United States Nat'l Bank v. Hill, 434 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1970). · Go Syfert
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United States Nat'l Bank v. Hill, 434 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1970). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
69 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 29 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Taheny v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (caed, 2012-04-03)
Treatment trajectory · 1970 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1970 1998 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Taheny v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
E.D. Cal. · 2012 · confidence medium
Bank, 434 F.2d at 1020. 31 E.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Robinette v. Griffith (3×) also: Cited "see"
W.D. Va. · 1979 · confidence medium
Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 563 , 83 S.Ct. 520 , 9 L.Ed.2d 523 (1963); Northside Iron and Metal Co. v. Dobson & Johnson, Inc., 480 F.2d 798, 800 (5th Cir. 1973); United States Nat’l Bank v. Hill, 434 F.2d 1019, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 1970); Klein v. Bower, 421 F.2d 338 , 342 (2nd Cir. 1970). 6 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fred Fisher v. The First National Bank of Chicago
1st Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
Buffum v. Chase National Bank, 192 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 944 , 72 S.Ct. 558 , 96 L.Ed. 702 ; American Surety Co. v. Bank of California, 133 F.2d 160 (9th *1287 Cir. 1943); United States National Bank v. Hill, 434 F.2d 1019, 1020 (9th Cir. 1970).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reaves v. Bank of America
S.D. Cal. · 1973 · confidence medium
Although Morgan dealt with the state venue limitation in § 94 that a bank may be sued only where “located”, the courts have interchangeably defined the terms “established” and “located”, and thus the purpose of preventing inconvenience and interruption to a bank’s activities applies whether a national bank is sued in federal court or state court. 2 See, United States National Bank v. Hill, 434 F.2d 1019, 1020 (9th Cir. 1970).
examined Cited as authority (rule) First National Bank of Boston v. United States District Court for the Central District of California (3×)
9th Cir. · 1972 · confidence medium
This court reversed, holding that a national bank can only be sued where “it maintained its principal place of business, even though it had ‘branch business offices’ in other states.” Id. at 1020.
examined Cited as authority (rule) The First National Bank Of Boston v. United States District Court For The Central District Of California (3×)
1st Cir. · 1972 · confidence medium
This court reversed, holding that a national bank can only be sued where "it maintained its principal place of business, even though it had 'branch business offices' in other states." Id. at 1020. 16 The court said: "The overwhelming weight of authority, . . . supports the proposition that a national bank does not become 'established' or 'located' in any district wherein it may open and operate a branch office." (Citing cases.) And the court concluded: "[I]f the national banks and the courts are to be placed in that position, it must be the Congress that puts them there." Id. at 1020-1021. 17 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Helco, Inc. v. First National City Bank
D.V.I. · 1971 · confidence medium
Several courts have expressed such a preference (U.S. National Bank v. Hill, 434 F.2d 1019, 1020 (9th Cir. 1970); cf., Bruns v. American National Bank, 394 F.2d 300, 303 ; and see Scheflin, supra, at 771-772), but the consensus of judicial opinion is that the contrary rule is too firmly established to permit such a reading.
cited Cited "see" Martinez v. Wells Fargo Bank
N.D. Cal. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Hill, 434 F.2d 1019 , 1020 (9th Cir.1970); Bank of Cal. Nat’l Ass’n v. Twin Harbors Lumber Co., 465 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir.1972).
cited Cited "see" Boone & Rodgers, Inc. v. National Bank of Washington
D. Maryland · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States National Bank v. Hill, 434 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1970), and the cases cited therein.
discussed Cited "see" First National City Bank New York v. Smith
Okla. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States National Bank v. Hill, 434 F.2d 1019 (9th C.A., 1970); Bruns, Nordeman & Co. v. American National Bank & Trust Company, 394 F.2d 300 (2d C.A., 1968), certiorari denied 393 U.S. 855 , 89 S.Ct. 97 , 21 L.Ed. 2d 125 ; Allied Steel Tractor Prod. v. First National City Bank of N.Y., 54 F.R.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Michigan National Bank v. Superior Court
Cal. Ct. App. · 1972 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States National Bank v. Hill (9th Cir. 1970) 434 F.2d 1019, 1020 ; Bruns, Nordeman & Co. v. American National Bank & Trust Co. (2d Cir. 1968) 394 F.2d 300 , 302-303 and 304 [ 10 A.L.R.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
United States National Bank, a National Banking Association
v.
Honorable Irving Hill, United States District Judge, Sam Greitzer and Tillie Greitzer, Husband and Wife, Real Parties in Interest
26447_1.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Nov 9, 1970.
434 F.2d 1019
Published

