Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, Choosing the Forum: Prosecutorial Discretion and Walker v. State, 46 Ark. L. Rev. 985.

Cotton, When the Punishment Cannot Fit the Crime: The Case for Reforming the Juvenile Justice System, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 563.

Comment: The Perpetuation of Illusory Rights in the Arkansas Juvenile Code, 57 Ark. L. Rev. 275 (2004).

Quincy A. M. Jordan, Comment: The Odd Couple: Reid Interviews & Miranda Custody, 69 Ark. L. Rev. 143 (2016).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Criminal Law, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 753.

Fifteenth Annual Survey of Arkansas Law, 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 427.

Seventeenth Annual Survey of Arkansas Law — Criminal Procedure, 17 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 449.

Arkansas' Missed Opportunity for Rehabilitation: Sending Children to Adult Courts, 20 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 77.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Caselaw: Criminal Law, 27 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 671.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Subsection (c) of this section — which grants the prosecuting attorney, when a case involves a juvenile sixteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of a felony offense, “discretion to file a petition in juvenile court alleging delinquency or to file charges in circuit court and to prosecute as an adult” — does not violate federal and state constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. Beck v. State, 317 Ark. 154, 876 S.W.2d 561 (1994).

Court properly denied appellant's motion to declare this section unconstitutional because he failed to demonstrate that the statute was arbitrary or irrational; appellant lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the sentencing authorized by this section because there had been no formal adjudication of guilt and appellant had not been sentenced. Otis v. State, 355 Ark. 590, 142 S.W.3d 615 (2004).

This section, which vested prosecutors with the discretion to bring felony charges against 16-year-olds in the criminal divisions of circuit courts, was substantive law and not a rule of pleading, practice, and procedure; therefore, it did not violate separation of powers under Ark. Const. Art. 4, §§ 1, 2. Also, subsection (c) of this section did not deny a juvenile equal protection of the law because treatment as a juvenile was not an inherent right and could be modified by the legislature. C.B. v. State, 2012 Ark. 220, 406 S.W.3d 796 (2012).

In General.

The operation of this section underscores the importance of the prosecutor's choice in charging because the General Assembly has not based court assignment in juvenile cases upon the nature of the offense committed but upon what the prosecutor chooses to charge. Webb v. State, 318 Ark. 581, 886 S.W.2d 624 (1994).

A juvenile court does not have authority to sua sponte transfer a case to the circuit court. Chavez v. State, 71 Ark. App. 29, 25 S.W.3d 431 (2000).

Construction.

The plain meaning of the words “the prosecuting attorney has the discretion to file … in circuit court and to prosecute as an adult” in subsection (c) of this section, is that when the prosecutor chooses to prosecute a juvenile in circuit court as an adult, the juvenile becomes subject to the procedures and penalties prescribed for adults. Boyd v. State, 313 Ark. 171, 853 S.W.2d 263 (1993).

The “case” transferred, within the meaning of this section, includes a direct transfer of a first-degree battery charge to the juvenile court. Webb v. State, 318 Ark. 581, 886 S.W.2d 624 (1994).

The statutes of the juvenile court clearly support the conclusion that a direct transfer of a case is effected by a transfer order. Webb v. State, 318 Ark. 581, 886 S.W.2d 624 (1994).

Although commission of a felony while armed with a firearm is a basis of concurrent jurisdiction of a circuit court over a juvenile, it is not one of the factors to be considered in making the transfer decision; subsection (e) (now (g)) of this section provides the factors to be considered. Green v. State, 323 Ark. 635, 916 S.W.2d 756 (1996).

It is not necessary for the trial court to give equal weight to each of the factors in subsection (e) (now (g)) of this section. Miller v. State, 328 Ark. 121, 942 S.W.2d 825 (1997).

Applicability.

Where juvenile had been arrested on a circuit court felony bench warrant, but neither the abstract nor transcript showed a copy of an indictment or information setting out the felony offenses with which the juvenile was charged, the juvenile had not been charged with a felony in circuit court as an adult when the law officers interrogated him and gained his confession; thus, the Juvenile Code was applicable at the time juvenile gave his statement, and his statement was therefore inadmissible at trial because the law enforcement officer's conduct failed to comport with required Juvenile Code procedures when they obtained juvenile's confession. Rhoades v. State, 315 Ark. 658, 869 S.W.2d 698 (1994).

The circuit court did not have jurisdiction to try the defendant for second-degree battery whether he was 14 or 15 years old since second-degree battery was not an enumerated offense. Jones v. State, 333 Ark. 208, 969 S.W.2d 618 (1998).

Age of Juvenile.

Jurisdiction of the juvenile court is exclusive and original with respect to all offenses charged against a juvenile who is 14 years old at the time of the commission of those offenses, with the exception of certain offenses enumerated in subdivision (b)(1) of this section; the same law applies to juveniles who are 15 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged offenses. State v. Gray, 319 Ark. 356, 891 S.W.2d 376 (1995).

Transfer properly denied where juvenile, charged with committing theft nine days before turning 18, had committed the prior crimes of theft, battery, and aggravated robbery, had violated probation, and where the juvenile was too close to age 19 and therefore ineligible under § 9-28-208 to be committed to the Division of Youth Services. Brown v. State, 330 Ark. 518, 954 S.W.2d 276 (1997).

Eighteen-year-old defendant seeking transfer to juvenile court argued that because he was seventeen when the alleged offenses occurred, he could be adjudicated delinquent and kept under the watchful eyes of the court until his twenty-first birthday; such argument was held unpersuasive when charges of serious and violent felony offenses remained to be adjudicated and the defendant was already eighteen years of age at the time of the hearing on the motion to transfer. Brown v. State, 330 Ark. 603, 954 S.W.2d 273 (1997).

Appellate Review.

In juvenile transfer cases, the standard of review on appeal is no longer abuse of discretion. Acts 1989, No. 273 requires the trial court to support a juvenile transfer decision by a finding of clear and convincing evidence; consequently, findings of fact by the trial court will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Walker v. State, 304 Ark. 393, 803 S.W.2d 502 (1991).

The standard of review in juvenile transfer cases is whether the trial judge's finding is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, and findings of fact by the trial court will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Smith v. State, 307 Ark. 223, 818 S.W.2d 945 (1991); Slay v. State, 309 Ark. 507, 832 S.W.2d 217 (1992).

The standard for review is whether the circuit court's denial of a transfer was clearly erroneous. Vickers v. State, 307 Ark. 298, 819 S.W.2d 13 (1991); Booker v. State, 324 Ark. 468, 922 S.W.2d 337 (1996).

The appellate court will not reverse a circuit court's denial of a motion to transfer a case to juvenile court unless it determines the denial was clearly erroneous. Williams v. State, 313 Ark. 451, 856 S.W.2d 4 (1993); Hansen v. State, 323 Ark. 407, 914 S.W.2d 737 (1996); Butler v. State, 324 Ark. 476, 922 S.W.2d 685 (1996).

Where defendant argued that the hearing on his motion to transfer this matter to juvenile court did not meet the due process standards required by this section, but failed to include a transcript of the juvenile transfer hearing in the record, the appellate court had to assume that the trial court ruled correctly based on the arguments and testimony presented. Tucker v. State, 313 Ark. 624, 855 S.W.2d 948 (1993), overruled in part, Missildine v. State, 314 Ark. 500, 863 S.W.2d 813 (1993).

On appeal of a decision to retain jurisdiction or transfer a case to the juvenile court, the trial court's findings will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Porter v. State, 43 Ark. App. 110, 861 S.W.2d 122 (1993).

Where an interlocutory appeal is permitted by subsection (h) (now l)) of this section, jurisdiction is properly in the Supreme Court under S. Ct. & Ct. App. Rule 1-2(a). Sebastian v. State, 318 Ark. 494, 885 S.W.2d 882 (1994).

A juvenile cannot challenge transfer orders on direct appeal from a judgment of conviction in the circuit court. Hamilton v. State, 320 Ark. 346, 896 S.W.2d 877 (1995).

For criminal prosecutions commenced after May 1, 1995, an appeal from an order granting or denying transfer of a case from one court to another having jurisdiction over juvenile matters must be considered by way of interlocutory appeal, and an appeal from such an order after a judgment of conviction in circuit court is untimely and will not be considered. Hamilton v. State, 320 Ark. 346, 896 S.W.2d 877 (1995).

