Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1987)
A manufacturer's decision to replace one carrier with another is a competitive activity subject to the Rule of Reason and requires evidence of anticompetitive intent and injury to competition.
A plaintiff filed an antitrust action alleging that a manufacturer's decision to terminate its delivery services and hire a new carrier constituted an illegal boycott under the Sherman Act. The court addressed whether such a substitution of services requires per se treatment or a Rule of Reason analysis. The court held that a manufacturer's decision to replace one carrier with another is a competitive activity subject to the Rule of Reason. To survive summary judgment under this standard, a plaintiff must produce evidence of an agreement intended to harm or unreasonably restrain competition that actually causes injury to competition. Because the plaintiff failed to provide evidence of anticompetitive intent or effect, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.
At page 211Requirements for newly discovered evidence under rule 60(b)(2)126 citing cases“such magnitude that production of it earlier would have been likely to change the disposition of the case.”
- Gonzalez v. US Human Rights Network, No. 2:20-cv-00757 (D. Ariz. Jan. 12, 2024).([T]he newly discovered 3 evidence must be of such magnitude that production of it earlier would have been likely to 4 change the disposition of the case.)
- CSAA Affinity Ins. Co. v. Amerigas Propane LP, No. 3:21-cv-08041 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2022). See Coastal, 833 F.2d at 212 (“Evidence 20 is not ‘newly discovered’ . . . if it . . . could have been discovered with reasonable 21 diligence.”); Sunburst Mins., LLC v. Emerald Copper Corp., 300 F.Supp.3d 1056 , 1063 22 (D.Ariz. 2018) (“E…
- Miller v. St. Charles Health Sys., Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00762 (D. Or. Dec. 17, 2021).(newly discovered evidence must be of such magnitude that production of it earlier would have been likely to change the disposition of the case)
- In re Raquel Medina, No. NC-18-1078-FBKu (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2018).unpublished See Coastal Transfer Co., 833 F.2d at 212 (“Evidence is not ‘newly discovered’ . . . if it was in the moving party’s possession at the time of trial or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.”).
- Reyes v. HSBC Bank USA, No. CAAP-12-0000507 (Haw. App. May 29, 2015).unpublished Id. ("This fact of possession also makes clear that Coastal did not use due diligence to discover its expert's error.
- Montano, No. 3:24-cv-05850 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2026).Relief under Rule 60(b)(2) “is warranted if (1) the moving party can show 7 the evidence relied on in fact constitutes ‘newly discovered evidence’ within the meaning of 8 Rule 60(b); (2) the moving party exercised due diligence to discover…
- Andrews, No. 2:26-cv-00027 (E.D. Wash. July 10, 2026).Relief under 4 Rule 60(b)(2) “is warranted if (1) the moving party can show the evidence relied 5 on in fact constitutes ‘newly discovered evidence’ within the meaning of Rule 6 60(b); (2) the moving party exercised due diligence to discov…
- Randall, No. 3:23-cv-00243 (D. Or. June 4, 2026).Similarly, Defendant Im’s request for relief under Rule 60(b)(2) is unsupported because Defendant Im does not show that his newly proffered evidence “could not have been discovered through due diligence . . . .” Jones v. Aero/Chem Corp., 9…
- Jones, No. 3:22-cv-08102 (D. Ariz. Mar. 27, 2026).Ariz. 1998). 10 Ms. Jones argues that the Court’s order granting summary judgment for the District 11 should be vacated for three reasons: (1) allegedly newly discovered evidence precludes 12 summary judgment, (2) “multiple issues of fact”…
- Novalpina Capital Partners I Gp S.A.R.L v. Read, 149 F.4th 1092 (9th Cir. 2025).publishedUnder Rule 60(b)(2), a district court may grant a party relief from a final judgment, but “the movant must show the evidence (1) existed at the time of [the judgment], (2) could not have been discovered through due diligence, and (3) was ‘…
Show 109 more citing cases
- Doe v. Lombardo, No. 3:24-cv-00065 (D. Nev. Apr. 4, 2025).(noting in the context of Rules 9 59 and 60 that “newly discovered” evidence does not include evidence previously in a 10 moving party’s possession or which could have been discovered with reasonable 11 diligence)
- Ignite Spirits, Inc. v. Consulting by Ar, LLC, No. 23-15635 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 2025).unpublishedCoastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1987). 1.
- In re Paniolo Cable Co., LLC, No. 24-1095 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 19, 2025).unpublished“such magnitude that production of it earlier would have been likely to change the disposition of the case”
- Fleury v. Platt, No. 2:24-cv-01321 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 18, 2025).To obtain such relief, the movant must show the evidence (1) existed at the time of the 7 trial, (2) could not have been discovered through due diligence, and (3) was “of such magnitude 8 that production of it earlier would have been likel…
- TB Holding Co. v. J&S Siding, No. 4:22-cv-00307 (D. Idaho Mar. 13, 2025).Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1987).