434 F.2d 1019

UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK, a national banking association, Petitioner,
v.
Honorable Irving HILL, United States District Judge, Respondent, Sam GREITZER and Tillie Greitzer, husband and wife, Real Parties In Interest.

No. 26447.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

November 9, 1970.

Stephen D. Drushall, of Epport & Delevie, Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioner.

Honorable Irving Hill, District Judge, in pro. per.

Marshall B. Grossman of Schwartz & Alschuler, Los Angeles, Cal., for real party in interest.

Theodore E. Orliss of Jaffe & Orliss, Los Angeles, Cal., Robert E. Jenks, Jr., of Calfas & Calfas, Santa Monica, Cal., for co-defendants.

Before HAMLEY, ELY, and WRIGHT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

[*~1019]1

The Petitioner is a national bank with its principal office and place of business in San Diego, California. The City of San Diego is located in the Southern District of California. The Petitioner and others were sued in the Central District of California, the claim against them being predicated, in part, upon the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (15 U.S.C. § 77v), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (15 U.S. C. § 78aa).

2

After the filing of the complaint in the District Court, the Petitioner moved that the complaint against it be dismissed or, in the alternative, that the suit, as against it, be transferred to the Southern District of California. It based its motion upon the provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 94. The District Court denied the motion for the reason that the Petitioner maintained a "branch office" within the Central District of California. This Petition for Writ of Mandamus followed.

3

We are convinced that the contention made by the Petitioner is correct. 12 U.S.C. § 94 provides, in effect, that a suit may be instituted against a national bank only within the district in which the bank is "established" or wherein it is "located." In American Surety Co. v. Bank of California, 133 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1943), our court had the opportunity to define the word "located" as it then appeared in 28 U.S.C. § 41(16), the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 1348. We held that the national bank involved in that case was "located" only in the state wherein it maintained its principal place of business, even though it had "branch business offices" in other states. Subsequently, in Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 467, 67 S.Ct. 1340, 1343, 91 L.Ed. 1602 (1947), the Supreme Court wrote: "For jurisdictional purposes, a national bank is a `citizen' of the state in which it is established or located, 28 U.S.C. § 41(16), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(16), and in that district alone can it be sued, 12 U.S.C.A. § 94." (emphasis added)

4

The overwhelming weight of authority, in line with American Surety Co. and Cope, supports the proposition that a national bank does not become "established" or "located" in any district wherein it may open and operate a branch office. See, e.g., Buffum v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 192 F.2d 58, 60 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 944, 72 S.Ct. 558, 96 L.Ed. 702 (1952); Leonardi v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 81 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 677, 56 S.Ct. 941, 80 L.Ed. 1398 (1936); Berman v. Thomson, 284 F.Supp. 521 (N.D. Ill.1968); General Electric Credit Corp. v. James Talcott, Inc., 271 F.Supp. 699, 703 (S.D.N.Y.1966); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Lippert Bros., Inc., 233 F.Supp. 650, 653 (D.Neb.1964); Prince v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 310 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1970); Ebeling v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 272 Cal.App.2d 724, 727, 77 Cal.Rptr. 612, 614 (1969); Tuthill v. George S. May Int'l Co., 55 Misc.2d 542, 285 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1967); cf. Levin v. Great W. Sugar Co., 274 F. Supp. 974 (D.N.J.1967).

5

The decision reached by the district judge may reflect the more desirable position, but if the national banks and the courts are to be placed in that position, it must be the Congress that puts them there.

[*~1020]6

The Petition for Writ of Mandamus is granted. The District Court's order of August 6, 1970, insofar as it pertains to the issue in question, is vacated. If the district judge deems it appropriate, he may order that the cause, in its entirety, be transferred to the Southern District of California; otherwise, the suit, as against the Petitioner, must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.