Meaningful review of the trial court's denial of a motion to transfer is impossible without a record of the hearing, and it is the appellant's duty to produce such a record. Miller v. State, 328 Ark. 121, 942 S.W.2d 825 (1997).

Motion for belated appeal was remanded for the circuit court to determine whether defendant requested either of his attorneys to file an appeal of an order denying the transfer of the cause against him to juvenile court on his behalf before the deadline for notice of appeal and, if such a request was made to either attorney, whether that attorney admitted fault for not timely filing the notice of appeal. Bryant v. State, 359 Ark. 244, 195 S.W.3d 924 (2004).

Denial of defendant's motion to transfer his case to the juvenile division of the lower court was upheld as defendant abandoned the sufficiency of the argument relating to the trial court's decision to deny his transfer, and the appellate court refused to consider defendant's arguments challenging the constitutionality of this section because they were not made in conjunction with a valid interlocutory claim. Barton v. State, 96 Ark. App. 23, 237 S.W.3d 512 (2006).

Court's declaration of extended juvenile jurisdiction was in error as was the resulting sentence that committed the juvenile to the Department of Corrections for a term of three years, because the juvenile was not charged with any of the statute's enumerated crimes; questions of jurisdiction may be heard on the appellate court's own motion even in the absence of an objection below. R.B. v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 377 (2013).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion to transfer his case to the juvenile division because, after remand, the circuit court entered an order enumerating the findings required by this section and found that, inter alia, the seriousness of the alleged offense of battery in the first degree required prosecution in the criminal division of circuit court; and, what defendant really sought was for the appellate court to reweigh the factors considered by the circuit court, but the appellate court would not reweigh the evidence presented to the circuit court. McClendon v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 217, 599 S.W.3d 668 (2020).

Burden of Proof.

A moving party's burden of proof is separate and apart from the standard of clear and convincing evidence which the trial court must find. The ultimate issue under subsection (f) (now subdivision (h)(2)) of this section is not who has the burden of proof or who must meet that burden of proof, but rather, whether the trial court finds clear and convincing evidence. Walker v. State, 304 Ark. 393, 803 S.W.2d 502 (1991).

The moving party seeking to transfer a defendant from one jurisdiction to another has the burden of proof. Walker v. State, 304 Ark. 393, 803 S.W.2d 502 (1991); Booker v. State, 324 Ark. 468, 922 S.W.2d 337 (1996).

If the court finds that a juvenile should be tried as an adult, it must do so by clear and convincing evidence. Vickers v. State, 307 Ark. 298, 819 S.W.2d 13 (1991); Butler v. State, 324 Ark. 476, 922 S.W.2d 685 (1996).

Defendant has the burden of going forward with the proof to show a transfer to juvenile court is warranted under this section. Williams v. State, 313 Ark. 451, 856 S.W.2d 4 (1993).

It was not necessary that proof of each factor listed in subsection (e) (now (g)) of this section be presented or that the trial court give each factor equal weight. Cole v. State, 323 Ark. 136, 913 S.W.2d 779 (1996).

Defendant, as the party seeking the transfer, has the burden of proving the transfer is warranted; however, if the circuit court decides to retain jurisdiction of the juvenile's case, that decision must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. Guy v. State, 323 Ark. 649, 916 S.W.2d 760 (1996).

A defendant seeking a transfer has the burden of proof to show a transfer is warranted; if he or she meets the burden, then the transfer is made unless there is clear and convincing countervailing evidence to support a finding that the juvenile should remain in circuit court. Lammers v. State, 324 Ark. 222, 920 S.W.2d 7 (1996).

While the trial court's decision to try a juvenile as an adult must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, the court is not required to give equal weight to the statutory factors. Majesty v. State, 330 Ark. 416, 954 S.W.2d 245 (1997).

Trial court did not err in denying a juvenile's request to transfer his case to the juvenile division under subsection (g) of this section based on the seriousness of the crimes; the aggressive, willful manner of the crimes; that the offenses were against persons; and the juvenile's sophisticated evasion of capture and non-cooperation. The trial court properly used the clear and convincing burden of proof in deciding the juvenile's request, not the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable under § 9-27-503(b). A.I. v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 83 (2010).

Construction With Other Law.

Section 9-27-309(k) did not apply because the victim's sister testified about her own personal experience and did not present evidence regarding the arrest or detention of a juvenile and related proceedings; in fact, there was no reference at all to the prior juvenile proceedings during the State's case and thus, the trial court did not err in admitting the sister's testimony and denying the motion to transfer the case to juvenile court. Gilliam v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 434, 502 S.W.3d 558 (2016).

Duty of Court.

This section clearly delegates the responsibility for determining whether circuit or juvenile court is most appropriate to the court in which the charges were brought, and the abdication of this responsibility to the prosecutor was an abuse of the court's discretion. Pennington v. State, 305 Ark. 312, 807 S.W.2d 660 (1991), modified, Bradley v. State, 306 Ark. 621, 816 S.W.2d 605 (1991).

Evidence.

Where the trial judge relied on: (1) the seriousness of the alleged offense; (2) the fact the defendants were 16 and 17 years old; (3) one had a previous juvenile record; and (4) one shot a gun into a crowd of people, there was clear and convincing evidence that the defendants should be tried as adults. Bradley v. State, 306 Ark. 621, 816 S.W.2d 605 (1991).

Evidence sufficient to support a finding of clear and convincing evidence under subsection (e) (now subdivision (h)(2)) of this section. Vickers v. State, 307 Ark. 298, 819 S.W.2d 13 (1991); Heagerty v. State, 335 Ark. 520, 983 S.W.2d 908 (1998).

The evidence supporting the circuit court's refusal to transfer this case to juvenile court was clear and convincing. Davis v. State, 319 Ark. 613, 893 S.W.2d 768 (1995).

A court may no longer base its decision on a motion to transfer solely upon the allegations contained in the information; there must be some evidence to substantiate the serious and violent nature of the charges contained in the information. Thompson v. State, 330 Ark. 746, 958 S.W.2d 1 (1997).

Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction.

Designation of the juvenile for extended juvenile jurisdiction (EJJ) was proper because his contention that the law-of-the-case doctrine barred the juvenile court from conducting an extended juvenile jurisdiction hearing and granting the state's motion for such a designation was rejected. Neither the criminal division nor the appellate court provided direction concerning EJJ when the appellate court reversed with directions to transfer the case to juvenile court, and nothing required the criminal division to make a decision on the EJJ issues before the case was transferred to juvenile court. N.D. v. State, 2012 Ark. 265, 383 S.W.3d 396 (2012).

Circuit court did not err in not designating and disposing of defendant's case under the Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction Act (EJJA), § 9-27-501 et seq., where it determined that his case was to remain in the criminal division, and EJJA designation applied only when a case was pending in the juvenile division. Hardin v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 178, 486 S.W.3d 808 (2016).

Extended juvenile jurisdiction did not apply as the circuit court had found that the juvenile should not be transferred to the juvenile division. Holmes v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 21, 569 S.W.3d 895 (2019).

Factors Considered.

The state failed to produce countervailing evidence warranting retention of the case in circuit court where the state introduced no evidence of violence, negative past history or criminal records, or any character traits which would reflect poorly on the minor's prospects for rehabilitation. Pennington v. State, 305 Ark. 312, 807 S.W.2d 660 (1991), modified, Bradley v. State, 306 Ark. 621, 816 S.W.2d 605 (1991).

A defendant's demeanor at the transfer hearing is relevant to the factor of character traits indicating a juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation. McGaughy v. State, 321 Ark. 537, 906 S.W.2d 671 (1995).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion to transfer defendant's case to juvenile court after defendant was charged with being an accomplice to capital murder and being an accomplice to aggravated robbery because the trial court considered the factors in subsection (g) of this section; the evidence and testimony showed that defendant, who was 17 years old, was highly culpable. Magana-Galdamez v. State, 104 Ark. App. 280, 291 S.W.3d 203 (2009).