- Hennessey v. Americredit Fin. Servs. Inc, No. 3:24-cv-05145 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 25, 2024).Relief under Rule 60(b)(2) “is warranted if 22 23 5 For reference, Rule 59(b) allows a motion for new trial “no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment.” Neither party briefed whether this aspect of Rule 60(b)(2) is satisfied. 24 1…
- Kimberly Marroquin v. City of Los Angeles, 112 F.4th 1204 (9th Cir. 2024).published“Reasonable diligence” is thus an express requirement to receive relief under Rule 60(b)(2), see Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, 833 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1987), and the text does not include any exceptions, Fed. R.
- Simon v. Superior Court of California, No. 3:23-cv-00889 (S.D. Cal. July 3, 2024).Cal. Nov. 9, 2016) 14 (“[T]he evidence must be ‘newly discovered,’ the movant must have exercised ‘due 15 diligence’ to discover the evidence, and the evidence ‘must be of such magnitude that 16 production of it earlier would have been lik…
- Greer v. State of Hawaii, No. 1:22-cv-00286 (D. Haw. May 22, 2024).“such magnitude that production of it earlier would have been likely to change the disposition of the case”
- Hart v. Perkins, No. 2:23-cv-00404 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2024).P. 60(b). 16 “Relief from judgment on the basis of newly discovered evidence is warranted if 17 (1) the moving party can show the evidence relied on in fact constitutes ‘newly discovered 18 evidence’ within the meaning of Rule 60(b); (2) t…
- (PC) Taylor v. Carbullido, No. 2:19-cv-02550 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2024).“such magnitude that production of it earlier would 25 have been likely to change the disposition of the case”
- Haynes v. Mick, No. 3:22-cv-05688 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2023).P. 6 60(b)(2).3 To obtain such relief, the movant must show the evidence (1) existed at the time of the 7 trial, (2) could not have been discovered through due diligence, and (3) was “of such magnitude 8 that production of it earlier would…
- Birri v. United States Small Bus. Admin., No. 5:22-cv-03311 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2023).The newly discovered evidence 5 must be of “such magnitude that production of it earlier would have been likely to change the 6 disposition of the case.” Feature Realty, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 331 F.3d 1082, 1093 (9th Cir. 7 2003) (quoti…
- Auld-Susott v. Galindo, No. 1:20-cv-00270 (D. Haw. Oct. 3, 2023).“such magnitude that production of it earlier would have been likely to change the disposition of the case”
- United States v. Shearer, No. 2:12-cv-02334 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2023).Corp., 2003 WL 15 27376890, at *3 (finding that the evidence was not “of such magnitude as to change 16 the outcome of the case” and therefore did not warrant setting aside the judgement); 17 accord Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sal…
- Troy Capital, LLC v. Patenaude & Felix APC, No. 2:20-cv-00205 (D. Nev. Jan. 18, 2023).It bases this argument on testimony from his 13 deposition, which occurred in January 2022, eight months before this court’s order on summary 14 judgment entered on September 21, 2022. 15 “Evidence is not newly discovered if it was in the…
- Gregory Caputo v. Tungsten Heavy Powder, Inc., No. 22-55142 (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 2023).unpublishedEvidence is not newly discovered “if it was in the moving party’s possession at the time of trial or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.” Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 212 (9th Cir. 198…
- Flores v. Austin, No. 3:20-cv-00656 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2022).The Court construes this 4 application as a motion for reconsideration of its Dismissal Order pursuant to Federal Rule 5 of Civil Procedure 60 based on newly discovered evidence. 6 The Court denies Plaintiffs’ ex parte motion for reconside…
- Heath v. Tristar Prods., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-02869 (D. Nev. Sept. 11, 2022). Coastal 23 Transfer Co., 833 F.2d at 211.
