Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-306 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, Waiver and the Special Appearance in Arkansas: Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Farris, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 883.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Family Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 483.

Jerald A. Sharum, The Arkansas Supreme Court’s Unconstitutional Power Grab in Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Shelby and the Judiciary’s Authority in Child-Welfare Cases, 37 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 391 (2015).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Former statute which provided that the judge of the juvenile court in each county could appoint a referee who had power to hear and pass on all juvenile cases of girls and of boys did not provide for the creation of a new court and thus did not violate Ark. Const., Art. 7 §§ 28 and 29. Fortin v. Parrish (In re Giurbino), 258 Ark. 277, 524 S.W.2d 236 (1975), overruled in part, Hutton v. Savage, 298 Ark. 256, 769 S.W.2d 394 (1989) (decision under prior law).

In General.

The Arkansas Juvenile Code of 1975 did not require that all juveniles, persons under 18 years of age, be charged and tried for criminal acts in juvenile court. Sargent v. Cole, 269 Ark. 121, 598 S.W.2d 749 (1980) (decision under prior law).

The enactment of the Arkansas Juvenile Code of 1975 in no way interfered with jurisdiction of the chancery court; the chancery courts retained general jurisdiction over the persons and the properties of minors. Jones v. Jones, 13 Ark. App. 102, 680 S.W.2d 118 (1984) (decision under prior law).

The juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over all of the offenses charged against a juvenile with the exception of those listed in § 9-27-318(b). Banks v. State, 306 Ark. 273, 813 S.W.2d 256 (1991).

The jurisdiction of the juvenile court is exclusive and original with respect to all offenses charged against a juvenile who is aged 14 years at the time of the commission of those offenses, with the exception of those offenses enumerated in § 9-27-318(b). Webb v. State, 318 Ark. 581, 886 S.W.2d 624 (1994).

Construction.

The statutes of the juvenile court clearly support the conclusion that a direct transfer of a case is effected by a transfer order; the transfer of the case, viewed from the perspective of the transferor court, in the language of § 9-27-318(b)(2) (“transfer the case to juvenile court”) (now see § 9-27-318(d)), is mirrored in the language of § 9-27-310(a), which provides, from the perspective of the transferee court, that proceedings in juvenile court “shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the chancery court or by transfer by another court.” Webb v. State, 318 Ark. 581, 886 S.W.2d 624 (1994).

Age of Juvenile.

Circuit court improperly held an extended juvenile jurisdiction review hearing and sentenced appellant, a juvenile when the crime of rape was committed, to an adult sentence because he had reached the age of 21 before the hearing was scheduled and conducted, and before the sentencing order was entered. Review hearing under § 9-27-507 had to be held prior to a juvenile turning 21. Z.L. v. State, 2015 Ark. 484, 478 S.W.3d 207 (2015).

Appealable Order.

Order which recited that the chancery court lacked personal jurisdiction and that any petition for termination of parental rights would have to be filed in another state decisively concluded the right to file for termination of parental rights in Arkansas and was, therefore, final and appealable. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Farris, 309 Ark. 575, 832 S.W.2d 482 (1992).

Central Registry.

The juvenile court does not have the statutory authority to order the removal of a name from the central registry of child maltreatment; the responsibility for the placement of names on the registry is vested in the Department of Human Services, and the decision is subject to administrative review. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Thomas, 71 Ark. App. 348, 33 S.W.3d 514 (2000).

Collateral Attack.

The exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles is not a permissible function of the county courts under Ark. Const., Art. 7, §§ 1 and 28, but, since county courts have exercised jurisdiction over juveniles in the past under color of law, their proceedings and judgments may not be collaterally attacked. Walker v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 291 Ark. 43, 722 S.W.2d 558 (1987) (decision under prior law).

Consolidated Proceedings.

Consolidation in juvenile court of divorce proceedings with custody proceedings involving several fathers and an allegation of dependency-neglect upheld to prevent conflicting custody orders within the same judicial district. Lowell v. Lowell, 55 Ark. App. 211, 934 S.W.2d 540 (1996).

Criminal Offenses.

Regardless of an adult's immunity from prosecution for the mere possession of a handgun, the General Assembly has clearly made the possession of a handgun a misdemeanor offense for juveniles; the juvenile court has jurisdiction of a juvenile charged with possession of a handgun. Lucas v. State, 319 Ark. 752, 894 S.W.2d 891 (1995).

Construing “minor in possession of a handgun” in violation of § 5-73-119(a)(1) in tandem with the grant of jurisdiction to juvenile court in subdivision (a)(1) of this section and the definition of “delinquent juvenile” in § 9-27-303, provides the juvenile court with jurisdiction of the handgun charge. Jones v. State, 319 Ark. 762, 894 S.W.2d 591 (1995).

Custody.

Where children had been abandoned by parents and temporarily placed by the juvenile court in the custody of the state social services agency, it was proper for custody dispute between social services and parents to be tried in the chancery court while the temporary custody of the children was tried in the juvenile court. Robins v. Ark. Soc. Servs., 273 Ark. 241, 617 S.W.2d 857 (1981), superseded by statute as stated in, Nance v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 316 Ark. 43, 870 S.W.2d 721 (1994) (decision under prior law).