Where appellant was charged with criminal attempted rape and sexual assault in the second degree arising out of acts committed when he was 16 years of age, the trial court did not err by denying appellant's motion to transfer his criminal case to juvenile court. The age factor, the fact that rape was a serious allegation and a violent offense against a person, and appellant's prior history of sexual assault were sufficient factors under subsection (g) of this section to support the trial court's decision to retain jurisdiction. R.F.R. v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 583, 337 S.W.3d 547 (2009).

In a case in which defendant was charged with residential burglary, criminal mischief in the first degree, and theft arising out of acts allegedly committed two days before his seventeenth birthday, and he appealed a trial court's denial of his motion to transfer his criminal case to juvenile court, he argued unsuccessfully that the trial court's ruling that he could not be properly rehabilitated was erroneous because there was no clear and convincing evidence to support that finding, in fact there was no evidence at all on that point. In its order, the trial court addressed its concerns that rehabilitation may not be appropriate due to defendant's age and the seriousness of the offense. D.A.S. v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 144 (2010).

In denying appellant's motion to transfer a terroristic act and criminal mischief case to the juvenile division, a trial court was not required to give equal weight to each of the factors in subsection (g) of this section; denial of the motion was proper because appellant's own testimony established that appellant went to a rival's home, and that appellant knew that guns were being taken. Neal v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 744, 379 S.W.3d 634 (2010).

Circuit court did not err in denying a juvenile's motion to transfer to the juvenile division under the factors in subsection (g) of this section. The juvenile had an extensive record, and he brutally ambushed and murdered a guard before escaping from a juvenile facility and carjacking a vehicle. C.B. v. State, 2012 Ark. 220, 406 S.W.3d 796 (2012).

Trial court did not err in denying transfer of the juvenile's criminal case to juvenile court because it found that even if there were rehabilitative facilities available to the juvenile division, they were not likely to rehabilitate the juvenile before his 21st birthday. Additionally, although he had been offered the services of the juvenile system as a result of his commission of previous offenses, rather than comply with the juvenile court's rules, he persisted in delinquent behavior. A.H. v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 419 (2013).

In a juvenile case involving murder and other offenses, a circuit court did not make clearly erroneous findings with regard to the part of this section concerning culpability because there was testimony that appellant, a juvenile, acted alone in two of the cases where transfer was sought, and he acted in concert with others in a third case. Even if he had a mental defect, the factors did not have to be weighed equally. B.D. v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 160, 457 S.W.3d 294 (2015).

Although a trial court's ultimate decision by denying a transfer motion was not clearly erroneous, some of the trial court's written findings bearing on this issue were unsupported by the evidence; there was no evidence that appellant, a juvenile, had been previously adjudicated a juvenile offender, the only evidence on his sophistication or maturity level was his mother's testimony that he was childish and immature, and there were no reports relating to his mental, physical, educational, or social history. The appellate court was unable to tell how much weight the trial court gave to the seriousness and violent nature of the offense. Z.T. v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 282 (2015).

Trial court was not clearly erroneous in denying defendant's motion to transfer his case to juvenile court, where he was charged with being an accomplice to aggravated robbery and first-degree battery; the court took defendant's 66-point IQ into consideration, defendant conceded that the crimes were serious and violent in nature and they were committed against a person by a group of people, and he had been placed on juvenile probation on two occasions and had that probation revoked both times. Nichols v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 397, 466 S.W.3d 431 (2015).

In a case in which defendant juvenile was charged with capital murder, aggravated robbery, and two counts of committing a terroristic act, the circuit court's denial of defendant's motion to transfer the case to the juvenile division was not clearly erroneous. The circuit court considered all the evidence on all the factors, as required by subsection (g) of this section, and it was free to use its discretion in the weight afforded to each factor. Brown v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 254, 492 S.W.3d 126 (2016).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding that the protection of society justified prosecution of defendant juvenile in the criminal division, given that defendant was charged with capital murder and aggravated robbery, and the victim was robbed by gunpoint and then shot three times, two from behind. Harris v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 293, 493 S.W.3d 808 (2016).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant juvenile's previous criminal history justified prosecution in the criminal division, as defendant had been involved in a fight at a rival school, had to be removed from the scene, and while being removed, he threatened to return with a gun and shoot people. Harris v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 293, 493 S.W.3d 808 (2016).

Trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant juvenile could not be rehabilitated and should be tried as an adult; a coordinator for the Department of Youth Services testified that many of the programs were not available to defendant due to his age, and that he would have only a little more than a year to review defendant's progress and make a recommendation as to whether he should be sentenced as an adult. Harris v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 293, 493 S.W.3d 808 (2016).

Circuit court properly transferred a juvenile's case to the criminal division of the circuit court because he was 17 years old at the time of the charged offenses, had prior contact with juvenile court, had violated probation, had been committed to the Department of Youth Services, the alleged burglary involved a firearm, the victims were an elderly couple who were injured during its commission, and the juvenile knew the victims prior to the burglary. R.J.W. v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 382 (2017).

Circuit court noted defendant's issues with his mother and schooling, but an atypical home life did not preclude the court's finding that he exhibited a normal level of sophistication and maturity for a 17-year-old. Randof v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 441, 559 S.W.3d 307 (2018).

Trial court did not clearly err in denying defendant's motion to transfer his three cases to the juvenile division because the trial court considered and made written findings on each required factor, it considered a clinical therapist's testimony and specifically found that defendant could benefit from continued therapy, and during counsel's examination of the therapist, the trial court asked her specific questions about her opinion regarding the propriety of the juvenile versus the adult division of the court. Jones v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 59, 569 S.W.3d 367 (2019).

Circuit court properly denied defendant's motion to transfer his case to the juvenile division of the circuit court because he was 15 years old when he fired at least 17 shots into a car seriously injuring two of the three occupants, defendant confessed to the shooting, had a previous adjudication in juvenile court for disorderly conduct, and had multiple suspensions from school, and the circuit court made written findings on all the statutory factors. Scott v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 15, 592 S.W.3d 715 (2020).

—In General.

There was no requirement in former statute that equal weight be given to each factor, or that proof on all factors must be against the defendants in order for the court to retain jurisdiction. Ashing v. State, 288 Ark. 75, 702 S.W.2d 20 (1986) (decision under prior law); Slay v. State, 309 Ark. 507, 832 S.W.2d 217 (1992).

The factors to be considered in deciding whether to transfer a case to juvenile court are the seriousness of the alleged offense, whether violence was allegedly used, and whether the alleged offense is part of a pattern of adjudicated offenses, along with the prior history, character traits, mental maturity, and any other factors that reflect upon the juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation. Wicker v. State, 310 Ark. 580, 839 S.W.2d 186 (1992); McClure v. State, 328 Ark. 35, 942 S.W.2d 243 (1997).

It is not necessary to give equal weight to each factor in juvenile transfer cases; further, proof need not be introduced against the juvenile on each factor. Hogan v. State, 311 Ark. 262, 843 S.W.2d 830 (1992); Macon v. State, 323 Ark. 498, 915 S.W.2d 273 (1996); McClure v. State, 328 Ark. 35, 942 S.W.2d 243 (1997).

A trial court must evaluate the specific offense and the individual defendant to determine whether a transfer is warranted. Fleetwood v. State, 329 Ark. 327, 947 S.W.2d 387 (1997).

The denial of the motion to transfer was not improper because there was an affirmative defense of self-defense; the statutory scheme for determining whether a case should be transferred to juvenile court is not dependent upon affirmative defenses. Fleetwood v. State, 329 Ark. 327, 947 S.W.2d 387 (1997).

It was proper for a court to consider an allegedly involuntary confession at a juvenile transfer hearing. Witherspoon v. State, 74 Ark. App. 151, 46 S.W.3d 549 (2001).

—Equal Weight Not Required.

There is no requirement that every element mentioned in this section be given equal weight. Holland v. State, 311 Ark. 494, 844 S.W.2d 943 (1993).

The court need not give equal weight to each factor in subsection (e) (now (g)) of this section in considering juvenile transfer cases, and it is permissible to give substantial weight to the information. Williams v. State, 313 Ark. 451, 856 S.W.2d 4 (1993); Booker v. State, 324 Ark. 468, 922 S.W.2d 337 (1996); Butler v. State, 324 Ark. 476, 922 S.W.2d 685 (1996).