- Ping Shun Corp. v. Imperial Pac. Int'l, No. 21-15836 (9th Cir. July 20, 2022).unpublished“the newly discovered evidence must be of such magnitude that the production of it earlier would have been likely to change the disposition of the case”
- Allstate Indem. Co. v. Lindquist, No. 2:20-cv-01508 (W.D. Wash. June 2, 2022). Where relief is sought on the basis of newly 3 discovered evidence under Rule 60(b)(2), the evidence “must be of ‘such magnitude that 4 production of it earlier would have been likely to change the disposition of the case.’” 5 Feature Real…
- Evangers Dog & Cat Food Co. v. Env't Democracy Proj., No. 2:21-cv-08489 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2022).Relief from judgment due to newly discovered 9 evidence is warranted only if the new evidence “would 10 have been likely to change the disposition of the case.” 11 Feature Realty, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 331 F.3d 1082 , 12 1093 (9th Cir.…
- King Cnty. v. Viracon Inc, No. 2:19-cv-00508 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 2022).To succeed on such a motion, the moving 5 party must demonstrate that (1) the evidence relied on in fact constitutes “newly discovered 6 7 evidence”; (2) the moving party exercised due diligence to discover this evidence; and (3) the 8 new…
- Green 076282 v. Ryan, No. 4:18-cv-00068 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2022).“of such 7 magnitude that production of it earlier would have been likely to change the disposition 8 of the case”
- (PS) Schmitz v. Asman, No. 2:20-cv-00195 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2021).Where the motion rests on newly discovered 12 evidence, the moving party must show that (1) “the evidence relied on in fact constitutes ‘newly 13 discovered evidence’ within the meaning of Rule 60(b),” (2) it “exercised due diligence to 14…
- Ireland v. Bend Neurological Assocs. LLC, No. 6:16-cv-02054 (D. Or. Mar. 31, 2021).“evidence that the agreement. . .was motivated by a desire to curtail competition”
- Donald Bailey v. United States, 384 F. App'x 670 (9th Cir. 2010).unpublished
- McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1988).published
- Walter D. Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., Walter D. Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 869 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1989).published
- City of Long Beach v. Stand. Oil Co. of California, 872 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989).published
- Douglas Emmons v. Robert McLaughlin Donald Ratliff, 874 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1989).published
- Albuquerque v. Arizona Indoor Soccer, Inc., 880 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1989).unpublished
- Clive Moss v. Casa Grande Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 892 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1990).unpublished
- Rose Maree Jones v. Aero/chem Corp., 921 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1990).published
- Raymond B. Simmons v. California Dep't of Transp., 956 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1992).unpublished
- John Hildreth Atkins v. Officer Weaver City of Newberg, 967 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1992).unpublished
- Londen Land Co. v. Title Resources Guar. Compa, 467 F. App'x 708 (9th Cir. 2012).unpublished
- Perez-Ortiz v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 15 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994).published
- George L. Vaughn v. Comm'r Internal Revenue Serv., 15 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1993).unpublished
- Onie L. Hyde v. United States, 26 F.3d 130 (9th Cir. 1994).unpublished
- Gary E. Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1994).published
- Vathsala Srinivasan v. Devry Inst. of Tech., 53 F.3d 340 (9th Cir. 1995).published
- James Reed, Jr. v. Teledyne Sys. Co., 94 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 1996).unpublished
- Joy Walden v. James D. Watkins, 95 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 1996).unpublished
- In re Indian Wells Estates, Inc., 96 F.3d 1451 (9th Cir. 1996).unpublished
- Nemex Assocs. v. Primerit Bank, 114 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1989).unpublished
- Larcenia Taylor v. Bakersfield City Sch. Dist. Dave Hashim Alice Johnson, 119 F.3d 7 (9th Cir. 1997).unpublished
- Janet Marie Dixon v. Susan E. Poole, 122 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1997).unpublished
- Simmons v. State, 122 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1997).unpublished
- Diana Alicia Huff v. Boeing Co. Clarke Abram Dan Habel, 129 F.3d 125 (9th Cir. 1997).unpublished
- Adaptive Power Solutions, LLC v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 141 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 1998).published
- Defenders of Wildlife Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Mike Bernal Robert Smith, Dr., 204 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2000).published
- Feature Realty, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 331 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003).published
- Jimmy Ewenike v. Carolyn W. Colvin, 513 F. App'x 676 (9th Cir. 2013).unpublished
- Lanier v. Lanier, 612 S.E.2d 456 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005).published
- Daghlian v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (C.D. Cal. 2008).published
- Genetic Sys. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 691 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C. 1988).published
- In re Arden Props., Inc., 248 B.R. 164 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2000).published
- Adidas-Am., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D. Or. 2008).published
- In re Walker, 332 B.R. 820 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005).published
