green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 24×
126.7 score
G Cite
cited 7× by 5 distinct cases, last quoted 2006 ·
…the question is not whether the employer made the best or even a sound business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination.
at p. 1109
⚠ not in text
Topic ↗
cited 6× by 6 distinct cases, 2008–2025 · 3 courts ·
…the question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is .
at p. 1109
⚠ not in text
cited 3× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2005 ·
…e must show, not merely that the employer's proffered reason was wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer's real reason.
at p. 1109
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997
2011
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Meis, D.O. v. ARIA HEALTH PHYSICIAN SERVICES
the question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is .
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
BENTLEY v. CONNELLSVILLE AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
the question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound business decision; it is whether the real reason is .
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
ROSNICK v. NORBERT, INC.
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
the question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound business decision; it is whether the real reason is .
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
HOLLAND-CARTER v. UPMC HEALTH PLAN, INC
must show, not merely that the employer's proffered reason was wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer's real reason.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
RIVERA v. PRA HEALTH SCIENCES
he plaintiff must show, not merely that the employer's proffered reason was wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer's real reason.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
PUNZO v. SUGARHOUSE CASINO
he plaintiff must show, not merely that the employer's proffered reason was wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer's real reason.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
SCOTT v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
the question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is .
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
SAMPSON v. FELICIAN SERVICES, INC.
the question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is .
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
MUHAMMAD v. MATRIX MEDICAL NETWORK
the question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is .
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
JAZAYERI v. AVAYA, INC.
the question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is .
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
SAUNDERS v. SOUTHEASTERN HOME HEALTH SERVICES OF PA, LLC d/b/a SOUTHEASTERN HOME HEALTH SERVICES
the question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
CARTER v. NJ DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
the question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound . . . decision; it is whether the real reason is race .
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
MULLEN v. NORTHAMPTON TOWNSHIP
(3×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
he plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's decision was wrong or mistaken ....
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Straka v. Comcast Cable
(4×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
as another court of appeals has put it, 'federal courts are not arbitral boards ruling on the strength of 'cause' for discharge. the question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is .
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Minetola v. Commonwealth Telephone Co.
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
the question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is .
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Hicks v. Tech Industries
(3×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
he plaintiff must show, not merely 351 that the employer's proffered reason was wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer's real reason.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Marione v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
the question is not whether the employer made the best or even a sound business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Richard J. Kautz v. Met-Pro Corporation
(4×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
the question is not whether the employer made the best or even a sound business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Kautz v. Met Pro Corp
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
the question is not whether the employer made the best or even a sound business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Fasold v. Justice
(5×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
e must show, not merely that the employer's proffered reason was wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer's real reason.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Fasold v. Justice
(10×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
e must show, not merely that the employer's proffered reason was wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer's real reason.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Thakur v. R.W. Johnson Pharmaceutical Research Institute
(3×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
evidence that a plaintiff was not criticized may take on significance if the plaintiff can show that other comparable employees regularly received express evaluations of their work.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
PERRY-HARTMAN v. THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA
federal courts are not arbitral boards ruling on the strength of the 'cause' for the . the question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
SEIPLE v. CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, INC.
(4×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
federal courts are not arbitral boards ruling on the strength of the 'cause' for the . the question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Tiffany Turner v. Philadelphia FIGHT
P. 56(a). 7 In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 990 F.3d 728, 737 (3d Cir. 2021). 8 Jones, 198 F.3d at 413 (quoting Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997)). 9 Id. (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994)). 10 Appellant’s Br. 17.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Robert L. Ganoe, Sr. v. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
In the alternative, to establish pretext based on the argument that a discriminatory reason was “more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause,” a plaintiff must present evidence “with sufficient probative force” to allow a factfinder to “conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that age was a motivating or determinative factor.” See Simpson, 142 F.3d at 644-45 (citing Keller, 130 F.3d at 1111).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Hassan A. Abdulbaqi, III v. United Steelworkers
Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Christopher Butler v. FedEx Supply Chain, Inc.
In the alternative, to establish pretext based on the argument that a discriminatory reason was “more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause,” a plaintiff must present evidence “with sufficient probative force” to allow a factfinder to “conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that [race or sex] was a motivating or determinative factor.” See Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 644–45 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Keller, 130 F.3d at 1111); see also Jones, 198 F.3d at 413 (applying Simpson to a Title VII and Section 1981 race discrimination clai…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Donna Jussen v. Atlantic Health System et al.