In making a determination whether to retain jurisdiction or to transfer a case to the juvenile court, the court is not required to give equal weight to the statutory factors in subsection (e) (now (g)) of this section, nor is the prosecutor required to introduce proof against the juvenile with regard to each factor. Porter v. State, 43 Ark. App. 110, 861 S.W.2d 122 (1993).

The court is not required to give each factor under subsection (e) (now (g)) of this section equal weight or force. Walter v. State, 317 Ark. 274, 878 S.W.2d 374 (1994).

In deciding whether to transfer a case from circuit to juvenile court, the trial court is not required to give every factor equal weight, and proof on every factor need not be introduced in order to warrant keeping a case in circuit court. Johnson v. State, 317 Ark. 521, 878 S.W.2d 758 (1994).

Trial court is not required to give equal weight to each of the factors in subsection (g) of this section, and a juvenile's lack of maturity, standing alone, does not mandate transfer to a juvenile division. Richardson v. State, 97 Ark. App. 52, 244 S.W.3d 736 (2006).

In a case in which defendant was charged with residential burglary, criminal mischief in the first degree, and theft arising out of acts allegedly committed two days before his seventeenth birthday, and he appealed a trial court's denial of his motion to transfer his criminal case to juvenile court, he argued unsuccessfully that the trial court did not properly weigh the factors because it should have given more weight to the fact that defendant had no prior criminal or juvenile history. The trial court specifically addressed the required factors in its decision denying defendant's motion to transfer; it was not required to give equal weight to each of the statutory factors, and it could use its discretion in deciding the weight to be afforded to each factor. D.A.S. v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 144 (2010).

—Intellectual Disability.

Circuit court properly denied defendant's motion to transfer his case to the juvenile division or to extend juvenile jurisdiction where it considered the evidence related to his intellectual disabilities, concluded from that evidence that he nonetheless had the ability to plan crimes and was street smart, considered his educational history and teacher evaluations, and concluded from that evidence that he was aware of the difference between right and wrong and understood that his actions had consequences. Nelson v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 148, 485 S.W.3d 284 (2016).

—Multiple Factors.

Trial court's decision that juvenile should be tried as an adult was clearly erroneous and against the preponderance of the evidence where juvenile had no prior record and there was no violence connected with his offense of possessing cocaine; to hold otherwise would be to allow the trial court to simply categorize all felonies as serious and utilize this reason alone to retain jurisdiction, rather than transfer the case based on consideration of all the statutory factors. Blevins v. State, 308 Ark. 613, 826 S.W.2d 265 (1992).

Where the circuit judge properly considered each of the three factors outlined in subsection (e) (now (g)) of this section and determined that there was violence employed in the commission of the offenses, defendant had a repetitive pattern of adjudicated offenses, and that based on defendant's character traits rehabilitation would not work, and defendant failed to offer any proof in his favor, the circuit judge properly determined the aggravated robbery charges should be tried in circuit court. Williams v. State, 313 Ark. 451, 856 S.W.2d 4 (1993).

Transfer to juvenile court denied based on charge of first-degree murder, defendant's criminal history in the juvenile division, and the failed attempts at rehabilitation. Jones v. State, 326 Ark. 681, 933 S.W.2d 387 (1996).

In a prosecution for delivery of controlled substances, the circuit court properly retained jurisdiction given: (1) the seriousness of the alleged offense; (2) a prior adjudication for two offenses that would have been felonies if committed by an adult; (3) previous treatment under the juvenile justice system followed by violation of probation conditions; (4) failure to attend school or obtain a GED; and (5) impossibility of future rehabilitation with the Division of Youth Services due to defendant's age. McClure v. State, 328 Ark. 35, 942 S.W.2d 243 (1997).

The trial court's decision to deny a motion to transfer a criminal case to juvenile court was supported by clear and convincing evidence where the defendant was almost 19 years old, an officer testified that the defendant participated in a serious offense, that the victim was held at gunpoint, and that the defendant's mother confirmed that he had a prior history of criminal acts. Rhodes v. State, 332 Ark. 516, 967 S.W.2d 550 (1998).

Circuit court properly denied defendant's motion to transfer his case to the juvenile division of circuit court; while he was between the ages of 12 and 15 years old when the alleged rape occurred, he was 20 years old when the charges were first brought against him and by the time he filed his amended transfer motion, he had already turned 21, the victim was between the ages of three and six, the rape involved a continuous course of abuse, rape was a crime of force and violence, there was evidence that the acts were willful and premeditated, and there were no programs or facilities available to rehabilitate defendant due to his current age. Byrd v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 2 (2018).

Trial court did not clearly err in granting the State's motion to transfer a juvenile's case because, even assuming that the trial court erred in finding there were no programs available through the juvenile court to rehabilitate the juvenile, it was for the trial court to determine the weight of each statutory factor, and several other factors weighed in favor of transferring the juvenile's case to the trial court's criminal division. N.R. v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 71 (2020).

—Other Factors.

Even though record indicated juvenile defendant had no prior adjudicated offenses, the trial court could properly consider testimony concerning his subsequent conviction for possession of a firearm, for which he was committed to the Youth Services Center, as a reason to deny transfer. Booker v. State, 324 Ark. 468, 922 S.W.2d 337 (1996).

On a motion to transfer to juvenile court, the circuit court did not err in considering evidence that the defendant may have been an accomplice in an unrelated murder trial. McClure v. State, 328 Ark. 35, 942 S.W.2d 243 (1997).

—Seriousness of Offense.

The serious and violent nature of an offense is a sufficient basis for trying a juvenile as an adult. Holland v. State, 311 Ark. 494, 844 S.W.2d 943 (1993); Ray v. State, 65 Ark. App. 209, 987 S.W.2d 738 (1999).

While the use of violence in committing a serious offense is a factor sufficient in and of itself for a circuit court to retain jurisdiction of a juvenile, the commission of a serious offense without the use of violence is not a factor sufficient in and of itself for a circuit court to retain jurisdiction of a juvenile. Sebastian v. State, 318 Ark. 494, 885 S.W.2d 882 (1994); Booker v. State, 324 Ark. 468, 922 S.W.2d 337 (1996).

While the commission of a serious offense alone, without the use of violence, is not sufficient for a circuit court to retain jurisdiction of a juvenile, the trial court may rely on the violent nature of a crime in denying a motion to transfer to juvenile court. Cole v. State, 323 Ark. 136, 913 S.W.2d 779 (1996).

Seriousness alone is not a sufficient basis to refuse a transfer; the factor in subdivision (e)(1) (now (g)(1)) of this section may not form the basis of refusal to transfer absent a finding that “violence was employed.” Green v. State, 323 Ark. 635, 916 S.W.2d 756 (1996).

No element of violence beyond that required to commit the crime is necessary under subdivision (e)(1) (now (g)(1)) of this section; however, that a crime is serious without the use of violence is not a factor sufficient in and of itself for a circuit court to retain jurisdiction of a juvenile. Lammers v. State, 324 Ark. 222, 920 S.W.2d 7 (1996).

The serious and violent nature of an offense is a sufficient basis for denying a motion to transfer and trying a juvenile as an adult. Lammers v. State, 324 Ark. 222, 920 S.W.2d 7 (1996).

Transfer denied where 17-year-old defendant was charged with aggravated assault and terroristic threatening because of defendant's age and because those offenses are of a serious and violent nature. Sanders v. State, 326 Ark. 415, 932 S.W.2d 315 (1996).

Transfer was appropriately denied because of the serious nature of the crimes charged, and the use of violence in the commission of the serious offenses. Toliver v. State, 330 Ark. 488, 953 S.W.2d 887 (1997).

Trial court's denial of a transfer of a rape case to juvenile court was not clearly erroneous. Although some of the factors in this section favored juvenile jurisdiction, the factors were weighed against those that supported jurisdiction in the criminal division of the circuit court. Appellant, a juvenile, repeatedly raped his 10-year-old stepbrother over the course of a year, and a juvenile can be tried as an adult solely because of the serious and violent nature of the offense. Kiser v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 198, 487 S.W.3d 374 (2016).