- W. Helicopter Servs., Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 777 F. Supp. 1543 (D. Or. 1991).published
- Amesco Exports, Inc. v. Associated Aircraft Mfg. & Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (C.D. Cal. 1997).published
- Spacey v. Burgar, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (C.D. Cal. 2002).published
- Adidas Am., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Or. 2007).published
- DeBoer v. Vill. of Oak Park, 86 F. Supp. 2d 804 (N.D. Ill. 1999).published
- Opals on Ice Lingerie v. BodyLines, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 286 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).published
- In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 728 (D. Md. 2001).published
- Lans v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2000).published
- In re Irish Pubâ€"arrowhead, LLC Irish Pubâ€"arrowhead Land, LLC (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014).unpublished
- Achique Coyaso v. Bradley Pac. Aviation, 578 F. App'x 715 (9th Cir. 2014).unpublished
- James Bowell v. R. Gamberg, 599 F. App'x 330 (9th Cir. 2015).unpublished
- Sathianathan v. Smith Barney, Inc., 362 F. App'x 853 (9th Cir. 2010).unpublished
- Nehara v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 650 F. App'x 495 (9th Cir. 2016).unpublished
- In re Ramon Concha & Isabel Concha, No. AZ-15-1298-LJuF (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Oct. 14, 2016).unpublished
- Gustavo Estrada v. Douglas Gillespie, 671 F. App'x 646 (9th Cir. 2016).unpublished
- Linda Ewing v. Randy Megrdle, 678 F. App'x 524 (9th Cir. 2017).unpublished
- LifeLock, Inc. Sec. Litig. v. LifeLock, Inc., 690 F. App'x 947 (9th Cir. 2017).unpublished
- Midland Innovations, Nv v. Wen Wang, 815 F. App'x 200 (9th Cir. 2020).unpublished
- Rochelle Nishimoto v. Cnty. of San Diego, 850 F. App'x 493 (9th Cir. 2021).unpublished
- Andrew Moret v. Poornima Ranganathan, No. 21-35424 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 2022).unpublished
- Baker v. City of Phoenix, 20 F. App'x 632 (9th Cir. 2001).unpublished
- Hason v. Univ. of California Bd. of Regents, 52 F. App'x 958 (9th Cir. 2002).unpublished
- Brooks v. Golden Feather Realty Servs., Inc., 60 F. App'x 150 (9th Cir. 2003).unpublished
- United States ex rel. Gilbert v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 61 F. App'x 488 (9th Cir. 2003).unpublished
- Benson Tower Condo. Owners Ass'n v. Victaulic Co., 105 F. Supp. 3d 1184 (D. Or. 2015).published
- Hawthorne Hangar Operations Lp v. Hawthorne Airport, LLC, No. 21-55542 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2022).unpublished
- Jenkins v. Marlowe, 308 F. App'x 227 (9th Cir. 2009).unpublished
- Pressure Vessels of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Empire Gas, 137 P.R. Dec. 497 (1994).published
- Lewis v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 264 F. App'x 647 (9th Cir. 2008).unpublished
- Cranmer v. Tyconic Inc., 278 F. App'x 744 (9th Cir. 2008).unpublished
- Vahora v. Valley Diagnostics Lab'y Inc., No. 1:16-cv-01624 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2019).
- City of West Sacramento v. R & L Bus. Mgmt., No. 2:18-cv-00900 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2020).
- (PC) Frazier v. Matteson, No. 1:19-cv-00188 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2020).
- Arnold v. Melwani, No. 1:09-cv-00030 (D. Guam Aug. 31, 2011).
- Pierce v. Jacobsen, No. 6:18-cv-00063 (D. Mont. Feb. 3, 2021).
- Newberry v. State of Montana, No. 6:19-cv-00050 (D. Mont. Oct. 14, 2021).
- Sciara v. Campbell, No. 2:18-cv-01700, 2020 WL 248653 (D. Nev. Jan. 15, 2020).
- Bartell Ranch LLC v. McCullough, 570 F. Supp. 3d 945 (D. Nev. 2021).published
- Freeman v. Field Serv. Agents, No. 2:21-cv-01827 (D. Nev. Oct. 31, 2022).
- Humphries v. Button, No. 2:21-cv-01412 (D. Nev. Apr. 8, 2024).
- Jerry Lee Losee, No. 19-40540 (Bankr. D. Idaho Oct. 4, 2019).
- Sanai v. Cardona, No. 4:22-cv-01818 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2024).
- Humphries v. Button, No. 2:21-cv-01412 (D. Nev. June 12, 2024).
- Neal v. Barrett, No. 2:20-cv-02281 (D. Nev. Aug. 2, 2024).
- Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563 (9th Cir. 2008).published
- Williams v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins., 593 F. App'x 610 (9th Cir. 2014).unpublished
- Mills v. Davis, 53 F. App'x 480 (9th Cir. 2002).unpublished
- Eigeman v. City of Great Falls, 723 F. Supp. 522 (D. Mont. 1989).published
- Morris v. McHugh, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (D. Haw. 2014).published
At page 212Determining if evidence qualifies as newly discovered45 citing casesEvidence is not ‘newly discovered’ under the Federal Rules if it was in the moving party’s possession at the time of trial or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.
- Hume v. Guardian Mgmt. LLC, No. 3:21-cv-00517 (D. Or. Dec. 21, 2022).(Evidence is not ‘newly discovered’ under [Rule 60(b)(2)] if it was in the moving party’s possession at the time of trial or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.)
- CSAA Affinity Ins. Co. v. Amerigas Propane LP, No. 3:21-cv-08041 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2022). (Evidence 20 is not ‘newly discovered’ . . . if it . . . could have been discovered with reasonable 21 diligence.)
- In re Raquel Medina, No. NC-18-1078-FBKu (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2018).unpublished (Evidence is not ‘newly discovered’ . . . if it was in the moving party’s possession at the time of trial or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.)
- Lanard Kitchens v. Leach, No. 16-16335 (9th Cir. June 21, 2018).unpublished(Evidence is not ‘newly discovered’ under the Federal Rules if it was in the moving party’s possession at the time of trial or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.)