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
(D-SOF J A8; Resp. to D-SOF 48.) To the extent Plaintiff contends her conduct was justified by the circumstances, she cannot meet her burden at this stage by simply showing that AHS’s decision was “wrong or mistaken,” rather, she must show that “a reasonable factfinder could rationally find [AHS’s stated reasons] unworthy of credence.” Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Tina Vu v. Michelle L. Kott et al
“To show that discrimination was more likely than not a cause for the employer’s action, the plaintiff must point to evidence with sufficient probative force that a factfinder could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that [sex] was a motivating or determinative factor in the employment decision.” Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1111 (3d Cir. 1997)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Emile Chreky v. University of Pittsburgh Physicians
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies in ADEA cases, Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997), and the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that age was the “but-for” cause of the adverse employment action to succeed on an ADEA claim, Gross v. FBL Fin.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
David Nathan Cypher v. J.V. Manufacturing Co., Inc., et al.
Keller v. ORIX Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mark Anthony v. DAS Companies, Inc.
The question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is [discrimination].” Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir.1996)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Guy Campagna v. Washington Township Public Schools
At the outset of this familiar three-step framework, “the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 644 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jack Kahriger v. Xavier Becerra
The plaintiff “must show not merely that the employer’s proffered reason was wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer’s real reason.” Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Deana Devincenzo v. Catherine Hershey Schools for Early Learning
CHS’s non-discriminatory reason If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the employer to “articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action at issue.” Jones, 198 F.3d at 412 , citing Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bryan Pesta v. Cleveland State Univ.
The question is not whether [the defendant] conducted the ‘best, or even a sound’ inquiry, but whether the investigation was a sham, a mere pretext to retaliate.” (quoting Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997))).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Norbert Alicea v. Health Advocate Solutions, Inc.; Health Advocate Inc.; Teleperformance; Language Line, LLC
That inquiry starts with step two of McDonnell Douglas, in which “the burden of production shifts to [Defendants] to identify a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Smith, 589 F.3d at 690 (citing Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
BOODOO v. AMP HOME CARE LLC
“The question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is [discrimination].” Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Carson v Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
REESE v. NORTHWEST BANK
Keller v. ORIX Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
TURNER v. PHILADELPHIA FIGHT
“The question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is [discrimination].” Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McCann-Cross v. CORAS Wellness and Behavioral Health
“In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court created a special scheme for structuring the presentation of evidence in discriminatory treatment cases under Title VII.” Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
GELTMAN v. ALLCITY NETWORK, INC.
Id. at 337-38 (citing Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108, 1113 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
GREEN v. MNUCHIN
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Plaintiff must show “not merely that the employer’s proffered reason was wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer’s real reason.” Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
NGAFUA v. CAREPINE HOME HEALTH, LLC
Under the first prong of the Fuentes analysis, the plaintiff “must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence.” Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
CANNON v. W.W. FRIEDLINE, INC.
(2×)
Id. (citing Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc)); Britton v. Oil City Area Sch.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Susan Galette v. Avenue 365 Lending Services LLC
Pa., 168 F.3d 661 , 667–68 (3d Cir. 1999) (disability discrimination); Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc) (age discrimination).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kenneth Moses v. United States Steel Corp
Although Moses contends that USS wrongly decided to terminate him,13 he fails to demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” in USS’s decision to terminate him for derailing a train “that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence.’”14 B. 9 Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (citations omitted) (quoting Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992)). 10 Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting Carson v. Bethlehem St…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
DORMANN v. SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY
Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
MCLAUGHLIN v. THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 249
Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Inc. And K-Mart Corporation"
Dec 2, 1997.
Kearse, Cardamone, Leisure.
24 | Carl E. Person, New York City, for Plaintiff-Appellant., Gary L. Reback, Palo Alto, CA (David J. Berger, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Palo Alto, CA, Neal R. Stoll, Peter S. Julian, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom, New York City, on the brief), for Defendant-Ap-pellee.
Citer courts: E.D. Pennsylvania (2) · W.D. Pennsylvania (1)
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Anti-Monopoly, Inc., appeals from a final judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Lawrence M. McKenna, Judge, dismissing its antitrust complaint against defendant Hasbro, Inc. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings dismissing so much of the complaint as asserted a secondary-line violation of the Robinson-Pat-man Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13, on the ground that plaintiff lacked standing to assert such claims. The court granted summary judgment dismissing the remainder of the complaint, which principally asserted- claims under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, and sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18, on the grounds, inter alia, that plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to infer that plaintiff suffered “antitrust injury.”
We have considered all of plaintiffs challenges to the district court’s rulings and have found in them no basis for reversal. We affirm substantially for the reasons stated in Judge McKenna’s Memorandum and Order, reported at 958 F.Supp. 895 (1997).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.