Juvenile may be tried as an adult solely because of the serious and violent nature of the offense. Brown v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 254, 492 S.W.3d 126 (2016).

Trial court did not clearly err by denying defendant's motion to transfer his case to the juvenile division because he could be tried as an adult solely because the trial court found that capital murder was a serious offense, there was evidence that defendant planned and participated in the victim's death either as the shooter or the driver of the getaway car, and evidence supported the trial court's finding that defendant had a high level of sophistication and maturity. Donson v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 459, 588 S.W.3d 84 (2019).

—Violent Offense.

Rape is, by definition, a violent offense, and such a charge is sufficient to meet the requirements set out in subdivision (e)(1) (now (g)(1)) of this section for denial of transfer to juvenile court. Slay v. State, 309 Ark. 507, 832 S.W.2d 217 (1992); Davis v. State, 319 Ark. 613, 893 S.W.2d 768 (1995); Ring v. State, 320 Ark. 128, 894 S.W.2d 944 (1995).

The use of violence in committing a serious offense is a factor sufficient in and of itself for a circuit court to retain jurisdiction of a juvenile; it is of no consequence that the juvenile may or may not have personally used a weapon, as his association with the use of a weapon in the course of the crimes is sufficient to satisfy the violence criterion. Guy v. State, 323 Ark. 649, 916 S.W.2d 760 (1996).

Even though defendant may not have held a gun in each of three robberies with which he was charged, his association with the use of a weapon in the course of the crimes was sufficient to satisfy the violence criterion of this section. Butler v. State, 324 Ark. 476, 922 S.W.2d 685 (1996).

Transfer of juvenile charged with criminal mischief for throwing a glass bottle at a moving vehicle from a moving vehicle denied because criminal mischief is a Class C felony that satisfies the seriousness criterion of subsection (e) (now (g)) of this section and because violence was employed in the commission of the offense. Maddox v. State, 326 Ark. 515, 931 S.W.2d 438 (1996).

Court properly denied appellant's motion to transfer to juvenile court after appellant was charged with capital murder when he was 14 years old because there was clear and convincing evidence that appellant should be tried as an adult; the offense was of a serious and violent nature. Otis v. State, 355 Ark. 590, 142 S.W.3d 615 (2004).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motions to transfer his case to the juvenile division and for extended juvenile jurisdiction where defendant, when he was almost 18 years of age, deliberately carried large pieces of concrete from below a viaduct to a protected niche and hurled them at oncoming traffic, killing one driver as a result; the need to protect society from lethal acts of violence directed against complete strangers for the sole purpose of providing amusement to the perpetrator was manifest. Richardson v. State, 97 Ark. App. 52, 244 S.W.3d 736 (2006).

—Written Findings.

The appellant's failure to object to the absence of written findings precluded consideration of the point on appeal. Box v. State, 71 Ark. App. 403, 30 S.W.3d 754 (2000) (decision under prior law).

Where appellant was charged with criminal attempted rape and sexual assault in the second degree, the trial court denied his motion to transfer his criminal case to juvenile court without making written findings on all of the factors set forth in subsection (g) of this section. Because appellant never made the argument of noncompliance with the mandatory statutory provisions to the trial court or the appellate court, the argument was waived. R.F.R. v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 583, 337 S.W.3d 547 (2009) (decision under prior law).

Trial court's denial of defendant's motion to transfer his case to the court's juvenile division was remanded because the court did not make required written findings on all 10 statutory factors; further, a case holding that an argument on this basis is waived if not raised in the circuit court was decided before the Legislature added subdivision (h)(1) to this section in 2003. McClendon v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 115, 572 S.W.3d 443 (2019).

Trial court did not rely solely on the serious and violent nature of the offenses as charged, and there was ample proof to support a finding that jurisdiction could be retained in the criminal division of circuit court, because the State presented evidence that the victim had been shot in his torso and hand, that defendant juvenile had lifted his shirt to show the victim he did not have a gun before others shot him, and that he had physically assaulted the victim on a prior recent occasion. Spears v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 576, 591 S.W.3d 803 (2019).

Trial court's observation from the bench did not result in reversible error because the trial court stated only that defendant juvenile, who was charged with accomplice to first-degree battery, could be charged as an accomplice to attempted murder, and that comment was not made part of the trial court's written findings in support of its denial of defendant's transfer motion. Spears v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 576, 591 S.W.3d 803 (2019).

Some of the trial court's written findings in its order denying defendant juvenile's motion to transfer to juvenile court were unsupported by the competent evidence because they were inconsistent with the proof presented at the hearing; therefore, its order denying the motion was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to reconsider the transfer motion, giving proper consideration to only the competent proof presented at the transfer hearing. Spears v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 576, 591 S.W.3d 803 (2019).

Jurisdiction.

Former statute, when construed with the rest of the Arkansas Juvenile Code, did not require that all juveniles under 18 years of age be charged and tried for criminal acts in juvenile court; a prosecuting attorney had discretion to charge juveniles over 15 years of age in juvenile, municipal, or circuit court. Sargent v. Cole, 269 Ark. 121, 598 S.W.2d 749 (1980) (decision under prior law).

The juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction of all of the offenses charged against a juvenile, with the exception of those listed in subdivision (b)(1) of this section. Banks v. State, 306 Ark. 273, 813 S.W.2d 256 (1991); Butler v. State, 324 Ark. 476, 922 S.W.2d 685 (1996).

Where a juvenile was charged with four offenses, only one of which, aggravated robbery, was listed in this section, the circuit court should have dismissed the other three offenses not listed in subdivision (b)(1) of this section for lack of jurisdiction. Banks v. State, 306 Ark. 273, 813 S.W.2d 256 (1991).

The General Assembly has not based court assignment in juvenile cases upon the nature of the offense committed but upon what the prosecutor chooses to charge. Walker v. State, 309 Ark. 23, 827 S.W.2d 637 (1992).

Where the circuit court acquired jurisdiction over a juvenile, criminal defendant, upon the filing of a first degree murder charge, it retained jurisdiction to convict and sentence for the lesser included offense of manslaughter. Walker v. State, 309 Ark. 23, 827 S.W.2d 637 (1992).

The court's decision to retain jurisdiction was not clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Holland v. State, 311 Ark. 494, 844 S.W.2d 943 (1993).

Where the circuit court ordered defendant's case transferred to the juvenile division, noting defendant had no record of violence, but the juvenile division judge declined to accept the case and issued an order refusing jurisdiction, that order effectively denied transfer of defendant's case, and the state should have appealed from the order if it desired to challenge the juvenile judge's decision. State v. Hatton, 315 Ark. 583, 868 S.W.2d 492 (1994).

Until a proper charging instrument (information or indictment) is filed by the state in a juvenile matter, the circuit court simply has no authority to proceed, much less rule on a transfer motion under this section. Whitehead v. State, 316 Ark. 563, 873 S.W.2d 800 (1994).

Where the state never filed a felony charge by information or indictment against a transferred juvenile, the circuit court had no authority to conduct a hearing under this section. Whitehead v. State, 316 Ark. 563, 873 S.W.2d 800 (1994).

The jurisdiction of the juvenile court is exclusive and original with respect to all offenses charged against a juvenile who is aged 14 years at the time of the commission of those offenses, with the exception of those offenses enumerated in subdivision (b)(1) of this section. Webb v. State, 318 Ark. 581, 886 S.W.2d 624 (1994).

What the prosecutor chooses to charge in the circuit court with respect to a juvenile is not necessarily determinative of the forum for trial; that decision rests with the circuit court. Webb v. State, 318 Ark. 581, 886 S.W.2d 624 (1994).

The circuit court's in personam jurisdiction of a juvenile, once surrendered pursuant to a valid hearing on the motion to transfer, may not be reconferred upon the transferor court simply by the state's unilateral action of there refiling its charges against that juvenile. Webb v. State, 318 Ark. 581, 886 S.W.2d 624 (1994).

Three theft charges against juvenile dismissed; since the charges were not among those enumerated in subdivision (b)(1) of this section, and since the prosecutor did not file the charges in juvenile court and then move to transfer them to circuit court, the circuit court never had jurisdiction of those charges. Butler v. State, 324 Ark. 476, 922 S.W.2d 685 (1996).

