obligated parent owes overdue child support, the court shall order the obligated parent to pay the overdue amount according to a plan approved by the court and in compliance with this Code.
      1. If the obligated parent subject to such a plan is not incapacitated, the circuit court may order the obligated parent to participate in work activities including, but not limited to, unsubsidized employment, subsidized private sector employment, subsidized public sector employment, work experience including work associated with the refurbishing of publicly assisted housing in the event that sufficient private sector employment is not available.
      2. The number of hours that the obligated parent must participate in work activities per week shall be set by the court in an appropriate order.
      3. Additionally, the circuit court may order the obligated parent to spend a minimum number of hours engaged in applying for available positions that the obligor is qualified to fill and keep records of such activities as directed by the court.
    2. If the obligated parent can demonstrate enrollment and full participation in job-related training, which may include on-the-job-training, job search and job readiness assistance, community service programs, vocational education training not to exceed twelve (12) months' duration, job skills training directly related to employment, education directly related to employment if the obligated parent has not received a high school diploma or high school equivalency diploma approved by the Adult Education Section, the circuit court may substitute such participation in lieu of work activities as set out in subsection (e) of this section.
  4. If the obligated parent who is not incapacitated refuses to pay past due support or refuses to engage in work activities or seek work activities as ordered by the court, the court may order the obligated parent to be incarcerated.
  5. In any action brought for the enforcement of a child support obligation, whenever the court orders an obligated parent to be incarcerated for failure to obey a previous order, the court may further direct that the obligated parent be temporarily released from confinement to engage in work activity upon such terms and conditions as the court deems just.

History. Acts 1989, No. 383, § 2; 1995, No. 707, § 1; 1997, No. 1296, § 30; 1999, No. 1514, §§ 15, 16; 2001, No. 1248, §§ 11-13; 2015, No. 1115, § 21.

Amendments. The 2015 amendment substituted “high school equivalency diploma approved by the Department of Career Education” for “general education development certificate” in (d)(3).

Meaning of “this Code”. See § 1-2-113(b).

U.S. Code. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, referred to in this section, is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.

Cross References. For child support enforcement guidelines, see the Appendix at the end of this subtitle.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Family Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 483.

Case Notes

Attorney's Fee.

Award of attorney's fees to an adult son seeking unpaid child support was proper because subsection (b) of this section did not require the trial court to award a contingency fee. Mills v. Mills, 2009 Ark. App. 175, 315 S.W.3d 707 (2009).

Judgment Interest.

Upon awarding unpaid child support to a 22-year-old son, who intervened in a domestic relations case between his parents to collect the unpaid support on his own behalf, the trial court erred under subsection (a) of this section in awarding interest from the date the petition to collect child support was filed because it should have been awarded from the date the child support should have been paid. Mills v. Mills, 2009 Ark. App. 175, 315 S.W.3d 707 (2009).

Court affirmed the trial court's order concerning the support of appellant's minor child because appellant's assertion that she was entitled to interest under this section and to attorney's fees was barred by res judicata, and res judicata also barred relitigation of the child-support arrearage issue as the question had already been reduced to judgment by the trial court's original support order under §§ 9-12-314 and 9-14-234. Williams v. Nesbitt, 2012 Ark. App. 408, 421 S.W.3d 320 (2012).