Minors are wards of the chancery court, and it is the duty of those courts to make all orders that will properly safeguard their rights, including the awarding of their custody to persons other than natural parents, if circumstances warrant. Jones v. Jones, 13 Ark. App. 102, 680 S.W.2d 118 (1984) (decision under prior law).

Where father filed pleadings with the court seeking affirmative relief on the merits of the case concerning custody of children, and accepted counsel, who represented him in all phases of the proceedings, he could not complain that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over him for the subsequent purpose of terminating his parental rights. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Farris, 309 Ark. 575, 832 S.W.2d 482 (1992).

Exclusive Jurisdiction.

Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) was not entitled to certiorari relief in a dependency-neglect proceeding because the circuit court was within its exclusive jurisdiction to act to protect the integrity of the proceeding and to safeguard the rights of the litigants before it when it ordered DHS to correct problems that were preventing work and services. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54 (2012).

While the circuit court might have erred in allowing a prior, closed dependency-neglect case to be reopened, it had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the petition and enter the termination order, the parents failed to raise any argument to the circuit court concerning the reopening of the closed dependency-neglect case, and any error in that regard on the part of the circuit court was waived and not preserved for appeal. Ward v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 106 (2015).

Judgment.

Judgment of juvenile court must have recited all jurisdictional facts to be free from collateral attack. Jackson v. Roach, 176 Ark. 688, 3 S.W.2d 976 (1928) (decision under prior law).

Jurisdiction.

Circuit court, juvenile division, had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the guardianship proceeding, which arose out of dependency-neglect proceedings. While the circuit court might have erred in retaining jurisdiction in the absence of a formal request, a failure to follow statutory procedure does not oust the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court. Subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i) of this section contemplates that the circuit court's juvenile division may exercise jurisdiction over a juvenile up to 21 years of age; because the mother did not object to the irregularity in the proceedings below, her argument was not preserved. Kantor v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 402, 559 S.W.3d 747 (2018).

Parties.

Where children had been temporarily abandoned by their parents, the state was the proper party plaintiff in its public guardianship capacity because an emergency situation involving children existed. Robins v. Ark. Soc. Servs., 273 Ark. 241, 617 S.W.2d 857 (1981), superseded by statute as stated in, Nance v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 316 Ark. 43, 870 S.W.2d 721 (1994) (decision under prior law).

Reopening of Case.

Arkansas Supreme Court held in Young v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. 334, that the circuit court erred in reopening a two-year-closed dependency-neglect case to entertain a petition for modification of visitation, but the Court of Appeals does not interpret the opinion as forbidding the reopening of a closed dependency-neglect case in all circumstances, nor does the Court of Appeals discern that the Supreme Court offered a remedy for any alleged error in doing so. Abram v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 437, 502 S.W.3d 563 (2016).

In this dependency-neglect case, decided on its own merits, occurring less than a month after the initial dependency-neglect case had been closed, and over which the circuit court clearly had subject-matter jurisdiction, the denial of the mother's motion to dismiss was not error; it was further noted that the mother did not object to the case having been reopened until the end of the termination hearing, over a year after the alleged error occurred, and it should have been brought to the circuit court's attention. Abram v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 437, 502 S.W.3d 563 (2016).

Transfer.

A probate court's failure to transfer an adoption case to the juvenile court would constitute reversible error had a party objected or brought it to the court's attention; however, the court was not acting without jurisdiction in hearing the matter. Appellant's failure to request a transfer of the case or otherwise question the propriety of the probate court hearing the case waived the issue. In re D.J.M., 39 Ark. App. 116, 839 S.W.2d 535 (1992).

The circuit court's in personam jurisdiction of a juvenile, once surrendered pursuant to a valid hearing on the motion to transfer, may not be reconferred upon the transferor court simply by the state's unilateral action of there refiling its charges against that juvenile. Webb v. State, 318 Ark. 581, 886 S.W.2d 624 (1994).

What the prosecutor chooses to charge in the circuit court with respect to a juvenile is not necessarily determinative of the forum for trial; that decision rests with the circuit court. Webb v. State, 318 Ark. 581, 886 S.W.2d 624 (1994).

As the criminal division of the circuit court lost its exclusive jurisdiction over a juvenile's case when it transferred the case to the juvenile division pursuant to § 9-27-318, the criminal division lacked authority to later set aside its transfer order, and that order was a nullity. C.H. v. State, 2010 Ark. 279, 365 S.W.3d 879 (2010).

Cited: Robinson v. Sutterfield, 302 Ark. 7, 786 S.W.2d 572 (1990); Juvenile H. v. Crabtree, 310 Ark. 208, 833 S.W.2d 766 (1992); Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Collier, 351 Ark. 506, 95 S.W.3d 772 (2003);

Hays v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 864, 372 S.W.3d 830 (2009); Williams v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 171, 458 S.W.3d 271 (2015).