Where the information charged the defendant with a class C felony, jurisdiction was appropriate in circuit court. Jensen v. State, 328 Ark. 349, 944 S.W.2d 820 (1997).

Trial court properly transferred burglary and theft-of-property charges to juvenile court while retaining jurisdiction of an aggravated robbery charge. Sims v. State, 329 Ark. 350, 947 S.W.2d 376 (1997).

The circuit court had no jurisdiction to try defendant for a theft charge where the alleged act was committed while defendant was 15 years of age. Rice v. State, 330 Ark. 257, 954 S.W.2d 216 (1997).

Circuit court found that defendant should not be transferred to the juvenile division; therefore, extended juvenile jurisdiction was not applicable. Lofton v. State, 2009 Ark. 341, 321 S.W.3d 255 (2009).

As the criminal division of the circuit court lost its exclusive jurisdiction over a juvenile's case when it transferred the case to the juvenile division pursuant to this section, the criminal division lacked authority to later set aside its transfer order, and that order was a nullity. C.H. v. State, 2010 Ark. 279, 365 S.W.3d 879 (2010).

Inmate was not entitled to habeas corpus relief because a trial court did not lack jurisdiction over a rape case; pursuant to subdivision (c)(1) of this section, the inmate could have been tried in an adult court because he was over the age of 16. Ashby v. State, 2012 Ark. 48 (2012).

Misdemeanors defendant juvenile was charged with in the criminal division of the circuit court had to be dismissed because the circuit court did not have jurisdiction of the misdemeanor charges. K.O.P. v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 667 (2013).

Under this section, a 15-year-old could be charged in circuit court for certain offenses, but not theft of property or aggravated assault, and because the trial court never had jurisdiction of these two charges, they were dismissed without prejudice. V.S. v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 433, 468 S.W.3d 311 (2015).

Municipal Court.

There is no statutory authority for a transfer from juvenile court to municipal court. J.B. v. State, 309 Ark. 70, 827 S.W.2d 144 (1992).

Procedure.

On motion to transfer charges to juvenile court, even though the circuit court did not follow the usual procedure in allowing the defendant to present evidence first, where the defendant did not object to the procedure but instead participated in the hearing without objection, there was no error. McClure v. State, 328 Ark. 35, 942 S.W.2d 243 (1997).

In a hearing on motions to transfer a case to juvenile court under this section, to dismiss the case, and to declare the transfer statute unconstitutional, the circuit court abused its discretion by not excluding the testimony of two key witnesses because the state blatantly violated Ark. R. Crim. P. 17.1(a) by refusing to offer these witnesses' names until late in the afternoon before the hearing and, as a result, the defense did not have time to interview the two witnesses. Although the hearing was not a trial or an adjudication, the state's dilatory behavior nevertheless occurred at a pivotal point in the proceedings when the circuit court was deciding the critical issue of whether the juvenile would be tried as a juvenile or as an adult. N.D. v. State, 2011 Ark. 282, 383 S.W.3d 396 (2011).

Timely Hearing.

Counsel's failure to demand a transfer hearing until well beyond the 90-day period waived the right to insist on a timely hearing. Cobbins v. State, 306 Ark. 447, 816 S.W.2d 161 (1991).

Trial court did not lack jurisdiction for failing to hold a timely juvenile transfer hearing because the 90-day requirement was not jurisdictional; appellant, a juvenile, waived his right to insist on a timely hearing where he did not request a hearing or object to the trial court's failure to hold a hearing within 90 days. Z.T. v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 282 (2015).

Legislature intended the time limitations in subsections (e) and (f) of this section to commence from the date the motion to transfer is filed, rather than, as appellant contended, from the date of detention. A plain reading mandates this construction; no other construction is reasonable. D.Q. v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 593, 590 S.W.3d 219 (2019).

Juvenile's transfer hearing was timely held because the time period within which such a hearing had to be held as to a detained juvenile began running from the date a motion to transfer was filed. N.R. v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 71 (2020).

Transfer to Criminal Division Allowed.

The trial court found clear and convincing evidence on many of the factors enumerated in the statute and transfer was appropriate. Cobbins v. State, 306 Ark. 447, 816 S.W.2d 161 (1991); Holmes v. State, 322 Ark. 574, 911 S.W.2d 256 (1995).

Trial court's decision that juvenile accused of criminal mischief and burglary should be prosecuted as an adult was not clearly erroneous where, although the juvenile did not employ violence against another person, the court specifically found that the charged offenses were very serious and that the juvenile was beyond rehabilitation under existing rehabilitation programs. Additionally, over $35,000 damage was intentionally done, the juvenile had twice before been adjudicated delinquent, and he had failed to complete the prior probation successfully. Porter v. State, 43 Ark. App. 110, 861 S.W.2d 122 (1993).

The chancellor did not err in transferring the case of a juvenile defendant accused of robbery to circuit court where the evidence of the statutory factors was more than sufficient. Myers v. State, 317 Ark. 70, 876 S.W.2d 246 (1994).

Trial court was not clearly erroneous in transferring case to circuit court, where defendant was charged with a class B felony, there were firearms involved, the offense appeared to be part of a repetitive pattern of conduct which would demonstrate that defendant was beyond the current rehabilitation available, and defendant's history, traits and maturity also reflected adversely upon his prospects for rehabilitation. Collins v. State, 322 Ark. 161, 908 S.W.2d 80 (1995).

In transferring appellant's case out of the juvenile division, the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that appellant had not benefited from his prior juvenile court involvement or the services he received and that his misbehavior and anger issues demonstrated a need to protect society from his persistent lawlessness, particularly gun-related lawlessness. D.Q. v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 593, 590 S.W.3d 219 (2019).

In a case involving theft of firearms from a hardware store, the circuit court properly granted the State's motion to transfer a 15-year-old juvenile's case to the criminal division; although the juvenile argued that the circuit court erred when finding that the juvenile committed the crimes “while armed” under subdivision (b)(1)(F) of this section because there was no proof that any of the juveniles possessed a firearm before they stole the firearms, it was not clearly erroneous for the circuit court to find the juvenile in possession of a firearm under subdivision (b)(2) of this section because, at the very least, his accomplices possessed the firearms as they were taking them from the hardware store. J.B.G. v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 43, 594 S.W.3d 109 (2020).

Transfer to Juvenile Division Denied.

Transfer of defendant to juvenile court held properly denied. Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 957, 98 S. Ct. 1590, 55 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1978); Franklin v. State, 7 Ark. App. 75, 644 S.W.2d 318 (1983); Evans v. State, 287 Ark. 136, 697 S.W.2d 879 (1985); Ashing v. State, 288 Ark. 75, 702 S.W.2d 20 (1986) (decisions under prior law); Walker v. State, 304 Ark. 393, 803 S.W.2d 502 (1991); Wicker v. State, 310 Ark. 580, 839 S.W.2d 186 (1992).

Multiple counts of aggravated robbery were sufficient to withstand a motion for transfer to juvenile court when the opposing evidence was essentially the defendant's age. Johnson v. State, 307 Ark. 525, 823 S.W.2d 440 (1992).

Trial court's decision in refusing to transfer five charges against the defendant from circuit court to juvenile court was not clearly erroneous, where no commitment under juvenile jurisdiction could have resulted from a transfer due to defendant's age of 18 years. Hogan v. State, 311 Ark. 262, 843 S.W.2d 830 (1992).

Where the defendant was charged with four counts of aggravated robbery and terroristic acts, all of which involved patently violent acts, transfer to juvenile court was properly denied despite defendant not having been the actual triggerman. Walter v. State, 317 Ark. 274, 878 S.W.2d 374 (1994).

Where there is evidence that the current felony charges were part of a repetitive pattern of offenses, that past efforts at rehabilitation in the juvenile court system have not been successful, and that the pattern of offenses has become increasingly more serious, these factors alone prevent the appellate court from holding the trial court's denial of a transfer to juvenile court motion clearly erroneous. Sebastian v. State, 318 Ark. 494, 885 S.W.2d 882 (1994).

Transfer for statutory rape prosecution properly denied. Hansen v. State, 323 Ark. 407, 914 S.W.2d 737 (1996).