Cited: Gould v. Gould, 308 Ark. 213, 823 S.W.2d 890 (1992); Branch v. Carter, 54 Ark. App. 70, 923 S.W.2d 874 (1996).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1992–2026 · leading case: Jeffery C. Frazier v. Jana Bland & Paige Bland, 2024 Ark. App. 495 (Ark. Ct. App. 2024).
Jeffery C. Frazier v. Jana Bland & Paige Bland, 2024 Ark. App. 495 (Ark. Ct. App. 2024). · cites it 11× “Specifically, Jeffery asserted that Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-233 (b) allows for attorney’s fees for only the enforcement of an existing child-support order, and this was an action for the establishment of an original child-support obligation.”
Gould v. Gould, 823 S.W.2d 890 (Ark. 1992). · cites it 3× “In support of her statutory argument that attorney’s fee arrearages reduced to judgment may be enforced by contempt, Shirley Gould cites another subsection of § 2 of Act 383 of 1989, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-233 (c) (1987), which provides: Arrearages — Interest and attorneys’ fees.”
Mills v. Mills, 315 S.W.3d 707 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 18× “We reverse and remand for the trial court to recalculate the amount of interest due to appellant, but we find no abuse of discretion with regard to the court’s award of attorney’s fees. | ¿Interest We turn to appellant’s first point on appeal: interest awarded.”
Williams v. Nesbitt, 421 S.W.3d 320 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 2× “Williams’s reliance on Mills is misplaced.”
Whitworth v. Whitworth, 961 S.W.2d 768 (Ark. 1998). · cites it 2× “See also Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-233 (Supp. 1995). In reading Strickland’s testimony and the colloquy between the bench and counsel, it would appear a copy of the parties’ divorce decree and the 1993 order were being referenced, but these orders were not made a part of the record.”
Brandt v. Brandt, 286 S.W.3d 202 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-233 (a) (Repl. 2008).”
Harley v. Dempster, 2017 Ark. App. 159 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 3× “§ 9-14-233 , which governs arrearages. Reversed and remanded.”
Williams v. Lofton, 569 S.W.3d 872 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 2× “Likewise, we remand to the circuit court for a determination of whether a material change of circumstances occurred.”
Kirby v. Semeyn, 2017 Ark. App. 556 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “The court held that attorney’s fees were mandatory pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-14-233(b), calculating the award based on the 2015 and 2016 support awarded and the amounts Jeffrey was ordered to pay into the trust fund.”
Branch v. Carter, 923 S.W.2d 874 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 2× “Therefore, we reverse and remand to the trial court for an award of support to appellant for this additional period of' time, and for the statutory attorney’s fee and interest provided under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-233 on the total child support owed in the sum of $12,966.”
Barham v. Bowman, 2017 Ark. App. 507 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 4× “Therefore, we remand this one issue involving ten-percent interest on the child-support arrearage to the trial court to consider the applicability of section 9-14-233 to the facts of this case.”
Deston Linkous v. Courtney Linkous, 2026 Ark. App. 261 (Ark. Ct. App. 2026). · cites it 2× “Nothing in the statute conditions an award of fees on a party prevailing on ancillary issues such as visitation and contempt.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-233(a) — 2 cases
Mills v. Mills, 315 S.W.3d 707 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009). “We reverse and remand for the trial court to recalculate the amount of interest due to appellant, but we find no abuse of discretion with regard to the court’s award of attorney’s fees. | ¿Interest We turn to appellant’s first point on appeal: interest awarded.”
Barham v. Bowman, 2017 Ark. App. 507 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017). “Therefore, we remand this one issue involving ten-percent interest on the child-support arrearage to the trial court to consider the applicability of section 9-14-233 to the facts of this case.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-233(b) — 4 cases
Jeffery C. Frazier v. Jana Bland & Paige Bland, 2024 Ark. App. 495 (Ark. Ct. App. 2024). “Specifically, Jeffery asserted that Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-233 (b) allows for attorney’s fees for only the enforcement of an existing child-support order, and this was an action for the establishment of an original child-support obligation.”
Kirby v. Semeyn, 2017 Ark. App. 556 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017). “The court held that attorney’s fees were mandatory pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-14-233(b), calculating the award based on the 2015 and 2016 support awarded and the amounts Jeffrey was ordered to pay into the trust fund.”
Mills v. Mills, 315 S.W.3d 707 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009). “We reverse and remand for the trial court to recalculate the amount of interest due to appellant, but we find no abuse of discretion with regard to the court’s award of attorney’s fees. | ¿Interest We turn to appellant’s first point on appeal: interest awarded.”
Deston Linkous v. Courtney Linkous, 2026 Ark. App. 261 (Ark. Ct. App. 2026). “Nothing in the statute conditions an award of fees on a party prevailing on ancillary issues such as visitation and contempt.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-233(c) — 1 case
Gould v. Gould, 823 S.W.2d 890 (Ark. 1992). “In support of her statutory argument that attorney’s fee arrearages reduced to judgment may be enforced by contempt, Shirley Gould cites another subsection of § 2 of Act 383 of 1989, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-233 (c) (1987), which provides: Arrearages — Interest and attorneys’ fees.”
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