- Delmore v. Washington State Dep't of Corr., No. 3:21-cv-05625 (W.D. Wash. June 20, 2025).(Evidence is not ‘newly discovered’ under the Federal 23 Rules if it was in the moving party's possession at the time of [the district court’s ruling] or could 24 have been discovered with reasonable diligence.)
- Jha v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., No. 2:23-cv-00584 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 22, 2024).(Evidence is not ‘newly discovered’ under the Federal Rules if it was in the 2 moving party’s possession at the time of trial or could have been discovered with 3 reasonable diligence.)
- Reyes v. HSBC Bank USA, No. CAAP-12-0000507 (Haw. App. May 29, 2015).unpublished “this fact of possession also makes clear that coastal did not use due diligence to discover its expert's error. the fact that walters analyzed data from the wrong year should have been apparent to anyone familiar with t…”
- Federated Towing & Recovery, LLC v. Praetorian Ins., 283 F.R.D. 644 (D.N.M. 2012).published(Evidence is not ‘newly discovered’ under the Federal Rules if it was in the moving party’s possession at the time of trial.)
- Jiang, No. 3:21-cv-01293 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2026).(newly discovered evidence justifying a Rule 59(e) motion cannot be in the party’s “possession” or able to be “discovered with reasonable diligence)
- Kuhk, No. 2:24-cv-00460 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2026).Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 212 (9th 17 Cir. 1987); see also Berman 30 F.4th 849, 859 (9th Cir. 2022); Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. 18 NL Indus., 618 F. Supp. 2d 614, 643 (S.D.
Show 35 more citing cases
- Jay Nelson v. Forest River, Inc., No. 4:22-cv-00049 (D. Mont. Nov. 18, 2025).“Evidence is not ‘newly discovered’ under the Federal Rules if it . . . could have been discovered with reasonable diligence”
- In re Paniolo Cable Co., LLC, No. 24-1095 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 19, 2025).unpublishedRelief from judgment on the basis of newly discovered evidence is warranted if (1) the moving party can show the evidence relied on in fact constitutes “newly discovered evidence” within the meaning of Rule 60(b); (2) the moving party exer…
- Leep, Inc. v. Zielke, No. 23-2661 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2024).unpublished“Th[e] fact of possession also makes clear that [the party] did not use due diligence to discover [the evidence].” Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 212 (9th Cir. 1987).
- Quince & Co LLC v. Last Brand, Inc., No. 3:23-cv-06016 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2024).Plaintiff seeks to 15 submit additional evidence related to Defendant’s food and beverage partnerships that its counsel 16 did not discover until after the close of briefing on the motion for preliminary injunction. 17 “Evidence is not ‘ne…
- Gregory Caputo v. Tungsten Heavy Powder, Inc., No. 22-55142 (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 2023).unpublished“if it was in the moving party’s possession at the time of trial or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence”
- 7590 La Jolla, LLC., No. 1:21-bk-11709 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2022).“Evidence is not 21 22 ‘newly discovered’ under the Federal Rules if it was in the moving party's possession at the time 23 of trial or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence”
- Ping Shun Corp. v. Imperial Pac. Int'l, No. 21-15836 (9th Cir. July 20, 2022).unpublishedTo obtain relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(2), the moving party must show (1) evidence that is “newly discovered,” (2) the moving party “exercised ‘due diligence’ to discover this evidence,” and (3) “the newly discovered evidence must…
- (PC) Caruso v. Johnson, No. 1:15-cv-00780 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2022).See Feature Realty, 2 331 F.3d at 1093; Coastal Transfer Co., 833 F.2d at 212; see also Wallis v. J.R.
- Chung v. Washington Interscholastic Activities Ass'n, No. 3:19-cv-05730 (W.D. Wash. July 23, 2021).Cal. 2009) (citing Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, 833 F.2d 208, 212 (9th 4 Cir. 1987)); see also Roness v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C18-1030-RSM, 2019 WL 4014314 , at 5 *1 (W.D.
- Feature Realty, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 331 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003).published
- In re Arden Props., Inc., 248 B.R. 164 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2000).published
- In re Walker, 332 B.R. 820 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005).published
- Baker v. City of Phoenix, 20 F. App'x 632 (9th Cir. 2001).unpublished
- Cranmer v. Tyconic Inc., 278 F. App'x 744 (9th Cir. 2008).unpublished
- Freeman v. Field Serv. Agents, No. 2:21-cv-01827 (D. Nev. Oct. 31, 2022).