Where defendant's actions and offense exhibited a serious and violent nature and where defendant failed to show trial court erred in finding that defendant was not a good prospect for rehabilitation, defendant's motion to transfer was properly denied. Macon v. State, 323 Ark. 498, 915 S.W.2d 273 (1996).

Where both the state's charges and testimony reflected that defendant, who was 15 years of age at the time of the alleged murder but 16 at the time of trial, was involved in the serious offense of capital felony murder, and had employed a gun in committing the offense, defendant's motion to transfer his case to juvenile court properly denied. Wilkins v. State, 324 Ark. 60, 918 S.W.2d 702 (1996).

Transfer denied pursuant to subdivision (e)(1) (now (g)(1)) of this section where defendant severely beat elderly shop owner during the course of a robbery. Booker v. State, 324 Ark. 468, 922 S.W.2d 337 (1996).

Transfer denied where defendant caused two-year-old victim to bleed during commission of statutory rape, and where defendant was to turn 18 less than six months after trial. Brooks v. State, 326 Ark. 201, 929 S.W.2d 160 (1996).

Where 16-year-old defendant held a pistol to the victim's head and attempted to pull the trigger, sufficient violence was employed so as to uphold the denial of the transfer of the aggravated robbery and attempted capital murder charges to juvenile court. Kindle v. State, 326 Ark. 282, 931 S.W.2d 117 (1996).

Transfer to juvenile court denied where defendant was charged with aggravated robbery and where three counts of capital murder were pending against defendant. Carroll v. State, 326 Ark. 602, 932 S.W.2d 339 (1996).

Transfer of 17-year-old accomplice with a low I.Q., charged with capital murder, properly denied. Carroll v. State, 326 Ark. 882, 934 S.W.2d 523 (1996).

Transfer denied where the defendant had previously been charged with theft, had been on probation or in rehabilitation programs since he was 12 years old, and was over 18 years old at the time of trial. Jensen v. State, 328 Ark. 349, 944 S.W.2d 820 (1997).

Transfer to juvenile court denied where the crimes, although property crimes, were intrusive to the victims and serious. Smith v. State, 328 Ark. 736, 946 S.W.2d 667 (1997).

Transfer denied, based on the seriousness of a Class B felony, and the fact that defendant had turned 18 years of age. Oglesby v. State, 329 Ark. 127, 946 S.W.2d 693 (1997).

Fourteen-year old defendant tried as an adult where the offense charged was capital murder and the trial court determined that the child was beyond rehabilitation. Ponder v. State, 330 Ark. 43, 953 S.W.2d 555 (1997).

Transfer denied where juvenile was 18 by the time of the hearing on the motion to transfer and where evidence linked the robbery charge to serious and violent conduct. Brown v. State, 330 Ark. 603, 954 S.W.2d 273 (1997).

Transfer of juvenile offender to juvenile court properly denied where he was charged with violent offenses and his prior record indicated an extensive history of offenses that had escalated in seriousness. Wright v. State, 331 Ark. 173, 959 S.W.2d 50 (1998).

The trial court had clear and convincing evidence to deny a motion to transfer a Class B felony terroristic act charge to the juvenile court where the terroristic act charge involved the firing of a gun at an occupied vehicle, the charge appeared to be part of a repetitive pattern of adjudicated offenses that increased in seriousness, and the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation were remote. Jones v. State, 332 Ark. 617, 967 S.W.2d 559 (1998).

The trial court did not err in refusing to transfer the defendant's case to juvenile court where the court concluded that, because of the defendant's prior criminal history, his “lack of responsibility and mental maturity,” and his numerous suspensions from and willful failure to attend school, his prospects for rehabilitation were poor or nonexistent and that jurisdiction of the case should be retained. Landrum v. State, 63 Ark. App. 12, 971 S.W.2d 278 (1998).

The trial court properly denied a motion by a 16-year-old charged with residential burglary, rape, and terroristic threatening in the first degree to transfer the charges to juvenile court where, in addition to the seriousness and violent nature of the charges, the trial court also found the charges to be part of a repetitive pattern of adjudicated offenses of increasing violence towards persons. Box v. State, 71 Ark. App. 403, 30 S.W.3d 754 (2000).

The circuit court did not clearly err in denying the defendant's motion to transfer, even if testimony by a detective regarding what he was told by a codefendant and regarding the defendant's own statement was improper, where (1) there was evidence that the case involved a home intrusion that resulted in injuries to one victim and the death of the victim's unborn child, and (2) the state presented, without objection from the defendant, evidence regarding his prior juvenile adjudications, his failure to comply with the conditions of his probation, and his commitment to the Division of Youth Services. Witherspoon v. State, 74 Ark. App. 151, 46 S.W.3d 549 (2001).

Trial court erred in granting a defense motion to transfer a rape case to the juvenile division where defendant was 17 when he committed the rape, he caused a tear in the 14-year-old victim's vaginal area requiring surgery and hospitalization, and he had previously been adjudicated a juvenile offender for first-degree criminal mischief, which involved destruction or causing damage to property; there had been an increase in the seriousness of the alleged offenses, indicating a lack of rehabilitation. State v. Graydon, 86 Ark. App. 319, 184 S.W.3d 476 (2004).

Where a 15-year-old defendant and his accomplice were charged with the robbery of a grocery store, the circuit court did not err by denying defendant's motion to transfer his case to the juvenile division pursuant to this section. While defendant claimed that his accomplice put a gun to his head and intimidated him into participating in the robbery, a video surveillance tape in the store showed defendant entering the store first with a gun and proceeding with his accomplice against the store owner and his wife; therefore, the clear and convincing evidence did not support defendant's story that he was an unwilling participant in the robbery. R.M.W. v. State, 375 Ark. 1, 289 S.W.3d 46 (2008).

Pursuant to subsection (g) of this section, the circuit court did not err in denying defendant juvenile's motion to transfer his case to the juvenile division of the circuit court where it made findings on each of the statutory factors; defendant had a prior juvenile offense and he was involved in serious crimes. R.A.S. v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 713 (2009).

Because a juvenile twice in less than a month invited 16-year-old girls into his truck, pulled over into isolated areas, and forced himself on the victims despite their protests, sexually assaulting one and raping the other, and because he understood that his conduct was wrong, and had no deficits in his family life that would excuse his conduct, pursuant to subsection (g) of this section, the juvenile's motions to transfer to juvenile court were properly denied. Lewis v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 691 (2011).

Trial court did not err in denying a juvenile's motion to transfer a case to juvenile court after the juvenile was charged with second-degree murder because the trial court complied with the mandate of subsection (g) of this section by considering all of the required factors and making findings for each; the victim received eight stab wounds that resulted in the victim's death. Cole v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 281 (2012).

Trial court committed no error in denying the juvenile's motion to transfer the case to juvenile court, because the trial court considered each of the statutory factors under subsection (g) of this section, and made written findings; the evidence demonstrated that the juvenile had been offered the services of the juvenile system as a result of his commission of previous offenses, but rather than comply with the juvenile court's rules he persisted in delinquent behavior, and the present allegations (four counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of theft of property, one count of theft by receiving, and one count of aggravated assault) involved serious, violent and premeditated conduct that raised legitimate concerns relating to the protection of society. D.D.R. v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 329, 420 S.W.3d 494 (2012).

Denial of a request to transfer a first-degree murder and terrorist acts case to juvenile court under subsection (g) of this section was proper because a juvenile had not taken advantage of opportunities given to her, she was charged with very serious offenses, she was involved in the planning of the offenses, and she was involved in gang activity. Because the transfer was denied, any arguments relating to extended-juvenile-jurisdiction were not applicable. M.R.W. v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 591, 424 S.W.3d 355 (2012).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant juvenile's motion to transfer his case to the juvenile court because the evidence supported a finding that defendant was not likely to be rehabilitated in the juvenile system; although defendant did well at times in the juvenile system, he was repeatedly arrested for more crimes and failing to comply with probation, and his probation officer testified that all available resources had been exhausted. K.O.P. v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 667 (2013).

