Cir.1998) & U.S v. Flores, 135 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir.1998), that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Fed. habeas applicants & 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 159 F.3d 914. · Go Syfert
Search
Cir.1998) & U.S v. Flores, 135 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir.1998), that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Fed. habeas applicants & 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 159 F.3d 914. Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“because, pre-aedpa, 2255 motions were not subject to a limitations period, aedpa's limitations period amount to a new statute of limitations period running from 24 april 1996.”
74 citation events (32 in the last 25 years) across 16 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Garza v. Director, TDCJ-CID (txed, 2025-04-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1999 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Garza v. Director, TDCJ-CID
E.D. Tex. · 2025 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
because, pre-aedpa, 2255 motions were not subject to a limitations period, aedpa's limitations period amount to a new statute of limitations period running from 24 april 1996.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Clark v. Landry
W.D. La. · 2025 · confidence medium
Ott v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1999); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998); 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gallow v. Myers
W.D. La. · 2024 · confidence medium
Ott v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1999); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998); 28 U.S.C. §2244 (d)(2).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Perkowski v. Florida Department of Corrections
S.D. Fla. · 2023 · confidence medium
See Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 149 (3rd Cir. 1998); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Godfrey v. Smith
M.D. Penn. · 2020 · confidence medium
See Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 2000). (“[T]he AEDPA provides that upon conclusion of direct review of a judgment of conviction, the one year period within which to file a federal habeas corpus petition commences, but the running of the period is suspended for the period when state post- conviction proceedings are pending in any state court.”); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998)(per curiam); Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Freemore v. Smith
M.D. Penn. · 2019 · confidence medium
See Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 2000). (“[T]he AEDPA provides that upon conclusion of direct review of a judgment of conviction, the one year period within which to file a federal habeas corpus petition commences, but the running of the period is suspended for the period when state post-conviction proceedings are pending in any state court.”); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998)(per curiam); Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dobbin v. Attorney General Of The State Of Pennsylvania
M.D. Penn. · 2019 · confidence medium
See Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 2000)(“[T]he AEDPA provides that upon conclusion of direct review of a judgment of conviction, the one year period within which to file a federal habeas corpus petition commences, but the running of the period is suspended for the period when state post-conviction proceedings are pending in any state court.”)(emphasis in original); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998)(per curiam); Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Poindexter v. Supt. SCI - HUNTINGDON
M.D. Penn. · 2019 · confidence medium
See Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 2000). (“[T]he AEDPA provides that upon conclusion of direct review of a judgment of conviction, the one year period within which to file a federal habeas corpus petition commences, but the running of the period is suspended for the period when state post-conviction proceedings are pending in any state court.”); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998)(per curiam); Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carson v. Mooney
M.D. Penn. · 2019 · confidence medium
See Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 2000). (“[T]he AEDPA provides that upon conclusion of direct review of a judgment of conviction, the one year period within which to file a federal habeas corpus petition commences, but the running of the period is suspended for the period when state post-conviction proceedings are pending in any state court.”); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998)(per curiam); Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hatfield v. Smith
M.D. Penn. · 2019 · confidence medium
See Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 2000). (“[T]he AEDPA provides that upon conclusion of direct review of a judgment of conviction, the one year period within which to file a federal habeas corpus petition commences, but the running of the period is suspended for the period when state post-conviction proceedings are pending in any state court.”); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998)(per curiam); Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schultz v. Smith
M.D. Penn. · 2019 · confidence medium
See Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 2000). (“[T]he AEDPA provides that upon conclusion of direct review of a judgment of conviction, the one year period within which to file a federal habeas corpus petition commences, but the running of the period is suspended for the period when state post-conviction proceedings are pending in any state court.”)(emphasis in original); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998)(per curiam); Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1998). not the conclusion of state post-conviction collateral review processes that starts t…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Phillips v. Davis
W.D. Tex. · 2019 · confidence medium
Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McGee v. Capozza
M.D. Penn. · 2019 · confidence medium
See Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 2000). (“[T]he AEDPA provides that upon conclusion of direct review of a judgment of conviction, the one year period within which to file a federal habeas corpus petition commences, but the running of the period is suspended for the period when state post-conviction proceedings are pending in any state court.”); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998)(per curiam); Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jon, Roy
