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Unknown, 208 F.3d 488. Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“he word 'state' in the phrase 'state post-conviction proceeding or other collateral review' modifies both the phrase 'post-conviction review' and the phrase 'other collateral review.”
50 citation events (41 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Jiminez v. Rice (ca9, 2000-08-22)
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Jiminez v. Rice (2×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
he word 'state' in the phrase 'state post-conviction proceeding or other collateral review' modifies both the phrase 'post-conviction review' and the phrase 'other collateral review.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc.
D. Mass. · 2004 · confidence medium
Moreover, in the [Internet Traffic] Order upon which the DTE purportedly relied, the FCC expressly stated that carriers “should be bound by their existing interconnection agreements, as interpreted by state commissions.” Southwestern Bell, 208 F.3d at 488, citing [Internet Traffic] Order (emphasis furnished).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mercadel v. Cain
5th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181 , 121 S.Ct. 2120 , 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001); Grooms v. Johnson, 208 F.3d 488, 489 (5th Cir.1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reaves v. Russell
S.D. Ohio · 2001 · confidence medium
See Jiminez v. Rice, 222 F.3d 1210, 1214 (9th Cir.2000) (“We hold that § 2244(d)(2) does not toll the AEDPA limitations period while a federal habeas petition is pending.”); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir.1999) (“[W]e are persuaded by the analysis of the majority of Courts that have considered the issues that the statute of limitations is not tolled under § 2244(d)(2) for the time during which a habeas petition is pending in federal court.”); Grooms v. Johnson, 208 F.3d 488, 489 (5th Cir.1999); but see Walker v. Artuz, 208 F.3d 357, 359-61 (2d Cir.2000).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Duncan v. Walker
SCOTUS · 2001 · confidence medium
See Jiminez v. Rice, 222 F. 3d 1210 (CA9 2000); Grooms v. Johnson, 208 F. 3d 488 *172 (CA5 1999) (per curiam) ; Jones v. Morton, 195 F. 3d 153 (CA3 1999).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Petrick v. Martin
10th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Jiminez v. Rice, 222 F.3d 1210, 1213-14 (9th Cir.2000); Grooms v. Johnson, 208 F.3d 488, 489 (5th Cir.1999); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153 , *627 158-59 (3d Cir.1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Burleson v. Johnson (2×) also: Cited "see"
5th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
“Equitable tolling applies principally where the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.” Grooms, 208 F.3d at 489-90 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
cited Cited "see" Watts v. Brewer
5th Cir. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
That period is tolled, however, while a petitioner’s state post-conviction review “is pending”. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2); see Grooms v. Johnson, 208 F.3d 488 , 489 (5th Cir. 1999).
cited Cited "see" Stromile v. Cockrell
5th Cir. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grooms v. Johnson, 208 F.3d 488, 489-90 (5th Cir.1999); 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d).
discussed Cited "see" Essic Fail v. Suzanne Hubbard, Warden (2×)
9th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grooms v. Johnson, 208 F.3d 488, 489-90 (5th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (denying equitable tolling because petitioner never tried to exhaust his claims in state court after the district court dismissed his first § 2254 petition without prejudice); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159-60 (3d Cir.1999) (same).
cited Cited "see" Frost v. Armstrong
5th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grooms v. Johnson, 208 F.3d 488 , 489 (5th Cir. 1999).
discussed Cited "see" Essic Fail v. Suzanne Hubbard, Warden (2×)
9th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grooms v. Johnson, 208 F.3d 488 , 489-90 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (denying equitable tolling because petitioner never tried to exhaust his claims in state court after the district court dismissed his first &#167 2254 petition without prejudice); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159-60 (3d Cir. 1999) (same). 14 In this circuit, equitable tolling is warranted only by extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner's control which made it impossible to file a timely federal habeas petition.
discussed Cited "see" Alexander v. Johnson (2×)
S.D. Tex. · 2001 · signal: accord · confidence high
See Duncan, 121 S.Ct. at 2129 ; accord Grooms v. Johnson, 208 F.3d 488, 489 (5th Cir.1999).
discussed Cited "see" Lookingbill v. Johnson
S.D. Tex. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Grooms v. Johnson, 208 F.3d 488, 489 (5th Cir.1999)(recognizing that the word “state” in 2244 modifies both the phrase “post-conviction review” and “other collateral review”); Ott v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir.1999)(finding that § 2244 does not apply to petitions for certiorari after state habeas review), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1099 , 120 S.Ct. 1834 , 146 L.Ed.2d 777 (2000); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 158 (3rd Cir.1999); Rupert v. Johnson, 83 F.Supp.2d 801, 804 (W.D.Tex.1998); but *433 see Walker v. Artuz, 208 F.3d 357, 358 (2nd Cir.2000)(arriving at the opposite …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hayes v. Wilson
5th Cir. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Duncan, 533 U.S. at 181-82 , 121 S.Ct. 2120 (noting that § 2244(d)(2) does not toll the limitation period during the pendency of a federal habeas petition); see also Grooms v. Johnson, 208 F.3d 488 , 489 (5th Cir. 1999).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
208 F.3d 488
PER CURIAM:

Richard William Grooms has appealed the district court’s judgment dismissing his second federal application for a writ of habeas corpus as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). On appeal from the denial of federal habeas relief, this court reviews the district court’s factual determinations for clear error and its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Thompson v. Cain, 161 F.3d 802, 805 (5th Cir.1998).

Section 2244(d)(1), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), provides that “[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(2) provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” § 2244(d)(2).

Prisoners whose convictions have become final prior to the April 24, 1996, effective date of the AEDPA have one year after that date in which to file for § 2254 relief. Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 200-02 (5th Cir.1998); see United States v. Flores, 135 F.3d 1000, 1004-06 (5th Cir.1998) (§ 2255 case), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1091, 119 S.Ct. 846, 142 L.Ed.2d 700 (1999). Because Grooms’s conviction became final prior to the effective date of the AEDPA, he had at least until April 24, 1997, to file his § 2254 application.

In Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1998), this court held that the § 2244(d)(2) tolling provision applies to the one-year limitations period. Noting that § 2244(d)(2) provides that the limitation period applies to periods during which a “State post-conviction proceeding or other collateral review ” is pending, Grooms contends that the limitation period should tolled for the number of days during which his first federal habeas petition was pending during the year following April 24, 1996. Grooms argues that the quoted phrase should be read in the disjunctive and that, accordingly, his first federal ha-beas petition constituted “other collateral review” within the meaning of the statute.

Recently, in Ott v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir.1999), this court held that “a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court is not an application for ‘State’ review that would toll the limitations period.” Accordingly, the period is not tolled during the ninety-day period within which a state habeas petitioner may file a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court adopted the reasoning of a Tenth Circuit case in which the court concluded that the word “State” in the phrase “State post-conviction proceeding or other collateral review” modifies both the phrase “post-conviction review” and the phrase “other collateral review.” Ott, 192 F.3d 510, 513 n. 10 (citing Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d 1153, 1156 (10th Cir.1999)). Ott is controlling in this case.

Grooms argues that he could not pursue state remedies during the pen-dency of his first federal habeas proceeding. This argument raises the question whether the limitations period was equitably tolled. See Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811-12 (5th Cir.1998) (holding that the one-year limitations period is subject to equitable tolling under appropriate exceptional circumstances); cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 1474, 143 L.Ed.2d 558 (1999). “Equitable tolling applies principally where the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the cause of action[*490] or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.” Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). More than one year expired after the first federal habeas petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies before Grooms filed his second federal habeas application. Grooms did not attempt to exhaust his state remedies during that period. Exceptional circumstances meriting equitable tolling are not present in this case.

IT IS ORDERED that the respondent’s motion for leave to supplement the record with documents from Grooms’s first federal habeas proceeding is GRANTED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the judgment of the district court dismissing Grooms’s second federal habeas application as time-barred is AFFIRMED.