Where a defendant appealed a circuit court's denial of his motion to transfer his case to the juvenile division, there was evidence, separate from the criminal information, to support the circuit court's findings regarding the first three factors listed in subsection (g) of this section, given defendant's age and the nature of the offenses alleged, the circuit's holding as to the seventh factor was not clearly erroneous, and, in light of the other findings by the circuit court, its finding under factor ten was not clearly erroneous. A.E.L. v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 706 (2013).

Circuit court properly considered all the factors in subsection (g) of this section and its decision to deny defendant's motion to transfer his case to the juvenile division was not clearly erroneous where the evidence showed that defendant willingly participated in the victim's abduction, robbery, and murder, defendant was aware that the victim had been left to die, he drove around in and later burned the victim's car, and defendant had a history of failing to rehabilitate. R.W.G. v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 545, 444 S.W.3d 376 (2014).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion to transfer his case to juvenile court where the seriousness of the aggravated robbery, the victim's injuries, and the testimony that the group planned and repeated the crime two other times during the day demonstrated the violent, premeditated, and willful manner of their actions; although defendant did not shoot the victim, there was evidence that he was armed with a rifle and that he was aware that another member of the group had a shotgun. Miller v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 117, 456 S.W.3d 761 (2015).

Denial of the motion to transfer was affirmed as to the kidnapping and aggravated robbery charges, given in part that defendant juvenile had failed to take advantage of rehabilitative opportunities in the past; while facilities and programs were available, defendant did not show an ability or willingness to take advantage of them, and the trial court found no clear evidence that justified prosecution in the juvenile division. V.S. v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 433, 468 S.W.3d 311 (2015).

Circuit court did not clearly err in denying appellant's motion to transfer his case to juvenile court where he allegedly participated in premeditated and serious crimes of violence against persons for which he had some part in planning, he had a history of failing to comply with juvenile-division orders, and he had participated in every program available in juvenile court. Hardin v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 178, 486 S.W.3d 808 (2016).

Circuit court properly denied defendant's motion to transfer his case to the juvenile division because its factual findings on the statutory factors were not clearly erroneous; the circuit court stressed the serious nature of the offenses and found that the protection of society outweighed the one factor—defendant's previous history—that favored transfer, and the fact that it did not weigh one factor the way defendant wanted it weighed did not make its decision clearly erroneous. Lindsey v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 355, 498 S.W.3d 336 (2016).

Circuit court did not clearly err in denying defendant's motion to transfer his rape case to the juvenile division; although there were treatment plans that would have been available to him in the juvenile system, his early-age sexually aggressive behavior, re-offense despite months of residential sex-offender treatment, and high risk of reoffending did not demonstrate an ability or willingness to take advantage of those plans such that prosecution as a juvenile was appropriate. Leach v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 502, 504 S.W.3d 668 (2016).

Circuit court did not clearly err in denying appellant's motion to transfer his case to the juvenile division where it considered all of the factors and determined that the seriousness of the offenses, the fact that the offenses were committed against persons, the need for societal protection, and the level of participation in the offenses outweighed any other factors. Austin v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 114, 515 S.W.3d 633 (2017).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to transfer his case to juvenile court where it considered each of the factors in subsection (g) of this section, made findings on each, including the serious nature of the rape offense, defendant’s active role in the crime, his previous criminal history, and his maturity level, and the findings were supported by the evidence. Flowers v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 468, 528 S.W.3d 851 (2017).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant juvenile's motion to transfer his case to the juvenile division of the circuit court under this section; even though the juvenile division had programs that might ensure the protection of society, defendant had participated in one program but nevertheless later engaged in criminal activity, and the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the resources available were not likely to rehabilitate him. Hubbard v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 636, 535 S.W.3d 669 (2017).

Trial court did not clearly err in denying defendant's motion to transfer his case to the juvenile division where the trial court made specific findings on each statutory factor tailored to defendant and the evidence before it, and given that the case involved a premeditated bank robbery in which defendant shot a person with a sawed-off shotgun, it was not error to weigh that against the testimony that defendant was a good person and had an abysmal home life. Randolph v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 694, 537 S.W.3d 294 (2017).

Circuit court did not clearly err in denying defendant's motion to transfer his case to juvenile court where he was charged with four Class Y felonies, he had played an integral and active role in the planning and commission of the offenses, he provided items to be used in the home invasion, and the homicide would not have occurred but for his involvement in naming the murder victim as a potential robbery target after the victim's act of kindness toward defendant. Parks v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 63, 542 S.W.3d 181 (2018).

Trial court did not clearly err in denying defendant's motions to transfer his cases to the juvenile division of circuit court because it properly considered all the factors, heard the evidence, weighed it, reached a decision, and enumerated its conclusions in an order; the trial court did not ignore the evidence that defendant cited in support of his motions or that was presented at the hearing but simply weighed the evidence differently than defendant desired. Harris v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 72, 540 S.W.3d 302 (2018).

Denial of defendant's motions to transfer defendant's cases to the juvenile division of circuit court was appropriate because the circuit court considered and weighed the evidence on all of the statutory factors, as required, and did not ignore the testimony of witnesses who thought that defendant had the potential to be rehabilitated, but simply weighed the evidence differently than defendant desired. In addition, each of defendant's cases included a charge of aggravated robbery, which was a serious and violent offense. Ward v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 210 (2018).

Circuit court's decision to deny a juvenile-transfer motion was not clearly erroneous because the fact that the juvenile followed his brother's orders in tying up the victim did not diminish his level of culpability, as he stole a gun for the group to use to “hit a lick” and thus played an integral and active role in the planning and commission of the crimes. Sharp v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 255, 548 S.W.3d 846 (2018).

Trial court did not clearly err in denying defendant's motion to transfer the case to juvenile court where the charges were serious and involved the discharging of a firearm in a residential neighborhood, multiple shots struck the interior of nearby apartments where people were present, defendant was on probation at the time for previously possessing a handgun, during which he failed to complete an anger management course and failed two drug tests, and he functioned at an accelerated level academically and held a stable job. Woods v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 576, 565 S.W.3d 124 (2018).

Circuit court did not clearly err in denying a juvenile's motion to transfer his case to the juvenile division where he had been charged with aggravated robbery in which restaurant employees were held at gunpoint, he had held the gun in one robbery, his age did not minimize his culpability as an accomplice, his prior involvement with the juvenile-justice system and continued antisocial behavior indicated that the juvenile-justice system would not have been effective in rehabilitating him, and the circuit court had considered his family's economic disadvantages. Holmes v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 21, 569 S.W.3d 895 (2019).

Denial of motion to transfer case to juvenile division upheld. Heard v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 586, 590 S.W.3d 215 (2019); Bailey v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 232 (2020).

Where appellant was charged with negligent homicide while intoxicated arising out of a motor vehicle accident when he was age 17, the circuit court did not clearly err by denying the motion to transfer the case to juvenile court or to designate the case as an extended juvenile-jurisdiction proceeding; appellant had already been provided numerous treatments, services, and interventions in his life, he would be age 21 in October 2020 which meant he would only have access to the Division of Youth Services for less than one year, the offense was against a person and the victim lost his life, and testimony from a trooper concerning appellant's dilated pupils and quick speech indicated signs of stimulant use. Lewis v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 123, 596 S.W.3d 43 (2020).

Cited: Bright v. State, 307 Ark. 250, 819 S.W.2d 7 (1991); Troutt Bros. v. Emison, 311 Ark. 27, 841 S.W.2d 604 (1992); Oliver v. State, 312 Ark. 466, 851 S.W.2d 415 (1993); Robinson v. State, 41 Ark. App. 20, 847 S.W.2d 49 (1993); State v. Pulaski County Circuit-Chancery Court, 316 Ark. 473, 872 S.W.2d 854 (1994); Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702 (1996); Humphrey v. State, 327 Ark. 753, 940 S.W.2d 860 (1997); Sanford v. State, 331 Ark. 334, 962 S.W.2d 335 (1998); C.L. v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 374 (2012); Drexler v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 95, 538 S.W.3d 888 (2018); Allen v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 244, 548 S.W.3d 227 (2018); Clinkscale v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 271, 550 S.W.3d 409 (2018); Ealy v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 339 (2018); Randof v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 441, 559 S.W.3d 307 (2018); Moore v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 516, 558 S.W.3d 918 (2018).