- Mark Muszynski v. D. L. Runnels, 441 F. App'x 483 (9th Cir. 2011).unpublished
- Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1988).published
- Andresen v. Hunt, 951 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1991).unpublished
- Putnam Resources v. Ronald M. Pateman, Ronald M. Pateman v. Frenkel & Co., Inc., 958 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1992).published
- Russell v. United States, 661 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011).published
- Kelly J. Deherrera v. City & Cnty. of Denver, Acting By, & Through Its Bd. of Water Commissioners W. Thomas Richards, Individually & in His Off. Capacity as Superintendent of Maint. of the Denver Water Dep't Charles Chapman, Individually & in His Off. Capacity as Transp. Foreman of the Denver Water Dep't, David L. Smith, Attorney-Appellant. Kelly J. Deherrera v. Lewis T. Babcock, Dist. Judge, 7 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 1993).published
- Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Washington Nat. Gas Co., 99 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 1996).published
- Flintkote Co. v. Gen. Acc. Assur. Co. of Canada, 692 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (N.D. Cal. 2010).published
- Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of the Colusa Indian Cmty. v. California, 649 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (E.D. Cal. 2009).published
- Howard ex rel. United States v. Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Indian Reservation, 608 F. App'x 468 (9th Cir. 2015).unpublished
- Julian Shulman v. amazon.com, Inc., 658 F. App'x 356 (9th Cir. 2016).unpublished
- In re James Jin Qing Li, No. NC-17-1062-STaB (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 12, 2018).unpublished
- In re Shmuel Erde, No. CC-19-1083-GTaS (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2019).unpublished
- In re Leilani Hope Rickert, No. MT-20-1100-BGF (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Dec. 1, 2020).unpublished
- Donell v. Keppers, 835 F. Supp. 2d 871 (S.D. Cal. 2011).published
- Sala v. United States, 251 F.R.D. 614 (D. Colo. 2008).published
- United States v. Tanoue, 165 F.R.D. 96 (D. Haw. 1995).published
- Raya v. Barka, No. 3:19-cv-02295 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2022).
- Antonetti v. Filson, No. 3:17-cv-00605 (D. Nev. Dec. 11, 2020).
- R.S. Coppola Trust - Oct. 19, 1995 v. Nat'l Default Servs., No. 3:21-cv-00281 (D. Nev. Oct. 8, 2021).
At page 210Motion to set aside summary judgment and new trial2 citing cases(2) Toyota “became dissatisfied with Coastal’s service and concerned about Coastal’s financial stability” in 1980. When conferences and communications between…
- Johnson v. Holms, No. 2:18-cv-00647 (D. Nev. Dec. 4, 2024).Cal. 2001) (citing Coastal 12 Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 210 (9th Cir. 1987)).
v.
TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., a California Corp. Toyota Motor Distributors, Inc., a California Corporation, and Direct Delivery Service, Inc., a California Corp.
Coastal Transfer Company, a California Corporation, initiated this action against Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., a California Corporation; Toyota Motor Distributors, Inc., a California Corporation; and Direct Delivery Service, Inc., a California Corporation. The facts are straightforward and undisputed. For several years, Toyota employed the services of Coastal to deliver parts to Toyota’s dealers. In 1981, Toyota discharged Coastal with proper notice and hired Direct to make the same deliveries.
Coastal initiated this action in 1982 in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that those facts constituted an antitrust violation. Coastal’s Third Amended Complaint, filed in 1984, prayed for general damages according to proof and punitive damages in the amount of $50,000,000.00. In an order of June 5, 1984, the district court dismissed the suit against the dealers in its entirety. The court also dismissed all pendent state claims against Toyota and Direct but declined to dismiss the antitrust claims against Toyota and Direct because the court believed that this circuit is reluctant to dismiss antitrust claims at the pleading stage. On October 22, 1984, the court set the discovery deadline for August 31,1985. Toyota proceeded with its preparations but Coastal apparently took no action until August 5, 1985, when it moved to extend the discovery cutoff by six months. The motion was denied but the cutoff was extended to September 30, 1985. The court also fixed October 31,1985 as the date for filing motions for summary judgment.
Toyota moved for summary judgment on October 31, 1985. In its Memorandum of Points and Authorities, along with supporting affidavits, Toyota alleged that:
(1) Coastal, a common carrier regulated by the California Public Utilities Commission, made local deliveries for Toyota from the mid-1970’s through February, 1981. “Coastal’s relationship with Toyota was merely that of a common carrier to a shipper; at no time did Coastal have a formal contractual relationship with Toyota.”
[*210] (2) Toyota “became dissatisfied with Coastal’s service and concerned about Coastal’s financial stability” in 1980. When conferences and communications between Toyota representatives and Coastal’s principals failed to resolve these perceived problems, Toyota terminated its relationship with Coastal and hired Direct as its local carrier.
(3) Toyota’s substitution of Direct for Coastal resulted solely from Toyota’s dissatisfaction with Coastal’s work, not
from any agreement with or coercion by Direct Delivery_[N]o one from Toyota intended that Direct Delivery obtain any sort of monopoly or market power, or that competition be restrained in any respect. Any such action by Toyota would have been utterly irrational, since a restraint of competition in any market in which Toyota purchased services could only redound to Toyota’s detriment.