Tex. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2); Sonnier v. Johnson, 161 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 1998) appointment of counsel - because state habeas counsel was incapacitated - was filed prior to (per curiam); Fields v. Johnson. 159 F.3d 914,916 (5th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sudberry v. Warden, Southern Ohio Correctional Facility
S.D. Ohio · 2009 · confidence medium
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2); Bennett v. Artuz, 199 F.3d 116, 119 (2nd Cir.1999), aff'd, 531 U.S. 4 , 121 S.Ct. 361 , 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000); Gaskins v. Duval, 183 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir.1999); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1998) (per curiam); Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223 , 1226 (10th Cir.1998); Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 148-49 (3rd Cir.1998); cf. Morris v. Bell, 124 F.3d 198 (table), No. 96-5510, 1997 WL 560055 , at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 5, 1997) (unpublished), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1149 , 118 S.Ct. 1169 , 140 L.Ed.2d 179 (1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Howard v. Epps
5th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
See § 2244(d)(2); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Colbert v. Tambi (2×)
S.D. Ohio · 2007 · confidence medium
See also Gaskins v. Duval, 183 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir.1999); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1998) (per curiam); Gendron v. United States, 154 F.3d 672 , 675 & n. 3 (7t h Cir.1998) (per curiam), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1113 , 119 S.Ct. 1758 , 143 L.Ed.2d 790 (1999); Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223 , 1226 (10th Cir.1998); Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 148-49 (3rd Cir.1998); cf. Morris v. Bell, 124 F.3d 198 , 1997 WL 560055 , at *3 (6th Cir. 1997) (unpublished), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1149 , 118 S.Ct. 1169 , 140 L.Ed.2d 179 (1998). 8 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cressionnie v. Kelly
5th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
The period during which a “properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review” regarding the same conviction is pending is not counted toward the one-year period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wessinger v. Cain
M.D. La. · 2005 · confidence medium
Smith v. Ward, 209 F.3d 383, 384 (5th Cir.2000) (citing Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1998))("tolling provision is applicable to this one-year [grace] period for filing following AEDPA's effective date”). 46 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Grillette v. Warden, Winn Correctional Center
5th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
However, pursuant to § 2244(d)(2), a “properly filed” state post-conviction application tolls “any [AEDPA] limitations period,” including the one-year grace period, throughout the entire time during which the application is “pending.” Smith v. Ward, 209 F.3d 383, 384 (5th Cir.2000) (citing Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1998) (stating that “the § 2244(d)(2) tolling provision is applicable to this one-year [grace] period for filing following AEDPA’s effective date”)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. Cockrell
5th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
Miller’s state petition was filed eleven days after the end of the grace period, and is thus untimely even though he 3 Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 810-11 (5th Cir. 1998); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998). 4 Davis, 158 F.3d at 810 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 5 Ott v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 1999). 3 delivered the petition to prison officials for mailing six days before the deadline.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alexander v. Johnson
S.D. Tex. · 2001 · confidence medium
“The AEDPA, which became effective April 24, 1996, enacted a one-year period of limitation for federal habeas proceedings that runs, unless tolled, from the date on which the petitioner’s conviction became final at the conclusion of direct review or during the pendency of a ‘properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review.’ ” Cantu-Tzin v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1091 , 119 S.Ct. 847 , 142 L.Ed.2d 701 (1999) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(A), (d)(2)); see Ott v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir.1999), cer…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Grooms v. Johnson
5th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
In Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998), this court held that the § 2244(d)(2) tolling provision applies to the one-year limitations period.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hines v. Louisiana
E.D. La. · 2000 · confidence medium
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Thompson v. Cain
5th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
In Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1998), this court held that the § 2244(d)(2) tolling provision applies to the one-year limitations period.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tony Bruce Bennett v. Christopher Artuz, Superintendent
2d Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Gaskins v. Duval, 183 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir.1999); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1998) (per curiam); Gendron v. United States, 154 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (resolving consolidated cases), cert. denied — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 1758 , 143 L.Ed.2d 790 (1999); Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir.1998); Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir.1998); see also Mills, 187 F.3d at 882-84 (applying § 2244(d) tolling provision to habeas petition challenging pre-AEDPA conviction without discussing propriety of doing so); Guenther v. Holt, 173 F.3d 1328, 1331…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Andrews v. Cain
E.D. La. · 1999 · confidence medium
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Huenefeld v. Maloney
D. Mass. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Gendron v. United States, 154 F.3d 672 , 675 & n. 3 (7th Cir.1998) cert. denied, — U.S. —, 119 S.Ct. 1758 , 143 L.Ed.2d 790 (1999); Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir.1998); Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir.1998); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1998) (per curiam); Connors, 1999 WL 98531 , slip op. at 10 n. 7 (J.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mitchell v. Cain
5th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