A hearing on Toyota’s motion for summary judgment was set for November 25, 1985. Coastal requested and received a continuance of the hearing to January 6, 1986. On the deadline date set for the filing of opposition papers, Coastal’s counsel filed instead a motion to withdraw as counsel. In their supporting memorandum, Coastal’s attorneys stated that Coastal had failed to cooperate with them in the preparation of opposition papers. Specifically, counsel alleged that Coastal’s principals had not provided essential information to Coastal’s expert and had not appeared at the expert’s offices for a scheduled meeting on December 9, 1985. Neither the memo nor the supporting declaration by Joel R. Bennett, co-counsel for Coastal, identified the expert by name.
The court granted Toyota’s motion for summary judgment on December 30, 1985. On January 13, 1986, the court also granted leave to Bennett and Harold J. Tomin, Coastal’s counsel, to withdraw.
On January 27, 1986, Bennett and Tomin reappeared as Coastal’s counsel and filed an ex parte application under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 to set aside the summary judgment. That motion was denied. Following entry of final judgment on February 4, 1986, Coastal’s counsel moved for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(2). In the supporting memorandum, Coastal claimed that it had only recently learned that its expert, Robert Walters, had erred in his original analysis of data concerning the legality of the rates charged by Direct at the time that Toyota switched carriers. The memorandum stated that Walters, a traffic consultant, had informed Coastal on November 27, 1985 that “Direct’s relationship with Toyota was in accordance with applicable P.U.C. regulations and tariffs” in 1981, the year in which Toyota hired Direct. Walters stated in an affidavit that he had informed Coastal’s counsel that the relationship between Toyota and Direct was illegal, but that he had mistakenly advised that the illegality took place in 1980, rather than 1981. In a separate affidavit, one of Coastal’s attorneys stated that had Walters not erred, he would have sought further extensions of the discovery cutoff date and would have sought to depose Toyota’s expert.
After a hearing, the district court denied Coastal’s motion for a new trial and imposed sanctions on Coastal and its counsel under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The court reasoned, first, that “the revised testimony of [Coastal’s] retained expert ... does not appear to be ‘new’ evidence within the meaning of Rule 59 [because] Coastal Transfer has possessed the information upon which Walters bases his opinion since before defendants moved for summary judgment.” Second, the court stated that Coastal had failed to exercise the requisite due diligence in attempting to discover Walters’ mistake. Third, Coastal had not shown how Walters’ testimony could alter the result in the action. The court ordered that Coastal and its two law firms pay defendants' attorneys’ fees in the amount of $5,000.00.
By any measuring rod, this appeal is frivolous. In well reasoned and well written dispositions, two district court judges pointed out to Coastal the defects in its approach. Whether we limit our review to the appeal from the denial of the Rule 59 and 60 motions as we must or whether as[*211] Coastal urges we reverse denial of those motions and reach the merits, the result is the same. There is no basis in law or fact for this action.
Coastal contends that Toyota’s termination of Coastal and hiring of Direct amounted to an illegal agreement between Coastal and Direct, in violation of the Sherman Act. At the threshold, Coastal claims that this conduct merits per se treatment under Section One of the Sherman Act, rather than Rule of Reason analysis, because the actions of Toyota and Direct reflected an illegal boycott or a refusal to deal. On the basis of this characterization of the facts, Coastal then argues that it was not required to come forward with evidence of anticompetitive behavior or anticompetitive intent on the part of the defendants in order to survive a motion for summary judgment.
Coastal is wrong in all respects. Toyota’s decision to replace Coastal with a new carrier is precisely the type of competitive activity that the antitrust laws are designed to protect. The Sherman Act distinguishes “between exclusive dealer agreements which eliminate a competing dealer and a collective refusal to deal among dealers or suppliers.” Dunn & Mavis, Inc. v. Nu-Car Driveaway, Inc., 691 F.2d 241, 244-45 (6th Cir.1982). While the latter are condemned per se because of their lack of any redeeming virtue, see Klor’s v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 79 S.Ct. 705, 3 L.Ed.2d 741 (1959), this case falls in the former category. Because of the clear benefits to a competitive economy of permitting firms to choose with whom to deal, “exclusive dealer agreements” of the type at issue here are scrutinized under the Rule of Reason.
In order to survive a motion for summary judgment in a Rule of Reason case, the antitrust plaintiff must produce evidence of
1) an agreement among two or more persons or distinct business entities;
2) which is intended to harm or unreasonably restrain competition; and
3) which actually causes injury to competition.
Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 916, 104 S.Ct. 280, 78 L.Ed.2d 259 (1983).
Coastal’s claim fails this test on a number of counts. First, Coastal presented no evidence that the agreement between Toyota and Direct was motivated by a desire to curtail competition. On the contrary, such an intention on the part of Toyota would have been illogical because a restriction on competition in the parts delivery market would have raised prices in a market in which Toyota purchased services. Second, Coastal produced no evidence that the agreement between Toyota and Direct adversely affected competition. When reduced to its essentials, Coastal’s claim “does no more than state [its] commercial disappointment at losing [Toyota’s] patronage — the recurrent case of the jilted ... supplier who loses a manufacturer’s franchise and accuses the manufacturer and the new suitor of attempting to monopolize something.” Dunn & Mavis, 691 F.2d at 243-44.