E.g., Muhleisen v. Ieyoub, 168 F.3d 840, 844 (5th Cir. 1999).3 On reviewing the record, we conclude that the state court denied Mitchell’s instruction claim on the merits; the court gave 3 While 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1), also added by AEDPA, sets a one-year period for seeking federal habeas relief after a state conviction has become final, this limitations period begins on 24 April 1996 (AEDPA’s effective date) for persons convicted before then, e.g., Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 914 (5th Cir. 1998), and is tolled while state habeas relief is pursued, id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mueller v. Angelone
4th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); Rivera v. _________________________________________________________________ 4 Section 107(c) of the Act provides that "Chapter 154 . . . shall apply to cases pending on or after the date of enactment of the Act." 110 Stat. 1226 . 7 Sheriff of Cook County, 162 F.3d 486, 489 (7th Cir. 1998); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 915 (5th Cir. 1998); Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917, 921 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 811 (1999).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. Cain
E.D. La. · 1999 · confidence medium
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Everett Lee Mueller v. Ronald J. Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections
4th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 , 118 S.Ct. 1352 , 140 L.Ed.2d 529 (1998); Rivera v. Sheriff of Cook County, 162 F.3d 486, 489 (7th Cir.1998); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 915 (5th Cir.1998); Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917, 921 (11th Cir.1998), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 811 , 142 L.Ed.2d 671 (1999).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Shabazz v. Johnson
5th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
Davis, 158 F.3d at 811 ; Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 915-16 (5th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ROY MENDOZA GARCIA v. GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION (2×) also: Cited "see"
unknown court · confidence medium
Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) RONALD WILLIAMS v. BURL CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary
unknown court · confidence medium
See Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 199-200 (5th Cir. 1998)(state prisoners seeking to challenge convictions which became final prior to April 24, 1996, have a one-year “grace period” within which to file); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998) (tolling provision of § 2244(d)(2) applies to “grace period”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) MOSE A. REED, JR v. HARRY CONNICK, District Attorney, Parish of Orleans; TERRY TERRELL, Warden; RICHARD IEYOUB, Attorney General, State of Louisiana
unknown court · confidence medium
See § 2244(d)(2); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) HERMAN EARL WOOLBRIGHT v. GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION
unknown court · confidence medium
See Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 199-200 (5th Cir. 1998)(state prisoners seeking to challenge convictions which became final prior to April 24, 1996, have a one-year “grace period” within which to file); Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998)(tolling provision of § 2244(d)(2) applies to “grace period”).
cited Cited "see" Will v. Cain
E.D. La. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914 (5th Cir.1998); 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2). 17 . 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1)(A). 18 .
cited Cited "see" Goff v. Johnson
5th Cir. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 915-16 (5th Cir. 1998).
cited Cited "see" Neverson v. Bissonnette
1st Cir. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 915-16 (5th Cir.1998) (per curiam).
cited Cited "see" Smith v. Ward
5th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1998).
cited Cited "see" Percy Stanley Harris v. Ronald Hutchinson, Warden, Maryland House of Corrections J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of the State of Maryland
4th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914 , 916 *328 (5th Cir.1998) (per curiam); Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir.1998); Calderon v. United States Dist.
cited Cited "see" Salazar v. Johnson
5th Cir. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998).
cited Cited "see" Coleman v. Johnson
5th Cir. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1998).
discussed Cited "see" Coleman v. Johnson
5th Cir. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998). 18 Under the "mailbox rule," a prisoner's federal habeas corpus petition is deemed filed when he delivers the petition to prison officials for mailing to the district court.
discussed Cited "see" Gaskins v. Duval
1st Cir. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1998) (per curiam); Gendron v. United States, 154 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (resolving consolidated case of state habeas petitioner), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 1758 , 143 L.Ed.2d 790 (1999); Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d at 1226-27; Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir.1998).
discussed Cited "see" Gaskins v. Duval
1st Cir. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Gendron v. United States, 154 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (resolving consolidated case of state habeas petitioner), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1758 (1999); Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d at 1226-27; Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1998).
cited Cited "see" Mercadel v. Cain
5th Cir. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1998) (holding that petitioner whose conviction became final before enactment of AEDPA may rely on 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2)'s tolling provisions).
discussed Cited "see" Fisher v. Johnson (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
5th Cir. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1998) (applying § 2244(d)(2)’s tolling provision to one-year "reasonableness period” under Flanagan and Flores). 6 .
cited Cited "see" Gasery v. Johnson
5th Cir. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1998).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Cir.1998) and U.S
v.
Flores, 135 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir.1998), that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas applicants and 28 U.S.C. § 2255
159 F.3d 914
1998 WL 754901
PER CURIAM:

Our court having held in Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196 (5th Cir.1998) and U.S. v. Flores, 135 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir.1998), that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas applicants and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 movants whose claims would have been otherwise time-barred immediately as of the enactment of the one-year limitations period in the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (AEDPA), instead have one year following AEDPA’s effective date to file then-applications, at issue is whether this one year is tolled pending the pursuit of state habeas relief, as per 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). We hold that it is.

Michael Wayne Fields, Texas prisoner # 645761, appeals the dismissal as time-barred of his § 2254 habeas application. We VACATE and REMAND for further proceedings.

I.

In June 1993, Fields was convicted in Texas state court for unlawful delivery of a controlled substance and was sentenced to prison for approximately 15 years. He did not pursue a direct appeal.

AEDPA became effective on 24 April 1996. On 13 November of that year, Fields filed for state habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the possibility of a direct appeal. That petition was denied by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on 12 February 1997, 91 days after the initial filing.

On 19 May 1997, Fields filed for habeas relief in federal court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, again claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The application was dismissed as time-barred. (Fields’ motion for appointment of counsel on appeal is DENIED.)

[*915] II.

AEDPA instituted for the first time a limitations period for state prisoner habeas applications under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and for federal prisoner motions for reconsideration of sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 (state prisoners) and 2255 (federal prisoners); Flanagan, 154 F.3d at 198; Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 1998 WL 733731 (5th Cir.1998) (98-20507) (holding that AEDPA limitations period is statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling, not jurisdictional statute of repose). For state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2244, as modified by AEDPA, provides in pertinent part:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (emphasis added). (The limitations provision for § 2255 motions is found in that section.)

Courts applying AEDPA’s new limitations period faced retroactivity concerns regarding prisoners, like Fields, convicted before AED-PA’s 24 April 1996 effective date. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), held that AEDPA applies only to applications filed after AEDPA’s effective date. Fields falls into this category; he filed his habeas application in 1997.

Courts also faced applicants whose one-year time limit had already run before AED-PA became effective. Fields also falls into this category; the time for his state appeal lapsed in July 1993, Tex.R.App. P. 202(b); therefore, the § 2244(d)(1) period would have expired in July 1994.

But, in Flores, 135 F.3d at 1002-05, considering a § 2255 movant, our court joined several sister circuits in granting such otherwise-time-barred prisoners a “reasonable” length of time to file such motions. See Ross v. Artuz, 150 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir.1998); Joseph v. McGinnis, 150 F.3d 103, 104 (2d Cir.1998); Mickens v. United States, 148 F.3d 145, 147-48 (2d Cir.1998); Rosa v. Senkowski, 148 F.3d 134, 135-36 (2d Cir.1998); Peterson v. Demskie, 107 F.3d 92, 92-93 (2d Cir.1997); Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir.1998); Brown v. Angelone, 150 F.3d 370, 374-75 (4th Cir.1998); O’Connor v. United States, 133 F.3d 548, 550 (7th Cir.1998); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 865-66 (7th Cir.1996), rev’d on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); Calderon v. United States District Court for the Central District of California, 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 899, 139 L.Ed.2d 884 (1998); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 977 (10th Cir.1998), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 210, — L.Ed.2d - (1998); U.S. v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 745-46 (10th Cir.1997).

Flores based its “reasonableness period” on the holding of Hanner v. State of Mississippi 833 F.2d 55 (5th Cir.1987), and Culbreth v. Downing, 121 N.C. 205, 28 S.E. 294 (1897), that claims accruing before a change in a limitations period must be filed within the shorter of (1) the time allowed by the old limitation period, running from the claim’s accrual, and (2) the time allowed by the new limitation period, running from the time of the change. Flores, 135 F.3d at 1005, 1006[*916] (quoting Culbreth, 28 S.E. at 296, and Hanner, 833 F.2d at 59). Because, pre-AEDPA, § 2255 motions were not subject to a limitations period, AEDPA’s limitations period amounted to the new statute of limitations period running from 24 April 1996.

Flanagan clarified the Flores period in two ways. First, the reasonableness period applies to § 2254 applications as well as to § 2255 motions. Flanagan, 154 F.3d at 200 n. 2; cf. Flores, 135 F.3d at 1002 n. 7. Second, the period does not include the day of AEDPA’s enactment, Flanagan, 154 F.3d at 200-02; accordingly, applications filed on 24 April 1997 are timely.

As quoted earlier, § 2244(d)(2) provides:

The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

We now further clarify the Flores/Flanagan rule and hold that the § 2244(d)(2) tolling provision applies to the reasonableness period. This result accords with Davis, which allows equitable tolling of the one-year period. Needless to say, in that equitable tolling may modify the strict one-year limit, so too must the tolling mandated by AEDPA. Accord Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1225-27 (10th Cir.1998); Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 148-49 (3rd Cir.1998); see also Brewer v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 491, 493 (5th Cir.1998).

III.

Because Fields’ state post-conviction proceeding was pending for 91 days during the year following 24 April 1996, the effective date of AEDPA, he had 91 days past 24 April 1997 in which to file his first § 2254 application. His 19 May 1997 application was filed within that time. Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment and REMAND for further proceedings.

VACATED AND REMANDED.