In addition, Coastal’s contention that the district court should have reopened the case when Coastal informed the court of the mistake made by Coastal's expert is without merit. We review denials of motions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 and 60 for abuse of discretion. Thompson v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 112, 93 L.Ed.2d 60 (1986); Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1006 (9th Cir.1985).
In order to establish an abuse of discretion, Coastal must make three showings. First, Coastal must establish that the revised testimony of its expert constituted “newly discovered evidence” within the meanings of Rules 60(b)(2) and 59. Second, Coastal must have exercised “due diligence” to discover this evidence. Third, the newly discovered evidence must be of such magnitude that production of it earlier would have been likely to change the disposition of the case.
[*212] Coastal fails to meet any of these three criteria. On the first point, Coastal’s argument falls short because the evidence upon which the expert’s testimony was based had been in Coastal’s possession since the start of litigation. Evidence is not “newly discovered” under the Federal Rules if it was in the moving party’s possession at the time of trial or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence. Engelhard Industries, Inc. v. Research Instrumental Corp., 324 F.2d 347, 352 (9th Cir.1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923, 84 S.Ct. 1220, 12 L.Ed.2d 215 (1964); accord Area Transportation Authority v. Missouri, 640 F.2d 173, 175 (8th Cir.1981). See also 11 Wright & Miller § 2859 (1973) (“Under both rules [59 and 60], if [the evidence] was in the possession of the party before the judgment was rendered it is not newly discovered ...”). This fact of possession also makes clear that Coastal did not use due diligence to discover its expert’s error. The fact that Walters analyzed data from the wrong year should have been apparent to anyone familiar with the date of Coastal’s termination by Toyota.
In any event, the expert testimony, even if produced in a timely fashion, would not have propelled Coastal over the hurdle of summary judgment. By Coastal’s own account, Walters’ revised testimony alleged only that the rates charged by Direct for shipments during the months of April and May in 1981 had not been adopted in a tariff filed under applicable P.U.C. regulations. Such an allegation falls far short of discharging Coastal’s burden, as one of the cases on which Coastal relies demonstrates. In Western Concrete Structures Co. v. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc., 760 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903, 106 S.Ct. 230, 88 L.Ed.2d 229 (1985), we held that in certain circumstances, below-tariff pricing may serve as a surrogate for below-cost pricing for purposes of establishing a Section One violation. Walters’ testimony, however, did not even address the question of whether the rates were below-tariff or not; his declaration merely stated that any traffic that Direct might have handled for Toyota during those two months when there had been no filed tariff “... would have been hauled at an illegal rate.” Moreover, as Western Concrete makes clear, a showing of below-tariff or below-cost pricing does not relieve the antitrust claimant of the burden of producing evidence of anticompetitive intent and anticompetitive effects. Id. at 1016-17.
We affirm the Rule 11 sanctions awarded by the trial court. In addition, we award double costs and attorney’s fees on appeal. We recognize that “an appeal that lacks merit is not always frivolous.... Sanctions are appropriate when the result of the appeal is obvious and the arguments of error are wholly without merit.” Grimes v. Commissioner, 806 F.2d 1451, 1454 (9th Cir.1986).
All of the arguments that Coastal makes on appeal, like the arguments that it raised before the district court, are frivolous. The law is well settled, for example, that dealer termination cases are subject to the Rule of Reason and require showings of anticompetitive intent and anticompetitive effects. Coastal’s arguments under Rule 59 and 60 fail to meet even one of the three requirements for a finding of discretionary abuse. And Coastal’s allegation that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint against approximately sixty southern California Toyota dealers ignores United States Supreme Court precedent. According to Coastal, its allegation that Toyota coerced its dealers to stop using Coastal’s services stated a claim under the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court, however, has stated the contrary. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761, 104 S.Ct. 1464, 1469, 79 L.Ed.2d 775 (1984); see 7 P. Areeda, Antitrust Law If 1446e (1986).
Moreover, we may consider Coastal’s “history of repetitive and meritless claims, the needless expenditure of judicial time, and our intent to deter further frivolous appeals.” Trohimovich v. Commissioner, 776 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir.1985). Coastal did not hire an expert to substantiate its antitrust claims until more than two years after filing a complaint. It conducted no discovery during the ten-month period set[*213] for discovery and then sought repeated delays to make up for lost time. It failed to file papers opposing Toyota’s timely motion for summary judgment, but then appeared after the entry of judgment urging first the district court, then this court, to set aside the judgment because its expert made a mistake. Five years is time enough to indulge Coastal’s lackluster pursuit of this litigation.
AFFIRMED.